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ABSTRACT
Knowledge management is a significant factor in tourism crisis management. To plan, make 
decisions, and react quickly and appropriately to tourism crises cannot be achieved without 
integration with the process of knowledge management and transfer. In addition, to manage 
crises, stakeholders depend on each other. Therefore, the collaboration of knowledge 
management between policymakers and industry agents, i.e. hotels in this study, requires 
further research.
This study combines the fields of tourism crisis management and knowledge management. 
Few studies have explored their combined links to practice, especially in the context of 
Thailand. There is limited research to be found about the linkage between these two topics in 
the Thailand hospitality industry. Although the research topics are starting to gain academic 
attention, research on these two topics has been dominated by the positivist methodology. In 
addition, their data collection and analyses were mostly conducted by deductive value-free 
researchers. As a result, there were the limitations to the richness and depth of their findings.
This research study’s main aim is to explore knowledge transfer and management for 
managing tourism crises in Thailand and to understand how this is manifested in the hotel 
sector. The specific research objectives of this study are: to analyse differences between the 
understanding and objectives of policymakers versus those of hotels for managing tourism 
crises; to analyse differences between hotels of different sizes and structures of ownership in 
recognizing tourism crises and their approaches to knowledge transfer/management; and to 
examine the barriers and facilitators they encounter.
Multi-case strategies with a mixed qualitative approach, influenced by interpretivism, were 
used to investigate policymakers’ views and the knowledge management practices of 
embedded ease studies in four different types of hotels: Type 1: Small/Independent; Type 2: 
Large/Independent; Type 3: Large/Thai chain; Type 4: Large/Foreign chain. Both interviews 
and non-interview evidence were used as data collection tools to ensure the dependability as 
well as the creditability of the findings. However, interviews were the main source of 
information in the data collection plan that was divided into two stages. First, semi­
structured interviews with tourism crisis management, consisting of 9 policymakers in 8
organisations based in Thailand. Second, semi-struetured interviews with 29 hoteliers in 
different positions, ranking from top, middle to and rank-and-file, within 9 hotels located in 
Bangkok, Thailand.
The finding of the research has shown that there is still a lack of shared understanding of 
crisis management and an unsatisfactory coordination between policymakers and hoteliers. 
This divergent understanding of such concepts can be one of the main issues that affect the 
collaboration between these stakeholders. It was found that the size and structure of 
ownership of different hotels plays an important part in knowledge management and transfer. 
There are differences in their commitment to crisis management and knowledge transfer 
practices, which are more developed in large chain hotels than in independent large and small 
hotels. Constrained resources to implement knowledge management are the factor that 
probably influences their commitment to knowledge management. Nonetheless, a lower 
number of employees within small hotels provided more chance of social interaction— 
especially face-to-face communication—to share knowledge. Technology nowadays helps 
increase the flow of knowledge in large organisations where there is more complexity in the 
organisational charts and a larger number of people and more information than in the small 
hotels. Culture, language and absorption capability are challenges, especially for an inter­
organisation knowledge transfer process. It was also found that human resources are far more 
of a barrier to reach effectiveness in knowledge management of tourism crises than 
organisational or technology factors.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction
The title of this research is ‘Knowledge Management for Tourism Crises: A Multi-Case 
Study of Hotels in Thailand’. Knowledge management research has emerged since the 90’s, 
driven by social, economic and technological trends (Cooper and Ruhanen, 2004, Shaw and 
Williams, 2009). In the tourism and hospitality industry, knowledge management has 
become an area of focus in enhancing business competitiveness and capability in response to 
external changes, including tourism crises (Cooper and Ruhanen, 2004, Shaw and Williams, 
2009). This chapter aims to provide a general background of the research and a roadmap of 
this thesis. There are five main sections. The first section provides the background and 
positioning of the researcher which may impact this research. The second section presents 
the rationale for the research which consists of a line of reasoning of intention of doing this 
research. The third section presents the aim and specific objectives of the study which states 
what the study is expected to achieve. The fourth section explains the research contribution 
of the study to demonstrate why this research is worthwhile. The last section provides the 
expected structure of the research.
1.1 Background and Positionality of the Researcher
The journey to explore knowledge management for tourism crises has now begun. Before 
going into detail, I would like to ‘confess’ some of the factors in my background that may 
impact the research. Bryman and Bell (2007) stated that since the mid-1970’s the research 
field has included ‘confessions,’ something the researcher reveals about his or her bias. This 
includes a statement to forewarn readers of potential areas of subjectivity and orientation that 
may influence subsequent findings.
My working life has centred on the tourism and hotel management field. After graduating 
from university, I started my career as a secretary to the executive management in a five-star 
hotel in Bangkok for almost two years. During this time, I obtained skill, knowledge and 
expertise in hotel management. Afterwards, with my strong passion for the field, I decided to 
enhance my knowledge by studying for a higher degree. I obtained two Master Degrees 
related to tourism and hotel management. Both Master Degree research projects employed
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qualitative research using interview methods in Thailand hotels. Later, I became a lecturer in 
the tourism department at Mae F ah Luang University. Through 4 years of experience in 
teaching, I have developed my knowledge and skills in understanding tourism and hotel 
management.
I have become curious to study these two important topics and attempt to integrate them: (1) 
knowledge management and (2) tourism crisis management. As I have been working in an 
academic institution, I truly support the statement that knowledge is power. Knowledge 
management was implemented in the university where I previously worked as a process of 
creating organisational knowledge and knowledge sharing. We apply knowledge to make 
decisions in various situations in our daily lives. In business, superior knowledge 
undoubtedly is a key for competitive advantage and innovative ideas. Certainly, knowledge 
is so important that it needs to be cultivated and shared in order to apply it to a situation or for 
solving problems.
Furthermore, my interest in tourism crisis management was driven by the increasing number 
of crises that have affected the tourism and hospitality industry, especially in Thailand where 
its location is prone to both natural and human-made crises. To operate tourism business in 
this environment, we have to search for ways to help us make decisions and handle tourism 
business more appropriately to minimise the serious consequences of tourism crises. I believe 
that once a crisis happens, it need not always cause tragedy, if we include knowledge as a 
tool to change crisis into opportunity and learn to apply innovative ways to manage crises 
better. Therefore, I have become curious to conduct research on how to implement 
knowledge management for tourism crises.
Having shared briefly my background and my interest, it is evident that these would impact 
this research in terms of how I explore, view, and interpret both theories and empirical 
findings. However, I will be determined to periodically review these aspects and to question 
my interpretations. Perhaps more profoundly, there may be whole philosophies of life, 
morals and ethics which I have formulated or intrinsically accepted as norms, based on my 
own background and beliefs. In addition, from a motivational point of view, my personal 
interest in conducting the research topic reinforced my commitment to finishing this study. 
Following this confession about my background and positionality that may impact this 
research study, the next section will explain the reasons behind my intention to study this 
topic.
1.2 Rationale of the Study
The tourism and hospitality industry has become an engine of the economic growth of many 
countries, including Thailand (Zhang et ah, 2009, McDowall and Wang, 2009). Although 
Thailand is a small country, it is the top inbound market in Southeast Asia due to its richness 
in cultural and historical sites, scenic natural beauty, a well-known cuisine, shopping, and 
local and international events (Zhang et al., 2009). Thailand’s international tourism receipts 
in 2011 (US$19.28 billion) accounted for 5.58 % of the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (Bank of Thailand, 2012)
McDowall and Wang’s (2009) work on the analysis of international tourism development in 
Thailand —1994 to 2007—used a SWOT analysis. They supported the fact that the strength 
of Thailand‘s international tourism not only derived from tourism resources, but also from 
other factors, namely the location being a tourism hub of Asia; accessibility; and marketing 
efforts by the Tourism Authority of Thailand to promote the country to the international 
market (Zhang et al., 2009, McDowall and Wang, 2009). Thailand has much opportunity for 
potential growth in tourism due to the emerging of new market segments such as Chinese, 
Russian and Indian travellers. Unfortunately, McDowall and Wang’s (2009) work has 
highlighted the fact that the weakness of Thailand’s tourism is the lack of the establishment 
of tourism crisis management.
Tourism crises can be perceived as unfavourable conditions that can affect tourists’ decisions 
to travel and stay in the areas that are affected by the crises. Throughout its history, the 
tourism business in Thailand has encountered several crises that range in scale and impact. 
For example, well-known mega-tourism crises which have hit Thailand from 2001 to the 
present include SARS and avian flu epidemics. Tsunami in 2004, political disturbances and 
floods (Wattanakuljarus, 2011).
Factors that make Thailand and its tourism and hospitality businesses become more 
vulnerable to tourism crises are location; reliance on few international markets; and tourism 
products and a lack of crisis resilience. First, the location of Thailand is subject to a high 
magnitude of impact from natural hazards such as tsunami, floods, and earthquakes. For 
example, the heavy rain in the rainy season often causes flooding yearly in several provinces, 
including Bangkok, the capital city which is located along both sides of the Chao Praya 
River. Second, changing the profile of Thailand to become a service-based country in the 
late 20* century made Thailand nowadays overly dependent on revenue from tourism.
Tourism is the main source of foreign income but the target markets are international— 
especially the long-haul groups that yield highest receipts—and this tends to avoid 
uncertainty. Third, lacking crisis resilience, tourism businesses and tourism industry 
organisations are often ill-prepared for crises (Cassedy, 1991, Murphy and Bayley, 1989). 
Nevertheless, Thai government has attempted to manage tourism crises, as can be seen from 
the establishment of a working group in 2007 (Svetasreni, 2009).
Among several tourism business sectors in Thailand, this study focuses on the hotel context 
because of several reasons. First. It has been the mainstream business for providing beds for 
tourist demand and for offering job opportunities. In 2010, there were 452,377 rooms 
provided to tourists across different regions of Thailand providing direct and indirect jobs 
(Nuchailek, 2012). Second, the effect of tourism crisis on hotel industry in. For instance, the 
reduction of tourist visits due to crises has caused a problem of over-supply of rooms, job 
vacancies in some areas, and collapse of small hotel businesses due to the lack of resources to 
respond to crises, not only financial and human resources but also knowledge of tourism 
crises (Nuchailek, 2012).
Hence, to plan, make decisions, and react quickly and appropriately to tourism crises cannot 
be achieved without knowledge management (Ritchie, 2009, Blackman et al., 2011). 
Knowledge management involves maximising organisational knowledge and sharing 
information about tourism crises and how it is communicated (Blackman et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, knowledge management also plays an important part in identifying, recoding 
and sharing crisis lessons (Robert and Lajtha, 2002). Certainly, knowledge management is a 
significant factor for tourism crisis management. Few studies have explored its link to 
practice.
Many authors have commented that the tourism and hospitality industry is a late adopter of 
knowledge management (Faulkner, 2001, Pforr and Hosie, 2007, Blackman and Ritchie, 
2008, Blackman et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the study in this field is growing due to the 
recognition that care is required in applying the findings of previous studies on the practice of 
knowledge management in the manufacturing and some branches of service industry to 
tourism and hospitality, sectors which have a distinctive nature. The hotel industry is a labour 
intensive industry where labour is the main vehicle to deliver goods and services to customers 
in the moment of truth interaction. Undoubtedly, staff are expected to be equipped with 
sufficient skill and knowledge and able to improvise their knowledge to deal with tourism
crises, especially because they are dealing with their customers in situ, rather than at a 
distance. The implementation of embedded knowledge into staff through knowledge 
management and transfer therefore tends to be more complex and is affected by several 
challenges. The hotel industry also ranges from small to large enterprises. Fragmented across 
a variety of activities, their workforces have a relatively low education level and both 
employees and tourists can be culturally diverse (Cooper, 2006, Racherla and Hu, 2009). 
Gold et al. (2001) argued that in a resource-based—knowledge-based—theory of the firm 
viewed employee as a knowledge asset, but the senior managers have found it difficult to 
transform their firms through programs of knowledge management. Likewise in hotel 
business a problem of high turnover and staff mobility caused by job dissatisfaction due to 
low wages and low-self-esteem affected the process of knowledge accumulation and transfer, 
and the potential for innovation in relation to tourism crisis management (Enz and 
Siguaw,2003 , Hallin and Mamburg 2008).
In the case of Thailand, there is no research to be found about the linkage between these two 
topics, even though they are significantly relevant. The limited empirieal research on tourism 
crisis management in Thailand has focused on two aspects: (1) describing what are the 
impacts of tourism crises i.e. Rittihchainuwat and Chakraborty (2009), Campiranon (2011), 
and Cohen and Neal (2010), and (2) explaining responses to crisis e.g. Gurtner (2006), 
Henderson (2007), Campiranon (2010). Knowledge management has been widely recognised 
among academics and industry but research topics regarding knowledge management have 
concentrated their effort more in the manufacturing industry and academic institutions— 
universities, laboratories and R&D (Numprasertchai and Poovarawan, 2006, Igel and 
Numprasertehai, 2004).
My personal background plus the importance of the topic and the lack of the research on it in 
context of Thailand are sufficient research justification. This study not only attempts to 
contribute by incorporating knowledge management theory and concepts into crisis 
management, but also provides a holistic view of practical guidelines to hoteliers and 
policymakers relevant to knowledge management of tourism crises.
1.3 The Aim and Specific Objectives
The main aim of this study is to explore knowledge management for tourism crises in 
Thailand from 2001 to 2012 and to understand how this is manifested in the hotel sector. The
thesis aims to adopt an interdisciplinary approach to the study of tourism crises by drawing 
literature from knowledge and tourism crises management. The thesis is informed by the 
belief that knowledge management has the potential to be one of the most important 
management tools for aehieving increased effectiveness in terms of managing tourism crises. 
The specific research objectives of this study are to:
1. Analyse differences in the understandings and objectives of policymakers compared 
with those of hotels for managing tourism crises that affect the tourism and hospitality 
industry.
2. Analyse differences between hotels of different sizes and organisations in their 
recognition of tourism crises, and their knowledge transfer and management 
approaches
3. Examine barriers and facilitators of knowledge management for tourism crises which 
affect different types of hotel businesses.
The first objective is to address research questions on how key players understand tourism 
crises. How might tourism crises that affect hotel businesses in Thailand be defined and 
classified? How are they understood, particularly by those relevant stakeholders who 
implement tourism crisis management policy as opposed to those who operate hotels? Cohen 
(2010) commented that several researchers have tended to conduct research with little 
concern for understanding the concept of tourism crises. However, Santana (1997) argued 
that it is necessary to understand how people define crisis because it is related to how people 
respond to crisis. This is necessary if a conceptualization of tourism crisis is to be developed. 
In addition, managing tourism crises requires the involvement of policymakers (Blake and 
Sinclair, 2003; Henderson, 2002; Blackman et al., 2011). Little research has been conducted 
on the involvement of policymakers in knowledge management for tourism crises. Hence it is 
the objective of this researcher to explore the opinion of policymakers on this subject and 
their involvement in tourism crisis management specifically in knowledge management.
The second objective is to address questions on knowledge management for tourism crises 
that are implemented in hotels in a Thailand context. What are the differences between hotels 
of different sizes and structure of ownership in their knowledge management processes? 
How is knowledge for managing tourism crises transferred internally, i.e. among employees
within the hotel, or externally to policymakers? The justification for studying different types 
of hotels is influenced by the recognition of the importance of organisational differences 
needed when studying knowledge management implementation. Most research focuses on 
mono-case study and these researchers assumed that their findings could be generalised. It is 
argued that one framework cannot apply to all; therefore, there is a need to investigate the 
resource and knowledge management capability in different types of hotels—especially 
different sizes and structure of ownership—before developing the framework that is tailor 
made for each specific cluster of hotels.
The last objective is to identify and address those facilitators and barriers that are influencing 
success in implementation of knowledge management for tourism crises which affect the 
tourism and hospitality industry. What solutions are hotels using to improve knowledge 
transfer and management? Because little research has embraced the holistic view of this 
research topic in context of Thailand, it is necessary to study the integrative relationship 
between these influential factors and the practice of knowledge management of tourism 
crisis.
What this thesis offers is an interpretivism-based insight into the inner-world view of those 
stakeholders of tourism crisis management policymakers versus hoteliers of the four hotel 
types. This is due to Ritchie (2004) who suggested that there is a need for researchers to 
move beyond simplistic prescriptive models which may provide checklists or information on 
what managers should do before, during or after crises. Thus, there is a need for research 
following different paradigmatic positions to positivists in order to improve our 
understanding of knowledge management for tourism crises, including phenomenological or 
interpretive approaches and ease study approaches needed to test models and concepts 
surrounding the subject (Ritchie, 2004).
1.4 The Contribution of the Study
This section addresses the questions about this study: (1) who will benefit from it and (2) how 
will they benefit? There are 3 groups to which this research is expected to contribute and 
these are academic groups, hotel businesses, and tourism crisis management policy related 
stakeholders.
1.4.1 Contribution to Academic Knowledge
Referring to the rationale of conducting this research study, there is a lack of linking 
knowledge management into tourism crisis management especially in the Thailand context. 
The findings of this research add new knowledge to theoretical or conceptual frameworks. It 
draws together two concepts: knowledge management and tourism crisis management and 
shows that the combination reveals something new and useful for generating better 
approaches to managing tourism crises. In addition, this research will contribute to 
re-contextualizing existing theoretical models related to knowledge management and tourism 
crisis management.
1.4.2 Contribution to Hotel Businesses based in Bangkok, Thailand
The practical implication of this study is to increase hoteliers’ awareness of knowledge 
transfer and management practices for tourism crises. The findings of the study provide 
significant insights that improve tourism crisis management through knowledge transfer and 
management practices. In addition, this research has implications for discovering whether 
knowledge transfer and management can play a role in managing tourism crises. This 
research provides insights into how knowledge transfer and management were implemented 
differently in hotels with different sizes and structure of ownership, as a contribution toward 
developing knowledge management for tourism crises guidelines. Furthermore, it evaluates 
factors influencing the practice of knowledge management and transfer for managing tourism 
crises in hotel businesses. It also provides recommendations on overcoming barriers of its 
practice.
1.4.3 Contribution to the Tourism Crisis Management Policymakers based in Thailand
Policymakers play significant roles in managing knowledge across diverse stakeholders, 
especially hotels. The findings should provide better understanding for the Tourism 
Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Centre (TIC) regarding knowledge management of 
tourism crisis, so as to be congruent with the absorption capability of different types of 
hotels. The findings of this research has potential to inerease the effieiency of implementation 
of knowledge transfer, collaboration and learning at a destination or regional level, as well as 
at an organisational level. This would create a shared understanding for adaptation to change 
and increase long-term sustainability in tourism crisis management.
1.5 The Structure o f the Study
This research is projected to have eleven chapters in total as shown in Figure 1.1.
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter providing the background of the study and research 
rationales. The aim and significance of the thesis are also discussed. This introductory 
chapter is followed by three chapters about literature reviews (Chapters 2-4).
Chapter 2 is the first part of the literature review. The main theme of this ehapter is to 
present an understanding of the conceptual background of tourism crisis management. There 
are seven main sections. The first seetion discusses the definition of erisis, tourism crisis, and 
crisis management. This is followed by crisis classification in section two and approaches to 
crisis management in seetion three. Section four reviews the empirieal research on crisis 
management implementation in industries including tourism and hotel businesses. Section 
five reviews the involvement of policymakers in tourism crises. Section six reviews the 
collaboration between policymakers and hoteliers in tourism crisis management. Seetion 
seven concludes this chapter with significant remarks related to this research study.
Chapter 3 is the second part of the literature review which explains knowledge transfer and 
management in organisations. This chapter eontains seven sections. The chapter begins with 
a concept of knowledge management eovering its definitions and forms in section one. 
Section two provides the models that are related to knowledge transfer and management as 
well as organisational learning. Section three diseusses issues of knowledge management 
practices of businesses in general while section four focuses more on tourism and hospitality 
businesses. Section five provides the role of policymakers in knowledge management for 
tourism crises. The barriers and facilitators of knowledge management implementation are 
highlighted in section six to provide a clearer understanding of why knowledge management 
can end up being a success or failure.
Chapter 4 is the final part of the literature review. This chapter aims to provide a baekground 
for the study context. It has seven sections. The first section displays general facts about 
Thailand relevant to tourism and tourism crises, especially its geography, both physical and 
human, including economic background. The second section presents the development of 
tourism and hospitality in Thailand. It is followed by the third section, a discussion on 
tourism crisis in Thailand and the analysis of the effeet of crisis on tourism and hospitality in 
Thailand. The fourth section provides the eontext of the study which focuses on Thailand
hotels. The fifth seetion explains the literatures on knowledge management implementation 
and tourism crisis management in Thailand. The sixth section reveals the research gaps 
evolving from review of literatures in Chapters 2-4. The seventh and final section is the 
conclusion of chapter four.
Chapter 5 describes and evaluates the methodologies used in this research. There are nine 
sections: The first seetion presents the research philosophy. The type of research purpose is 
discussed in seetion two. Reviews of research methods and the research methods used in this 
study are presented in seetion three. In sections four and five there is a discussion of the case 
study research unit of analysis and data collection process. Methods of analysis and data 
interpretation are explained in seetion six. The quality of the research design will be 
discussed in seetion seven. Seetion eight considers the research ethics and section nine is the 
conclusion.
Chapter 6 covers the data analysis and discussion of policymakers’ views on knowledge 
transfer and management for tourism crises. While Chapters 7 provides the data analysis and 
discussion of four types of hotel on knowledge transfer and management for tourism crises. 
The findings are organised according to a categorisation of themes and discussions in the 
context of knowledge management for tourism crises theories.
Chapter 8 discusses the findings from a perspective of comparing an understanding of 
tourism crisis with collaboration between these two groups: policymakers and hoteliers. The 
findings and discussion are divided into four main sections. First, the comparative findings of 
policymakers’ and hoteliers’ understanding of tourism crisis concepts is presented. In 
particular, we compare the findings of Chapters 6 and 7 on managing tourism crisis in 
Thailand. Second, the collaboration between these two groups on tourism crisis management. 
Third, the knowledge transfer activities between them and factors affecting the knowledge 
transfer process. Fourth, the key findings and conclusion of this chapter are presented.
Chapter 9 gives the conclusion of the research and final remarks. It addresses the 
implications of this research for both hotels and tourism crisis management policy-related 
stakeholders, and then discusses the limitations of this study and makes suggestions for future 
research.
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CHAPTER 2 
TOURISM CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
2.0 Introduction
The main aim of this study is to explore knowledge management for tourism crises in 
Thailand and to understand how this is manifested in the hotel sector. There are three 
chapters (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) which review the background literature which is relevant to the 
research topic. This particular chapter provides theoretical concepts which offer an 
understanding of tourism crisis management in the tourism and hospitality industry. There are 
seven main sections. The first section discusses the definition of crisis, tourism crisis, and 
crisis management. This is followed by crisis classification in section two and approaches to 
crisis management in section three. Section four reviews the empirical research on crisis 
management implementation in industries including tourism and hotel businesses. Section 
five reviews the involvement of policymakers in tourism crises. Section Six reviews the 
collaboration between policymakers and hoteliers in tourism crisis management. Section 
seven concludes this chapter with significant remarks related to this research study.
2.1 The Clarification of Terms
To manage a crisis, it is important to understand what it is. This section aims to firstly define 
the meaning of tourism crisis and to distinguish the term from other terms that have been 
used interchangeably in several research sources. This is followed by explanation of the 
definition of tourism crisis management.
2.1.1 What is Crisis?
The meanings of crisis are ambiguous and diverse; therefore several researchers tend to 
conduct research with less concern for its meaning, while there has been overlap with other 
vocabularies such as disaster, emergency and problem (Cohen, 2010).
Historically, the term crisis originates from the medical field, referring to patients who are in 
a phase of illness from which they can recover by self-healing power or external help from 
life support systems, doctors and medicines until they recover (Santana, 1997). Later, this 
term was used for the need to respond to military strategy in war and to prevent serious
12
effects of natural disaster, i.e. tsunami, flood, and hurricanes (Heath, 1998, Jallat and Shultz, 
2011).
The term of crisis generally refers to unwelcome events that cause serious consequence both 
physically and psychologically. It was viewed as ‘problems’. However, in the management 
perspective, crisis does not always end up in tragedy. Instead, for some organisations where 
their businesses were not in area affected by crisis, the crisis could then become an 
opportunity to generate benefits. Ulmer (2001) supported that crisis can be an event that 
creates potential ‘opportunity’, ‘renewal’ and ‘growth’ for some organisations. Although for 
some organisations affected by crisis, they were presented with an opportunity to learn and 
develop a perspective of moving forward (Ulmer, 2001).
Having reviewed the literature, scholars tend to define crisis based on two approaches: an 
event-centred approach (Brewton, 1987, Sonmez et al., 1994, Santana, 2004, Laws and 
Prideaux, 2006, Ritchie, 2009) and an incubation process approach (Fink, 1986, Faulkner, 
2001, Jaques, 2007, Roux-Dufort, 2007).
First are those who hold the event-centred approach. They tend to view crisis as an act of God 
and an unforeseen event. Academic works which were influenced by this view can be found 
in the opening editorial of the first edition of the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management. The early studies on crisis defined it in the simplest form as an unscheduled, 
unexpected, unplanned, unpleasant and even sometimes unmanageable event (Rosenthal and 
Kouzmin, 1993). Similarly, several notable authors considered crisis as an unexpected event 
that generates undesirable outcomes resulting in shock and fear in people (Brewton, 1987, 
Sonmez et al., 1994, Santana, 2004, Laws and Prideaux, 2006, Ritchie, 2009). A critique 
against this view is that it caused managers to handle tourism crises in a reactive style 
because they believed that crises cannot be anticipated.
On the other hand, there are those who think that before a crisis hits an organisation some 
issues may have already existed. But, they are overlooked so an acute crisis stage arrives 
(Roux-Dufort, 2007). This second group thinks that crisis should be viewed as an incubation 
process (See: Figure 2.1) (Fink, 1986, Faulkner, 2001, Jaques, 2007, Roux-Dufort, 2007). In 
a process approach, crisis is perceived as “a long incubation process that suddenly manifests 
itself under the influence o f a ‘precipitating' evenf’ (Roux-Dufort, 2007, p. 109). Laws and
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Prideaux (2006) called the issues which may have already existed before crisis hits as a 
“triggering event” or “the origin of crisis.” The origin of crisis can be human driven or as 
forces such as natural disasters (Laws and Prideaux ,2006). This view is supported by several 
proactive crisis management theories, i.e. risk assessment by the Pacific Asia Travel 
Association (PATA, 2003), crisis preparation in pre-event stage (Faulkner, 2001) or reduction 
stage (PATA, 2003).
Triggering events
(Origin of crisis) Crisis
Figure 2.1 An incubation process of the crisis 
Source: (applied from Elliott, 1998, p.8 and p.26)
Due to the ambiguity of its definition, there are other associated terms which have been used 
equivalently in many studies. After reviewing several academic journals, ‘disaster’ is the 
most commonly used term rather than crisis. Other terms which are used instead of the term 
‘crisis’ are ‘problem’ (Laws and Prideaux, 2006), ‘incident’, ‘accident’ (Pauehant and 
Mitroff, 1992), ‘emergency’ (Alexander, 2005, Quarantelli, 2000, Quarantelli, 1988) and 
‘disaster’ (Shaluf and Said, 2003, Prideaux et ah, 2003).
Those who argued crises are not the same as disasters provided several supportive reasons. 
First, disaster is an unpredictable change so only reactive responses can be made (Elliott, 
1998, Laws and Prideaux 2006, Faulkner, 2001) Secondly, crisis and disaster originate from 
different sources. Thirdly, disasters cause a higher degree of impact than crises (Shaluf and 
Said, 2003).
The first argument was provided by Laws and Prideaux (2006, p.7) who defined disaster as 
"'unpredictable catastrophic change that can normally only be responded to after the event, 
either by deploying contingency plans already in place or through reactive response''. 
However, this criterion is still indistinguishable due to the fact that the edge of technology of 
the present, it has caused some uncertain disasters to become predictable disasters (Ritchie, 
2009), i.e. the Indian Ocean Tsunami. Hence, disaster can be proactively prepared for with 
disaster management (Faulkner, 2001).
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In the second argument, Faulkner (2001) attempted to develop a model to distinguish crisis 
from disaster based on source of event. He explained that many situations can be classified 
as either crisis or disaster based on the root of the problem (Faulkner 2001). Figure 2.2 shows 
that crises are caused by internal actions, failure of management and poor decision making to 
cope with change, while disaster is induced by external environment or natural phenomenon 
(Act of God) which is difficult to predict or is even unpredictable (Faulkner, 2001, Jallat and 
Shultz, 2011). The scale or magnitude of both crises and disasters can be ranked from weak 
to strong impact toward an organisation (Faulkner, 2001). Faulkner (2001) presents a variety 
of definitions as a continuum where crises can be viewed as problems or issues ranging from 
little to great effect. However, the model provided no clear-cut statistical measurement and 
has a conceptual problem in differentiating between crisis and disaster, so it can make 
practitioners feel confused. Nevertheless, this continuum does serve as a useful tool for 
examining the complexity of terms and actions associated with crisis and disaster.
CRISES
INDUCED BY THE ACTIONS OR 
INACTIONS OF THE ORGANISATION
High
DISASTERS
INDUCED BY NATURAL PHENOMEN OR 
EXTERNAL HUMAN ACTION
t
Scale or 
Magnitude of 
the event
I
Low
Chernobyl Kobe earthquake
Exxon Valdez Lockerbie
Swiss Canyon Katherine flood
Incident (Australia)
Figure 2.2 Crises and disaster 
Source: (Faulkner, 2001, p. 137)
The third argument was that disasters cause a higher degree of impact than crises. Shaluf and 
Said (2003) also strongly supported the argument that crisis is not a disaster because disasters 
cause higher negative impact than crises, so it requires more extensive actions and 
management. This argument possibly is influenced by the UN environmental program and 
the centre of research on the epidemiology of disasters. This organisation uses threshold
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numbers to define disasters which are loss of money (damage cost $US 1 million) and loss 
of life (at least three or more people died; and if 50 or more people died, it is regarded as a 
major disaster) (Shaluf and Said, 2003). Faulkner (2001) commented that using the statistical 
benchmarks could reduce an ambiguous foundation for defining disasters and is appropriate 
for quantitative research, especially as to forecast and magnitude of disasters. Nevertheless, 
to conclude that disasters cause more loss of life and money than crises was criticised by 
Hardin (1971 cited in Elliott, 1998) as a simplistie view. Hardin (1971 cited in Elliott, 1998) 
suggested that if there is preventive management, a great deal of damage would not be so 
substantial (Hardin, 1971 cited in Elliott, 1998). In other words, it can be said that a crisis 
can be a nightmare for an organization but may not have such a bad effect on other firms 
whieh have better preparation and superior knowledge to handle crises.
Other terms—problem, incident, accident and emergency—are more inclined to be 
unweleome events and often lead to problematic results. The definition of problem by the 
Oxford dictionary is “a matter or situation regarded as unwelcome or harmful, needing to 
be dealt with and overcome "(Pearsall, 2002). As well, Elliott (1998) explains that ineident 
and accident are based on the degree of negative impact of an event toward the organisation. 
Elliott (1998) further noted that incidents will affect in part while accidents tend to damage 
the whole of the organizational system. Lastly, emergency refers to “a disruptive event 
ranging from high to low such as disasters to small organisational problems” (Alexander, 
2005).
At this point, it ean be said that erisis provides a broad term; these associated terms can be 
replicated as crisis only when they describe events that incline to negative consequence. As 
this researcher wants to explore how hotels implement knowledge transfer and management 
for tourism crises, which could be triggered by negative situations, these terms (problem, 
incident, accident and emergency) will be considered as the origin of potential crisis. Since 
the meaning of crisis and other related terms have been clarified, the next part offers a 
discussion as to how this term is manifested in the tourism and hospitality industry.
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2.1.2 Definition Tourism Crisis Management
This part provides firstly the definition of tourism crisis, followed by the definition of tourism 
crisis management, from different scholars. At the end, the definition of tourism crisis 
management for this research study will be presented.
The various definitions of crisis have led to being problematic in defining tourism crisis. The 
early attempt to define tourism crisis was developed by the World Tourism Organisation (Au 
and Ali, 2010). The World Tourism Organization has defined a tourism crisis as:
"'any unexpected event that affects travellers’ confidence in a destination and 
interferes with its ability to continue operating normally'
(Au and Ali, 2010, p.60)
This definition is narrowed as it only perceives crisis by concentrating on tourists’ activities 
as the centre of things (Tribe, 1999). Tribe (1999) explained that consumers’ centred ideal of 
tourism is driven by the mass media including television, radio, and advertisement. 
However, the concept of a crisis in tourism should be broader. In other words, tourism crisis 
is not only about the difficulties that tourists face in travelling but also about the challenges 
that businesses face in their operations (Lydecker, 1986, Ross, 2006).
With the growth of recognition by tourism businesses that crises ean seriously disrupt their 
operation or even wipe them out of the tourism system, the definition of tourism crisis 
focusing on the business side has thus emerged. Sonmez (1998) opts for a definition of 
tourism erisis as:
"...any occurrence which can threaten the normal operations and conduct o f  tourism 
related businesses, damage a tourist destination's overall reputation fo r safety, 
attractiveness and comfort by negatively affecting visitors’ perceptions o f  that 
destination and, interrupt the continuity o f  business operations for the local travel 
and tourism industry, by the reduction in tourist arrivals and expenditures".
(Sonmez, 1998, p.417)
Similarly, Beirman (2003) emphasised that a [tourism] crisis is
“a situation requiring radical management action in response to events beyond the 
internal control o f the destination, demanding urgent adaptation o f  marketing and 
operational practices to restore the confidence o f employees, associated enterprises 
and consumers in the viability o f the destination".
(Beirman, 2003, p.82)
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It is apparent that definitions by World Tourism Organisation, Sonmez (1998) and Beirman 
(2003) commonly perceive crisis as an event that causes a problem toward tourism activities 
and stakeholders rather than provide opportunities. The two definitions of Sonmez and 
Beirman have not only grasped a holistic view but also highlighted comprehensive aspects of 
tourism business which includes stakeholders such as employees, businesses, and consumers 
(tourists) within tourism destinations.
Brewton (1987) was a pioneer in developing a model for crisis management for the lodging 
industry. He defined tourism crisis management as: “the systematic approach to ensuring 
that qualitative decision and actions are made in order to avoid or minimise the damage to 
hotel guests and assets. ” (Brewton, 1987, p. 13).
Brewton’s definition has been adopted by several researchers who published their works 
regarding tourism crisis management for the hospitality industry, i.e. Ritchie (2009), Israeli 
and Reichel (2003) (2011) and Tavitiyaman et al. (2008). Although this definition is 
narrowed because it focuses on the hotel business only, the hotel industry is one of the 
important tourism businesses to which specific attention needs to be given.
In order that the appraisal of crisis tourism in hotel businesses may progress, for the purpose 
of this thesis this author will employ the definition of tourism crisis management introduced 
by Sonmez (1998), Beirman (2003), and Brewton (1987) as a guideline to investigate for this 
study. The reasons for choosing these definitions are that they are widely accepted by several 
researchers who have empirically studied tourism erisis management in the tourism and hotel 
business. In addition, this definition is holistic but concise, and contains a key concept of 
crisis management that was claimed by researchers who have published works regarding 
crisis management.
2.2 Classification o f Crises.
This section presents different general types of crisis and their characteristics. The advantage 
and disadvantage of each available crisis classification system are discussed in Seetion 2.2.1. 
Also, a review of literatures on the classification of crisis for tourism and hospitality is 
provided in Section 2.2.2.
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2.2.1 The General Crisis Classifications
According to Prideaux et al. (2003), understanding the characteristics of a crisis will help 
identify methods and techniques to deal with crises. In the literatures, there are three major 
ways for classifying crisis: (1) the time element of erisis; (2) sources of crises; and (3) 
combination of these criterions. The following are the explanations of each.
2.2.1.1 The Time Element of Crisis
The time element of crisis refers to the duration and distribution of impacts over time. 
Parsons (1996) provides 3 categories of erisis: immediate, emerging, and sustained crises. 
First, immediate or sudden crisis is one that happens with little or no warning signs; 
therefore, it is difficult for an organisation to control it. Second, emerging crisis or gradual 
crisis is one that gradually occurs so that it provides time to plan and prepare. Third, 
sustained crises (long-term crisis) often last for weeks, months or even years.
The study of Moreira (2008) adopted the similar classification system to examine the 
perception of tourists and residents between stealth crises and catastrophic events. The stealth 
crisis refers to events that slowly progress from a small issue to a point where nothing can be 
done to avoid the worst consequences such as a gradual increase of crime, price and product 
change. The catastrophic event is a sudden crisis which has a higher degree of damage and 
occurs in a shorter time frame, such as floods, earthquakes and airplane crashes. It was 
discovered that tourists and residents perceived higher risk in stealth risk than catastrophic 
risks. The study implied that the longer period the crisis happens, the more anxious people 
will be.
2.2.1.2 Sources of Crises
The Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA) suggested that there are two types of erisis that 
affect travel industry: (1) natural crisis; for example avalanches, earthquakes ,fires and floods 
and (2) man-made erisis, such as an act of terrorism , adventure sport, mechanism or system 
failure, riots and wars (PATA, 2003).
Coombs (1999) and Ritchie (2009) focused on types of events; they explained that the crises 
that affect a firm can range from small to big organisational problems. They further explained 
that small organisational problems are derived from internal practices, i.e. Human resource 
management functions—staff illnesses and staff challenges/breakdowns. The latter is caused
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by external factors, i.e. Natural disasters (earthquakes, floods and fires) or global 
environmental changes (political uncertainly and terrorist incidents).(Coombs, 1999).
2.2.1.3 Combination
Rather than using a simple classification system, which is critiqued as not offering precise 
infqnngmn frr crisis management planning and responsive strategies, some scholars suggest 
a combination of criteria to classify. For example, using two factors—level of severity and 
level of certainty of forecast (Prideux et ah, 2003). Or, three factors: threat level (high versus 
low), time pressure (intense versus minimal), and degree of control (high versus low) 
(Burnett, 1998).
Prideux et al. (2003) introduced the classification of shock in Table 2.1 based on severity, 
probability and level of certainty. There are 4 levels of shocks starting from the lowest shock 
(SI) to the highest shock (84) or mega crisis (Prideux et ah, 2003, Ritchie, 2009): Prideux et 
ah (2003) claimed that the crisis that cannot be anticipated is the most severe type of shock 
labelling in Table 2.1 as “84” (Prideux et ah, 2003 p. 484). From Table 2.1, it can be said 
that the lower the level of predictability an event is, the higher the risk people will perceive.
Ritchie (2009) agrees that using the probability of occurrence could be useful, especially in 
the area of a high edge of technology where it has made some uncertain incidents into 
probable incidents. For example, the Indian Ocean Tsunami incident at a level 4 (the 
maximum level of shock) can be lowered to 2 or even 1. Thereby, managers can focus on the 
most shocked event first. However, it is partly true that technology can provide early warning 
to reduce shock but it does not guarantee that the severe damage of crisis will be lowered. 
The technology may also cause a false alarm that may even increase the panic of people.
Table 2.1 Classification of shocks
Scale Probability Example o f event Forecasting tools Level o f 
certainty o f 
forecast
84 Not anticipated September 11 terrorist 
attack in the USA, 
1991 Gulf War, Asian 
financial crisis
Scenarios, risk assessment, Delphi 
forecasting and historical research may be 
used to identify risks o f  this nature and 
develop estimates o f  post-shock travel 
demand and supply conditions. At this 
point new parameters are established 
allowing employment o f  standard 
forecasting techniques
Very low
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Scale Probability Example o f event Forecasting tools Level of 
certainty o f  
forecast
S3 Unlikely but just 
possible
Pre-existing conditions 
cause major disruption 
i.e. earthquakes, 
terrorist attacks, coups -
Scenarios determine possible boundaries 
o f the impact o f  shock allowing 
employment o f  standard forecasting 
techniques to test tourism responses for a 
range o f  possible outcomes
Beyond 
current range 
o f
acceptability -
S2 The possible 
based on worst- 
case scenario o f  
past trading 
conditions
Upper limit o f  
variables normally 
used in forecasting 
used i.e. rapid rise in 
exchange rates
Existing forecasting techniques with 
allowance for sudden changes in demand 
and supply conditions
Medium to 
low
SI The expected 
based on recent 
past trading 
conditions
Within the range o f  
expected movements 
in exchange rates and 
inflation
Standard forecasting methods High for near 
term, lower 
in the
medium term
Source: (Prideux et al. 2003, p. 484)
Bumett (1998) has introduced a 16-cell matrix based on threat level (high versus low), time 
pressure (intense versus minimal), and degree of control (high versus low). The problems in 
each cell shown in Figure 2.3 were classified into different levels starting from level 0 to 
level 4. According to Bumett (1998), level 4 includes some of the most challenging problems 
such as E-coli because the threat level is high and there are few solutions. In this regard, the 
problem in level 0 and 1 would not be considered as a crisis and would require only day-to- 
day management to overcome the problems, for example customer complaint (level 0) and 
officer scandal (level 1) (Bumett, 1998). However, problems found in level 2 and level 3 cells 
do require more than a routine strategic management process. The model is criticised for not 
having a clear idea which cell should be indicated as a crisis; however, it has provided to 
managers a recommendation on how to cope with different problems with different strategies 
(Ritchie, 2009).
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Time Pressure
Intense Minimal
Degree o f Control
Threat
Low HighLevel Low High
Response option^
Many Level 2 Level 1 Level 1 Level 0
Ex: Officer scandal Ex: Customer
complaint
LOW
Few Level 3 Level 2 Level 2 Level 1
Ex: Strike Ex: Stock Decline Ex: Sexual
Harassment
(12) (11) (10)
Many Level 3 Level 2 Level 2 Level 1
Ex: Flood Ex: Intel Pentium 
Chip
Ex: CEO 
Retirement
HIGH (16) (15) (14) (13)
Few Level 4 Level 3 Level 3 Level 2
Ex: Jack in the Box, 
E-Coli
Ex: Tylenol Ex: Exxon Valdez Ex: Procter & 
Gamble Logo 
Rumor
Figure 2.3 Crisis classification matrix with examples 
Source: Bumett (1998, p.483)
So far, the elassification of shock by Prideux et al. (2003) and Crisis Classification Matrix by 
Bumett (1998) are thought to provide a better way to strategically plan and manage crisis 
than other classification systems (Racherla and Hu, 2009). To use the level of certainty of 
forecast to evaluate the system of Prideux et al. (2003), a company needs to have reliable 
technology and knowledge to help with forecasting. However, with the uncertain nature of 
crisis, the crisis evaluation ean vary; for example, the case of 9-11 which no one has thought 
of became the hot terrorism crisis that ranked at the top in severity and occurrence. Besides, 
not all organisations will experience the same level of severity from crisis, depending on such
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factors as the crisis preparation effort, crisis management resources, and view of organisation 
on crisis.
2.2.2 The Classification of Crises in Tourism and Hospitality Industry
Racherla and Hu (2009) provided a classification of crises affecting the tourism and 
hospitality industry. They conducted exploratory research into the lodging business in the 
Philadelphia region which comprises eleven counties in the states of Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, and Delaware. The researchers used a survey to ask managers in medium-size hotels 
(150 rooms) to rate both natural disasters and operational risks on the probability of 
occurrence and level of control using a 5-point Likert-type scale. The study classified crises 
into 4 groups as can be seen in Figure 2.4.
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II: Conventional Q’lses
• Gas Price Increase 
B— Heavy Snow
q 6— Economic Downturn 
^  Ice Storm 
• Terrorist Attack Hsewtiere
e— Government Regulation!
ill: Tractable Crises
e— Operating Cost Increase 
Local Competition
^  Guest Theft « -  Loss of PowerJ  'fr- Slip and Fall
e— Worker's Compensation
Lightning Damage
Environmental Damage 
e— Hurricane Flood—i
- . &
Direct Terrorist Attack 
Earthquake J
J  ^
I: Unexpected Crises
{/ Workplace Theft 
Intniders 
—^ Loss of Data
e— Gas Leak
y — Electrocution Food Poisoning i  » * -  Workplace Violence
" Drowning—  Assault on Guests
Poor Constmction
IV: Extraneous Crises
2  3
Level of Control (LOG)
Figure 2.4 Crisis typology as perceived by surveyed lodging operators 
Source: Racherla and Hu (2009, p.570)
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Quadrant I, unexpected crises (a low probability of occurrence and a low level of control) are 
hard to predict and rarely happen. The types of knowledge required to deal with such crises 
inelude long-term expertise development in areas that can provide the required knowledge 
and training to suit local scenarios. Quadrant II, conventional crises (a high probability of 
occurrenee and a low level of eontrol) are predictable events but they cannot be easily 
cohtfdlled by individuaT organisations. Typieal cbuntenheasures involve coping father than 
attempting to control them. Thus, even though the level of control is low, the common 
occurrences of these erises provide opportunities for organisations to engage in substantial 
learning regarding how to deal with them.
Quadrant III, tractable crises (a high probability of oecurrence and a high level of control) 
results in relatively direct financial losses and is a threat to the competitive viability of the 
organisation. Knowledgeable staff and management coupled with effective investments in 
teehnology and equipment can develop sufficient countermeasures to help mitigate traetable 
crises. Interestingly, Racherla and Hu (2009) noted that countermeasures aimed at these 
crises also improve the hotel’s service quality. Actions taken to prepare for or manage these 
crises can also improve the hotel’s competitive position. Quadrant IV, extraneous crises (a 
low probability of oceurrenee and a high level of control) which often are neglected by 
management in pre-planning them, until they lead to loss of life, property, or goodwill.
The work of Racherla and Hu (2009) adopted level of eontrol and probability of occurrence 
as the criteria to investigate crises affecting hotels. The crisis typology in Figure 2.4 would 
be a good guideline for this research to investigate whether hotel in large and small 
independent hotels as well as chain hotels in Thailand would perceive likewise. As Racherla 
and Hu (2009) employed a survey research approach, this research will contrarily from a 
qualitative approach which would provide more insight to interpret the fact of what and why 
these crises were placed in different quadrants of crisis typology.
In conclusion of this section, there are several ways to classify crisis based on one or a 
combination of several criteria, namely the time element, sources o f erisis, level of severity, 
probability of occurrence and level of eontrol. Classifying crisis based on its source, such as 
natural crisis or man-made crisis, is commonly used because it is easy to cluster crisis based 
on the physieal aspect but may not provide enough information to develop the strategy to 
manage crises (PATA, 2003). While using the time elements, level of severity, probability of
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occurrence and level of control can be complicated and lack of clear mechanism to 
classifying crises into one group precisely. Especially, asking people to rate level of 
probability and probability of occurrence of crisis, the result will be subjeet to the 
background knowledge of each respondent. However using a level of severity and probability 
of occurrence approaeh can provide a better view on stratégie crisis planning. In hospitality 
Thdüstrÿ as^seen iri Racherla and Hu’s (2009) study that hotel business also uses à level of 
control and probability of oceurrenee approach.
2.3 Theories and Approaches of Tourism Crisis Management
Tourism crisis management has become increasingly important because tourism businesses 
have become more inter-connected and internationalised, thereby tending to be exposed to 
greater unexpected changes from external faetors (Cassedy, 1991, Hall, 2010). This is 
reinforced by safety being a primary faetor in tourist deeision making (Faulkner, 2001,Shaw 
and Williams,2002, Barbara, 2006). Perry (2006) stresses that because tourism is a voluntary 
and discretionary aetivity; tourism erises can exert a signifieant influence on the choice of 
destination. In other words, the information that tourists receive from the media, and 
espeeially warnings from governments relating to crises, are likely to have a significant effect 
on tourist decision making (Irvine and Anderson, 2006). Although, Plog (2001) argued that 
not all tourists will be equally deterred by risks, such as venture or alloeentric groups, the 
importanee of all forms of risk is not diminished. However, risk is negotiated rather than 
given, and several seholars support the notion that individuals and destinations develop 
mechanisms to handle tourism erises (Barbara, 2006).
This section presents models and theories developed in order to understand and manage 
crises. There are two general approaches to crisis management: reaetive and proaetive.
2.3.1 Reactive Approach
A reactive or passive approaeh refers to crisis management after the events have occurred, 
while a proactive approach would be implemented before a crisis (Pforr and Hosie, 2007). 
Barbara (2006) stated that there are many organisations that handle crisis in a reactive 
manner. Her interview-based research reported that organizations engage in relatively limited 
preparation for tourism crisis events, and that there was an absence of policies to guide 
organisations in the Australian tourism industry (Barbara, 2006). Roux-Dufort (2007) further 
assumed that the reason that many managers do not prepare for crises is because of the
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limitation of resources and their understanding that crises constitute acts of god or misfortune 
so that nothing can be done to prevent, or prepare for, these. Elliott (1998) critiqued this 
approach for reducing the opportunity to intervene early in system failures because there is no 
pre-crisis stage or crisis reduction stage.
"2*3*2 iPi*oactive ^ \^.ppi*oach0s ' -  -------— - —  ■ - ....................................... —   — • — ............................ —  ................... ...  —  ~
A proactive management approach refers to the aetion of an organisation that prepares for 
ineoming crises. Although there may be various types and characteristics of crisis— it is hard 
to foresee all—proactive crisis management at least helps in the reduction of shock and crisis 
management improvement especially in crises that organisations frequently encounter 
(Henderson, 2003b). There are four theories that are relevant to tourism crisis management.
First, ‘risk management theory’ which aims at forecasting risks that could cause problems to 
firms and then try to eliminate them at an earlier stage. Second is the ‘crisis life cycle model’ 
which is an extension of risk assessment. Third, ‘strategic tourism crisis management’ was 
introduced to the management seience field to encourage the notion of how a business can 
overcome negative impaets and turn crisis into opportunity. Strategic crisis management is 
different from the life cycle model because it requests managers first of all to consider the 
organisational goal and then analyse its internal and external environments before erisis 
management preparation and execution to ensure that business objectives are met efficiently 
and effectively. Finally, ‘chaos theory’ presents a different angle from the previous theories. 
Chaos theory does not aim to prepare a plan for a crisis but instead prepares a mechanism to 
facilitate crisis response funetions. Chaos theory recognises that crisis happens unexpectedly 
and is unforeseen; therefore, what we need is a mechanism to solve all problems as quickly as 
possible without unnecessary consideration of the long term consequenee of the aetion. The 
following part is the explanation and discussion of each theory.
2.3.2.1 Risk Management Theory
Risk management is a proactive effort to take control of a situation through early 
identifieation and prevention of risk (Wilks and Moore, 2004). According to the Australian 
and New Zealand Standard (Australian/NewZealand Standard, 1999), a risk is:
‘'The chance o f something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. It is 
measured in terms o f  consequences and likelihood”
(Australian/New Zealand Standard, 1999, p. 3).
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Risk Management is defined as:
“An interactive process consisting o f  well-defined steps which, taken in sequence, 
supports better decision-making by contributing a greater insight into risks and their 
impacts. The risk management process can be applied to any situations where an 
undesired or unexpected outcome could be significant or where opportunities are 
identified”
(Australian/New Zealand Standard, 1999, p. iii).
Faulkner (2003) defined risk management as an assessment of potential erises that may 
emerge and their relative probability of occurrence. Risk management is an important issue 
because it may prevent an event escalating into crisis (Wilks and Moore, 2004) and helps 
transferring risk; for example, via financial tools such as crisis insurance (Tsai and Chen, 
2011).
The Pacific Asia Travel Assoeiation, PATA (2003) suggested steps of risk management as 
follows:
“Identify: Identify risks before they become realities
Analyse: Transform risk data into decision making information by evaluating
the probabilities, timeframes and potential impacts o f  each risk, then 
classifying and prioritising them 
Plan: Use decision- making information to formulate plans and
contingencies fo r mitigating the potential impact o f  each risk.
Track: Monitor the effectiveness o f  those plans by reanalysing risk data
Control: correct fo r deviations from the risk mitigation plans
Communicate provide internal and external information and feedback 
loops to monitor changes in the risk environment 
Communicate: Provide internal and external information and feedback loops to 
monitor changes in the risk environment”
(PATA, 2003, p.3).
The contribution of PATA’s functions of risk management is a comprehensive stage in risk 
management starting from identifying, analysing, and managing risk; and then 
communicating feedback to internal and external stakeholders. A number of authors claim 
that risk identification is a crucial stage as it links to preparation for potential crisis, crisis- 
driven lessons and organisational cultural adjustment (Elliott, 1998, Faulkner, 2003). Risk 
identifieation can involve an analysis of the history of natural disasters in the region, along 
with a scanning of the current and emerging environment and alternative seenarios (Faulkner, 
2003). However, the effectiveness of risk management is not only risk identification but risk
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prioritisation through a risk assessment process (Faulkner, 2003, Beirman and Walbeek, 
2011).
Miller and Ritchie (2003) studied Foot and Mouth Disease in the UK and suggested that 
tourism organisations can integrate the risk management approach into crisis management in 
two ways. Tirstly the traditional way is to assess âhd manage the risU before a crisis begins 
(Pre-crisis) and then to move along the crisis life cycle (Miller and Ritchie, 2003). Secondly, 
learning and feedback from previous experience can be a source for crisis risk assessment 
(See: Figure 2.5). The implieation of the second view of risk management is that assessment 
can be done after the event (post-crisis) and the findings are then kept for future reference.
Risk assessment. 
Response and reeovery 
planning
Crisis situation. 
Response and recovery 
plans implemented
Feedback -  learning 
from experience, risk 
identification, planning 
& preparedness for 
future crisis
Figure 2.5 Risk management approach to a crisis 
Source: Heath (1998 in Miller and Ritchie ,2003, p. 157)
It can be said that risk management is important to crisis management in order to prevent an 
event esealating to beeome a crisis and to help organisation to be better prepared and transfer 
risks at the earlier stage. However, a number of works in this field tend to foeus more on 
responding to crisis than thinking of ways to detect warning signs and acting on something at 
an early stage to minimise the expansion of the problem.
23.2.2 Crisis Life Cycle Theories
A  number of researchers have applied the life cycle model to manage crises and disasters—  
for example Fink (1986) (2002) and Faulkner (2001)—but the labels and vocabulary may
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vary. The crisis lifecycle or linear model illustrates the distinetion and relationship between 
different management elements in linear structure (Jaques, 2007). It shows the process of 
crisis management passing through different stages typically from concerns to problems to 
issues to crises and then to the final stage which is resolution (Jaques, 2007).
Table 2.2 Crisis management lifecycle
Faulkner’s (2001) stages Fink’s (1986) stages Thé Pacific Asia Travel 
Association (PATA) (2003)
Pre-event: Action taken to 
prevent disasters
Proactive Reduction : detecting early 
warning signal
Prodromal; apparent a crisis/ 
disaster is about to hit
Prodromal stage: When it 
becomes apparent that the 
crisis is inevitable
Readiness: preparing plans and 
running exercise
Emergency: incident hits; 
damage limitation and action 
needed
Acute stage: The point of no 
return when the crisis has hit 
and damage limitation is the 
main objective
Response: executing 
operational and 
communication plans in crisis 
situation
Intermediate: short term needs 
dealt with; restoring services
Reaction Recovery returning 
organisation to normal after a 
crisisLong-term (Recovery) : 
Longer term clean up ; repair; 
reinvestment; post modem
Chronic stage: clean-up, 
postmodern, self-analysis and 
healing
Resolution; Normal or 
improved state created
Resolution: routine restored or 
new improved state
Source: applied from Ritchie (2009, p. 47, p.76) and The Pacific Asia Travel Association 
(PATA) (2003, p.4)
As seen in Table 2.2, the following are explanations and discussions of the model of crisis 
management by Fink (1986), The Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA) (2003), and 
Faulkner (2001) respectively.
Fink (1986) provided a comprehensive situation audit based on six stages of the crisis 
anatomy (proactive, prodromal, acute, reaction, chronic and resolution) as shown in Table 
2.2. He believes that a crisis is any event that may esealate in intensity and therefore the 
action plan should be prepared after the seenarios are developed (Fink, 1986). Every
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organisation is all located somewhere within the erisis lifeeycle. Any managers who elaimed 
that their organisations are free from crisis, will be alloeated into the stage of pre-erisis, or 
prodromal model (Fink, 1986). Penrose (2000) noted that in order to develop strategic or 
tactical options to response to crises, team members should ask hypothetical ‘what i f  or ‘if 
then, whaf questions.
With the contribution of Fink’s idea on managing the on-going scenarios, the broad and basie 
principles of disaster and crisis management were later developed and used by many erisis 
managers. The name of each stage may be different but they are based on a similar eoneept of 
handling crises in accordance with the lifecyele model. These are MPRR (mitigation, 
preparation, response, recovery) or PPRR (prevention, preparation, response, recovery) that 
were used in many western government agencies (Heath, 1998).
The Paeific Asia Travel Association (PATA) also adopted this linear eoneept to invent the 
four Rs (reduction, readiness, response and recovery) of crisis management: (1) ‘Reduction’ 
refers to the stage where managers have to evaluate an organisation’s SWOT analysis 
(Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats). Through the outcome of a SWOT analysis, 
particular types of crises will be apparent resulting in managers having to prepare a eontinuity 
and contingeney plan to reduce the possibility of further erisis (PATA, 2003). (2) ‘Readiness’ 
is the stage to make organisations both psychologically and physiologically prepared for the 
impact when events oceur to them. For example, training and developing skills of staff and 
conducting drills or crisis management plans (PATA, 2003). (3) ‘Response’ is the stage 
where a plan is conducted in the readiness stage whieh will be retrieved to respond to the 
actual crisis. It is the most chaotic period and requires not only implementing the plan but 
also having a crisis communication strategy in plaee to reassure confidence and 
understanding of the stakeholders and the public (PATA, 2003). (4) ‘Recovery’ refers to the 
way which businesses can restore operations to where the organisation was before the erisis 
occurred. Feedback of the exiting crisis plan will be adjusted to re-form a better version of 
crisis management plan to handle future crises (PATA, 2003)
Faulkner (2001) developed a framework to manage tourism erises and it was then later 
applied by several tourism researchers. Crisis management is separated into six phase-process 
stages as shown in Table 2.2. First of all, the pre-event phase is when managers develop 
scenarios and eonduct probability assessment and then study the disaster in order to exeeute
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crisis contingency plans (Pforr and Hosie, 2007). The stage of pre-event is erucial according 
to Pforr and Hosie (2007) because it v^ould possibly help a company avoid entering the 
prodromal phase, where erisis is expeeted to oceur and crisis contingency plan has to be 
aetivated. Stages 3 to 5 are all about crisis response with immediate, short term and long 
term actions, respectively. In other words, the emergency phase requires emergency and 
rescue teams to makë decisions^d  act simultaneously toward rising crisis issues to protect 
people and property as much as possible. In the intermediate phase, a media communication 
strategy is essential to assure the understanding of the public and stakeholder and prevent 
rumours. In the reeovery phase, it is a long-term problem, solved by re-establishing 
businesses. For example, reeonstructing damaged infrastruetures and properties. Finally, the 
resolution phase would be used as a cross-eheck to determine if crisis planning and action 
were effective to solve the crisis. The review and learning stage after an event has passed 
will be used to develop better strategy and eontingency planning as a basis for managing 
crises in the future (Pforr and Hosie, 2007). Next are the discussions of Faulkner (2001) in 
various empirieal researches.
Henderson (2003b) applied Faulkner’s model to consider human-made crisis—the terrorist 
attack in Bali in 2002. The study found that there was a significant link between erisis 
preparation and effeetiveness in crisis response. In the ease of Bali, crisis started at the 
emergeney phase and progressed quiekly to the intermediate phase without having erisis 
preparation or warning (Henderson, 2003b). Several attempts at short term reeovery were 
done by showing sympathy to victims and reassuring the security of the people. There was 
good cooperation from both local and international agencies involved in the Bali crisis 
response. Later, long term recovery was achieved such as rebuilding the physical 
environment and the destination image, as well as a re-evaluation of target markets. With 
these reeovery aetions, the number of tourist arrivals has been stopped from declining. 
Nevertheless, the resolution phase which is supposed to be done after reeovery was not found 
to prevent future attacks. Henderson’s study highlighted that the necessity of advanced 
planning is critical for dealing with terrorist attacks and noted that to respond to such a crisis 
required formal cooperation from a more local, national and international response. 
However, Tribe (2008) argued that using governance through a set of procedures and 
planning to eontrol crisis has mainly been driven by technical concern. Tribe (2008) 
commented on Henderson’s work that there is a lack of an attempt to understand critical 
issues at the heart of terrorism. To promote long term sustainability and survival within the
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tourism industry rather than focusing on searching for the rules and procedures to prevent, 
there is a need for eritical researeh to understand the issues of the cause of problem (Tribe, 
2008).
Peters and Pikkemaat (2006) have also applied Faulkner’s model to natural crisis 
mahagemeht : the case study of ah avalanche disaster in the Tyrol Mountains of Europe. They 
investigated security and emergency measures taken in the Alpine winter resorts and 
diseussed failures and success factors in disaster management (Peters and Pikkemaat, 2006). 
The study concluded that the main success factor in the erisis management proeess of Galtuer 
Resort was that it had established a crisis management plan and paid attention to 
preparedness of the prodromal phase. However, the major failure was that there was no 
cooperation and sharing of information among resort stakeholders, especially among the local 
communities, eausing warning systems to become inefficient (Peters and Pikkemaat, 2006). 
The media blamed loeal eommunities in Gultuer for the disaster but damage and that losses 
could have been minimised if there had been cooperation and sharing of a crisis plan among 
stakeholders (Pforr and Hosie, 2007). To avoid the repetition of mistakes in the future, they 
recommended the development of an internet platform as the method of communieation and 
content management system (Peters and Pikkemaat, 2006). However, an internet platform is a 
channel where everyone can post and check information based on the internet’s 24/7 
accessibility where internet messages can be regulated rapidly. Henee, the monitoring of 
message and discussion should be established to avoid rumours and wrong information. In 
addition, it is important to be aware of the fact that technology and the internet can fail during 
a crisis and not every household and business has access to the internet. Therefore, other 
codified forms such as manual or leaflet should be considered as a method to share the erisis 
plan. In short, their study showed that the existence of crisis plans had a beneficial effect on 
the outcome of an avalanche disaster in Tyrol. It is neeessary to not only have a erisis plan to 
ensure seeurity but also to share it among stakeholders. This would link to the next ehapter of 
integrating knowledge transfer and management of tourism crisis.
In the perspective of the author, Faulkner’s model is much more popular than the other linear 
models, especially in the academic field, because the model provides a holistic view of crisis 
management stages. Additionally, the resolution phase emphasizes the commitment of 
continued learning and improvement for a better erisis response in the future. While the 4 
letter models—for example PATA’s four Rs—have shortened the process so that it would be
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more easily memorized by praetitioners and reduce the tedious feeling of working on many 
stages of crisis planning. However, lacking a clear criterion on how to implement a plan or 
having specific indicators to guide a manager when to move to the next stage would lead to 
confusion. To critique the linear models, their weakness is that they are based on the belief 
that when a crisis happens it will beeome more seriously needing to provide an extensive 
resolution which ihay be unnecessary (Jaques, 2007). The ihbdels a l^  imply that cbmpetih^ 
crises are managed one at a time, whereas different crises are often managed simultaneously, 
frequently at eaeh different phase (Jaques, 2007). Another critique is that it may cause 
misunderstanding for practitioners when the model is applied beeause there are no elear 
indicators to classify the crisis in each stage. In addition, the term ‘resolution’ is ambiguous 
as to whether review should be done immediately when a erisis has ended or when an 
organisation is free of a crisis. What if there are several crises oecurring simultaneously? 
When should this feedbaek process be done and how?
2.3.2.3 Strategic Crisis Management Theories
The view of a crisis as an event that can destroy or disrupt an entire organisation had led to 
the development of strategic crisis management models since the 1980s (Massey and Larsen, 
2006, Roux-Dufort, 2007). However in the late 1990s, models for crisis management were 
changed by an attempt to integrate strategic management into crisis handling as a turning 
point for an organisation as seen in the work of Bumett (1998) and Ritchie (2009) Massey 
and Larsen (2006). Their models have integrated crisis management into an organisational 
strategy in order to ensure that organisations ean be enabled to grasp business opportunities 
from erisis when it happens. It is suggested that managers should be able to proaetively 
estimate and prepare for the erisis that may oeeur at any time to limit or to prevent negative 
effects (Faulkner, 2001). Heath (1998) emphasized that a fundamental mission for erisis 
managers is to prevent loss of control before a erisis happens; prevent further loss of control 
when a crisis arises; and illustrate when and where regain of control is possible when loss of 
control occurs. The following are the discussions of Burnett’s and Ritchie’s strategic models.
Bumett (1998) identified six major tasks in stratégie management to handle crises (See: 
Figure 2.6). They are (1) goal formulation (2) environmental analysis (3) strategy formulation 
(4) strategy evaluation (5) strategy implementation (6) stratégie control. First, he explained 
environmental analysis and goal formulation tasks must be undertaken to provide the 
strategic guideline to managers and employees within the organisation (Bumett, 1998). 
Next, crisis management strategies should be formulated and evaluated to develop strategic
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options for implementation (Bumett, 1998). Finally, it is important that the strategies are 
controlled by managers to ensure they were implemented as planned (Bumett, 1998). Bumett 
(1998) also noted that to integrate the crisis management in the business strategic plan is 
much more complicated as managers are shaped by time pressure, control issues, threat level 
concems and response option constraints.
Goal
Fonnation
%
Crisis
Management
Strategy
Evaluation
Figure 2.6 Crisis management: strategic consideration
Source: Bumett (1998, p.481)
Ritchie (2004) agreed on the necessity to integrate crisis into strategic management. His 
study on chaos, crises and disasters provided a strategic approach to crisis management in the 
tourism study outlines and discussions of a strategic and holistic approach to crisis 
management from proactive pre-crisis planning through strategic implementation and finally 
evaluation and feedback. He is trying to consolidate the linear crisis management model of 
Faulkner’s crisis life cycle and the steps of strategic management.
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Strategic Management Framew ork Anatomy o f  a Crisis/Disaster
1. Pre-Event Stage 
■ action taken to 
prevent disasters
2. Prodromal 
■ Apparent a 
crisis/disaster is 
- about to hit
3. Emergency 
m Incident hits; 
damage 
limitation and 
action needed
4. Intermediate 
m Short term 
needs dealt 
with; restoring
5. Long term 
(recovery) 
m Longer term 
clean np; repair; 
reinvestment; 
postmortem
6. Resolution 
■ Normal cr 
iagjTOved state 
created
■ Proactive planning and itrateg}’ formulalion: environmental scanning; issues analysis; 
scenario planning; strategic forecasting, risk anal}'sis.
■ Scanning to planning: des-eloping plans from scanning and issues analysis; contingency and 
emergency planning.
CRISIS/DISASTER PRE\TNTION AM) PLANNING
■ Resolution and normalifyi resolution and restoration o f destination cr organisation to pre- 
crisis sitnatioa; reinvestment strategies and resourcing; crises/disasters as agents o f change.
■ Organisational learning and feedback: organisations or destmations may reassess and take 
‘stock’ o f  themselves; evaluating effectiveness o f strategies and responses; feedback to pre­
event planning; levels o f learning depend on single or double loop learning.
RESOLUTION, EVALUATION AND FEEDBACK
■ Strategy’ valuation and strategic control- formulation o f strategic alternatives, evaluation of 
alternatives, selection o f appropriate strategies; making effective decisions quickly; influence 
or control over crises/disasters.
■ Crisis communication and contrat ccrhrol over crisis communication; development o f crisis 
communication strategy including use o f a public relations plan; appointment o f a 
spokesperson; use o f crisis communication to recov^er from incidents; short versus long term 
crisis communication strategies.
■ Resource management: responsive organisational structures; redeployment or generation o f 
financial resources; leadership styles and ençlcyee ençowerment.
m Understanding and collaborating vrith stakeholders: internal (ençloyees, managers,
shareholders) and etctemal (tomists, industry sectors, government agencies, general public, 
media) stakeholders; need for collaboration between stakeholders at different levels to resolve 
crises cr disasters.
STRATEGIC EMPLIAIE.NTATION
Figure 2.7 Crisis and disaster management: a strategic and holistic framework 
Source: Ritchie (2004, p.674)
Figure 2.7 illustrates the strategic management framework. The first thing is that a crisis 
manager or planner has to understand and classify crises and disasters, including the types of 
incident, its scale and magnitude in order to develop specific strategies. The manager should 
then consider specific strategies to handle crises that occur in different phases of the anatomy 
of a crisis cycle starting from pre-event, prodromal, emergency, intermediate, long term 
recovery and resolution.
Strategic development for handling crisis can be done together with the time when an 
organisation is developing overall business strategies (Ritchie, 2009). In stage one of strategic 
management framework is crisis/disaster prevention and planning (Pre-event and prodromal 
stage) which refers to when several analytical techniques such as environmental scanning, 
issues analysis, scenarios analysis and risk analysis were used to identify the crisis that may 
likely occur in an organisation and then to develop the contingency and emergency plan. 
Stage 2 is strategic implementation (crisis response) which mainly concerns strategic 
formulation, stakeholder collaboration, resource management and crisis communication and
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control. Finally, stage 3 is resolution, evaluation, and feedback ihetX. refers to restoration of an 
organisation and provides feedback for organisational learning. He remarked that each stage 
should be evaluated in a flexible manner and strategies should be modified to match the 
nature of the crisis/disaster (Ritchie, 2004).
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Chaos theory (CT) has emerged as a practical framework to understand organisational crisis 
and crisis communication (Henderson, 2003b). The chaos theory was claimed to be a more 
useful tool to handle crisis than the traditional linear and non-linear model mentioned earlier 
because it provided a quick and immediate response to crisis which tends to have a volume 
of complexity and uncertainty (Hale et al., 2006).
Gilpin and Murphy (2008) commented in their book entitled “crisis management in a 
complex world” that the linear models are trying to simplify and standardize the decision­
making for crisis which actually is “contingency, uncertainty and happenstance” in its 
nature. They argued that successful crisis management is not guaranteed by scientific 
planning and prescriptive decision-making (Gilpin and Murphy, 2008). In addition, when an 
actual crisis occurs, it cannot be fully controlled and the crisis planning can cause false 
expectation or staff appears incompetent if they cannot follow the structure of the plan. 
Gilpin and Murphy (2008) claimed that a complexity-based approach would be a paradigm 
shift in crisis management for practitioners.
Seeger (2002) investigated the link of ‘chaos theory’ (CT) to issues of organisational crisis 
and crisis communication. He discovered that CT may be useful as a general framework for a 
broad, conceptual understanding of organisational crisis (Seeger, 2002). However, Seeger 
(2002) recognised that both crisis communication researchers and practitioners have focused 
the use of CT for crisis management mainly to aim at short term goals by resolving a crisis as 
quickly as possible with little damage to organisational image. Seeger (2002) however, has 
not applied the concept of chaos theory to any empirical research but instead he uses related 
case studies to strengthen his assumption that the traditional linear crisis management may be 
unnecessary and impractical due to the complexity of crisis.
Sellnow et al. (2011) also supported applying chaos theory to a system-wide analysis of crisis 
communication in a natural disaster. Their study showed that chaos theory would provide
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flexibility, generate various creative ideas to handle crisis and promote a sense of place 
among agents who are involved in the crisis management. Nevertheless, their work did not 
provide complete favour to this concept (Sellnow et ah, 2011). It also was pointed out that 
applying chaos theory to crisis has some limitations (Henderson, 2003b). The case of the Red 
River Valley flood in Minnesota and North Dakota during 1997 also showed that having no 
préparation and making décisions about the fisihig^probléms could cause thé public to feel 
uncertainty and a lack of trust as problems are engaged ineffectively (Henderson, 2003b). 
Nonetheless, they argued that pre-existing structures that made sense, favouring rationalized, 
traditional views of a complex system led officials to make inappropriately unequivocal 
predictions, and ultimately diminished the effectiveness of the region’s crisis communication 
and planning (Henderson, 2003b).
An interesting crisis response system using a complex scientific approach was invented by 
Paraskevas (2006) with the aim to overcome the weakness of linear and non-linear models 
with chaos theory approaches. A narrative analysis is the research methodology for 
discovering crisis response where hotel chains are faced with a major food poisoning 
outbreak. Data of his research was collected through 17 in-depth interviews of persons 
involved in the crisis response and through analysis of secondary data (Paraskevas, 2006). 
This paper supports the statement claimed by Gilpin and Murphy (2008) that a crisis 
management plan does not guarantee an effective crisis response and it can even create 
confusion. Paraskevas (2006) suggested that organisations should adjust the role of crisis 
management plans and crisis management teams. From a complexity theory perspective, an 
effective crisis response should be viewed as a living (co-evolving) system within the 
organisation (Paraskevas, 2006). A complexity science framework for a crisis response 
system as a co-evolving system is depicted in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8 A complexity science framework for a crisis response system 
Source: Paraskevas (2006, p.903)
Figure 2.8 shows that the system should aim at the eolleetive robustness and resilience of the 
organisation (Paraskevas, 2006). Instead of dictating the aetion plan of people in the 
organisation, it should set the rules to link them. The operation and the flow of information 
should flow easily among units and allow agents to adjust the information based on the 
particular condition at a local level (Paraskevas, 2006). The organisation should have a 
diffuse feedbaek system so that it can help to detect warning signals and assess the 
performance of the crisis response. The organisation should also have a high connectivity to 
assure an effeetive sharing of information and collaboration (Paraskevas, 2006). The crisis 
also should not be handled in a traditional linear manner because one or more events may 
happen spontaneously; therefore, actions and decisions must be made as quickly as possible. 
The success of the crisis response system requires developing a eo-created culture. The no­
fault learning culture must be established to eliminate the fear of staff by sharing of 
knowledge.
To this point in the section, we have examined proaetive approaehes with models to manage 
tourism crisis. The models by Faulkner (2001) were regarded as a parental model to guide 
managers and researchers to handle erisis in linear stages. At the same time, there were also 
scholars who perceived crisis from a strategic view by using strategic process to turn crisis
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into an opportunity for the organisation to fulfil business goals. However, with the 
complexity and uneertainty of crisis, the researcher recognised that erisis should not be 
managed in a linear manner, but rather a flexibility of crisis knowledge to handle erises based 
on the chaos theory could be an alternative. The next seetion will review empirical researches 
regarding crisis management implementation in different types of business mainly on its size
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2.4 Crisis Management Implementation in Business Sector
One of the research objectives is to analyse different understanding and response between 
hotels of different sizes and structure of ownership in their reeognition of tourism 
management. This seetion aims to discuss whether there are differenees and what has been 
done in crisis management practices between small and large companies ineluding ehained 
firms. The end of this section focuses more on empirieal research studies related to crisis 
management in tourism organisations and hotels.
2.4.1 Small versus Large firms
The aims of this part are to review what erisis management implementation has been 
exeeuted in large firms and small firms and what research gaps need to be elosed or pursued 
in extensive investigation.
2.4.1.1 Large Firms
The crisis response in large firms has been performed proaetively emphasizing the 
importance of pre-planning (Roux-Dufort, 2007, Darling, 1994). Darling (1994) stated in his 
study regarding erisis management in international business that large firm especially 
international eompanies are affected by more erises and believes that the firms should 
develop a formal and systematic response to crises. His standpoint was that many crises can 
be found through early detection by following four phases which are prodromal crisis stage, 
acute crisis stage, ehronic crisis stage, and erisis resolution stage. Darling (1994) suggested 
that scenario development along with these phases will provide business managers a 
guideline to make deeisions effeetively. Nevertheless, massive amounts of available 
information and planning are rarely implemented during crisis. Hence, to make an effective 
decision, spontaneous collaboration and input of ideas among stakeholder is needed (Darling, 
1994). Jashapara (2004) argued that if we have a good knowledge retrieval system, loads of 
information would not be a problem; instead, too little information would lead to wrong
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decision making. The work of Darling (1994) has also pointed out the significance of 
knowledge transfer and management toward erisis management in large firms is apparent in 
providing information for decision-making and planning for crisis. This research hence 
extends Darling’s suggestion by exploring the practice of knowledge management for 
tourism crises.
Ulmer (2001) raised an interesting issue in communication among stakeholders which is an 
important part of the crisis planning in a large firm. In his case study of the blaze at Malden 
Mills, a textile manufacturing plant located in Lawrence, Massachusetts, he illustrated the 
importance of establishing strong communication channels and positive value positions with 
stakeholders well before a erisis erupts (Ulmer, 2001). Ulmer (2001) applied the stakeholder 
theory to analyse and to expand an understanding of how business actions impact internal and 
external groups, and vice versa. He emphasised that the industry should establish 
instrumental communication channels with stakeholders pre-erisis to build reservoirs of 
goodwill, alliances, and shared understanding. However, the practice of how crisis planning 
knowledge is shared among internal and external stakeholders was not clearly explained. 
This gap in his research fails to provide an understanding of collaboration for managing 
tourism crises—i.e. internal knowledge sharing among hotel employees and external 
knowledge transfer between policymakers and hotels, and vice versa.
To this point, it can be said that large firms—especially international ones—tend to be 
vulnerable to crises. Given the size of such firms, failure of crisis management can have 
tremendous negative effect upon a wider range of stakeholders. Therefore, proactive crisis 
management has come into being to ensure that decision and action have been exeeuted 
effectively. The knowledge transfer and management issue has been addressed and now it 
provides potential roles to support decision-making and crisis management planning. 
However, to date no research has fully studied this aspect. The next part will review what 
erisis management implementation has been executed in small firms.
2.4.1.2 Small firms
A ‘small business’ is defined by the Small Business Administration as one that is 
independently owned and operated with considerably less capital than comparable units 
within a large corporation, and employs fewer than 100 workers (Runyan, 2006). It is 
generally accepted that most studies of erisis issues of enterprise in the past mainly aimed to 
study the ways to respond to crisis impact upon large organisations rather than SME (small
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and medium-size enterprise) because it might have been assumed that a crisis has greater 
impact upon large organisations and that there are fewer entities in the small business 
population (Herbane, 2010, Spillan and Hough, 2003). However, the SME sector also plays a 
significant role in national economies in increasing GDP and employment ratings; therefore, 
it is also necessary to implement erisis management at this level as well (Runyan, 2006).
A number of studies have highlighted the absence of formal crisis management plans in 
SME’s (Runyan, 2006, Spillan and Hough, 2003, Herbane, 2010). Runyan (2006) employed a 
qualitative approach to consider how small businesses respond to and recover from a large 
disaster, by interviewing 17 stakeholders in five different communities on the Gulf Coast of 
the United States. He discovered that there was a lack of planning by small companies; so, 
when Hurricane Katrina struck on August 28, 2005, small businesses were seriously affected 
-especially in terms of profit loss and difficulty to access recovery capital. The lack of 
assistance of government was claimed to be the cause of many business failures. Herbane 
(2010) noted that the chance of large corporate collapse from crisis impact is smaller than 
that of small enterprises because they can normally continue to operate other branches— even 
in other countries, in the case of multinational organisations. Runyan (2006) also agreed with 
Herban that small business may experience higher barriers to recovery from erises. These 
recovery barriers are cash flow interruption, lack of capital recovery, federal assistance and 
infrastructure problems.
Similarly, erisis planning in small businesses was investigated by Spillan and Hough (2003). 
Their study showed the results of a survey of small businesses in Pennsylvania and New 
York. The results from the 162 responses demonstrated that little emphasis had been placed 
on crisis planning in these businesses, the majority of which had fewer than 25 employees. 
The study also concluded that ''concern for crises was generated from the past experience o f  
those crises” (Spillan & Hough, 2003, p. 406). Herbane (2010) commented that earlier 
experience in erisis is not a successful indicator that a firm will survive a future crisis. 
Herbane (2010) reported that not having crisis management planning in small firms was due 
to cost and lack of strategies to develop such planning, so they normally operate on a day-to- 
day basis less organized, having no strategic planning.
Herbane (2010) explored the meaning of ‘crisis’ for owners of small businesses; seeking to 
identify the types of crises and business interruptions that they may have encountered or
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averted; and identifying perceived non-financial barriers to improving their business 
resilience. The findings indicate that there is a significant comparative difference in how 
crises are understood by small and large firms. From the perspective of small firms, a crisis 
can be defined as “a lack o f  control, a lack o f cash and compressed time to respond” 
(Herbane, 2010, p.58). The problem of financial losses was perceived to be the most serious 
crisis Tor small firms^ and the nibst pressing reason to pay attention to how to respond to 
crises. In general, the managers in small firms tend to give more attention to the effects of 
crises as they unfold, and to solve problems without relying on pre-planning. Herbane (2010) 
also contributed a conceptual model of erisis handing in small-firms (Figure 2.9).
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Figure 2.9 Conceptualizing crisis in SME -  A chronological perspective 
Source: Herbane (2010, p.59)
Figure 2.9 shows that once small firms perceived that they were threatened—especially when 
IT or supply-chain related factors were discovered—they tended to act directly in response to 
these. The degree of threat is evaluated in financial and emotional (stress/surprise) terms. It 
can be understood that the usual practice of SMEs in crisis management is to wait and see 
what has gone wrong and then try to solve the problems as fast as possible in order to avoid 
the damage in terms of profits or confidence. Herbane’s (2010) study also pointed out that 
SME’s are highly dependent on external organisations—especially the government—for 
information on how to respond to erises, as there is little or even no crisis preparation within 
most of these businesses. However, the availability of a crisis response plan is expected to be 
free, and easily accessible, and also to provide impartial guidance that is tailored to the needs 
of small firms.
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Jin (2010) examined the risk perception and crisis resource requirement comparing small and 
large-size organisation in a total sample of 140 properties in the USA. The study investigated 
four erisis scenarios which were: (1) external and long term crisis; (2) external and short term 
crisis; (3) Internal and long term erisis; (4) Internal and short term crisis (Jin, 2010). 
A cognitive appraisal approach was used. The results were summarized in Table 2.3 below:
Table 2. 3 Interaction effect of for profit organisation size, risk perception, and 
practitioner role
Crisis situation
Organisation size + practitioner 
roles
External and long term such as damaging publicity Non-significant
External and short term such as activists’ claimed • Less perceived risk in small 
organisation
• More required organisational 
crisis resources in small 
organisation
Internal and long term such as marring of 
employees’ perception of company
• More perceived danger in 
small firm
• More required organisational 
crisis resources in small 
organisation
Internal and short term crisis such as rumour that 
marred an organisation leader’s reputation
Non-significant
Source: Jin (2010, p.52)
Table 2.3 shows that practitioners and crisis managers working for smaller firms tend to be 
less worried about external and short term erisis but feel more anxious in internal and long 
term crisis (Barton, 1994). Jin (2010) explains that the reason for high risk perception in 
small firms in an internal and long term crisis—such as marring of employees’ perception of 
a company—is due to the lack of crisis resources, i.e. financial and human resource 
restriction and experience-based handling of crises (Barton, 1994). Managers in larger 
organisations feel more secure because they have a higher number of stakeholders who share 
the fate; and better human resources for handling all crisis types (Barton, 1994). It can be
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noticed from this study that the more the crisis occurrence and the longer it affects staff in 
small firms, the more the risk will be perceived. To reduce the level of shook amongst them, 
an appropriate erisis preparedness audition should be implemented to assess resource needs in 
the most feasible way (Barton, 1994).
From the above litefatiife, it can be said that erisis can affect the business ho rhatter what size 
and structure of ownership. The lack of tourism crisis management in large firms led to a 
higher degree of severity as it tended to affect a wide range of stakeholders. As for the small 
organisation with limited resources to cope with crisis, business can be ended. The literature 
also pointed out another significant piece of information; namely, that different sizes of 
organisations perceived risk and handled crisis in different ways. Therefore, it requires 
exploring for tailored frameworks for tourism crisis management that suit the requirement 
and characteristics of different business clusters.
2.4.2 Tourism Industry
In the tourism industry there are many SME’s that are family enterprises with a significant 
number of instances of little market stability; low levels of capital investment; weak 
management skills; and resistance to advice or change, causing barriers to successful tourism 
expansion (Jones, 2005).
The nature of the tourism industry is different from others in the sense that tourism provides 
both tangible and intangible products. For example, the decoration of facilities for both long 
term and for special events, and the ability of staff to develop service and experiences that 
guest customers expect to receive after purchasing the service. Due to the intangible 
characteristic of ‘service’, customers often tend to perceive higher risk as they cannot 
experience it until they arrive at the service delivery point; for example, the staying at a hotel, 
participating in the tour program and dining in the restaurant.
Another challenge of tourism crisis handling for the tourism industry—especially in high- 
labour intensive firms—is that customers have to arrive at the premises in order to receive the 
product or service (Heymann and Rodier, 2003). When a crisis occurs, the customer can 
detect the problems, thus being the main group that is involved in the event. This 
phenomenon can be referred to as the moment of truth. Moment of truth can be related to
44
this context because when a crisis occurs a guest customer tends to be highly emotional, thus 
expecting management to have a highly organised response to deal with crises. Front-line 
staff would be those who are with customers and are expected to be able to manage customer 
problems with good service and high emotional intelligence in order to create long-term 
relationship and business loyalty (Heymann and Rodier, 2003).
Henderson (2003a) presented a case of how an airline handled a sudden and acute crisis of a 
crash of Singapore Airlines (SIA) in 2000 causing the death of 83 passengers and crew 
members. The study reported that—unlike other tourism organisations that may adapt a plan- 
of-action freely in their own crisis management plan— Airline companies have to strictly 
follow a crisis management plan mandated by the civil aviation industry (lATA). Going by 
the book is not good enough to make airlines recover from a crisis, as Singapore Airlines 
found out. There is a need for communication strategies to regain reputation back from the 
public (Henderson, 2003a). Figure 2.10 shows a stage for airline crisis management which is 
proposed by Henderson (2003a).
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Figure 2.10 Airline crisis management 
Source: Henderson (2003a, p.281)
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The case of an airplane crash strengthens the fact that crises do not always follow an orderly, 
delineated pattern of theoretical models of scholars such as Fink or Faulkner and his life­
cycle model, due to the unpredictability, uncontrollability and the hurriedness in an 
atmosphere of intense public scrutiny (Jaques, 2007). As found in the case of SIA, pre-event 
or crisis pre-planning would not provide a 100% guarantee of safety and security. The 
interestirig point that Henderson (2003à) raises is that a manager should not try to rush ahead 
into recovery or resolution but should instead make decisions quickly to respond to a crisis in 
the intermediate phases. In its intermediate phases, SIA acted by communicating to the 
airline public, including survivors and next of kin, staff, media, residents, customers, travel 
industry, regulatory industry agencies, shareholders and government on the incident to 
assuage public frustration and minimize damage to its reputation (Coombs, 2007). The choice 
of strategic communication that Singapore airline chose was to admit the problem, take 
responsibility for the victims and express its sympathies to their bereaved families in 
newspaper advertisements before looking ahead. Then, later SIA focussed on recovery and 
improving the structures and systems, and heightened preparedness for future crises. 
Learning should also be included in the sequences. The author assumed that the fact that SIA 
could handle this crisis well is because they have learned from an accident of SilkAir which 
is a subsidiary airline of SIA (Tan, 2006). Nevertheless, Henderson did not address the 
learning process in the study clearly. A significant aspect from Henderson’s study to be noted 
is that to handle tourism crisis effectively, a traditional cycle of a crisis management plan 
may be unattainable without readjustment in management and marketing philosophies 
(Jaques, 2007, Coombs, 2007).
2.4.3 Hotels
The pioneer research on crisis management in hotels was done by Brewton beginning in 
1987. His work provided a definition o f crisis management and a model that helps turn crisis 
management into a planning process for the lodging industry. He defined tourism crisis 
management as the systematic approach to ensuring that qualitative decisions and actions are 
made in order to avoid or minimise damage to hotel guests and assets. Brewton’s definition 
has been adopted by several researchers who published their works regarding tourism crisis 
management for the hospitality industry, i.e. Ritchie (2009), Israeli and Reichel (2003) (2011) 
and Tavitiyaman et al. (2008).
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Research regarding crisis management in hotels became a hot topic in 2001 due to the 9/11 
terrorist attack on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. which had a severe impact on the local 
hospitality industry. Research regarding crisis management in hotels toward terrorism has 
been studied by Stafford et al. (2002) and Yu et al. (2005). Their studies examined how hotel 
general managers handled catastrophic events. The researchers analysed and compared 
erhpirically the impact of that terrorist attack bh human and financial aspects of the hotel 
industry. The survey used a data collection tool to investigate the opinion of general 
managers operating hotels with different affiliations, sizes and in different locations in the 
Washington, D.C. metro area. The significant finding related to this research study is that all 
the hotels focused on marketing strategies and sales promotions to boost room, food, and 
beverage sales. The strategies likely had some variations according to hotel locations and 
sizes (Stafford et al., 2002, Yu et al., 2005). The large-sized hotels worked more closely than 
the smaller ones with convention and other tourism marketing (Stafford et al., 2002, Yu et al.,
2005). The hotels that are in the same alliance tend to work together on marketing strategies 
(Stafford et al., 2002, Yu et al., 2005). It is apparent that to recover from crisis— especially 
catastrophic events—collaboration with other stakeholders and alliances are needed.
As mentioned above, not only size but also the location is one of the variables that make hotel 
managers respond to crisis. Israeli and Reichel (2003) studied hospitality crisis management 
practices within the context of the Israeli hospitality industry. 116 usable questionnaires were 
returned from general managers from all of the hotels in Israel registered with the Ministry of 
Tourism (Israeli and Reichel, 2003). The findings illustrate that marketing, hotel 
maintenance, human resources, and governmental assistance are the four main practices that 
need to be in focus when managing crisis— especially governmental assistance as an aspect 
of financial and knowledge sharing (Israeli and Reichel, 2003). They noted that the focus of 
these four practices may be different from the norm of each hotel and from the type of crisis 
that country experiences. The work of Israeli and Reichel (2003) emphasised that the 
government does play a significant role in managing crisis. Thus, this research aims to 
analyse the understanding and objective of policymakers on managing tourism crises as well 
as study the collaboration between policymakers and hotels in knowledge management for 
tourism crises.
In the UK, crisis management in hotels was found in the study of Rousaki and Alcott (2006). 
Their work examined the relationship of organisation size and prior experience with crisis 
and managers' job level with crisis readiness within the lodging industry in the United
47
Kingdom. Their work employed a quantitative approach with questionnaires. 93 respondents 
from both a self-administrative questionnaire via post and an online survey reported that 
hotels in the UK have good preparation for crisis and managers’ prior experience in 
managing crisis would help them to be ready for future crises. Their significant finding which 
may be related to this research study is that the increasing size associated with higher 
perceived crisis readihessTcores and the previous experience in rhahagihg crisis is positively 
linked to their readiness to manage crises (Rousaki and Alcott, 2006). Nevertheless, their 
work appears to have limitation as they only obtain the hotel manager’s perception and then 
conclude a holistic picture of the organisation. The other employees who work in the hotel 
may provide different perceptions of the hotel’s crisis readiness. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to conduct extensive research to examine the opinion of other members in the 
organisation besides hotel managers alone.
From a review of the literature related to crisis management in the hotel industry, it is 
discovered that most research has been focused on using a quantitative research approach. 
These researches work mainly to survey the general manager for perception of crisis 
management in hotels. The implications from these findings therefore provide a narrow idea 
of crisis management in hotel businesses. Moreover, location and size of hotel are found to be 
a significant variable of how hotels manage tourism crises.
2.5 Crisis Management and the Role of Policymaker
This section begins by explaining why governments become engaged in tourism policy 
making. Then, it summarises the main types of government intervention. Afterward, the 
discussion focuses on the specific challenges posed for policymakers by tourism crises, 
followed by a review of research on their responses to tourism crises.
The reason that policymakers are involved in tourism crises depends on the conditions and 
circumstances of each country. Hall (1994) indicated two major general reasons why 
government should become involved in tourism. First, to ensure that the economic benefits of 
tourism are sustained and distributed to a wider range of tourism stakeholders. Second, to 
ensure that tourism development is sustainable, and that the positive benefits are prolonged 
while the negative social and environmental impacts are minimised, such as poor 
relationships between hosts and guests, or the depletion of tourism resources at the 
destination.
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Tourism also has to be understood as subject to policy influence at a number of different 
government levels: international, national, regional, community and individual. This study is 
focussed on the national level. Hall (1994) has identified the following five main types of 
interventions by national policymakers:
Table^2.4 Interventions of policymakers
T he interventions Specific reasons A ctions C hallenges
Coordination The fragmented nature o f  
tourism industry
Coordinate between  
different interest groups 
both private and public 
sectors to agree on either 
administration and 
policies
-The risk o f  no consensus 
due to conflict o f  interest
Planning Economic and sustainable 
tourism objectives and 
outcomes
Form o f  tourism policy -Fragmentation between  
central governm ent,local 
authority and private 
industry leads to 
confusion o f  roles, 
coordination
Legislation and 
regulation
Legislative and 
regulative powers
Regulate and deregulate 
tourism
-Over regulating industry 
can reduce 
competitiveness 
-Nature o f  tourism  
industry is as voluntary 
compliance 
-Industry com ply with 
more profit centres than 
the cost centres regulation
Entrepreneur Encouraging tourism 
development and tourism  
services
Subsidiaries part o f  the 
cost o f  production to 
promote tourism  
development i.e. 
infrastructure
- Scarce econom ic 
resources
Stimulation Promoting destination 
and establishing a distinct 
destination identity and 
image
Provide financial 
incentives, sponsoring 
research and marketing 
activities
-Fair contribution o f  
promotional campaign 
-Tourism lobby over 
tourism policy
Social Tourism Creating best possible 
social conditions for both 
tourist and locals
Extension o f  economic 
benefits to stakeholders 
especially less fortune 
people through 
sponsorship and welfare 
functions
-Ensuring more justice, 
more dignity and 
improved w ellbeing for 
mankind
Interest protectors Balancing various 
interests and values in 
order to meet national 
rather than narrow group
Policy formulation and 
tourism development 
planning
-Ignorance o f  
government in tourism  
and various interest 
groups
Source: Author’s development after Hall (1994)
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Turn now to challenges that are posed for policymakers by tourism crises. The impact of 
tourism crises and roles of policymakers was studied by, for example, Blake and Sinclair 
(2003) and Henderson (2002), who studied the impact of the policymakers’ response to 
September 11. They found that this crisis event caused negative effects upon relevance to the 
policymakers, i.e. government revenue, labour and capital adjustment costs and employment 
and job losses (Blake and Sinclair, 2003). The roles of government response to September 11 
included law enforcement activity, disaster relief and security measures (Blake and Sinclair, 
2003). They also reported that at the time of the crisis a group of industry members formed to 
lobby government; thereby policymakers encountered the difficulty of making decisions on 
what measures needed to be implemented (Blake and Sinclair, 2003).
Henderson (2002) studied the role of the national tourism organisations in Southeast Asia 
during the late 1990s when the region faced an economic crisis, environmental pollution and 
political uncertainty during crises. She found that the approaches to handle crisis varied in 
different countries due to different conditions and resources (Henderson, 2002). She 
discovered that the studied cases (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand) were similar 
for lack of formal planning to deal with crises (Henderson, 2002). Several statements in 
response to crisis—i.e. launching promotions, developing new products and facilitating 
travel—were announced but not always put into practice due to resource constraint 
(Henderson, 2002). Furthermore, she discovered that the marketing strategy can be 
troublesome for a crisis manager to manage crisis in reality as he or she has to maintain the 
interest of the governments (Henderson, 2002). She further suggested that the tourism crisis 
management classical model is a starting point for improved understanding of how to manage 
a crisis. Modification is still needed to correspond with the responsibilities of the policymaker 
and the magnitude of the crises that each country encounters (Henderson, 2002).
There are researches related on their responses to tourism crises by policymakers for 
example, the study by Blake and Sinclair (2003) highlighted that the most efficient means of 
handling such a crisis is to focus on providing help on crisis-targeted sectors through 
subsidies and tax reductions. In the case of September 11, confidence in the airline industry 
was rather severely affected. So, this sector became the focused one (Blake and Sinclair, 
2003). They suggested that different crises may impact different sectors and that before 
taking measure, a careful estimation of the magnitude and dispersion of impact needs to be 
considered (Blake and Sinclair, 2003). However, the results of their work should enable them 
to decide on which sector to provide help based on a calculation using the computable
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general equilibrium (CGE) model of tourism impact. It is based on economic perspectives, 
though the demands of tourists can be shaped by other factors, such as socio-cultural trend. 
Moreover, responding to crisis is complicated because one crisis can interact with another. 
The impact is hardly quantified, and also different businesses have different strategic 
inclinations toward business planning (Hall, 2010).
Wang’s (2009) study showed that crisis impact on safety, whether domestic or international, 
negatively affects tourism demand. He suggested that key measures taken by the policymaker 
should ensure the safety and health of tourists. However, his work falls short of suggestions 
on dealing with these issues. Nevertheless he provided an interesting suggestion of the 
finding which was that the policymaker should not launch a marketing strategy by hoping to 
apply it to all markets. International tourists are not homogeneous enough to enhance relative 
competitiveness. In-depth studies on the characteristics of inbound tourists from different' • j .  .   . . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . . .
countries should be performed in order to devise appropriate strategies. This is evident in the 
work of Wang, who recognised that the Japanese tourists are the target market of Taiwan so 
the implication of his work suggested the policymaker consider the financial and socio­
cultural aspect of Japanese traveller when deciding a marketing strategy (Wang, 2009).
After reviewing the literature relating to role of policymakers so far, we can conclude that 
policymakers are involved in different ways coordinating, planning, regulating, and 
maintaining sustainable practices of tourism. From reviewing related researches, tourism 
crises provide important conditions for defining the degree of involvement and more 
challenging to policymakers to make decisions on how to response to different crises.
2.6 Collaboration between Policymakers and Tourism and Hospitality Industry
Having reviewed researches and roles of the policymaker, the collaboration is suggested as a 
possible mode of governance to achieve effective tourism crisis management. This section 
present discussion of the term “collaboration” and literature reviews of work related on 
collaboration between policymakers and tourism and hospitality industry actors.
Several scholars state that collaboration becomes a topic of consideration in tourism crisis 
because of the recognition of stakeholders that are depending on each other to manage the 
crisis (Hall, 1999, Bramwell and Lane, 2000, Plummer et al., 2006). Bramwell and Lane 
(2000, p .l) said that “stakeholder collaboration has the potential to lead dialog; negotiation
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and building o f mutually acceptable proposal about how tourism should be develop”. 
Collaboration is defined as the process of sharing resource (crisis knowledge) and 
cooperating to solve crisis problems (Plummer et ah, 2006). The benefits of collaboration in 
relationship to this study according to Bramwell and Sharman (1999) are: First, reducing the 
cost of resolving the conflicts among stakeholders over long term. Second, giving 
stakeholders à chance to be involved in decision making processes to managing crisis that 
may affect their lives. Third, improving coordination of policy and actions toward tourism 
crisis management. Fourth, building crisis knowledge of stakeholders through collective 
learning.
There are several associated term to collaboration which are partnership, network and 
cooperation (Hall, 1999). The collaboration is the umbrella term of partnership and network. 
The partnership refers to a formalised structure and operation of collaboration with reference 
to board meetings, minutes, agreements on rights and obligations of members. While network 
is less formalised and tends to a voluntary of working together. Lastly cooperation is wider 
than partnership and network. The term cooperation goes beyond the patterns of social 
interaction but covering the conflict-solving with the involvement of a neutral mediator (Hall, 
1999, Bramwell and Lane, 2000). In this research the term collaboration will be used to 
examine the participation pattern between policymakers and hotels and examines what 
knowledge, objectives and resource that they are shared to manage tourism crises.
Selin and Chavez (1995, p.848) stated that “crisis is often the catalyst fo r collective action 
through partnership. ” Although collaboration is important to crisis management, there is 
little research which provides understanding and an agreed approach on public-private 
collaboration processes in the tourism and hospitality industry. The following is a review of 
the literature related to collaboration between public and private parties.
Selin and Chavez (1995) stated that the nature of tourism collaboration is complex and 
dynamic. Nevertheless, they have developed an evolutionary tourism partnership model to 
provide a way for building partnerships. The partnership model is comprised of 4 stages: (1) 
setting the problem, (2) setting directions, (goals), (3) structuring roles and tasks (4) and 
defining outcomes (Selin and Chavez, 1995). These stages were used to investigate a 
partnership in Eagle Valley, Colorado. They found that the idea of having a visitor 
information centre started with a meeting and the awareness of members to consider having a
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first class information centre. It took a few months to test people’s commitment to the idea 
and to organize a meeting. It followed by an early discussion with weekly meetings over 
lunch to reach consensus on the concept of a visitor centre. An advisory committee 
representing each agency was formed and charged with developing a plan for fundraising and 
implementation. The responsibilities were formalised and a memorandum of understanding 
was signed. EacK representative was given one vote on the committee. This process took 
three years, but finally the centre was opened. The constraints of partnership that can be 
observed from this case study are competition, bureaucratic inertia, the fragmentation of the 
organisation. What we have learned from the study of Selin and Chavez (1995) was that the 
process of tourism partnership requires both time and effort with successful implementation 
being dependent on several factors.
Dredge (2006) studied ‘public and private partnership’ using the case study of Lake 
Macquarie, New South Wales, Australia. Similar to Selin and Chavez (1995) regarding the 
factors affecting the collaboration. Dredge (2006) found that a competitive relationship 
among networks leads to lower commitment and discontinuity of participation. In addition, 
the imbalance of power between participants obstructed cohesion and development of a 
common platform of interest. Dredge (2006) added that the absence of a clear network 
structure negatively affected communication and the characteristics of members in terms of 
expertise, professionalism and networking ability which was important for the cohesiveness 
of the network. Leadership management was suggested as the solution to minimise the 
problems caused by the above influences (Dredge, 2006). The government set rules of 
conduct and allowed participants—especially the small enterprises in the local tourism 
industry—to negotiate and discuss possible outcomes (Dredge, 2006).
However, with these studies being based on using case study strategy methodologies, the 
influential factors and suggestions provided may have limitations when applied to other cases 
because public-private relationships and management strategies will depend on the specific 
characteristics of the destination.
To summarise this section, collaboration is important to tourism crisis management. The term 
‘collaboration’ covers several terms such as partnership (formal structure) and network 
(informal structure). The nature of tourism collaboration is complex and dynamic. It requires
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both time and effort, and the success of implementation depends on several factors i.e. aiming 
for a collective goal; understanding roles and tasks; and leading; and controlling.
2.7 Chapter Conclusion
This, chapter, has explored_the literature related to tourism crisis management. It starts. with„ 
clarification on definition of crisis and related terms—especially crisis and disaster. Then, 
classification of crises is presented to understand the characteristic of each type of crisis. 
This was followed by a range of crisis management theories which are risk management, 
crisis-cycle theories, strategic crisis management, and chaos theory. The crisis management 
implementations in small versus large size firms, the tourism industry and the hotel business 
were highlighted. Based on these sections several critical conclusions can be discussed.
The definition and nature of tourism crisis and tourism crisis management is characterised by 
ambiguity. The definition of these terms and their characteristics seem to vary according to 
the context in which they are being used. This is important because the understanding of 
these terms was strongly argued to be important as it would reflect the commitment and the 
approach used to manage tourism crises in proactive or reactive style. Some of the existing 
research in this field has overlooked this point, assuming uniformity of understanding of the 
nature of crises. Hence, this study has the aim of analysing differences between the 
understandings and objectives of policymakers versus those of hotels for managing tourism 
crises that affect hotel businesses in the context of Thailand. This is important not only in its 
own right, but as a basis for understanding the challenges posed in the translation of policy 
into practices. Differences in understanding amongst hotel managers can also contribute to 
explaining differences in their approaches to tourism crisis management.
Many of the early studies on tourism crisis management have suggested guidelines for how 
organisations respond to crises without taking into account how differences between 
organisations influence their practices. However, there is research that supports a strong link 
between size and structures of ownership in the way that business readiness and response to 
crises is managed. Large firms have tended to perform more proactively, emphasizing the 
importance of pre-planning. While small firms tend to demonstrate relatively little emphasis 
on crisis planning in these businesses. The chance of large corporate collapsing from crisis 
impact is less than that of small enterprises, and it is not clear to what extent this depends on 
differences in understanding, resources, of knowledge management. In the tourism and
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hospitality industry, tourism crisis management research is still in its infancy stage. Yet, it is 
an important issue because this industry is dominated by a wide range of businesses from 
large to small that are important to local, regional and national economies. In the context of 
tourism and hospitality in Thailand, there has been no comparative case study research 
between firms with different types and structures of ownership, and how this influences crisis 
management. .....
The review also revealed that the involvement of policymakers in tourism crisis management 
is important and the collaboration of policymaker and business (hotels) needs to be 
broadened. The stakeholders are mutually inter-dependent when it comes to managing crises 
and this can be formalised through several forms of collaborative structure such as 
networking, partnership and coordination. This research focuses on these issues in relation to 
crisis management in Thailand, a topic on which there has not been any previous research.
This chapter has also demonstrated that most of the relevant literature on crisis management 
favours a positivist view toward conducting research. In contrast, this research provides 
findings from within a qualitative approach with interviews being informed by an 
interpretivist view that explores the case of hotels and the collaboration between hotels and 
policymakers in relation to tourism crisis management in Thailand’s hotels.
While this chapter has examined the issues related to the concept of tourism crisis 
management, the next chapter will continue to examine the concept of knowledge 
management and how it can be related to tourism crisis management.
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CHAPTER 3 
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
3.0 Introduction
This chapter provides the second part of the literature review of this research, focusing on 
knowledge management. This current chapter together with Chapter 2 offers the issues of the 
link amongst knowledge management practices in the tourism crisis arena. As stated in the 
previous chapter, the tourism industry is particularly prone to crisis, which by its nature is 
unpredictable and must be planned and managed to minimise serious impacts. There has been 
a concern for some time among academics, policymakers and business people to involve 
knowledge management in order to develop innovative ideas for dealing with tourism crises 
(Ritchie, 2004, Faulkner, 2001).
This chapter contains seven sections. The chapter begins with the concept of knowledge 
management covering its definitions and forms in section one. Section two provides the 
models that are related to knowledge transfer and management as well as the organisational 
learning. Section three discusses issues of knowledge management practices of businesses in 
general while section four focuses more on tourism and hospitality businesses. Section five 
provides further reviews from Section 2.5 on the role of policymakers in knowledge 
management for tourism crises. The barriers and facilitators of knowledge management 
implementation are highlighted in section six to provide a clearer understanding of why 
knowledge management can end up being a success or failure.
3.1 Concept of Knowledge Management
Knowledge management entered the academic field in the 1980’s. Later, it was adopted 
widely by economic sectors during the 1990’s with the aim of using knowledge to 
develop innovative products to gain a competitive edge (Penrose, 1959, Simon, 1968, 
Davidson and Voss, 2002, Hjalager, 2002, Cooper et al., 2005). Additionally, knowledge 
management is able to help improve the chance of adaptation for survival in a rapid changing 
business environment (Bahra, 1999, Cooper, 2006, Malhotra, 2004, Mistilis and Sheldon,
2006).
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This section provides general concepts which offer an understanding of knowledge 
management with definition of knowledge, knowledge management, and its forms.
3.1.1 What is Knowledge?
Before going into the discussion on the definition of knowledge management, it is important 
to address firstly that knowledge is different from information. Knowledge is information 
that has already been interpreted through cognitive structure and has been translated so that 
humans can understand it (Chang and Chen 2004, p 24 cited in Hall and Williams, 2008). 
Jahaspara (2004, p. 16) explains that knowledge is regarded as 'actionable information ' which 
is stored in the right place and right form, to be retrievable for future usage—especially to 
make a decision. Davenport and Prusak, (2000) stated that knowledge can be found in various 
forms, for example: experience, values, contextual information and expert insight. These 
knowledge forms should be evaluated and developed for creating new knowledge in the mind 
of the knower (Davenport and Prusak, 2000). In an organisation, knowledge can be seen in 
organisational routines, process, practices, and norms (Davenport and Prusak, 2000). In this 
research, the term knowledge is regarded as the actionable information kept in the right place 
and right format in order to be used for managing tourism crises.
3.1.2 Knowledge Forms
A chapter in the book written by Hall and Williams (2008) has been devoted to discuss the 
characteristics and limitations of two kinds of knowledge, which are codified or explicit 
knowledge and tactic knowledge. They recorded and discussed two classic works of 
Polanyi’s tacit and codified knowledge and Nonaka’s tacit and explicit knowledge.
The following are the explanations of two kinds of knowledge: codified knowledge (explicit 
knowledge) and tacit knowledge by Hall and Williams (2008).
“Codified knowledge is that which can be made explicit, and therefore can be 
transmitted in formal and systematic ways, whether in a manual, data set or software 
program. In contrast, tacit knowledge is person and context specifc. Paraphrasing 
Polanyi, this is epitomized by notion that an individual knows more than can be 
expressed in word. ”
(Hall and Williams, 2008, p.56)
Nonnaka and Takeuchi (1995 cited in Hall and Williams, 2008) suggested that companies 
should discover ways to capture both tacit and explicit, and use tacit to supplement codified
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knowledge. Therefore, knowledge needs to be managed. The definition of knowledge 
management will be discussed next.
3.1.3 Definition of Knowledge Management
In the knowledge based view by Grant (1996) and Spender (1996), they claimed that 
knowledge (know-how and know-what) is the most important resource to survive in 
a cut-throat business environment. The organisations that have superior knowledge can run a 
business better than their rivals can. An on-going knowledge management practice would 
assist firms to achieve their business objectives, overcome business’s challenges and obtain 
the competitive edge (Jashapara, 2004, Newell et al., 2009).
Cooper (2006) and Blackman et al. (2011) commented that the definition of knowledge 
management is still developing and dependent on the perspective of different authors. 
Generally, knowledge management can be defined as a systematic process to produce and 
share ‘organisational knowledge’ which is both ‘what’ and ‘how’, plus experience, values 
and beliefs of its members (Nonaka et al., 1996, Alavi and Leidner, 2001, Awad and Ghaziri, 
Jashapara, 2004).
A critique of the above definition provided by these scholars overlooked the stage of 
knowledge assessment, even though that knowledge management is simply an accumulation 
of a massive availability of information. Wiig (1997) argued that the quality of information 
that can be used is far more important than the quantity of information that hardly ever gets 
used. Wiig (1997) emphasised that knowledge should be focused and understood. It should 
be continuously developed and renewed in order to create an innovation to apply creatively to 
situations (Wiig, 1997).
In this thesis, the author defines knowledge management for tourism crisis as ‘a systematic 
and continuous process to audit, develop, and transfer knowledge o f tourism cmz5. ’This 
definition does not only capture the basic notion of knowledge management from definitions 
provided by several scholars such as Nonaka et al.,(1996), Alavi and Leidner (2001), Awad 
and Ghaziri (2004) and Jashaspara (2004) but also integrates knowledge assessment and total 
quality management of knowledge as suggested by Wiig (1997) to manage tourism crises. 
Since we have understanding of the concept of knowledge management, the next section 
provides the models that are involved in knowledge management.
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3.2 Models involved in Knowledge Management
The section begins with a knowledge management process model which explains the linear 
process of knowledge management starting from knowledge acquisition to knowledge 
application. Since knowledge management is a complex issue, currently there are models that 
elaborate on one or more specific functions of knowledge management processes in 
detail. These models are, for example, knowledge conversion models by Nonaka et aï. 
(1996); knowledge transfer process by Liyanage et al. (2009); model of source, channels with 
mechanisms and outcomes of knowledge transfers between attractions by Hall and Williams 
(2008) and Hjalager (2002); Lewinian experiential learning model by Kolb (1984); and lastly 
double loop learning model by Kolb (1984). Discussion of each one follows.
3.2.1 Knowledge Management Process Models
The knowledge management process models which have been applied and developed by 
several researchers are shown in Table 3.1. The review of literature on knowledge 
management by Mishra and Bhaskar (2011, p.347) shows the broad stage of the knowledge 
management process. The process covers knowledge acquisition, knowledge, knowledge 
storage and retrieval, dissemination (knowledge transfer and knowledge sharing), and 
knowledge application and feedback (Mishra and Bhaskar, 2011).
Table 3.1 Literature depicting the process of knowledge management
Author Year Theme
Hedlund 1994 Knowledge acquisition, knowledge storage, 
knowledge transfer, 
knowledge application, 
knowledge protection
De Jamett 1996 Knowledge construction. Knowledge 
embodiment,
knowledge dissemination and use. 
Knowledge retention and refinement.
Quintas et al. 1997 Process or practice of creating, acquiring, 
capturing, sharing, and using knowledge
59
Author Year Theme
Demerest 1997 Knowledge construction, knowledge 
dissemination, knowledge embodiment, use
Lettieri et al. 2004 Knowledge management cycle in non-profit
organisation comprises_____  . ...... ....„ ,
knowledge acquisition, codification, storage, 
retrieval, diffusion and presentation, 
application, creation
Zolingen et al. 2001 Acquiring knowledge, establishing knowledge, 
disseminating knowledge, developing 
knowledge, applying knowledge
Fong and Choi 2009 Six knowledge management processes; 
acquisition, creation, storage, distribution, use, 
and maintaining
Source: Mishra and Bhaskar (2011, p.347)
know led ge
evaluation
and
feed back
kn ow ledge
application
K nowledge
acquisition
know led ge  
storage  and 
retrival
know ledge
transfer
Figure 3.1 The knowledge management process
Source: Author’s diagram after Mishra and Bhaskar (2011, p.347)
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Figure 3.1 summarizes the consensus of stages introduced by different scholars in Table 
3.1. Figure 3.1 presents knowledge management as a continuous process starting from 
knowledge acquisition, knowledge storage and retrieval, knowledge transfer, knowledge 
application, evaluation and feedback of implementation. The following are explanation and 
discussion of each stage shown in Figure 3.1.
Stage 1: Acquisition
The first stage is acquisition which refers to the attempt of organisations to acquire 
knowledge from various sources in order to convert tacit into an explicit form and store in 
organisational repositories (Bose and Sugumaran, 2003). There are 2 ways of acquiring 
knowledge: 1) technical database or technocratic and 2) human resource or organisational 
routines—or combination of both. Technical database or technocratic approach uses 
technology (such as web search engines and online database) as enabled tools to acquire 
information (Bouneken, 2002, Raeherla and Hu, 2009). While human resources or 
organisational routines use networks and communities (informal or formal conversation 
among staff) to attain organisational and individual knowledge (Bouneken, 2002, Raeherla 
and Hu, 2009).
Knowledge can be obtained from both internal and external sources. According to research 
on knowledge sources in the Australian tourism industry, most companies could obtain 
knowledge from in-house delivery (32%) and the rest gained from external sources: private 
sector firm (supply chain) 20%, industry association (network) 14%, universities 2%, federal 
government 3% and local government 5% (Hall and Williams, 2008). The study showed that 
this tourism organisation gains knowledge to develop innovations from external sources more 
than internal sources. Likewise, Menon and Pfeffer (2003 cited in Argote et al., 2003) 
discovered that employees are more likely to value knowledge from external sources than 
from internal sources because they do not have to worry about the authority of 
outsiders. Coffey et al. (1994) commented that appreciating an outsider’s knowledge does not 
guarantee that an organisation will improve in performance.
The controversial issue of whether an organisation should buy knowledge from outsiders or 
discover knowledge within the firm was investigated further by Argote et al. (2003). They 
suggested that in fact organisational units are more likely to benefit from internal than 
external knowledge. Several supporters were cited in their papers for the argument that best 
practices can be transferred better from units that are part of the same organisation than from
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units that belong to different organisations (Irwin and Klenow, 1994 cited in Argote et ah, 
2003). Zellmer-Bruhn (2003 cited in Argote et al., 2003) claimed that firms can leam three 
times as much from their own experience as from experience of other firms. Song et al. (2003 
cited in Argote et a l . , 2003) presented evidence that organisations are more likely to benefit 
from the knowledge of individual scientists when those scientists join the organisations rather
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While there is a debate regarding what is the best source of knowledge, it is important to bear 
in mind that the ability of acquiring data can vary depending on the absorptive capability of 
a firm (Hickman and Crandall, 1997). The ability of a firm to recognise the value of new, 
external information then integrate it and apply it to commercial ends is critical to its 
innovative capabilities (Hickman and Crandall, 1997). Absorptive capability is shaped by 
R&D expenditures and human capital; organisation structure and management practices, and 
types of intensity of interactions with external partners (Hickman and Crandall, 1997). Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990) supported that effective learning or problem solving skills are not only 
about where an organisation gets its knowledge. The organisation should consider whether 
their staff can assimilate and use new knowledge. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) claimed that 
the staff can assimilate knowledge well if they have pre-existing relevant knowledge 
background. In an organisation where staff is unfamiliar with the new knowledge, a 
gatekeeper should perform as a boundary spanner to monitor and translate technical 
information into an understandable form (Hickman and Crandall, 1997). To develop effective 
absorptive capacity especially for problem solving, it is not enough to allow staff exposure to 
new knowledge. There is also a need to ensure that it is retained in staff memory for day-to- 
day application. Knowledge storage and retrieval are discussed in the following part.
Stage 2: Knowledge Storage and Retrieval
Once the knowledge has been acquired, data storage must be effective to retrieve it so that 
effective tracking of history and decisions are possible (Blackman et al., 2006). The stage of 
storage and retrieval is called organisational memory which is recorded in various forms such 
as written documents or structured information stored in an electronic database as well as 
tacit knowledge embodied in human memory (Tan et al., 1999 cited in Alavi and Leidner, 
2001).
The knowledge warehouse of the firm known as organisational memory can be classified in 
two parts: semantic or episodic (Jashapara, 2011). Semantic memory refers to an explicit
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form of knowledge which can be found in, for example, annual reports of an organisation; 
whereas episodic memory refers to context-specific and situated knowledge; for example, 
the specific situation or decision (Alavi and Leidner, 2001). Alavi and Leidner (2001) 
claimed that memory embedded in both forms can help in applying knowledge as a solution 
and avoid the waste of organisation resources in repeating the same mistake. However, they 
also pointed out that memory can be both a bad and good influence in an organisation. In 
other words, it can influence people’s behaviour to resist changing as well as having a bias 
decision (Alavi and Leidner, 2001).
In an attempt to make use of organisational memory, Blackman et al. (2006) said that there 
are two main strategies in the stage of storing and retrieving knowledge which are 
a personalisation-based strategy and a codification-based strategy (Blackman et al., 2011). 
The first one is people-led and based on tacit knowledge, which is developed through 
engagement in dialogue and channelled expertise. It can be seen that the primary concern of 
this approach is to ensure that knowledge sharing and mentoring among colleagues 
occurs. The latter strategy is technology-led based on explicit knowledge which is codified 
and is database driven (Blackman et al., 2011). It tends to create knowledge objects and 
templates for later use by stakeholders (Pforr and Hosie, 2007).
While many organisations are trying to invest in knowledge creation and learning, tacit 
knowledge can be forgotten, especially when it is kept in the memory of human brains, e.g. 
personalisation-based strategy (Alavi and Leidner, 2001). Therefore, through a codification- 
based strategy by using technology as storage, and retrieval tools such as query languages, 
multimedia database and database management system, these were claimed to be more 
effective to manage organisational memory (Alavi and Leidner, 2001). The document 
management technology allows explicit knowledge or tacit knowledge, which often 
disappears and becomes effectively stored and made accessible (Alavi and Leidner, 2001). 
Alavi and Leidner (2001) concluded that IT can be a better tool in enhancement and 
expansion of both sematic and episodic organisational memory. However, over-dependenee 
on IT can cause troubles in case of computer failure or malware issues. As noted earlier 
much knowledge remains commonly in a tacit form and some are hard to convert to an 
explicit form; therefore Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argued that loss of memory in the human 
brain can be avoided by storing knowledge deeply in human memory through building up 
over many practice trails on related problems. However, to ensure that knowledge will 
remain after an employee leaves the organisation, knowledge transfer to another is required.
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Stage 3 Dissemination (Knowledge Transferring and Knowledge Sharing)
Having discussed knowledge acquisition, storage, and retrieval; this section will shift to the 
importance and relevant concept of knowledge dissemination. The models of knowledge 
transfer will be elaborated further in Section 3.2.3.
Blackman efal. (2011) stated thaf the key to knowledge dissemiriation is to distribute relevant 
knowledge to employees and departments within the organisation at the right place and 
time. The knowledge dissemination covers knowledge transfer and knowledge sharing.
These two terms often are used interchangeably, however they are different in the fact that 
knowledge transfer is a one-way communication from knowledge source to knowledge 
receivers through several modes of knowledge transfer while knowledge sharing is a two-way 
communication among networks (Castillo, 2002). Some scholars pointed out further 
distinctive aspects between knowledge sharing and knowledge transfer, in that sharing mainly 
involves exchange of knowledge at the individual level , while transfer focuses at a higher 
group, department or division level (Castillo, 2002). It is argued that knowledge sharing is a 
crucial part of knowledge transfer because there are companies that employ a two-way flow 
of knowledge in order to gain some advantage in terms of developing co-learning, reducing 
cost and enhancing long-term trust from networking by developing inter-firm collaboration 
coordinating with suppliers, market intermediaries, competitors, and community associations 
(Wenger, 1998, Bathelt et al., 2004).
Although there are different kinds of knowledge sharing; Wenger (1998) argued that the 
communities of practice is the most common way that people transfer knowledge in their 
daily life. Wenger’s concept focuses on social participation in informal structures where the 
members are connected to each other by specific shared problems or interest (Wenger, 1998). 
According to Wenger (1998, p.73-85), the community of practice defines itself along three 
dimensions. First is joint enterprise—members are involved over time in some particular area 
of knowledge and activity which provides them with a sense of joint enterprise and identity. 
Second is mutual agreement, to ensure that the communities of practice can function, and 
whereby a shared understanding among members needs to be established. Third is the shared 
repertoire—the resources to support knowledge dissemination and accumulation within the 
community such as knowledge transfer mechanisms, stories and artefacts. Taken together, 
these three dimensions differentiate communities of practice from communities of interest or
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a geographical community. Hence specifically in relation to tourism crisis management, the 
idea of communities of practices would explain in the way that people who are working in an 
organisation have established an informal-structured group with insiders or the outsiders to 
accumulate and share their knowledge on the issues related to tourism crises through social 
participation. Ardichviliet et al. (2014) asserted that the communities of practices is a 
powerful fbrrh of assbciatioh, especially in terms of capturing know-how knbwledp which is 
intangible and is deeply personalised. As we know from the previous chapter, knowledge of 
tourism crises is likely to be embedded in the persons who have experiences in dealing with 
tourism crises. Therefore, one of the ways to help people share and internalise tacit 
knowledge of tourism crises is to allow people to talk and share their stories while working 
on specific problems especially through face to face interaction.
Salis and Williams (2010) studied the association of knowledge sharing through faee-to-faee 
communication and labour productivity with evidence from British workplaces. The results 
showed a positive link between productivity and faee-to-face communication (FTFC) in 
problem-solving groups, teams and meetings of senior or line managers and employees (Salis 
and Williams, 2010). The study also suggested that British workspaces in the trading sectors 
could increase their productivity by implementing HRM practices in such a way as to 
enhance knowledge sharing through employee personal interactions (Salis and Williams, 
2010). The significance of their research has proven that knowledge exchange among 
employees or between employees and employers can be done effectively and linked to a 
desired result which is the productivity through employee's personal interactions (Salis and 
Williams, 2010). It is apparent that direct voice practice, employee involvement, or direct 
participation must be established within an organisation. The only criticism is that different 
organisations have resource capability to implement the face to face interaction for example 
multi-organisation; this practice may involve high cost of travelling.
Stage 4: Knowledge Application
A  number of researchers stated that application of knowledge is the ultimate outcome of 
putting an effort into managing knowledge. Knowledge application refers to the process of 
turning knowledge into effective action in order to achieve business objeetive(s). Alavi and 
Leidner (2001) stated that the process of knowledge acquisition, storage, retrieval and 
transfer does not necessarily lead to enhanced organisational performance nor to attain 
competitive advantage toward solving organisational problems. Instead, to achieve the
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business objective, innovation plays an important role where knowledge lies at the heart of 
such innovation (Hall and Williams, 2008). Following is an example study of knowledge 
management actions for creating the new product within a company.
The work of Pitt and MacVaugh (2008) showed that there is a strong link between knowledge 
management processes innovative ideas for effectivehess of hew product”
development (NPD). They found that effective knowledge management needs to: (1) 
acknowledge the multiple organisational levels at which knowledge is deployed, and (2) 
support the production and exchange of tacit and explicit knowledge (Pitt and MacVaugh, 
2008). They suggested that to be able to come up with new product, it requires knowledge 
mechanisms and social processes which are consistent with and fully integrated into every 
relative unit within the organisation (Pitt and MacVaugh, 2008).
Stage 5: Evaluation and Feedback
The last process is evaluation and feedback which emphasises the significance of total quality 
management of knowledge. Knowledge is used and evaluated by receivers. Later, their 
feedback is gathered as a source of new knowledge to organisations (Bose and Sugumaran, 
2003). Feedback would give a chance for the organisation to leam new knowledge (know 
what), develop new skills (know how) and change the attitude of the learner (Jashapara, 
2004; Ritchie, 2009). This set of processes according to Blackman et al. (2006) is called 
organisational learning which will be further discussed in Section 3.2.4.
In brief, the advantage of the knowledge management process model provides an overall 
picture of stages of knowledge management. Knowledge can be acquired internally and 
externally, through either technology or human resources communication. Once the 
knowledge is captured then a knowledge warehouse should be established so that knowledge 
can be memorised in either people-led-based or eodification-based form. To ensure 
knowledge application, knowledge should be transferred to the right people at the right time, 
utilising the right forms. However, these stages cannot be done easily because each person 
and each organisation has different knowledge absorption capability. This research therefore 
aims to understand these knowledge management processes that are implemented in hotels 
which are different in size and structure of ownership, which presumably has different 
knowledge absorption capability. Now that we have understanding of the overall idea about 
the knowledge management process, the next section will present more details on converse 
forms of from one form to another through different channels and mechanisms.
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3.2.2 Knowledge Conversion Model
One of the well-known knowledge management models was introduced by Nonaka et al. 
(1996). Nonaka’s model (See: Figure 3.2) shows a hypothesis for the four modes of 
knowledge conversion as follows:
From tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge: process of socialisation through shared 
experience and interaction ( for example via conversations between individual);
From tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge: process of externalisation using 
metaphors and figurative languages ( for example identifying knowledge held by 
individual or group and then codify this into reports, manuals or guidelines)
From explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge: process of combination through 
reconfiguring exiting knowledge such as sorting, adding , re-categorising and re- 
eontextualising explicit knowledge can lead to new knowledge; (for example a paper 
based database into an electronic one)
From explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge: process of internalisation through 
learning process (codified knowledge will be added to stocks of personal knowledge 
for example read from the reports and remember key information). Hall and Williams 
(2008) noted that the effectiveness of internalisation will be varied according to the 
capacity of individual and environmental factors.
(Jahaspara, 2004, p.49. Hall and Williams, 2008, p. 69)
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Figure 3.2 Tacit-explicit knowledge conversions 
Source: Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995)
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The assumption of this model is that tacit knowledge ean be shared through a process of 
socialisation. Tacit knowledge ean also be converted into explicit knowledge through a 
process of externalisation (top 2 squares of the model in Figure 3.2) (Chong and Nyaw, 
2002). The model also assumes that explicit knowledge can be transferred into tacit 
knowledge through a process of internalisation. Viee versa, explicit knowledge can be 
transferred to explicit knôwlédgë through a process of eombinatibh (bbftom 2 squares) 
(Chong and Nyaw, 2002).
However, MeAdam and McCreedy (1999) argued that Nonaka’s matrix is too simple because 
knowledge transfer in organisations is much more complieated, especially the conversion 
from tacit to explicit. Shaw and Williams (2009) explained that tacit knowledge consists of 
experiences of an individual employee (in the form of specific experience, expertise, 
knowledge, and intuition) which is closely associated with the employee who processes it. 
Baumard (1999) added that tacit knowledge encompasses not only cognitive but also 
technical elements. The technical elements are related to skilled and learned know-how of 
specific actions while cognitive elements refer to paradigms, schemes and beliefs that provide 
individuals with an ability to understand the work environment (Baumard, 1999). Thereafter, 
tacit knowledge is difficult to measure, present and store; however, it is considered a crucial 
asset for an individual and for organisational performance (Ahmed et al., 2002).
The conversion model is relevant to this thesis in showing that knowledge can be in different 
forms and the forms of knowledge can be transferable through several methods. It is the 
researcher’s interest to examine what forms of knowledge for tourism crisis hotels would 
likely have. Also, what knowledge conversion mechanisms and channels that hotels will use 
to develop "'organisational knowledge"" for tourism crises management. The next section will 
present two models related to knowledge transfer that will emphasise the flow of knowledge 
from source to receiver.
3.2.3 Knowledge Transfer Models
This part is an extension of knowledge dissemination in Stage 3 of the knowledge 
management process. This part provides two relevant knowledge transfer models: the first is 
developed by Liyanage et al. (2009). The second model is developed by Hall and Williams
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(2008) and Hjalager (2002) to present sources and channels with mechanisms, and outcomes 
of knowledge transfers. The discussion of these two models will be at the end of this section. 
Liyanage et al (2009) explained that knowledge transfer is a flow of information from source 
to receiver. However, in practice knowledge transfer is not an easy task to achieve. The idea 
of knowledge transfer is not only about delivering what sources of knowledge are known but 
also tailof-making significant knowledge that later can be used by receivers (Castillo, 2002). 
Indeed, before the knowledge can be transferred, knowledge transformation must be modified 
by adding or deleting knowledge for future application by receivers (Castillo, 2002).
Considering the tacit nature of knowledge transfer may fail, although transformation is done 
because a nature of high tacit knowledge requires close and fluent liaison or knowledge 
brokers—for example, consultation between those who transfer tacit knowledge and those 
who receive it (Sicilia et al., 2006).
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the cycle of knowledge management. Initially, a firm should assess what 
knowledge they need before starting to acquire it. Once knowledge is acquired, knowledge 
transformation will be pursued by integrating principles of knowledge transformation. 
Knowledge transformation involves theories of translation and perception. The success of 
knowledge transfer depends on several factors. It means that those delivering knowledge 
should wish to share relevance and have an ability to translate complexity to receivers” 
Receivers themselves would want to leam and have the right absorptive capacity (Liyanage 
et al., 2009). It is necessary to keep in mind that the absorptive capacity of each individual 
may vary depending on different demographic backgrounds such as age and education level 
(Huan et al., 2004, Castillo, 2002). Once the knowledge has been applied by users, then 
feedback will be returned to the source that conveyed it as a continuous cycle. The model 
also indicated that the success of the process is not only determined by internal players or 
organisational culture (intrinsic influence), but also by external influences such as 
environmental, socio-cultural, and technological.
Hall and Williams (2008) also introduced a knowledge transfer model, shown in Figure 3.4. 
It clearly demonstrates sources, channels of knowledge with mechanisms, and outcomes of 
knowledge transfers. Figure 3.4 shows that knowledge can be obtained from internal and 
external sources both of a tacit and explicit nature. Knowledge is transferred via two levels: 
(1) Through an individual level via labour mobility and/or knowledge broker; (2) Firm level 
through imitation, demonstration, and observation and even inter-firm exchange. The 
outcome of transfer process is innovation and stock of knowledge within the organisation.
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These two models of knowledge in Figure 3.3 developed by Liyanage et al (2009) and Figure
3.4 by Hall and Williams (2008) and Hjalager (2002) can be critiqued. The first model makes 
a good attempt to marry the basic model of knowledge management process with Nonaka’s 
knowledge conversion model as the modes of knowledge transfer. However, this model fails 
to indicate source, channels, and mechanism of knowledge transfer whilst the model of Hall 
and Williams (2008) and Hjalager (2002) has clearly provided information that is more 
practical. The only criticism of Figure 3.4 is that it does not indicate how feedback can be 
reported back to the source for purposes of future sharing and learning. The model by Hall 
and Williams (2008) and Hjalager (2002) seems to have at accomplished this by having 
organisational knowledge reservoir and knowledge innovation. Considering their strong and 
weak points, the researcher has modified the knowledge transfer and management process for 
this study.
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Figure 3.5 Knowledge transfer and management conceptual framework
Source: Author’s presentation applied from Nonaka (1996), by Liyanage et al. (2009), Hall 
and Williams (2008) and Hjalager (2002))
Figure 3.5 is modified after the models related to knowledge management process and 
transfer by Nonaka (1996), by Liyanage et al. (2009), Hall and Williams (2008) and Hjalager 
(2002). The model has combined key distinctive stages of knowledge management process in 
order to apply to this study. This model shows that a firm can obtain knowledge from both 
internal and external sources. However, in every stage of knowledge management, 
knowledge needs to be converted into the right format through one or more knowledge 
transfer approaches: socialisation, externalisation, combination, and/or internationalisation. 
Knowledge which is acquired from internal or external sources then would be stored as the 
organisational knowledge for managing tourism crises. Later, when knowledge has been 
applied, a receiver—which could be an individual or group—has to evaluate and provide 
feedback to the senders. Liyanage et al. (2009) stated that external business environments— 
for instance, politics and legal, economic, social and technology—can challenge the
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implementation of knowledge transfer and management process. This model applies not 
only to the business external environment but also the business internal challenges, i.e. 
absorption capability, human and organisational barriers (Riege, 2007).
To this point, we have reviewed models related to knowledge transfer and 
rnanageinent. Hoy^yer, an organisational learning model would relate to this research study 
as well, for it is crucial to adding new knowledge for an individual or an 
organisation. Hence, it would be interesting to know whether hotels as an industry has 
learned from previous tourism crises and how this valued experience has been transferred in 
order to develop innovative response to manage one-after-another tourism crises.
3.2.4 Organisational Learning Models
The concept of knowledge management and organisational learning goes hand-in-hand 
(George and Jones, 2002). According to Kim (2004) organisational learning can be literally 
defined from the generic word Teaming’ which means trying to discover the know-how and 
know-why in order to increase the experience and capability to accomplish effective action. 
Jasharara, (2011, p. 125) explained that it is a learning which is based on a constmctive 
perspective regarded as “a process where individuals develop new ideas based on their 
current and past knowledge and experience. ” Learning was claimed to have helped 
organisations adapt to a changing environment and promote a collective awareness of 
eventual economic, social, and environmental risks and impacts (Blackman et al., 2011). The 
following is a discussion of learning models that were developed from a behavioural 
approach.
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Figure 3.6 Lewinian experiential learning model 
Source: Kolb (1984)
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The Lewinian experiential learning model developed by Kolb (1984) shows that individuals 
can acquire experience through observation. After an individual has obtained knowledge, 
they will then apply it to situation(s). The test of knowledge application will be reflected to 
form a concrete experience within the organisation. However, this cycle is perceived to have 
a limitation that may influence people to handle the situation in the same pattern without 
tlyihg alternative options thâfmâÿ lead to better results! Kolb (1984) further added that in 
order to ensure effective organisational learning, an organisation should establish the double 
loop learning method (See: Figure 3.7).
Kolb's learning cycle
depicting "instrumental" learning h]fl)othesis
expei generalization
"Double-loop" learning can m flS C tion
bring fundamental shifts In ~
understanding and involve emotions
new paradigm
understanding shift
emergent
knowing
Figure 3.7 Double loop learning model 
Source: Kolb (1984)
The concept of single loop is about responding to a problem based on past experience, record 
or procedure without considering and trying to search for the real source of the problem 
(Ritchie, 2009). For example, in the situation of a flood, a factory utilizes sand bags to 
prevent water from entering the building. When the flood becomes more serious, people 
respond by adding a double quantity of sandbags in the same manner that has been done in 
the past. In contrast, double loop, thinking leads the factory to assess the problem much more 
closely and examine the underlying assumptions. For example, the factory may discover that 
the drain system has been blocked by sewage and garbage, thereby discovering the source of 
the problem of why the water cannot be drained away from the premises.
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Similar to the double loop learning model, Revans (1977 cited in Jashapara, 2011) 
commented that it is necessary to implement action learning by encouraging staff to 
question the real cause of a problem rather than purely recommending or making analysis of 
given situations. The following is a simple mathematical equation combining cognitive and 
behavioural theory:
L (learning) = P (programmed learning) + Q (questioning insight)
(Revans, 1977 cited in Jashapara 2011, p. 127)
Jashapara (2011), however, commented on Kolb’s model, writing that the learning model has 
ignored the learner's motivation to leam and other factors that may disrupt the process of 
learning. People need an incentive to leam. For example, rewards or career development and 
political climates can lead managers to make decisions based on irrational grounds 
(Jashapara, 2011). Additionally, the model perceives the process of the teaming cycle in 
linear, but in a busy culture people may not have a chance to provide the feedback (Jashapara, 
2011). Pforr and Hosie (2007) added that double loop teaming seems to have many barriers 
to be achieved in practice.
March (1991) stated that both single loop (exploitation) and double loop (exploration) are 
important to promote a sense of teaming within an organisation. A teaming practice can be 
varied depending on organisational context. If a firm has scarce resources, avoiding the risk 
may be a better choice because exploration behaviour requires risk taking or experimentation, 
so its outcome is less certain and not guaranteed (Jashapara, 2011). However, it has been 
argued that firms which tend to focus on exploitation will achieve short term goals, though 
they could lose business opportunities in the long term (Jashapara, 2011).
Jashapara (2011) noted that in order to become successful in implementing teaming, the 
organisation should have an “error-harvesting” characteristic. Error-harvesting refers to an 
organisation where a group of team members work together to discuss problems, issues and 
collective appraisals on remedial measures and future action (Jashapara, 2011). Jashapara 
(2011) wrote that reflexive group implementation will promote “action teaming” and “quality 
circles” in organisational teams. However, error-harvesting is not an easy task to implement 
in some organisations where this phenomenon—called ‘defensive routines ’—is sited. Often 
defensive routines can arise from individuals not wishing to confront their own thinking to 
save themselves from threat and embarrassment, so they would rather act in a play-safe
75
manner (Jashapara, 2004). The barrier of learning will be further discussed later in the 
Section 3.6 on knowledge management facilitators and barriers.
In conclusion, this section provided several models related to knowledge management and 
also provide a model that would be a framework to help understanding key stages in 
knqv^ledge management process and investigate the r n q d e s  qf knowledge management for 
managing tourism crises in Thailand. The next section will present empirical research that has 
been conducted in relation to the knowledge management topic.
3.3 Knowledge Management in Business Sectors
This section provides relevant empirical research conducted by several scholars in three 
business areas of knowledge management implementation: (1) small/large firms, (2) multi­
organisation firms and (3) hotel and tourism firms.
3.3.1 Small Firm versus Large Firm
The study by McAdam and Reid (2001) was to compare the perceptions of both large 
organisations and small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with regard to knowledge 
management (KM) to improve overall understanding and synthesis of the philosophy and to 
develop sector-specific learning in the SME sector. They combined quantitative and social- 
constructionist-qualitative as research methodologies and used Demaresf s (1997) knowledge 
management process model to compare between large and small organisation regarding 
knowledge implementation (McAdam and Reid, 2001). The study revealed that the 
knowledge transfer process in a large organisation is more of a people-based knowledge 
management—e.g. informal discussion group, workshop and forum—than the SMEs because 
the SMEs lack resources for strategic business improvement such as labour and budget to 
arrange face to face meetings (Desouza and Awazu, 2006). The study also found that the 
application of kno\vledge for long-term business planning did not receive much attention by 
SMEs (Desouza and Awazu, 2006). The practice of knowledge was done to serve the need of 
SMEs’ customers in order to maximise the short-term benefit (Desouza and Awazu, 2006). In 
comparing to a large organisation, the SME sector had less advance in a mechanistic 
approach to knowledge and had a lack of investment in the knowledge management 
approaches and systems (Desouza and Awazu, 2006).
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Should small organisation neglect knowledge management implementation due to shortage of 
knowledge resources and finance? Wong and Aspinwall (2004) stated that disregarding the 
knowledge and letting knowledge to loss will result in greater risks in a small firm than in a 
large firm. It is because key knowledge is held in the minds of a few people, especially 
owners or managers (Wong and Aspinwall, 2004). When these people are away or key 
employees become sick, this will afiect business opérations (Nathan, 2000). But, in large 
films, there is more hierarchical organisation structure and more knowledgeable people on 
whom to depend (Wong and Aspinwall, 2004). Wong and Aspinwall (2004) argued that 
although small businesses do not have lot of knowledge management facilitators, SMEs 
could start to implement knowledge management from a small project in an area where the 
organisation needs it the most. This could prevent losing confidence in knowledge 
management practice and ensure that return on investment is the most valued aspect of the 
organisation. They suggested that job rotation and cross-functional training is the cheapest 
and most effective way to share knowledge in SMEs (Wong and Aspinwall, 2004).
Chen et al. (2006) claimed that external sources of knowledge are prime ones for small to 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), especially coming from customers. Their study uses a 
two-tier methodology with both questionnaire survey and interview approaches to investigate 
UK SMEs in the service sector (Chen et al., 2006). They suggested that in order to gain this 
kind of knowledge, good relationships with customers should be developed and maintained 
(Chen et al., 2006). However, their study’s suggestions overlooked the limitation on the 
knowledge capacity of small business.
The larger the size the more complexity there is likely to be in transferring knowledge. This 
argument is supported by the study of Claver-Cortes et al. (2007) which noted that large 
corporations tend to lead in system processes. Their research in six large Spanish firms 
revealed that those that have a flexible, flat organisational structure with fewer hierarchical 
levels will have better communication and teamwork among staff members because 
everybody can interact much easier (Northington, 2005, Claver-Cortes et al., 2007). Small 
organisations make it possible for employees to take better advantage of their competencies, 
generating organisational routines and increasing the value of their contributions with the 
freedom of action they are given (Claver-Cortes et al., 2007). The study proposed a solution 
for the large organisations which have a larger hierarchy in which they can opt to develop 
work teams and project-based groups, using communities of practices and communities of
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knowledge. In this way, it will help to bridge the gaps amongst staff, fostering more and 
better communication; and also to share and distribute knowledge about certain topics 
(Northington, 2005).
In brief, these empirical researches highlighted key different characteristics that are relevant 
to khovvledge management implementation in small firms versus large firms that will be 
summarised in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 The comparison of knowledge transfer and management process between 
large and small organisations
Size Absorptive capability Knowledge management implementation
Large Have an advanced mechanistic 
approach and sufficient capital to 
implement knowledge management 
(Desouza and Awazu, 2006).
Size o f  organisation and hierarchy could 
be barriers in knowledge transfer 
because members may find it hard to 
interact. A  large corporation tends to 
lead in systems processes (Claver- 
Cortes et al, 2007).
People-based knowledge management 
(McAdam and Reid, 2001).
Large organisation with large 
hierarchy can opt to develop work- 
teams and project-based groups, using  
communities o f  practices and 
knowledge (Claver-Cortes et 
al.,2007), (Northington, 2005).
Small The practice o f  knowledge management 
was done to serve the need o f  SM Es’ 
customers in order to maximise short­
term benefit.
Small businesses do not have many 
knowledge management facilitators; 
lack resources and capital (Desouza 
and Awazu, 2006), (W ong and 
Aspinwall, 2004).
K ey knowledge is held in the minds o f  a 
few  people, especially the owner or 
manager (W ong and Aspinwall, 2004) 
Flexible and fiat organisational structure 
(Claver-Cortes et al., 2007)
External knowledge is a prime source 
o f  knowledge (Chen et al., 2006).
Job rotation, cross functional training 
is the cheapest and the most effective 
w ay to share knowledge in SMEs 
(W ong and Aspinwall, 2004).
Source: Author’s presentation
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3.3.2 Multi-Organisations
This research aims to explore knowledge management for tourism crises in not only small 
versus large independent firms, but also chain firms. This part explains empirical research on 
knowledge management implementation in multi-organisations.
The issues of multi-organisations and knowledge management have been studied for over 20 
years (Siguaw and Enz, 1999). Among several studies, Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) pointed 
out that there are many complex issues in knowledge transfer from one unit to another in 
different geographical areas. The challenges of knowledge management between two firms 
are the characteristics of knowledge donor and recipient. To ensure the success of knowledge 
transfer, both donor and recipient must be equipped with an absorptive capability, learning 
motivation, and intra-organisational capability (diffusing facilities and skills) (Siguaw and 
Enz, 1999). Their study suggested that inter-organisation firms can leam from one another by 
training members of the recipient firm, planning social activities, and transferring 
experienced personnel, documents, blueprints or hardware (Siguaw and Enz, 1999). They 
noted that the success of knowledge transfer can be measured by changes in knowledge, 
levels of innovation or performance in recipient firms (Siguaw and Enz, 1999).
Strach and Everett (2006) studied knowledge transfer within Japanese multinational 
businesses and discovered distinctive management styles that could promote organisational 
learning. Japanese organisations normally equip their employees with a higher level of social 
status than western firms (Smith, 2005, Strach and Everett, 2006). Staff are expected to share 
their personal relationships and previous work, study and experience with other people in the 
company, resulting in employees developing a sense of belonging and tmst (Smith, 2005). 
Trust among individuals and an organisational unit is an essential factor in establishing 
motivation favourable to knowledge transfer (Boisot, 1995 cited in Strach and Everett, 2006). 
It was stated earlier that job rotation, flat organisational stmcture, and labour mobility could 
promote learning (Strach and Everett, 2006). However, these methods are restricted in 
Japanese organisations due to the fact that they believe more in fostering internal promotion 
and anti-extemal retention. The internal promotion practice leads to the development of a 
long term relationship and accumulation of essential knowledge and experience within the 
firm’s departments (Smith, 2005, Strach and Everett, 2006). The mechanisms for knowledge 
transfer in Japanese organisations are published in books, comics and other memorabilia 
related to their great leaders (Smith, 2005). Sharing the same myths, historical patterns and
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metaphors could promote knowledge transfer, especially in the form of uncoiled 
organisational knowledge (Smith, 2005).
Minbaeva et al. (2003) examined the effect of human resource management (HRM) practices 
on knowledge transfer within multinational corporations. It revealed that there were positive 
links among the employment of human resources practices; absorptive capacity of knowledge 
receivers; and supportive organisational learning environment, to the extent of knowledge 
transfer to the subsidiary (Stafford et al., 2002, Minbaeva et al., 2003). Moreover, the result 
of the analysis indicated the existence of two groups of HRM practices conducive to 
knowledge transfer (Stafford et al., 2002). The simultaneous effect of the first group of HRM 
practices consisting of “staffing”, “training”, “promotion”, “compensation” and “appraisal” 
on the extent of knowledge transfer was found to be positive and substantial. The hypothesis 
regarding the effect of corporate socialization mechanisms and flexible working practices 
(the second group of HRM practices) was not supported by the data (Stafford et al., 2002, 
Minbaeva et al., 2003)
In brief, comparison of independent firms with multi-organisations has to do with issues that 
are more complex. Knowledge transfer from one unit to another in different geographical 
areas requires and develops trust in sharing knowledge—this is important. In addition, to 
ensure the success of knowledge transfer, both donor and recipient must be equipped with the 
right absorptive capability, learning motivation, and intra-organisational capability (diffusing 
facilities and skills) (Siguaw and Enz, 1999) The mechanisms for knowledge transfer can be 
both codified and human-led knowledge forms through human resource management 
functions such as ‘staffing’, ‘training’, ‘promotion’, ‘compensation’ and ‘appraisal’. In 
western firms, job rotation and labour mobility could promote learning and knowledge 
transfer but these ways did not gain much attention in Japanese firms, because they believe 
more in fostering internal promotion. Japanese firms prefer to use a codified strategy as the 
knowledge transfer mechanism. As this research will explore the knowledge management for 
tourism crises affecting both small versus large and independent versus multi-organisational 
hotels, the knowledge management implementation in the tourism and hospitality industry 
will be discussed in the following part.
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3.3.3 Tourism and Hospitality Industry
Like other industries, competitiveness and survival adaptation are primary reasons the 
tourism and hospitality industry has to apply knowledge management to studies and practices 
(Malhotra, 1998, Cooper, 2006, Davidson and Voss, 2002). In tourism business sectors, a 
recent study shows that tourism and hospitality management considered knowledge 
management to be relevant concepts but they were confronted with too many unclear 
knowledge management strategies, activities and implementation techniques (Cooper, 2006). 
Therefore, Cooper (2006) suggested that the relationship between researchers and business 
should be tightened and formalized in order to promote the transfer of knowledge.
The definition of knowledge management for tourism by Davidson and Voss was cited in 
Cooper (2006) that it refers to applying knowledge assets available to tourism organisation to 
achieve competitive advantage. Having reviewed the definition in Section 3.1, this research 
will define knowledge management for the purpose of managing tourism crises.
In the tourism industry. Cooper (2006) attempted to provide a model of knowledge 
management to close the gap of research and offer insight and application. The model was 
aimed at a stock and flow concept (Cooper, 2006). He said that tourism organisation should 
be mapped, captured and codified knowledge to ensure that it is legible, relevant and useable 
(Cooper, 2006). Mapping is the way tourism organisation assesses the current environment to 
identify what knowledge is needed (Cooper, 2006). Then, knowledge in both tacit and 
explicit forms have to be captured from internal and/or external sources (Cooper, 2006). 
Once the tourism firm has acquired knowledge, then it must be stored preferably in a codified 
form as Cooper believed that it is an effective format for transferring information (Cooper, 
2006). Cooper (2006) further explained that knowledge can be flowed via 4 channels: 
technology system (website, social network); association system (industry meeting); 
regulation system (policy or laws); and infrastructure system (location where knowledge can 
be easily accessed such as public venues).
About the hospitality industry, Raeherla and Hu (2009) stated that it is dominated by 
enterprises ranking from small to large firms, fragmented across a variety of activities and 
vocational reinforcement such as poor resource practices militating against continuity of 
absorption. In addition, the industry is a mix of fragmented and heterogeneous business
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entities yet interrelated, each of them having its own process to retain knowledge; therefore, 
transfer is a complex task.
Hallin and Mamburg (2008) reviewed 19 published studies of knowledge management in the 
hotel industry. The study highlighted interesting knowledge management processes 
implemGnted b)  ^ hotels. To begin the first stage—knowledge acquisition—hospitality 
managers should assess the need for knowledge and real gaps in competencies before 
acquiring the knowledge (Agut and Grau, 2002).
The study reported that hotel staff generally acquire knowledge informally and spontaneously 
among themselves in their daily work life (0gaard et al., 2008). Training is still the main 
mechanism for staff to obtain new knowledge even though mostly done in the form of on-the- 
job training (OJT). OJT is an informal and unsophisticated method (Jameson, 2000). Agut 
and Grau (2002) claimed that one-to-one training was the best training method for knowledge 
acquisition, changing attitude, problem solving, interpersonal skill development, participant 
acceptance and knowledge retention in hotels. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) disagreed with 
OJT and one-to-one training as it may reduce the creation of diverse knowledge. They 
claimed this informal training may also cause organisational capacity and innovation to be 
cut. Hallin and Mamburg (2008) then suggested that the organisation should promote formal 
knowledge acquisition amongst staff, together with informal knowledge acquisition.
The second phase is knowledge storage and retrieval. Document files and computers were 
used as the storage tools in the hospitality industry (Hallin and Mamburg, 2008). Logbook 
and standard of procedure (SOP) were the most cmcial information stored according to Yang 
and Wan (2004). Other forms of data storage were used as well, i.e. sales reports, employee 
newsletter, and an intranet system (Yang and Wan, 2004). At this point, in the review of 
Hallin and Mamburg (2008) they had failed to investigate how hotel staff can retrieve 
knowledge and apply it to real situations.
The third phase is sharing and transferring of knowledge. There are two knowledge transfer 
channels: through either an individual or the firm. Hallin and Mamburg (2008) elaborated 
that the transfer mechanism at the individual level could be done through daily conversation 
among staff; and at the firm level through OJT, documents (logbook and standard of 
procedure), and technology (email system for tacit-to-explicit) (Yang and Wan, 2004, 
Jameson, 2000, Stevens and McElhill, 2000).
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The fourth phase is knowledge application. Knowledge management is conducted to develop 
a knowledge-based system. An example of a knowledge-based system currently used in some 
hotels is IS-JEK (intelligent system to support judgmental forecasting and knowledge) (Ben 
Ghalia and Wang, 2000). The information from this system will be used to forecast future 
room demand. However, this forecast is based on statistics and does not consider the external 
forces affecting the demand in each period; therefore, ahbther knowledge-based system" 
should be used to support the process of making the judgement (Ben Ghalia and Wang, 
2000).
The last phase is feedback and evaluation. Hotels normally conduct employee appraisals 
with both qualitative evaluation and quantitative appraisal programmes to investigate, 
measure and compare performance (Engstrom, 2003, Stacey, 2001). However, this feedback 
of evaluation process was not totally aimed at embedding knowledge within an organisation 
but rather used to indicate whether an organisation fails or has met their business objectives.
In conclusion, the implementation of knowledge management in tourism and hospitality is 
still in its infancy. Only a handful of empirical research studies that investigate knowledge 
management implementation in this industry were found. However, it is apparent that 
knowledge management has been established in day-to-day operation of the hotel. 
Generally, knowledge can be acquired informally and internally among staff in their daily 
operation and with on the job training. The knowledge is recorded in a more codified form to 
allow better circulation of knowledge amongst staff and for later retrieval. The knowledge 
normally will be applied to decision making on issues related to products and customers. The 
feedback of knowledge application will be gained indirectly through an appraisal programme 
of how well staff makes use of knowledge to make decision to solve problems. To narrow 
knowledge management specifically to managing tourism crises by hotels, the details will be 
revealed in the following section.
3.4 The Relationship between Knowledge Management and Tourism Crisis 
Management
The aim of this section is to explain the link between the concept of knowledge management 
transfer and tourism crisis management from the previous chapter. It begins with the 
significance of knowledge management for managing tourism crises. It is followed by a 
review of available research that has been conducted on tourism crises in hotel businesses.
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Many authors commented that the tourism industry is a late adopter of knowledge 
management because there are different perspectives defining the terms crisis, tourism and 
knowledge, as well as the chaotic nature of crisis (Pforr and Hosie, 2007). However, Ritchie 
(2004, p.68) notes that a small but growing body o f research on crisis management has been 
conducted in the tourism industryP
As mentioned earlier that global tourism has experienced many crises, the security plan to 
deal with environmental changes is likely to increase (Gossling and Hall, 2006). Fortunately, 
knowledge management involves stock—what is known and flows. How information is 
communicated will help firms to react quickly and appropriately to tourism crises (Blackman 
et al., 2011). Additionally, knowledge management plays an important part in identifying, 
recoding and sharing crises lessons (Robert and Lajtha, 2002). Faulkner (2001) pointed out 
one of the benefits of knowledge management: knowledge which is acquired or applied in 
novel ways can cause stakeholders to change their perceptions and ways to overcome 
situations. This emphasises that a tourism crisis can be a turning point when knowledge is 
recognised as being useful for planning in an on-going manner (Ruhanen, 2008).
Two studies were found. First is Mistilis and Sheldon (2006) who conducted studies under 
the title of ‘Knowledge Management for Tourism Crises and Disasters.’ Second is Raeherla 
and Hu (2009) who conducted studies under the title of ‘A Framework for Knowledge-Based 
Crisis Management in the Hospitality and Tourism Industry.’
To begin with, Mistilis and Sheldon (2006) created a knowledge-based system to respond to 
crisis management. The system is comprised of three separate types of knowledge for dealing 
with the three stages of a crisis. In knowledge base 1 (KBl), the knowledge will be obtained 
from both internal and external sources to create a response to crises in different scenarios. 
All stakeholders—for example, NGO, government, residents and businesses—are involved 
formally and informally in sharing storytelling of best practices. The possible crisis and 
capability of those who are involved in crisis management will be assessed to develop the 
database. In this stage, knowledge will be captured for decision-makers to enable information 
to be shared for creating new knowledge. It will be collected, possibly in policy manuals, 
both in web-based storage and in hard copy. Knowledge base 2 is the duration of a crisis 
when it hits, followed by plan activation, and finally a tourism crisis communication centre is 
developed to facilitate the operation. A crisis team is made up of representatives of 
stakeholders such as government, travel and tourism businesses, and community leaders.
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Knowledge base 3 refers to the phase where a crisis has subsided and knowledge has been 
captured for use in developing and implementing a recovery plan. The criticisms of Mistilis 
and Sheldon’s model are that the authors believe crisis will occur in a linear manner. 
Nonetheless, to be realistic, one or more crises could happen and create chaos. Also, the 
model assumes that crises will occur in familiar patterns. Therefore, feedback will help the 
team to handle events better the next time. Their work is more applicable to destinations, but 
my research will include exploration of knowledge management for hotels to manage tourism 
activities that affect guests in particular.
Other research that studied the hotel context was done by Racherla and Hu (2009). Their 
study aimed to develop a framework for knowledge-based crisis management in the 
hospitality and tourism industries to ensure the effectiveness of crisis response tailored to the 
lodging industry. The framework in Figure 3.8 has blended the model of knowledge process 
management and tourism crisis lifecycle while scope, efficiency, and flexibility are taken into 
account
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Figure 3.8 shows that in pre-crisis phases, a crisis manager would focus on crisis prevention 
and planning. So, knowledge acquisition, creation and storage were employed. The scope of 
crisis parameters should be broad enough to promote innovative ideas for encompassing 
possible crises. A technocratic approach was noted to be the most appropriate way to obtain 
knowledge from various sources, namely government regulations; scenario planning details; 
and relief agencies (Racherla and Hu, 2009). The knowledge attained would be codified so 
that it can be accessed later. During the crisis phase, knowledge retrieval, dissemination, and 
application would be conducted to strategically overcome crisis. Scope of knowledge 
integration would be narrowed to specific issues that arise. Both technocratic (knowledge 
from codified resources) and organisational approaches, (expertise, such as trained 
knowledge or prior experience) are required in this stage. Lastly, post crisis knowledge 
feedback from internal staff is needed to capture essential experiential knowledge. This 
feedback can be shared with other stakeholders to revaluate the usefulness of the knowledge.
After the framework was developed, Racherla and Hu (2009) tested it with exploratory 
research in lodging businesses in the Philadelphia region of the U.S. which comprises eleven 
counties in the states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware. Racherla and Hu (2009) 
used a survey to ask managers to rate both natural disasters and operational risks on the 
probability of oecurrence and level of control using a 5-point Likert-type scale. The study 
classified crises into 4 groups.
First, unexpected crises (a low probability of occurrence and a low level of control) are hard 
to predict and rarely happen. The types of knowledge required to deal with such crises 
include long-term expertise development in areas that can provide the required knowledge 
and training to suit local scenarios. Secondly, conventional crises (a high probability of 
occurrence and a low level of control) are predictable events but they cannot be easily 
contfolled by individual organisations. Typical countermeasures involve coping rather than 
attempting to control them. Thus, even though the level of control is low, the common 
occurrences of these crises provide opportunities for organisations to engage in substantial 
learning regarding how to deal with them.
Thirdly, tractable crises (a high probability of occurrence and a high level of control) result 
in relatively direct financial losses and are a threat to the competitive viability of the 
organisation. Knowledgeable staff and management coupled with proper investments in
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technology and equipment can develop sufficient countermeasures to help mitigate tractable 
crises. Interestingly, Racherla and Hu (2009) noted that countermeasures aimed at these 
crises also improve the hotel’s service quality. Actions taken to prepare for or manage these 
crises can also improve the hotel’s competitive position. Fourthly, extraneous crisesip low 
probability of occurrence and a high level of control) which often are neglected by 
management in pre-planning for thern, but deal with them \vhen they lead to loss of life, 
property, or goodwill.
The key to dealing with these crises is to establish risk prevention processes and regulations, 
and develop operational procedures from the best industry practices (Racherla and Hu, 2009). 
Key areas of knowledge includes managing regulatory and policy information, as well as 
developing learning and sharing of knowledge from best practices and well-trained 
employees (Racherla and Hu, 2009).
Having reviewed these relevant studies, the researeher finds that crisis has caused more 
complexity in managing knowledge in the hospitality industry. Reviewing research in a hotel 
context, only one study was found and that research was conducted using quantitative 
approaches. Thus, there is a need to explore the link of these two issues with other research 
approaches—i.e. qualitative—in order to have more in-depth understanding of the 
implementation of knowledge management for tourism crises.
3.5 Policymakers’ Involvement in Knowledge Management for Tourism Crises
In the previous chapter. Section 2.4.4 mentioned the roles of policymakers in tourism crisis 
management as eoordinators, planners, legislators, regulators, sponsors, stimulators, 
promoters, and protectors. This section attempts to elaborate on the roles of policymakers in 
relationship to knowledge management perspectives.
Blackman et al. (2011) added that policymakers should have a greater role in knowledge 
management. They confirmed the study of Carlile’s (2004 cited in Blackman et al., 2011) 
that the destination marketing organisation (DM0) should go beyond a marketing role and 
managing knowledge across boundaries during crises. The roles are transferring, translating, 
and transforming (Blackman et al., 2011). The details can be found in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3 Specific roles of policymaker in knowledge management for tourism crisis
R oles o f  policym akers : 
know ledge m anaging  
perspective
D escription
Transferring Identify source o f  knowledge from all key stakeholder.
Facilitating the discussion between members (face to face) through the u s e ...
o f  technology (video conference).
Translating Seeking, storing and transferring knowledge to relevant stakeholder. 
Finding new ideas or knowledge to solve crisis problems (environmental 
scanning).
Transforming - Having clear understandings o f  policymaking and practice and 
attempting to understand those o f  other stakeholders.
- Encouraging change o f  practice o f  stakeholder into vision-driven, rather 
than enforcement to get things done.
Source: Author’s presentation (Applied from Blackman et ah, 2011)
Paraskevas et al. (2012) studied crisis knowledge, types, flows and governance. There were 
32 tourism executives from business and policymakers interviewed (Paraskevas et al., 2013). 
The study eoncluded that there are 4 types of crisis knowledge that policymakers and tourism 
businesses need to share that are: procedural knowledge, behavioural knowledge, third party, 
and learned ignorance (Paraskevas et al., 2013). Following is an explanation of each type of 
crisis related knowledge.
Table 3.4 Type of crisis knowledge to be shared between policymakers and tourism 
businesses
Crisis knowledge Description
Procedural knowledge Explicit knowledge, rule-based such as Crisis management plan, operational 
continuity.
Behavioural
knowledge
Individual behaviour during a crisis determined by the individual’s psychology, 
personal judgement, risk attitude and b elief system.
Explicit forms: the standards that are shared through social interaction i.e. training. 
Tacit forms: role model behaviour.
Third party The External experts.
Learned ignorance Learning what you don’t know and filling in m issing knowledge through scenario 
planning and crisis plan testing.
Source: Author’s presentation (Applied from Paraskevas et al. (2013)
Their study also showed that different types of crisis knowledge flow in different ways and 
for different purposes (Paraskevas et ah, 2013). In a non-emergent crisis stage, all knowledge 
in the Table 3.4 was transferred between policymaker and tourism businesses in codified 
formats i.e. script, standard of procedures, poster course, and training. While in an emergent 
crisis, the social interaction becomes the main mechanism of sharing pertinent knowledge. 
Paraskevas et al. (2003) clairhed that although this knowledge cahhdt be static-^-especially in 
dealing with emergent crises— it could be experimented, rationalized and improvised 
(Paraskevas et al., 2013). Sayegh et al (2004) agreed that the crisis plan has a limitation, i.e. 
when things do not follow the plan (or its scenarios); an emotional response is a necessary 
component (consequence) in reaching a ‘rational’ decision (Sayegh et al., 2004).
Innovation and knowledge management go hand-in-hand. Hjalager (2010) reviewed 
published studies in innovation research in tourism, especially in innovation policy. The 
review indicated that policies required greater involvement and networking with industry 
partners by sharing resources—especially financial supports (Decelle 2006 and Hjalager et al. 
2008, cited in Hjalager, 2010). The availability of ‘free’ resources and the encouragement to 
SME’s are required to facilitate these processes. In the study of Pechlaner et al. (2005, cited 
in Hjalager, 2010) it was found that the cost of collaboration is often considered too high by 
SME’s. Hjalager (2010) also provided the key success factor of collaboration of 
policymakers and industry agents are being open to interaction, efficient technology transfer, 
and trustworthy leadership. However, she commented that the literature on tourism 
innovation policies is mainly conceptual or prescriptive, and with little empirical evidence 
(Hjalager, 2010).
In sum, this section shows that tourism crises have increased the complexity of the role of 
policymakers in relation to knowledge management. Policymakers’ specific role in 
knowledge management covers transferring, translating and transforming different kinds and 
forms of crisis knowledge as seen in Table 3.4.
3.6 Knowledge Management Facilitators and Barriers
It is widely accepted that knowledge management is a complex issue, with success or failure 
to implement knowledge management depending on several factors. One of the objectives of 
this research is to examine barriers and facilitators of knowledge management for tourism
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crises that affect hotel businesses. This part explains knowledge facilitators and barriers with 
empirical evidence.
Orzano et al. (2008) studied a knowledge management model for enhancing quality of health 
care. It utilised a qualitative analysis of transcriptions from observational and interview data 
c^ollëcfedln fdüTU.S.'^Midvvèsterh family cafe clinics (Ofzand ef al., 2008). They fepdfted 
facilitators that potentially influence and enhance knowledge management practice in 
knowledge-based entities such as health care. There are 8 relevant facilitators: (1) active 
network (2) reflective practice (3) helpful relationship (4) robust infrastructure (5) accessible 
technology (6) supportive leadership (7) effective communication, and (8) trusting climate 
(Orzano et al., 2008). With these facilitators, a business will be able to accomplish an 
outcome of making decisions to solve problems and establish a culture of organisational 
learning. Later, the organisation can achieve a long term outcome of improving 
organisational performance in terms of quality, product and service improvement, and 
employee satisfaction.
These eight facilitators can be grouped into 2 aspects; the first one is intangible support as a 
psychological backup and the second is tangible support to facilitate the knowledge process. 
Weick (2002) agreed that intangible aspects such as trusting environment and good 
relationship between leader and employees can facilitate knowledge management. The leader 
(knowledge champion) who shows a commitment to support knowledge management is a 
vital enabler to motivate staff to take risk, to share knowledge and to collaborate in 
knowledge sharing and reflective activities (Weick, 2002).
Riege (2007) provided a list of knowledge transfer barriers and actions that help managers to 
overcome thern. According to Riege (2007), key barriers of knowledge transfer that 
managers, especially in international organisations, need to consider are grouped into three 
categories: human, organisational, and technological challenges. Following is a review of his 
study which applied in-depth interviews with over 60 senior and middle managers in 20 
Australian-based multinational corporations (MNCs).
The first barrier is ‘human issues.’ Managers need to recognise that employees are diverse in 
terms of demographic background such as age, gender, education, and experience. Riege 
(2007) recommended that managers must provide a mentoring and coaching programme to
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eliminate the misperception. This would be more complex when dealing with an international 
organisation where languages and culture can become significant variables. Managers or 
team leaders need to minimise communication breakdown or cultural misunderstanding by 
using a specific common language. Additional issues concerning psychological effects are 
that people may lack several supporting skills and morality to facilitate the knowledge 
sharing such as fifhe-td-shafe dr to establish contact with internal and external khdwledp 
sources-as well as lack of sharing habit, interpersonal skills and social network. Riege 
(2007) agreed that human resource management functions and roles of senior and middle 
managers are key elements to overcome human barriers. To explain, senior and middle 
managers should know how to minimise and diversify barriers by encouraging and 
motivating people in an internal and external value chain to share their knowledge openly. 
A fear of sharing knowledge with a manager should be solved by that manager to promote the 
notion of sharing mistakes without worrying about managers’ status or authority (Cameron, 
1980). A no-fault learning culture must be established in order to facilitate learning transfer 
and the sharing of knowledge and experience without fear of failure or blame (Schianetz et 
al., 2007).
The second is ‘organisational barriers’ which covers several aspects, namely organisational 
culture, structure, business strategy, resources, and supports. “The transfer o f  knowledge is 
deeply rooted in personal and organisational value systems, norms, and practices” (Riege, 
2007, p.61). Riege (2007) suggested that knowledge sharing policies and activities should be 
integrated into corporate values and style and must be clearly linked to company goals and 
strategic direction. Riege (2007) recommended that it is a must to identify who needs to share 
what, where, why, when and with whom. Next step is to form small units or project teams to 
enhance direct communication and collaboration while methods and tools that encourage and 
facilitate direct and indirect communication flow should be considered (Cameron, 1980).
Riege (2007) also agreed that an organisational structure and hierarchy could affect the flow 
of information. Flat, flexible and open organisational structure would bring change and 
generate a spirit of teamwork. Chell (2001) pointed out that an innovative firm where there is 
a need for high employee empowerment; flexibility in organisational structure; informal and 
flat hierarchy; and having an organisational culture which stresses creativity, would require 
high financial investment. Empowerment, as an example, would require a greater investment 
in selection and training and higher labour cost to retain employees. In the perspective of a
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customer, empowerment may cause a violation to fair play because some customers prefer 
company rules rather than fluctuation of services (Bowen and Lawler, 2006).
The last is ‘technological barriers.’ Technology becomes a tool for knowledge sharing 
internally and externally. So, when it fails the employee work process and communication 
flow would be interrupted. Sharing information through technology would experience several 
problems as founded in Riege’s work (2007). For example, the mismatch amongst people 
requirement, lack of compatibility, user unfriendliness and lack of technology skills of user. 
To ensure that these barriers are minimised or eliminated, an audit of suitable technology 
should be implemented to upgrade or change the existing technology as well as providing 
training, which should be done to ensure that people can clearly and carefully understand 
how tools are to be used (Cameron, 1980).
Cooper (2006) and Racherla and Hu (2009) agreed that barriers to transfer knowledge in 
tourism are related to the nature of the industry itself. The tourism industry is dominated by 
small enterprises, fragmented across a variety of activities and low education level employees 
which can be a barrier in terms of absorptive capability. The issues become more complex 
when dealing with international chains where people encounter language and cultural 
differences. Cooper (2006) further claimed that cost is also a major barrier for 
implementation of knowledge management systems, especially when the result of 
implementation was not as expected. Other barriers related to the tourism industry are 
technology related issues (poor design interface and incompatibility to user), lacking of links 
between knowledge management and action, and last, no integration between knowledge and 
business strategies.
Enz and Siguaw (2003) raised an interesting point that organisational learning often begins 
with an individual champion introducing innovative ideas but when they leave their job, their 
ideas are discontinued (Enz and Siguaw, 2003). Hallin and Mamburg (2008) agreed that this 
type of situation can become a barrier in achieving innovation in the hospitality industry due 
to the following reasons. First, there is high mobility of managers in the industry. Second, 
there is a high rate of consolidation through mergers and acquisitions. This leads to 
difficulties in maintaining benefits of individual learning in the organisational system. 
Mobility and labour turnover are caused by job dissatisfaction due to low wages and low-self- 
esteem, for example. Nevertheless, labour mobility plays a central role in the development of 
skills and that turnover is stimulated by the presence of external labour (Deery and Shaw,
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1997, Deery, 2002). To maintain and benefit the most from knowledge management in 
hospitality companies, codified knowledge would be the best choice (Hallin and Mamburg, 
2008).
Having reviewed this empirical research concerning facilitators and barriers of knowledge 
transfer and management. Table 3.5 summarises a lig of them. This list will be used to 
identify and examine what were facilitators and barriers of knowledge management for 
tourism crises affecting tourism crises affected hotels in Thailand.
Table 3.5 Facilitators and barriers for knowledge management developed for this 
research
Faci itators for knowledge management Barriers for knowledge management
1 facilitators:
1) Active network
2) Reflective practice
3) Helpful relationship
4) Robust infrastmcture
5) Accessible technology
6) Supportive leadership
7) Effective communication, and
8) Trusting climate.
Orzano et al. (2008)
3 key barriers of knowledge transfer that 
manager especially in international 
organisations need to considerate are 
grouped into three categories: 
technological, organisational and people 
(TOP) (Riege, 2007).
Technology:
the mismatch amongst people
requirement, lack of compatibility, 
user unfriendliness and lack of 
technology skills of user 
Organisation:
culture, structure, business strategy, 
resources, and supports 
People:
Demographic background 
Different language and culture 
(Cooper ,2006)
Psychological effects 
Relationship leader and staff 
Motivations
Turnover (Enz and Siguaw ,2003)
Source: Author’s presentation adapted from Orzano et al. (2008), Riege (2007)
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3.7 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter commenced by discussing the term ‘knowledge management’ and the difference 
between knowledge compared with other relevant terms such as ‘data’ and ‘information.’ The 
term ‘knowledge’ refers to ‘actionable information’ which is stored in the right place and 
right form, to be retrievable for future usage. Knowledge can be found in different forms: 
explicit (in a manual, data set or software program) and tacit knowledge (skills, and 
experience embedded in individuals). À key theme that runs throughout the thesis is the need 
to understand the role played by different forms of knowledge, and the different approaches 
that are required to manage these distinctive types, and the relationships between them.
In a knowledge-based view, where organisational knowledge needs to be created and 
managed, this chapter also provided the process of knowledge management starting from 
knowledge acquisition, storage, retrieval and application. As knowledge—especially in tacit 
form—has been argued to be difficult to capture, this knowledge conversion model is also 
presented to provide ways of maximising organisational knowledge through the exchange of 
knowledge form. Another challenge of knowledge management is transferring knowledge to 
the appropriate individual or group at the right time. This chapter attempted to explain this 
issue through models of sources and channels with mechanisms and outcomes of knowledge 
transfers. Additionally, learning models have been discussed to offer understanding of how to 
utilise lessons learned from previous crises. In this thesis, the conceptual framework for 
knowledge management of tourism crises has been built on these models to investigate the 
practices in the context of hotel and policymakers in Thailand. Nevertheless, it is recognised 
that knowledge is a slippery concept, and one that is difficult to pin down conceptually, let 
alone in empirical analyses.
This chapter has also reviewed the research on knowledge management implementation in 
small versus large, independent and multi-organisations. Previous research has shown that, in 
different types of organisation, the implementation of knowledge management may vary 
depending on their understanding and awareness of the importance of knowledge, as well as 
the resources available to the firm. For instance, small organisations seem to lack resources to 
implement knowledge management. Meanwhile, the large and multi-organisation are 
concerned with handling massive amounts of information, complex organisational 
knowledge, and the tacit knowledge of a large number of culturally diverse staff and 
managers. This indicates the need to understand the highly contingent nature of management 
practices, and how these are strongly socially situated.
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Additionally, the literature also indicated that absorption capability was the main issue of 
knowledge transfer in the case of inter-organisation especially the policymaking organisation 
and hotels. Knowledge transfer is argued to be likely to be weak if the receiver does not 
have sufficient knowledge absorption capability. This is an important concept for this thesis, 
especially because of the way it addressed knowledge transfers both between and within 
orgahizatidhs. However, it is also acknowledged that absorption capacity is difficult to 
capture empirically, and is constantly shifting, especially in smaller organizations where the 
departure of a single key individual can be critical.
This chapter has also emphasised the importance of the role of policymaker with specific 
reference to knowledge management in tourism crises. It informed that policymakers have to 
go beyond being coordinators, planners, legislators, regulators, sponsors, stimulators, 
promoters, and protectors. They need to work on translating, transferring and transforming 
the knowledge of tourism crises as well.
This chapter also identified two recent studies that have some similarities in their approaches 
to this research: First, Mistilis and Sheldon (2006) who conducted studies under the title of 
‘Knowledge Management for Tourism Crises and Disasters.’ Second, Racherla and Hu 
(2009) who conducted studies under the title of ‘A Framework for Knowledge-Based Crisis 
Management in the Hospitality and Tourism Industry’ by using survey. However, Racherla 
and Hu (2009)’s work only focused on using survey methods to study the perception of top 
management in USA hotels. And, Mistilis and Sheldon (2006) focused only on the views of 
the policymaker (Destination management organisation). In contrast, this research has built 
on these two key studies and seeks to bring together research on the approaches to knowledge 
management of tourism crises of both policymakers and hoteliers in the context of Thailand
This chapter ends with a discussion of facilitators and barriers of knowledge transfer and 
management. There are 8 relevant facilitators according to: (1) active network, (2) reflective 
practice, (3) helpful relationship, (4) robust infrastructure, (5) accessible technology, (6) 
supportive leadership, (7) effective communication, and (8) trusting climate (Orzano et al., 
2008). The 3 key “TOP” barriers by Riege (2007) are: technology, organisation and people. 
The debate in the literatures showed that knowledge management process was complex and 
affected by these factors. Therefore, this list will be used to identify and examine which 
facilitators and barriers of knowledge management affecting tourism crises affected the
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implementation of hotels and policymakers in Thailand. In the next chapter, all of these 
issues will be discussed, but in context of Thailand relevancy.
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CHAPTER4 
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FOR TOURISM CRISES IN THAILAND 
4.0 Introduction
This chapter aims to provide a back^ouhd for the study cohtext. It has seven sections. The 
first section displays general facts about Thailand relevant to tourism and tourism crises, 
especially its geography, both physical and human, including economic background. The 
second section presents the development of tourism and hospitality in Thailand. It is fbllov^ed 
by the third section, a discussion on tourism crisis in Thailand and the analysis of the effect of 
crisis on tourism and hospitality in Thailand. The fourth section provides the context of the 
study which focuses on Thailand hotels. The fifth section explains the literatures on 
knowledge management implementation and tourism crisis management in Thailand. The 
sixth section reveals the research gaps evolving from review of literatures in Chapters 2-4. 
The final section is the conclusion of chapter four.
4.1 Background of Thailand
This research study focuses on tourism crisis in Thailand, therefore this section aims to 
provide a background of Thailand in aspects of its physical and human geography and 
economic data to build the understanding of its context and portray the discussion of the 
reasons for the crisis vulnerability in Thailand tourism in Section 4.3.3.
4.1.1 Physical and Human Geography of Thailand
According to Fellmann et al. (1997), knowledge of the physical and human geography will 
help foster an understanding of phenomenon in the region. There are two aspects to be 
discussed in this section physical and human geography (Thai culture value).
4.1.1.1 Physical Geography of Thailand
Physical geography determines the activities provided to travellers in specific areas. This 
section explains the relationship of physical geography that is related to tourism activities in 
Thailand.
Thailand, was called Siam until 1939, is situated in the middle of the Southeast Asia region 
and Greater Mekong sub-region (Loos, 2006, Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014). It shares 
boundaries with Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia and Myanmar as displayed on the map of
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Thailand in Figure 4.1. The Chao Praya River became the central nourishing focus of Thai 
civilization and history. Thailand has a population of 66 million (March 2, 2011 est.) and 
more than 70% of the population are in the 15-64 year age range (Bank of Thailand, 2012). 
The climate of Thailand is tropical—a rainy, warm, cloudy monsoon season flowing from the 
southwest (mid-May to September) and a dry, cool season of airs coming from the northeast 
(November to rhid-March)7 The southern peninsula region is always hot and humid. 
Therefore, visitors can experience distinct ecological zones, from the temperate forests of the 
northern mountains and the plains of central Thailand to the savannahs of the northeast and 
the mangrove forests of the southern coasts (Tourism Authority of Thailand, 2012). In the 
case of tourism, Thailand’s tourism resources can be divided into four categories: nature, 
archaeology, religion, and traditional culture. There are more than 100 national parks, 
including more than 20 marine parks, and each one features unique attractions, outstanding 
facilities, and opportunities to see a variety of flora and fauna of Thailand (Tourism Authority 
of Thailand, 2012). Therefore, tourists can enjoy several activities such as trekking, mountain 
hiking, photography, birding, camping, scuba diving, or getting up close to exotic animals 
such as the elephant, Thailand’s mascot (Tourism Authority of Thailand, 2012). This country 
has not only an advantage in terms of natural resources for tourism but also the evidence of 
ancient civilizations, which attracts tourists to travel throughout Thailand. There is an 
approximate area of 513,115 square kilometres comprising 77 provinces with more than 700 
attractions across many regions. The following are the highlights of tourism resources by 
regions, ranking from the most to the least popular, based on the statistics of international and 
domestic tourist arrivals in 2011 (Tourism Authority of Thailand, 2012b).
The first is the Southern region. It is located in the powerful ancient Srivijaya Empire. This 
region is well-known for antiques and sacred places showing the remains of past—even 
ancient—prosperity. The southern region also has natural attractions, such as famous pristine 
beaches, exotic islands, prominent mountain ranges and stunning waterfalls throughout. The 
unique native lifestyles of the southern region are of special interest, with a different 
traditional flavour, that attracts visitors to the south.
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Figure 4.1 Map of Thailand
Source: Country Report (Thailand) (2011)
The second is the central part of Thailand, which contains vast lowlands, with Bangkok as the 
centre of the country and the seat of government adorned with gorgeous palaces, temples, and 
historic antiques symbolic of the diverse traditional values associated with each local 
lifestyle. The central region also has many popular and well-known natural tourist attractions 
along the east coast.
The third is the northern region of Thailand that is well known for its ancient civilization and 
natural beauty of a high mountain landscape where famous traditional festivals and hill tribe 
lifestyles can be found. Northern people have the reputation of being friendly and gentle, and 
this can be observed by the way they speak and live.
Last is the north-eastern region, known as Tsaan’ which means ‘enormous wealth’. This 
region covers 1/3 of Thailand’s total land area with diverse high hill ranges (Phu), a natural 
abundance of scenic landscapes and the site of another one of the world’s ancient 
civilizations. The earliest historic site and painted pottery, aged from 5,000 to 7,000 years 
were also discovered here, along with numerous stone castles and relics of Buddha sites 
throughout the region. Their dialect and food is influenced by the Lao people’s culture and 
language since ancient times.
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4.1.1.2 Thaï Cultural Values
Hofstede’s argument that the study of management is determined by the human geography 
and pointed out that there is a distinction between Western and Asian culture. People are part 
of the culture of the society in which it takes place (Hofstede, 2007). Culture is defined as the 
sum of beliefs and customs that distinguish one group from another (Hofstede, 1994).
Table 4.1 Contrasting of between culture of Western European and Anglo countries and 
Thai
Western European and Anglo countries Thai
Individualism Collectivism (family oriented)
Explicit communication Implicit communication
Function oriented expression Relationship oriented relation
Low power distance High power distance
Divested information networks Top down information system
Systematic trust Personal trust
Seek to reduce uncertainty Accept or tolerate uncertainty
Source: Based on Hofstede (1984) and Thanasankit and Corbitt (2002), Vatanasakdakul (2007).
Based on Hofstede’s five dimensions, Thai people show respect to superior or knowledgeable 
people (See Table 4.1). So within the workplace there tends to be a big gap between boss and 
subordinates. Likewise, the study of Thanasankit and Corbitt, (2002) asserted that there is a 
strong link between the concepts of power in the Thai culture hierarchical forms of 
communication and decision-making process in Thailand. Thai staff tend to avoid 
participation or confrontation with supervisors, so input ideas are unlikely to be generated 
from staff. Vatanasakdakul (2007) also portrayed the collectivist and feminist character of 
Thai society that Thai people give high consideration to relationship between people. Thais 
tends to treat other people as if they are their family members, with care and tenderness. She 
commented that that these characteristics of relationship create a harmonious atmosphere and 
networking process (Vatanasakdakul, 2007).
After reviewing the physical and human geography of Thailand, one can see that it has a 
strong link to the availability of tourism resources and the behaviour of Thais in tourism
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organisation and industry in Thailand. Thailand has a variety of tourism products that can 
serve tourist demand; consequently, it has become one of the most popular tourism 
destinations in the world. Thai cultural value refleets the way of expression and pattern of 
behaviour of Thais in tourist industry organisations. This study is about the understanding of 
policymakers and hoteliers with regard to tourism crisis management and also the 
impleniehtatioh of knowledge mahagerneht of tourism crisis in organisatidhs. It would be 
interesting to know whether the uniqueness of culture determines their understanding and 
their implementation, or not.
4.1.2 Thailand Economy: An Overview
This section aims to explain the economic situation of Thailand and present the factors which 
support the service industry in beeoming an important economic sector.
For centuries, Thailand was a strong agricultural country, but since 1981 Thailand has been 
transformed from an agriculturally dominant structure to an industrially dominant one 
(Kaosa-ard, 1998). In 1985, the value of manufactured exports began to exceed that of 
agriculture.
From 1988 to 1993, the industrial sector took on a leading role in generating substantial 
exchange earnings for the Thai economy (Kaosa-ard, 1998). Factors that affected the ehange 
in the structure of Thailand’s industrialization were strong agricultural production as well as 
foreign investments (Kaosa-ard, 1998). Thailand has made a great effort in opening up and 
liberalising its privatisation programme. As a result, Thailand has had many foreign 
investors, especially from Japan (Kaosa-ard, 1998). In 1985, the value of textiles and clothing 
exports surpassed the export of rice, and reached a level three times the value of rice by 1991 
(Kaosa-ard, 1998). The four main manufacturing exports which were the driving force of the 
Thai economy between 1984 to 1987 were earmed foods, textiles, leather goods, machinery 
and eleetrieal products (Kaosa-ard, 1998).
Meanwhile, the serviee industry has become an important source of economic benefits. In 
1995, the service industry was approximately 14 percent of total export earnings and 49 
percent of the total income from the serviee sector. The foreign exchange income from 
international tourism has been greater than the country’s top ranking manufactured exports, 
including garments, computer components and equipment, rice, jewels and plastic products 
(Kaosa-ard, 1998). Therefore, the Thai government has recognised potential grovv4h and
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foreign exchange earnings from international tourism. Development of the tourism and 
hospitality industry will be further discussed in Section 4.2.
In September 1996, the depreciation of Thai currency (Baht) by about 26 % led to the 
collapse of stock and property markets. The International Monetary Fund provided Thailand 
$ 17.2 billion in loans but those funds were used to increase gôvëmmeht expenditure to pay 
the debt and interest (Wilsenblit, 1989). Table 4.2 shows that since 2000, the Thai economic 
situation has gradually recovered and become dependent more on an industrialized economic 
system. GDP has been growing steadily at an average of 4.04% over the last 12 years, 
including a -2.3% drop in 2009 due to domestic political uncertainty, the beginning of the 
international economic crisis, and the severe flooding that the central part of the country 
suffered. Despite that. Country Report of Thailand (Yu et al., 2005) reported that Thailand’s 
economy bounced back in 2010 from the previous year’s reeession, growing by 7.8%, its 
fastest pace of expansion in 15 years.
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Figure 4.2 shows that in 2011, Thailand’s economy ranked fourth in Asia, with a GDP of US 
$345.67 billion, of which 45.3% came from manufacturing, 42.5% from the commercial and 
service sectors which include tourism and only 12.2% from agriculture (Bank of Thailand, 
2011).
Agriculture
12%
Services
43%
Industry
45%
Figure 4.2 GDP contribution by sectors 
Source: Bank of Thailand (2011)
To conclude, the main challenges facing the Thai economy are: reducing dependence on 
foreign receipt, reducing the budget conflict, attracting new investment, and managing and 
preparing for global and national crises—  especially political, economic, and environmental. 
The statistics indicated that Thailand followed successful steps toward improving its 
economy. The reform agenda and the economic development policy have clearly 
eorresponded to the evolving global trends, and success has been attained in creating an 
attractive investment climate, in whieh business can thrive by tapping into the vast global 
market. As Thailand’s economy also gains substantial income from service sectors, tourism 
in particular should be given more attention. The next section will cover tourism and 
hospitality in Thailand and explain the importanee and characteristics of that industry.
4.2 Tourism Industry in Thailand
This section aims to present the development of tourism in Thailand to provide an 
understanding of historié development of Thailand tourism: its growth, its importance, and 
characteristics of the tourism products and tourist markets of this industry. The tourism and 
hospitality industry has become an important sector in many countries, including Thailand 
(Zhang et al., 2009, McDowall and Wang, 2009). Although Thailand is a small country, it is
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the top inbound market in South East Asia due to richness in cultural and historical sites and 
scenic natural beauty, renown cuisine, shopping and local and international events (Zhang et 
ah, 2009). Thailand’s international tourism receipts in 2011 (US $19.28 billion) account for 
5.58 % of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (Bank of Thailand, 2011). Tourism 
contributes to not only the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but also impacts positively on 
employment, investrhehf, fd re i^  exchange, and job creation (Tourism Authority of Thailand, 
2011b). In addition, it is a way to foster increased production, and maximize the usage of 
resources from other sectors (Bank of Thailand, 2011)
4.2.1 History of Thailand’s Tourism Growth
Historically, tourism in Thailand was launched during the reign of King Chulalongkom, 
when Krom Phra Kambaengbejra Agrayodhin, afterward Commissioner General of the Royal 
State Railway of Siam, sent publicity materials on Thailand to the United States. In 1924, a 
publicity section was established under the Royal State Railway of Siam. Its major obligation 
was to provide reception and facilitation services to international visitors and manage 
publicity campaigns (Wattanakuljarus, 2011).
Mass tourism in Thailand began during the Vietnam War (1959-1975) when Thailand 
became a recreational retreat for the US military (Nimmonratana, 2000 in McDowall and 
Wang, 2009). Similarly, Cohen (2001) stated that rapid development of the tourism industry 
in Thailand began in the late 1960s and became mass tourism in the1980s and 1990s. The 
motivation of the boom of tourism was based on ‘hedonistic appeal’ (Peleggi, 1996,p. 433 in 
Cohen et al., 2001,p. 157) ‘the exotic and erotic’ (Berger, 2007). However the connection 
between tourism and sexuality as the main drive of tourism (pull) motivation to visit Thailand 
may be too narrowly defined and based on personal experience as well as secondary sources 
(Rittichainuwat, 2008). Nevertheless, with the receipts from US military tourists, Thai 
government recognised the importance of tourism and established an organisation to manage 
tourism activities and develop positive positioning of Thailand tourism. These tourism 
products and markets will be further discussed in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.
In 1960, the Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) under the Ministry of Tourism and Sports 
was established as the official organisation to promote tourism activities in Thailand. TAT is 
the organisation responsible for promoting the country’s tourism. In 1972, the Thai 
government initially planned to promote tourism and serviee business to the international
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market under the ‘commerce and services’ sector in Thailand’s Third National Economic and 
Social Development plan (NESDP) (1972-1976) (McDowall and Wang, 2009). This master 
plan provided strategic guidance for Thailand’s economic and social development. To 
overcome the negative image, TAT then began to introduce cultural and seaside tourism 
through a series of campaigns such as ‘Visit Thailand Year’ (1987), ‘Thailand Arts and 
Crdfts Year’” (1988-T9'89), and ‘Amazing Thailand’ (1998-1999) (Cohen ef dl., 2001).
Thailand tourism today has shifted itself from being a mass market towards a ‘high quality’ 
target market with smaller numbers of tourist since 2011. The reasons for the focus of 
tourism in Thailand were: (1) to avoid being over-dependent on existing tourism market 
segments (2) the recognition of some negative tourism impacts from tourism development, 
especially environmental and social problems and (3) the influence of the “sufficiency 
economy” philosophy of His Majesty King Bhumibol. His Majesty’s principle of “sufficiency 
economy” was introduced over many years, and is currently adopted as a comprehensive 
framework for sustainable development in every area in Thailand, including the tourism 
industry. TAT explains the principle as follows:
'’Sufficiency economy is a philosophy that stresses the middle path as the overriding 
principle for appropriate conduct by the populace at all levels. This applies to 
conduct at the levels o f  the individual, families and communities, as well as to the 
choice o f a balanced development strategy for the nation so as to modernize in line 
with the forces o f  globalisation while shielding against inevitable internal and 
external shocks and excesses that arise. ”
(Tourism Authority of Thailand, 2010, p.l cited in Choibamroong et al., 2011)
Choibamroong et al., (2011) commented that this principle will be the guideline for Thailand 
tourism businesses to operate in a more sustainable way and have greater immunity to cope 
with changes or shocks from both within and without the nation. He further stated that 
knowledge and moral integrity are key prerequisites to implenient this concept. The idea of 
having superior knowledge would help to increase the resilient capability of Thailand to 
overcome unexpected changes (tourism crises) influenced by the forces of globalisation.
Since this research aims to be related to the issues of knowledge management for managing 
tourism crises, it would therefore fit with the present trend of tourism in Thailand that has 
gradually adopted the sustainable tourism concept and principles of a sufficiency economy.
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The next part will present the tourism products that are available to Thailand tourism 
markets.
4.2.2 Thailand Tourism Products
It is apparent from the growth history of tourism in Thailand that the early stage of the 
development was driven by the government and tourism business sectors in order to 
maximise profit from mass tourism. The tourism products of Thailand from the past were 
recognised by international tourists as the 4Ss i.e. Sun, Sand, Sea, and Sex. The first three Ss 
are constituted from the natural geography of Thailand which has access to the sea and 
beautiful beaches in the southern part and along the Eastern coasts. The last S is obviously 
influenced by the early image of Thailand as a Rest and Recreation (R&R) vacation 
destination of American GIs between 1966 and 1974 (Kontogeorgopoulos, 1998b). Thailand 
tourism products were internationally associated with “exotie kingdom” and “erotic 
destination” (Kontogeorgopoulos, 1998b). Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) has tried to 
underscore this by providing a clearer positioning of the country’s tourism products 
(Choibamroong et al., 2011). According to Choibamroong et al. (2011) from 1998 to 1999, 
TAT launched ‘Amazing Thailand’ as a marketing eampaign and reclassified the tourism 
products into seven categories under the theme ‘Seven Amazing Wonders’, which are as 
follows:
• Thainess: The art of Thai living, traditional Thai hospitality, lifestyles and 
eultural tourism products.
• Treasure: Heritage and history, world heritage sites, historieal attractions, 
temples and museums.
• Beaches: Thailand popular beach resort destinations.
• Nature: National parks, soft adventure and ecotourism products.
• Health and Wellness: Medieal tourism, spa and health resorts.
• Trends: Boutique hotels, shopping centres, dining and night life.
• Festivals: International and Thai festivals and events.
The success of the Amazing Thailand slogan led to the remarkable growth in the number of 
international tourist arrivals. Nevertheless, the negative tourism impacts become obvious, 
caused by tourism over-carrying capacity. To address the earrying capacity problem, 
Thailand has moved from a mass tourism focus toward more tourism sustainable practiees.
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Currently, the tourism products are based on alternative tourism which concerns more with an 
environmental focus—namely eco-tourism, green tourism and responsible tourism 
(Choibamroong et ah, 2011).
Since 2011, TAT has strongly emphasised minimizing tourism's environmental footprint.
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society to ensure long-term sustainable tourism marketing as ean be seen from TAT's green 
slogan for the domestic market, ‘Travel with New Hearts for a Sustainable Thailand.’ And, 
for the international market, ‘Go Green, Go Thailand’. TAT's concept of Seven Greens, 
which includes Green Hearts, Green Logisties, Green Destinations, Green Community, Green 
Activity, Green Service and Green Plus, are the ultimate combination of eco-concem and 
visitors' Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) awareness (Tourism Authority of Thailand, 
2011a). The seven greens concept will affect targeted tourists of Thailand in the future. The 
following part will explain the segments of tourists in Thailand.
4.2.3 Segmentation of Tourism Market in Thailand
'"Tourists are not all the same, they have different pictures o f  their ideal vacation."’ (Dolnicar, 
2007, p. 129). Henee, it is important to have an understanding of tourists—their behaviour, 
attitudes, needs, and wants—and to identify which market segments Thailand has previously 
and currently depended upon. Market segmentation is the strategic tool to group tourists 
according to heterogeneity (Dolnicar, 2007).
Comparing the number of domestic and international tourists between 2009 and 2011 in 
Table 4.3, it can be seen that the number of domestic tourists in Thailand is higher than the 
number of international tourists, varying from 20% higher in 2011 up to 140% higher in 2009 
and 2010. However, the amount of average expenditure is much higher from the foreign 
tourists: 120% higher in 2009 and 90% higher in 2011; and the length of stay is also higher 
for the international tourists. The international tourists length of stay is more than twice that 
of national tourists in 2009 (120% more), 70% longer in 2010 and 60% longer in 2011.
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Table 4.3 Situation of domestic and international travellers 2009-2011
Item
2009 2010 2011
T hailand B an gk ok T hailand B an g k o k T hailand B an gk ok
Tourist
77,235,686 21,364,871 96,933,869 26,550,700 111,574,991 30,649,772
■54,698,887 ■ 11,993,988 68,463,373 - 16,106,524 - 75,698,416 16,847,839 -
Foreigners 22,536,799 9,370,883 28,470,496 10,444,176 35,876,575 13,801,933
Avg. Expenditure (Bath/Person/Day)
2,727 3,428 2,778 3,571 2,887 3,449
Thai 1,724 2,553 1,944 2,858 2,042 2,717
Foreigners 3,839 4,013 3,967 4,326 4,022 4,178
Avg. Length of Stay (Days)
3.17 4.12 3.11 4.07 3.23 4.10
Thai 2.35 2.57 2.59 3.15 2.73 3.39
Foreigners 5.15 6.11 4.37 5.48 4.28 4.95
Number of National/International ’ 
tourists 2.4 1.3 2.4 1.5 2.1 1.2
Avg. Expenditure 
International/National 2.2 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.9 1.5
Avg. Length of stay 
International/National 2.2 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5
Source: Author’s presentation from statistics provided by Department of Tourism, Ministry 
of Tourism and Sports.
Although international tourists are the primary target group of Thailand’s tourism, Suraphon 
Svetasreni, Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) governor, commented that domestic 
travellers are less vulnerable to seasonality fluctuations and the first to make a comeback 
after any unexpeeted crisis, such as floods (France, 2012). The tourism authority of Thailand 
thereafter initiated a marketing eampaign, using the marketing slogan “New Thinking, New 
Perspectives—Travel in Thailand Can Yield More Than You Think” to motivate domestie 
tourists to travel.
Bangkok, a gateway of the national tourists, is ehosen to be the area for the study. Therefore, 
the section will provide further understanding of international tourists.
The international tourist elassification was initially developed by Tourism Authority of 
Thailand whose interest lay in monitoring the growth of international tourism. However, the 
record of tourist statistics in Thailand lacks consistency in data collection. Data during 
1998-2007 was collected by TAT and from January 2007 onwards, the tourist’s statistics
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have been collected by the Department of Tourism, Ministry of Tourism, and Sport. The 
analysis of tourism segments in this part will be taken from Department of Tourism.
Figure 4.3 shows a comparison amongst tourist arrivals by tourist generating region in years 
2005, 2010, 2011, and 2012. The three main regions of tourist market of Thailand came from 
East Asia (mainly China, Korea, and Japan), ASEAN (mainly Malaysia and Singapore), and 
Europe (mainly UK, Germany and France).
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Africa 24.64%  
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2.54%
Oceania
4.48%
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7.24%
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Oceania East 
S o u th 4  8 1 % 2.61%  Africa
Asia \  I ^0.99%
6.05% _
A m erica___
4.90%
East Asia 
54.13%
28.06%
East Asia 
52.57%
Figure 4.3 Percentage of tourists per tourist generating region 
Source: Department of Tourism (2012)
Figure 4.4 shows total incomes gained from tourists by tourist generating region in 2011. 
Although there were around twofold Asian tourists, European tourists spent more money in 
total. It means that the spending of European tourists is twice that of Asians (East Asia, 
ASEAN and South Asia).
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Figure 4.4 Tourist receipts per tourist generating region 
Source: Department of Tourism (2012)
Table 4.4 shows the evolution of the top 10 tourists’ nationalities arriving to Thailand from 
2007 to 2012. Malaysian tourists stayed at the top until 2011. However, the rapid evolution of 
China’s economy in recent years, has allowed Chinese tourists to rise to top position in 2012. 
An increase of Russian and Indian visitations can also be seen; in fact, from all of the 
emergent economies. According to the data of TAT, the tourist flow from Russia to Thailand 
increased by 57% in 2011. Thailand received 1,014,000 Russian citizens in 2011, according 
to the Association of Tour Operators of Russia (ATOR), 2012 Even the flood in Thailand did 
not affect the tourist flow from Russia. Russia outstripped such countries as Korea, USA, 
Germany, France, and UK—giving way only to Malaysia (2.5 million people), China (1.76 
million) and Japan (1.12 million). According to ATOR Analytical Service, Thailand became 
one of the priority destinations for Russians during the New Year holidays. A great influence 
on the growth of tourist flow to Asian countries was exerted by the situation in Egypt and a 
great excess of air transportation (Association of TourOperators of Russia, 2012). Contrarily, 
European countries such as UK and Germany have been progressively losing position. 
Germany has dropped down from the top 10, possibly because of the current financial 
economic crisis in Europe.
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Table 4.4 The top ten tourism market in Thailand by country from 2007 to 2012
1 Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia China
2 Japan Japan Japan China China Malaysia
3 Korea Korea UK Japan Japan Russia
4 China China China UK Russia Japan
5 UK UK Laos Korea Korea Korea
6 USA Australia Australia India India India
7 Australia U SA USA Laos Laos Laos
8 Singapore Laos Korea Australia Australia UK
9 Germany Singapore India Russia UK Australia
10 India Germany Germany USA USA USA
Source: Department of Tourism (2012)
In conclusion, an analysis comparing receipts by tourist and region has been made in graph 
4.5:
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Figure 4.5 Receipts per tourist and region in 2011 (THB per tourist)
Source: Department of Tourism
Considering Figure 4.5, it is clear that the long-haul markets (Europe, Americas, and 
Oceania) proved to be the most beneficial in terms of revenues in 2011, probably due to the 
higher affluence of Europeans and Americans. Meanwhile, the short-haul market and its 
economies are growing fast and steadily, so attention should be given to them as well.
1 1 2
With this understanding of the type of tourists that travel to Thailand, it is worth knowing to 
what extent these market segments are sensitive to tourism crises. Campiranon and Arcodia 
(2007) studied market segmentation in time of crisis by using Thailand as a case study. The 
objective was to study qualitative methods employed by 37 organisations that offer Meeting 
Incentive Convention and Event (MICE) services in Thailand (Campiranon and Arcodia, 
2007) . The finding reveals that long-haul markets appear to be the niainstfeam of fëveriüé for 
a number of organisations offering MICE services, due to higher spending levels. However, 
they claimed that to attract these markets in time of crisis appears to be problematic. First, 
long- haul markets tend not to have good geographical understanding which is why they are 
quite vulnerable to crises (Campiranon and Arcodia, 2007). For example, SARS happened in 
Singapore and Hong Kong but tourists in Europe had an impression that those locations are 
close to Thailand therefore they have decided not to come to attend their meetings in 
Thailand.
The overseas MICE markets—especially the long haul market—are susceptible to crises due 
to two major factors, which are news and travel advisory notices issued by governments or 
some other reliable source. First, overseas tourists rely heavily on news which is normally 
overwhelmed with the crisis. Sometimes the news depicts a very negative image of the 
situation and repeats those images again and again when the situation has improved 
(Campiranon and Arcodia, 2007). Second, travel advisories issued by the government or a 
reliable association also causes MICE to be vulnerable because the tourist would listen to 
those advisories (Campiranon and Arcodia, 2007). If the government or the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) issues a travel advisory concerning a risk in travel to Bali, for example, 
few organisations would ignore this advisory. These two dominant factors significantly 
influence the decision-making process of the MICE tourists. Consequently, any life 
threatening situation will make the MICE tourists hesitate to visit that area. This is mainly 
because they feel that the crisis, e.g., the tsunami, might happen again. They also feel that the 
destination might be unattractive or the essential infrastructure may be negatively affected by 
the crisis (Campiranon and Arcodia, 2007). Some tourists say that they feel that it is 
inappropriate to enjoy their activities while local people are suffering from the aftermath of a 
crisis (Campiranon and Arcodia, 2007). In addition to the local market, the short-to-medium 
haul market (regional market) also tends to be targeted in time of crisis, but not the long haul 
market, because a regional market has better understanding of the crisis. It is also important 
that organisations take an issue of culture differences into account and be able to adapt their
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marketing strategy accordingly (Kotler and Armstrong, 2013). In different crises, certain 
markets may be more vulnerable than other markets according to cultural differences.
From the study above, we can say that long haul markets are generally more sensitive to 
crises than short haul, short-to-medium haul market (regional market) and domestic markets. 
Hbwevefrfrdm the statistics by TAT, the long haul (the Europeans and Americans) remain as 
the major source of receipt per tourist so there should be some mechanism to enhance the 
effectiveness in tourism crisis management, i.e. knowledge transfer and management. 
Knowledge management is a key, but the practice of knowledge management for managing 
Thailand tourism crisis remains to be investigated especially for the hotel markets.
This section provides understanding that Thailand still depends on international tourists. 
There is a difference in crisis reaction between international and domestic tourists. The 
international tourists seem to be more sensitive to crises. Domestic tourists have gained more 
attention as the tourism Authority of Thailand recognizes that they are less vulnerable to 
seasonality fluctuations and the first to make a comeback after any unexpected crisis.
4.3 Tourism Crises in Thailand
McDowall and Wang (2009) analysed International Tourism development in Thailand 1994 
to 2007 by using A SWOT analysis. They reported that the strength of Thailand’s 
international tourism was not only derived from tourism resources, but also from other 
factors—location (being a tourism hub of Asia), accessibility and marketing efforts by 
TAT—to promote the country to the international market (Zhang et al., 2009, McDowall and 
Wang, 2009). Thailand has much opportunity for potential growth in tourism due to the 
increase of Chinese, Russian and Indian travellers. However, the development of tourism has 
also provided negative impacts on the socio-cultural dimension, i.e. sex tourism. McDowall 
and Wang’s (2009) work further emphasised one major weakness of Thailand tourism: it 
lacks established security and safety services. When crisis occurred, this factor affected 
tourist decisions to travel, as explained earlier by the work of Campiranon and Arcodia 
(2007). Therefore, this section presents past tourism crises in Thailand and introduces the 
working team in Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Center: (TIC) that is the 
policymakers of this study. This will be followed by an analysis of key factors that made the 
tourism business in Thailand more vulnerable in tourism crises.
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4.3.1 Past Tourism Crises in Thailand between 2001-2012
As stated in Chapter 2, in the researcher’s consideration of tourism crisis management, the 
definition of tourism crisis varies according to the context to which it is being applied. This 
section’s research focus is on tourism crises that affect hotels, an essential part of tourism 
business. According to Sonmez et al. (1994) and Beirman (2003), any event that would be 
considered as a ‘tourism crisis’ must be an occurrence that disrupts the normal operation of 
the tourism industry—not only the tourists’ activity but also the tourism businesses and 
wellbeing of stakeholders in tourism.
Based on the above definition, Thailand has encountered several tourism crises throughout 
the industry’s history. As this study employed the case study strategy, a specific scope of 
research needed to be put in place. The researcher has set the parameter of the research on 
crises that occurred between 2001 and 2012 because of two reasons. First, this period 
contains key tourism crises including pre and post crisis years as shown in Figure 4.6. 
Second, 10 years was maximum for reliable memory recall. The list of tourism crises that 
will be explained below were accumulated from secondary sources, such as newspapers, 
journals, websites and articles.
Figure 4.6 shows that from 1990 to 2000, tourism recovered from a downturn as the number 
of international tourists to Thailand increased despite the Gulf War in 1991 and the 1997 
Asian Economy Crisis due to heavy marketing effort by TAT (McDowall and Wang, 2009). 
The international arrivals to Thailand continued to grow till 2002. The number of tourists 
suddenly declined by 7.27% due to the SARS epidemic in 2003. And again, after the 
Tsunami at the end of 2004, the number of tourists declined slightly by 1.45%. Figure 4.6 
shows that tourism experienced a rising trend from 2005 to 2007. Unfortunately, several 
political disturbances in 2010, and later the floods at the end 2011 became the two main 
national crises. These same floods are expected to cause a drop in tourist arrivals again during 
2012. However, 2011 was the best year for tourism on record even though there was the 
negative impact of the severe flooding in the last quarter of the year. It could be that not all 
famous areas were affected; therefore, tourists would have a choice to visit alternative 
attractions.
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Figure 4.6 International arrivals to Thailand from 1998 -2011 and crises between 2001-2011  
Source: Author’s presentation
After seeing the pattern of international tourism arrivals between 2001 and 2006, it is 
apparent that tourism crises that most affected the Thailand tourism industry were the events 
triggered by the natural disaster of the tsunami and the (SARS) epidemic. Based on severity, 
probability, and level of uncertainty these two events would be classified as highest shock 
(S4) or mega crisis (Prideux et ah, 2003 Ritchie, 2009). However, with the edge of 
technology of current Tsunami monitoring systems and modem medical treatments, level 4 
incidents (the maximum level of shock) can be lowered to as low as level 2 or 1 (Ritchie, 
2009).
After 2006, a major tourism crisis was triggered by many events related to political instability 
in Thailand. This type of crisis may not be ranked as high shock like the Tsunami event of 
2004, but the duration of this crisis lasted much longer (sustained crisis); therefore the impact 
was greater according to Parsons (1996).
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4.3.2 Policymakers in Tourism Crisis Management in Thailand
“The TAT s^ experience shows that no matter what type of crisis occurs— economic, 
political, health issues, natural disasters, or terrorism—there is always some impact 
on the tourism sector. International travellers are very sensitive to situations and 
incidents, particularly in today ^ s world where news travels very fast through many 
channels, especially those online. ”
Mr Suraphon Svetasreni 
Governor of the Tourism Authority of Thailand
(Svetasreni, 2009)
Realising the importance of developing resilience to difficult situations, Tourism Intelligence 
Unit and Crisis Management Center: (TIC) was established in in 2007. It is the brainchild of 
the Minister of Tourism and Sports. It was expected to enhance the Thai travel and tourism 
industry’s response to the challenges and uncertainties of highly competitive operating 
environments shaped by the forces of globalisation and natural crises (Tourism Authority of 
Thailand, 2010).
Figure 4.7 shows the organisation chart of Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management 
Center: (TIC). Its working teams included the Immigration Department, Tourism Police, 
Ministry of Transport and Communication, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Relations 
Department, private sectors in travel and tourism and also related associations, societies and 
clubs , the Thai hotels Association and airlines as shown in Figure 4.7 (Svetasreni, 2009).
The Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Center is the group which enacts 
policies on tourism crisis management. They are also a pressure group toward the legislature. 
They work mainly on monitoring situations that cause changes in the Thai Tourism industry 
as well as sharing and exchanging information amongst TAT, state agencies, and tourism- 
related agencies (Svetasreni, 2009).
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This segment illustrates that crises are factors affecting the number of tourist arrivals which is 
the main source of income for the tourism industry. To strengthen the ability of Thailand in 
crisis management this working group was established to monitor, share and exchange 
information concerning crises that can affect the tourism business. This research therefore 
aims to analyse differences between understandings and objectives of policymakers versus 
those of hotels for managing tourism crises that affect hotel businesses. Additionally, 
knowledge management practice between the policymakers and hotels will be investigated. 
The next part will discuss the factors that made Thailand become crisis-vulnerable in tourism.
4.3.3 Analysing Thailand and Crisis Vulnerability in Tourism
Vulnerability is defined as the degree to which a destination or a business tends to be prone to 
becoming stressful or change to something new (Calgaro and Lloyd, 2008). In this research, 
vulnerability refers to the level to which Thailand, and tourism and hospitality businesses, 
will be exposed to tourism crises.
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Calgaro and Lloyd, (2008) stated that there are five factors that help to explain why some 
destinations are vulnerable to crises: (1) nature of tourism industry, (2) fragility of destination 
images to negative perceptions of risk, (3) dependency on revenue from tourism, (4) heavy 
dependence on international market and (5) high levels of seasonality. He claimed that 
Thailand is among the countries which have all these characteristics (Calgaro and Lloyd,
Thailand has a high potential for exposure to crisis because of its location which encounters a 
high magnitude of impact from natural hazards such as tsunami, flood, and earthquake. For 
example, the heavy rain in rainy season often causes flooding yearly in several provinces, 
including Bangkok, the capital city that is located along the Chao Praya River.
In terms of its economic situation, Thailand is a developing country; therefore, the economy 
is still unstable. The traditional agricultural livelihood has been rapidly replaced by industrial 
and service industries. However, with the limitation of knowledge, and money to invest in 
state of the art production, manufacturing in Thailand depends on foreign investments. When 
there are problems of world economic crisis and uncertainty in the political system, investors 
tend to reduce their investments which put the economic situation in Thailand at risk.
Any intent to change the profile of Thailand to become a service-based country later in the 
20^  ^century seems to be in the distant future, but unfortunately, it caused Thailand to already 
be highly dependent on tourism. Tourism is a significant source of income but the target 
markets are international, especially the long-haul group that yields the highest receipts 
which is very sensitive to crises (Campiranon and Arcodia, 2007). Thus, when crisis 
occurred, this group was likely to cancel travel to Thailand.
Cassedy (1991) and Murphy and Bayley (1989) stated that tourism business and industries 
organisations are often ill-prepared for crisis management. Roux-Dufort (2007) assumed that 
the reason that many managers refuse to prepare for crisis is because they are influenced by 
an event-centred approach in which crisis is regarded as an act of God or misfortune. It is a 
fatalism attitude to presume that nothing can be done to prevent crises.
Nevertheless, Thai government has attempted to respond to tourism crises as can be seen 
from the establishment of the working group in 2007. To strengthen the resilience level of 
tourism crisis, cooperation with business is required as an aspect of learning and adaptation 
capabilities in response to shocks. Having said all this, the issue of knowledge management
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practice to promote proactive tourism crisis management in Thailand needs to be thoroughly 
studied.
4.4 The Context o f the Study: Thailand Hotels
As stated in chapter 1, this study’s main aim is to explore knowledge management for 
tourism crises in  Thailand from_2001 to 2012 and to understand.how this is manifested in the 
hotel sector. To better understand hotels as the context of the study, this section provides the 
rationale for choosing hotels as a context of the study, the history of hotels, facts about the 
number of hotel establishments and the types of hotels in Thailand that will be the focus of 
this study and rationale.
4.4.1 Rationales for Choosing Hotels in Thailand as a Context for the Study
The hotel is the important business of the tourism and hospitality industry in Thailand, 
yielding high income and increased employment (Nuehailek, 2012). Today, the hospitality 
industry has become one of the important sectors in Thailand. Employees in hotels and 
restaurants represented 12.09 % of the labour force in 2011 amongst non-agricultural sectors 
(Bank of Thailand,2011). Therefore, this research focuses on hotels in Thailand for two main 
reasons:
First, hotels represent a service business that is one of the most susceptible and vulnerable 
industries to crisis (Santana 1997, p.221). Hotel revenue is dependent on occupancy rate. 
Crisis can be perceived as an unfavourable condition that can affect tourists’ decisions to 
travel and stay in the areas that are affected by a crisis. Especially, hotels which are located in 
Thailand have a high exposure to several types of crises as mentioned in Section 4.3.
Tourism crisis can affect the balance of supply and demand in the hotel industry. Nuehailek 
(2012) analysed the pattern of supply and demand of hotel business in Thailand. The data is 
derived from a secondary source, the statistics of accomodation in Thailand as recorded by 
The Ministry of Tourism and Sports; and also an in-depth interview with the president of the 
Thai Hotel Assoiation (THA) (Nuehailek, 2012). The results show that the growth rate of 
hotel business in Thailand was expanding at a rate of 11.9% annually before political crises 
occurred during the period 2006-2008—the 2006 Thai coup d'état and the 2008 airport 
closure (Nuehailek, 2012). Moreover, there was a global economic crisis between 2009 and 
2010 that caused an imbalance of supply and demand in Thai hotel business due to a decrease 
in tourist arrivals. The number of international tourists staying in Thai hotels decreased by
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0.02% per annum. However, the arrivals rate of the domestic market remained relatively 
constant (Nuehailek, 2012).
Second, the research in tourism crisis management for the hotel industry is a recent concept 
(Santana, 1997, Ritchie, 2009). Therefore, it is important to investigate hotel implementation 
for tourism crisis rnanagemenf to contn^ knowledge to hotel management theories.
The points above, individually or combined, are the fundamental reason that this researcher 
decided to apply this research to an investigation of hotel crisis management in Thailand. 
The next part will provide the history of hotels in Thailand.
4.4.2 The History of Hotel in Thailand.
The Thai word for ‘hotel’ is ‘Rong Ram, (Jir^ iitjj)’. Hotel refers to a commercial place that
provides temporary stay, food, and services for travellers. The place may be built as one or 
more buildings with several rooms. The price is charged at a daily rate for up to 30 days 
(Department of Tourism, 2012).
The first hotel industry in Thailand was started in the Reign of Phra Chom Klao Chao Yu 
Hua (Rama IV) (1851) as boarding houses to welcome guests from other countries. Since the 
adoption of westernization in the Reign of Phra Chunla Chom Klao Chao Yu Hua, the 
number of standard hotels in Thailand has increased continuously (Dangroj, 2006). For 
example, the Oriental Hotel, the oldest luxurious hotel, was built next to the French Embassy 
in 1876 by C.Salje from Holland.
Dangroj (2006) commented that the growth of the hotel business since that era was due to the 
modernization of Siam, especially the development of electricity and transportation such as 
rail, immense government and social reforms, and the relationships and agreements with the 
British Empire and French Indochina.
The study of Sri Udom (2000 in Dangroj, 2006) about tourism in the Reign of King 
Varavudh (1910-1925) claimed that in this era, tourism became a popular activity for 
pleasure—not only for the elite but also for an increasing middle class grouping of 
consumers. The main factors to promote mass tourism in that period were the convenience of
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transportation, infrastructure and increased accomodation to cater to tourists’ needs (Sri 
Udom, 2000 in Dangroj, 2006).
In short, the hotel as an important business in the hospitality industry has been underway for 
a long time and its importance to Thailand’s economy has steadily increased. There are 
several factors that enhance the growth of the industry, such as the transportation network, 
government support and demand of market for travelling for both business and pleasure.
4.4.3 Number of Accommodation Establishments and Rooms in Thailand
The top ten tourist destinations in Thailand in 2010 were Bangkok, Cholburi (Pattaya), 
Phuket, Chiang Mai, Suratthani (Samui Island), Prachuapkririkun (Huahin), Songkhla 
(Hadyai), Chiang Rai, Rayong and Nakonratchaseema (Nuehailek, 2012). To serve the 
increasing demand of both domestic and international tourists, there is extensive provision of 
accomodation scatted throughout all regions of Thailand (See: Table 4.5).
Table 4.5 The number of accommodation establishments and rooms in major regions in 
2010.
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Table 4.5 shows the approximate number of rooms in different regions of Thailand, the 
Southern region having the highest number , at 25 percent of the whole—followed by 
Bangkok and the Eastern region at 19 percent; and the Northern at 16 percent. The 
Northeastern part of Thailand was at 10 percent while the Western and Central parts 
excluding Bangkok were at 7 percent and 4 percent respectively. The reason why the 
Southern part has the largest number of robrhs is because of the popular beach tourism in 
various provinces which are Suratthani (Samui Island), Prajuankririkun (Huahin), and 
Songkhla (Hadyai). Phuket is especially important and was ranked as the second highest in 
Asia and tenth in the world of best island destinations (Thailand Board of Investment, 2006 
in Zhang et al., 2009). Bangkok is the capital city where it is the centre of business and 
several important tourist attractions. Bangkok was voted for “Best Leisure DestinAsian City” 
for its cheap, safe, vibrant and good food by DestinAsian Media Group in 2007 (TAT, 2007 
in Zhang et al., 2009). Therefore the number of rooms and hotel accomodation establishments 
is high compared to area size of the others. The Northern part of Thailand, especially Chiang 
mai and Chiang rai are the main destinations for unique eutural and nature-based tourism for 
tourists.
Bangkok has been selected as the focus of this research for four reasons. First, the high 
poportion of hotel rooms in comparison to the area size. Second, the importance of Bangkok 
as the gateway of international tourism, both for business and lesiure. Third, it has been the 
area affected by several major tourism crises; for example, the Political crises from 2008- 
2010 and the flooding in 2009—and again in 2011. Fourth, it is the location where the office 
of Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Center: (TIC) is located.
4.4.4 Thailand Hotel Classification
The interpretation of hotel classifications varies considerably from country to country. 
Classification can cause confusion to tourists as there is no universal standard and some 
countries do not even have a standard (Goeldner and Ritchie, 2009). Some hotels may claim 
that they use the same system to classify, but five star hotels in developing and developed 
countries tend to be different (Goeldner and Ritchie, 2009).
With the reviews, there are several ways to classify hotel types based on different variables 
but the most popular one worldwide is the ‘star rating system’. Other rating variables that are 
used to classify a hotel are its amenities ( i.e. Golf, Spa, Convention facilities), location ( i.e.
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city, airport, resort, seaside), level of luxury (deluxe, first class, second class, economy class) 
and size (small, medium, and large) (Goeldner and Ritchie, 2009, Pizam, 2010, Dangroj, 
2006). This section explains the hotel classifications of ‘star rating system’, structure of 
ownership and size.
4.4.4.1 Star Rating System
     "  - —  ^        - - -    —     —    - —. . .  .      - . . .  . . . . .
To classify hotels into common physical, service, and pricing characteristics, hotel star rating 
has been used in many countries as well as Thailand (Narangajavana and Hu, 2008, Goeldner 
and Ritchie, 2009). A variety of grading symbols are used to communicate the quality level a 
hotel achieves such as stars, crowns, diamonds, suns, or letters. The symbol most universally 
recognised is star, as most countries have at least one rating system using stars to represent 
quality grades (Callan, 1993; WTO & IH&RA, 2004 cited in Narangajavana and Hu, 2008 ).
In Thailand, the hotel standard star rating was developed in 2004. There are 3 institutions 
involved in grading: Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT), Thailand Hotel Association 
(THA), and the Association of Thai Travel Agents (ATTA/ However, it is a voluntary 
scheme; the hotel that participates will receive a star rating certification which is valid for 
three years. There are 5 aspects used to evaluate the hotel standard: (1) physical; i.e. location 
and/or environment. (2) Construction; i.e. exterior and interior design, and its safety system. 
(3) Hotel amenity and facility. (4) Quality of product and services. 5) Quality of maintenance.
In Thailand, the same property could have multiple ratings especially chain hotels that want 
to meet the requirements of the US or British rating standard may opt to apply for one. In the 
U.S., the three most popular hotel rating systems are AAA (diamond rating). Mobile (star 
rating), and Utell (Official Hotel Guide-OHG). In Britain, there are a number of hotel 
classification schemes offered by private organisations and regional tourist boards. For 
example, the English Tourist Board (ETB) awards crowns to hotels in England, whereas the 
Automobile Association (AA) and the Royal Automobile Club (RAC) rate tourist 
accommodations by star systems with different criteria and judgments (Narangajavana and 
Hu, 2008).
4.4.4.2 Structure of Ownership (Independent and Chain hotels)
The structure of ownership system classifies hotel into two types: independent and chain 
hotels (Baker et al., 2001, Rutherford and O'Fallon, 2006). The term ‘independent’ refers to a
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hotel that has a single property in one location and operated by the hotel owner. In contrast, 
chain hotels have more than one property in various locations (Baker et al., 2001, Rutherford 
and O'Fallon, 2006). The chain can be subdivided into: (1) Parent hotel company (the 
company that owns and operates them). (2) Management contract hotel (absentee owner with 
an employed staff to manage the property). (3) Franchise hotels (the owner rents the name to 
a rhaha^meht group to operate thé establishment). (4) Independent chains or referral ÿbups 
(independent hotels that partner to gain advantage of purchase savings, shared reservation 
system and co-op marketing) (Baker et al., 2001, Rutherford and O'Fallon, 2006).
The growth of the Thai tourism industry has attracted investments for hotel expansion, so 
there are not only international chains ,but also independents financed by local entrepreneurs 
(Narangajavana and Hu, 2008). The study of Panvisavas and Taylor (2006) showed that the 
hotel management contract has become more common in Thailand due to the lack of equity 
and know-how of Thai hotel owners to operate their hotels themselves (Panvisavas and 
Taylor, 2006). The hotel management contract, in the ease of Thailand, can be done through 
the development of a written agreement between the owner and an operator, by which the 
operator is appointed to operate and manage the hotel on behalf of the owner and the operator 
is to receive a management fee in return (Panvisavas and Taylor, 2006). Generally, for the 
initial term and renewal of contracts in Thailand this appears to be in the range 10-12 years, 
with two five-year renewals. However, the study of Panvisavas and Taylor (2006) revealed 
that due to a lack of experience of Thai owners in dealing with international hotel firms, Thai 
owners did not gain sufficient benefit from their agreements. They suggested that before 
participating in a management contract, Thai hotel owners should have greater knowledge of 
the practices of international hotel firms in other markets with a view to improving their 
bargaining power.
4Â.4.3 Small and Large hotels
Most research on firm size has been based upon the notion that larger firms have more 
resources (financial, technological, personnel) and are more capable of achieving economies 
of scale (Aaby and Slater, 1989). The entry barriers to establishing a small hotel are quite 
small, mostly requiring capital investment within the realm of domestic property investment 
(Beaver and Lashley, 1998, Shaw et al., 1990). However, the limited ability to invest makes 
small enterprises vulnerable in competing with larger firms (Beaver and Lashley, 1998). In 
addition, establishing small firms require relatively small amounts of expertise (Shaw & 
Williams, 1988) and ‘‘the management process is characterised by highly personalised
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preferences, prejudices, and attitudes o f  the firm's entrepreneur, owner, and/or owner- 
manager” (Beaver & Lashley, 1998, p. 146). In addition, smaller enterprises tend to be a 
locally owned business and employ family members (Kontogeorgopoulos, 1998a).
In terms of scale, hotels can be classified in relation to two criteria : size (number of room 
. and ..empbyee) and capitalis^^ 2002). As stated in a previous chapter, small
business is defined by the Small Business Administration (SBA cited in Runyan, 2006) as 
one that is independently owned and operated with revenue that is considerably less than 
comparable units within a large corporation, and employs fewer than 100 workers. With 
reference to the accommodation sector, Rodenburg (1980 in Andriotis, 2002) stated that size 
and bureaucracy define scales of enterprise which attract different categories of customers 
and based in Bali, Indonesia, he identified three different scales of tourism enterprises: large 
industrial (international standard hotels of 100 rooms or more), small industrial (economy 
class hotels) and craft tourism (homestays, hostels, guesthouses, small independent 
restaurants and souvenir shops).
An example of a study of accommodation-related scale in Thailand was done by 
(Kontogeorgopoulos, 1998). Kontogeorgopoulos (1998) assessed the economic patterns and 
opportunities associated with accommodation sector employment on the islands of Samui and 
Phuket, in Thailand. He identified three size categories of hospitality firms based on their 
number of rooms: small (1-14 rooms), medium (15-39) and large (40 rooms-plus). His 
findings show that distinctions according to size reveal crucial differences in the nature of 
tourism-related impacts on employment and propose that future planning of tourism 
development must take into account how particular local conditions foster different types of 
accommodation sector linkages, leakages and economic opportunities. However, taking the 
scale-of accommodation developed by Kontogeorgopoulos (1998) this may have a limitation 
because he did not take data from the TAT master list. Instead, he did the actual count of 
establishments on the islands. In the opinion of the author, his classification of only 14 rooms 
for a small accommodation business can be assumed to mean that the context of his study is 
islands where business tends to be relative small in number of rooms for this specific area. 
Due to this fact, it was decided not to utilise his scale in this study.
In brief, hotel classification varies considerably from country to country. Hotel classification 
in Thailand has no clear position because there are various systems currently being used. 
Although government has utilised the Thailand standard hotel scheme launched in 2007, it is
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a voluntary project for marketing purpose rather than setting a system to classify all hotels in 
Thailand. In aeademia, different researchers tend to select different criteria to select a hotel 
classification that he or she will bring to focus. In the next part, the hotel types that this 
research will study will be presented.
4.4.5 Types of Hotels for this Study and Rationales ---- ------- --- ---—
This research aims to investigate and compare 4 types of hotels in their knowledge 
management implementation for tourism crisis management in Thailand. They are (1) 
small/independent hotel, (2) large/independent hotel (3) large/ national chain hotel and (4) 
large/ international chain hotel.
The hotel classification for this research is based on the characteristics of: (a) size using the 
number of room and (b) organisation-independent (one property) or chain (more than one 
property in different locations including national and international chains). The researcher 
will not use the star system because the star rating system has been found to lack of 
consistency as previously discussed. Also, this research will not use other types such as the 
number of employee, revenue, and capitalisation due to the practical consideration and 
accessibility. This information is regarded as confidential while the number of rooms can be 
easily obtained via hotel fact sheet and hotel websites.
This research will only study the small and large hotels by using the most recent information 
from the National Statistical Office of Thailand. It has classified the hotels in Thailand by 
size of establishment into number of rooms: small (Less than 60 rooms), medium (60-149 
rooms) and large (150 rooms plus).
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Table 4.6 Number of the hotels in Thailand by size of establishment and number of 
rooms in 2008
Region and size of 
establishments
Hotel Rooms
Bangkok ^ 3 .............  ........................... ^,074_ .......... ........... , ..._
Less than 60 rooms 126 4,020
60-149 rooms 101 9,078
150 rooms or more 146 45,976
Central 590 37,446
Less than 60 rooms 405 11,467
60-149 rooms 131 11,676
150 rooms or more 54 14,303
North 550 26,934
Less than 60 rooms 437 9,752
60-149 rooms 77 7,107
150 rooms or more 36 10,075
North Eastern 393 19,659
Less than 60 rooms 282 6,497
60-149 rooms 83 8,017
150 rooms or more 28 5,145
Southern 644 41,134
Less than 60 rooms 419 10,323
60-149 rooms 151 13,973
150 rooms or more 74 16,838
Total 2,550 184,247
Less than 60 rooms 1,669 42,059
60-149 rooms 543 49,851
150 rooms or more 338 92,337
Source: The National Statistical office
The rationale of this research in comparing small and large hotels while excluding medium 
size one is based on the following arguments:
First, they have distinctive aspects on resources for knowledge management implementation 
(financial, technological, personnel). The researcher will refer to the small hotel as one that
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has fewer than 60 rooms while the large hotel is a one that has 150 rooms plus (See: Table 
4.7).
Second, the statisties from the National Statistical Office in Table 4.6 show that Thailand is 
still dominated by small independent operators— 1,669 while the large hotels—although there 
are fewer numbers oT properties—made almost'a hundred thbusarid fbdms available across 
the country.
Besides the size of the hotel, this research also studies the comparison between (independent 
properties) and chains (more than one property in different location) in their knowledge 
management for tourism crises (See: Table 4.7). The reason for studying this eomparison is 
that the issues about knowledge transfer from one unit to another in different geographieal 
areas can be more complicated (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Having reviewed the empirieal 
research for the issues of knowledge transfer and management within chain hotels, no 
relevant literature has been found, indicating the existenee of an important research gap.
Table 4.7 The type of hotels adopted for this research and its description
Hotels Number of room Operation
1) Small /independent Below 60 a single property in one located and operated by 
the hotel owner
2)Large /independent More than 150 It can be operated in one of these criteria 
1) Parent hotel company (the company owned 
and operate them) 2) management contract hotel 
(someone else owns but you manage the 
property) 3) Franchised hotels (you are the 
owner but rent the name to someone else to 
operate) 4) Independent chains or referral groups 
(independent hotels become partners to gain 
advantage of purchasing, reservation and 
marketing)
3)Large / national (Thai) 
chain hotel 
( headquarter is in 
Thailand)
More than 150
4) Large / International 
chain hotel
( headquarter is outside 
Thailand)
More than 150
After we understood the details about hotel in Thailand, the next section will provide review 
of empirical research related to knowledge management and tourism erisis management in 
hotels in Thailand.
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4.5 Knowledge Management and Tourism Crisis Management in Hotels in 
Thailand.
A number of scholars have been researching tourism crises and their impact on tourism and 
hospitality in Thailand, as well as response to crises. However, there are no empirical studies 
to be found of the link between knowledge management implementation and tourism crisis 
management. Although, the importance of knowledge management practices has been widely 
recognised in Thailand research, studies have tended to concentrate on the manufacturing 
industry—(Anuchiracheeva et al., 2003, Phusavat et al.,2008, Juntarung and 
Ussahawanitchakit, 2008, Worasinchai and Bechina, 2009, Worasinchai et al., 2008a, 
Worasinchai et al., 2008b)—and academic institutions, i.e. universities, laboratories and 
R&D (Igel and Numprasertchai, 2004, Numprasertchai and Igel, 2005). This section aims to 
review empirical studies that investigated areas related to the current study (See: Table 4.7).
Table 4.8 The summary of empirical studies related to knowledge management and 
tourism crisis management in hotels in Thailand.
Authors Constructs Context Methodology Findings
Research area: Impacts of crisis to tourism industry in Thailand
Rittihchainuwat 
and Chakraborty 
(2009)
Terrorism and 
disease, 
tourists ‘s risk 
perception. 
Impact o f  
crises on 
hospitality 
industry
Hospitality
industry
Quantitative and 
qualitative
-Crises can affect the hospitality 
industry in both affected areas and 
unaffected areas due to the lack o f  
geographical knowledge o f  tourists
- N ot all crises— especially epidemic 
ones— cause the same impact to risk 
perception.
- Hospitality businesses should work 
together with the destination 
marketing organisation to provide 
information, especially the geo­
graphical area where both affected 
and unaffected by crises.
- Develop preventive methods to 
manage crisis so that impact from 
crisis can be limited and tourists 
understand they can visit other areas 
safely.
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Cohen (2010) Tsunami and 
Political crisis 
( Airport 
Closure)
Tourism and 
hotel
businesses
Qualitative - Different sources: exogenous 
(tsunami) or endogenous (Airport 
closure) have different degree o f  
impact
- An endogenous crisis (Airport 
closure) is harder to manage due to its 
greater invdivenïentirfsbciety’s 
socio-political and tourism systems.
Campiranon
(2011)
Crisis types 
and impacts to 
tourism 
industry
Tourism
organisation
Qualitative - Crises that affected tourism industry 
in Thailand can be classified into four 
categories of: (1) natural disaster (2) 
epidemic (3) terrorism and (4) 
political.
- Each crisis varies in terms o f  scope- 
-(probability o f  occurrence, duration 
o f  media attention and public 
relations)— and extent o f  damage 
caused.
Research area: Response to tourism crises in Thailand
Gurtner (2006) Tsunami Destination - Effective crisis response requires a 
pre-established organisation with  
skills and flexibility as shown that 
Thailand can manage a tsunami — 
better than Indonesia for example
- Crises may have been reduced by 
better stakeholder awareness and 
preparation including competent 
knowledge o f  appropriate response 
and recovery strategies.
-Tourists including backpackers pay 
attention to personal safety over price.
Campiranon
(2007)
Crisis
management 
and WTO  
crisis
management
framework
MICE sector Qualitative - A  large number o f  organisations, 
particularly small ones, are not Well 
prepared for crises.
- MICE market is not price sensitive, 
but rather crisis sensitive.
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Campiranon
(2010)
Political crises Tourism
organisation
Qualitative - Five critical success factors (CSFs) 
are crisis management plan, lesson  
learned, communication strategies, 
human resource strategies, & 
marketing strategies.
Henderson
(2007)'^
Corporate
Social
responsibility 
and Tsunami
Hotel Qualitative:
direct
longitudinal
field-
work/observatio 
n, interviews, 
personal 
communication, 
& various 
sources o f  
primary and 
secondary data
- The ability to cope with such a crisis 
w hile giving due regard to social and 
environmental needs may be partly 
related to size and larger international 
groups w hose risks are spread across 
the globe. They are perhaps in a 
stronger position regarding the 
bearing o f  financial costs.
O thers
Cohen and N eal 
(2012)
Multiple Destination Qualitative
crises, the
impact to
tourism
industry
-Crisis is interstate and 
transformable— one crisis can lead 
to another crisis from different 
source (fi-om political crisis to 
tourism crisis and then econom ic 
crisis).
- Human action might play a part in 
the creation o f  (at least som e) 
tourism crises.
Source: Author’s presentation
Table 4.8 shows research related to knowledge management and tourism crisis management 
for the hospitality industry in Thailand. It is apparent that tourism crisis management in 
Thailand has attracted increasing interest among scholars. As stated in the beginning there is 
no empirical research that studied the application of knowledge transfer and management to 
tourism crises in Thailand. However, it is important to review relevant research in order to 
know what has been studied so far, what could be further developed and what original 
contribution that this research is able to make to a conceptual framework of tourism crisis and
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knowledge management. Following is an elaboration of research presented in Table 4.8. It 
begins with the discussion of key tourism crises that have been focused on academically. It 
will be followed by a review of the responsive strategy for managing tourism crisis in 
Thailand.
Riftichaihüwàt and Chakraborty (2009) sftidied the perceptibn of risk regarding terrorism and 
disease in the case of Thailand and the impact of these crises on the hospitality industry. The 
study is divided into three stages. In the first two stages, Rittichainuwat and Chakraborty 
(2009) used both qualitative and quantitative methods for 60 tourists at the Grand Palace, 
Kaosan Road and at Bangkok International airport. The third stage, was an in-depth interview 
used with manager level in hotels (15 interviewees), restaurant (35 interviewees), tour 
operators and travel agencies (15 interviewees) to identify the impact of SARs, bird flu and 
terrorism in the province of Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani (Rittichainuwat and Chakraborty, 
2009). The study of the first and second stage revealed that safety and security play a major 
role in tourists’ travel decisions. Tourists tend to avoid epidemic areas rather than an area 
where they perceive terrorism risk because some of them said that a threat of terrorism is a 
part of life in general. The results of the third stage about the impact of terrorism and disease 
showed that the hospitality industry was affected by both, in the affected area and in the 
unaffected area. Due to a lack of geographical knowledge, for example, terrorism happened 
in the southern part of Thailand only, but some tourists decided to cancel their trips. The 
finding also reveals that not all epidemics can cause the same impact to risk perception. For 
example, the bird flu has less impact than SARs because tourists and restaurants feel that they 
are able to prevent bird flu by eating chicken well-cooked and by avoiding bird flu areas.
Interestingly, the study found that tourists and backpackers pay more attention to personal 
safety than price. Therefore, a “low price” marketing scheme to lure tourists to visit may not 
be a wise choice and could cause a negative image to a destination businesses long term if the 
destination is not fully recovered from a crisis. The conclusion of the study is that the 
hospitality businesses should work together with the destination marketing organisation to 
provide information about the geographical area both affected and unaffected by crises. A 
preventive method should be designed so that the impact from crisis can be limited and 
tourists understand they can visit other areas. Moreover, instead of heavily advertising price 
reduction, the hotels should give more concern to safety, quality and satisfaction issues.
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Cohen (2010) compares two very different tourism crises: the 2004 tsunami on the Andaman 
coast of southern Thailand and the occupation of the Bangkok airports in the course of Anti- 
government protests in 2008. The paper focuses on the significance of the different sources of 
these crises for their distinctive dynamics: exogenous or endogenous to the society’s socio­
political or tourist system. The source of the tsunami crisis was exogenously generated; 
though a major disaster, if could have been rather successfully managed, since it did hof^ 
affect the socio-political centre. The airport occupation crisis was part of an on-going 
political struggle. Though a comparatively much less severe tourism crisis, the government 
was unable to resolve it because its authority imploded. The author argues that the 
management of tourism crises is deeply embedded in the socio-political system, as shown in 
this comparative study; its practices should therefore not be taken for granted, but considered 
a topic of investigation.
The attempt to understand a holistic view and the list of crises that affected Thai industry was 
done by Campiranon (2011). He identified key characteristics of crisis types and their 
impacts on the tourism industry in Thailand (Campiranon, 2011). The research aim was to 
identify the key characteristics of crisis types and their impacts on tourism in Thailand. The 
research employed a qualitative method with in-depth interviews of 25 respondents that are 
Pacific Asia Travel Association (FATA) members. The study showed that a crisis- affected 
tourism industry in Thailand can be classified into four categories: (1) natural disaster (2) 
epidemics (3) terrorism, and (4) political crises. Each crisis varies in terms of scope 
(probability of occurrence, duration of media attention and public relation) and the extent of 
damage caused. Campiranon (2011) revealed that among the four categories, political crisis 
tends to occur more frequently, attracting longer media attention, drawing less sympathy 
from the public and placing higher negative image on destination. He recommended that top 
executives of the tourism organisation should pay more attention and have a plan to respond 
to this type of crisis.
At this point, we can confirm that Thailand has experienced several crises and these few 
empirical studies showed that different crises have affected tourism businesses to a different 
extent. The types of crisis that obtained attention by scholars are: (1) natural disaster such as 
tsunami, (2) epidemics such as SARS, and (3) terrorism and political crises such as the 
Bangkok airports in the course of Anti-government protests in 2008. The following will
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present the research showing how tourism and hospitality businesses in Thailand have 
responded to past crises.
Response to crisis represents another research area that has been explored in Thailand since 
the Tsunami in 2004. Gurtner (2006) investigated the tourism crisis comparing case studies of 
Bali and Thailand.^ ^^  T derived data is predominantly based on direct longitudinal 
fieldwork/observation, interviews, personal communication, and various sources of primary 
and secondary data (Gurtner, 2006).
The result shows that Thailand was better at responding to large-scale hazards such as a 
Tsunami than Bali because Thailand has a pre-established organisation with the skills and 
flexibility to respond to crisis. Thai authorities were able to facilitate greater stakeholder 
integration and resource sharing. The local tourism organisations were able to gather accurate 
information quickly and with the assistance of the media and various websites were able to 
convey information and details directly to consumers.
Gurtner (2006) suggested that destination preparation and prevention strategies include 
enhanced security measures; hazard warning/evacuation procedures; more sustainable 
development practices; formal crisis management; and even straightforward policies of 
greater public education and awareness (particularly regarding applicable natural hazards). 
Consistent with any risk reduction approach, proactive planning can augment control and 
coordination capabilities during crisis conditions. From two ease studies, Gurtner (2006) 
pointed out that negative impacts from crises may have been reduced by better stakeholder 
awareness and preparation—including competent knowledge of appropriate response and 
recovery strategies. Although it is impossible to predict or anticipate all facets of adversity, 
the shared and open accumulation of skills, knowledge, ideas and resources can enhance a 
destination’s flexibility to develop effective crisis management capabilities.
Campiranon (2007) adopted the World Tourism Organisation’s approach as a framework in 
order to examine the crisis management practices in the MICE sector. A qualitative 
approach—in-depth interviews using a semi-structured interview teehnique-has been 
undertaken in Bangkok with high-level executives of 37 organisations that offer MICE 
services. Those organisations are hotels, convention centres, event planners, tour operators, 
and other key stakeholders such as tourism authority and industry experts. Findings showed
135
that the impact of crises is one of the factors affecting demand in the MICE sector. 
Unfortunately, a large number of organisations, particularly small ones, are not well prepared 
for crises so this issue requires immediate attention from those organisations.
Campiranon (2007) concluded that the MICE market is not price sensitive, but rather crisis 
sensitive. Campiranon {2007) fecommehded that organisations dfferihg "MICE services 
should establish a channel of communication with the media in order to convey a message to 
the public that destination businesses are recovering or fully recovered from a crisis. He also 
recommended that it is important for tourism organisations to identify which markets are 
resilient to the current crisis and utilize a suitable promotion strategy to target such markets 
accordingly.
In the hotel business, Henderson (2007) studied corporate social responsibility (CSR) with 
particular reference to the hotel sector and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that occurred in 
Phuket, Thailand. The aim of the study was to reveal reactions to the disaster of hotel 
companies. Henderson (2007) collected data from published sources (corporate websites and 
press releases issued by companies and individual hotel establishments at the end of 2004). 
He also utilised a questionnaire with 14 hotel groups. Nine were multinational and the 
remainder regional. Their properties were contacted and asked to complete a questionnaire 
about overall CSR activities and efforts following the tsunami.
The results indicated that several hotel companies represented in Phuket did endeavour to act 
in a responsible manner after the tsunami. Concerns were expressed about the welfare of 
communities and the state of the environment and efforts made to promote recovery and the 
restoration of normality, often in alliance with international aid agencies and local groups. 
There were also signs of interest in wider issues of sustainable development, evident in social 
and environmental relief projects with longer term goals.
Henderson (2007) discovered that the ability to cope with such a crisis while giving due 
regard to social and environmental needs may be partly related to size and larger 
multinational groups whose risks are spread across the globe who are perhaps in a stronger 
position regarding the bearing of financial costs. In contrast, domestic chains in the country 
afflicted or those concentrating on that particular region of the world are heavily dependent 
on localised market conditions and greater exposure to sudden downturns. Size and wealth do 
not necessarily result in the adoption of CSR, however, and it might be argued that more
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could have been done in Phuket by leading organisations. Individual companies may also 
have responded quickly and generously to the urgent situation at the height of the emergency, 
but meeting the CSR requirements previously noted necessitates an extended commitment 
and perhaps a fundamental shift in orientation and philosophy for some businesses.
Campiranon (2010) identified the critical success factors -responsible for effective crisis 
management in the tourism industry, using Thailand as a ease study. He employed a 
qualitative methodology for data collection and used content analysis of in-depth interviews 
with 21 tourism organisations in Thailand. In sum, this research achieved its aims by 
identifying five critical success factors (CSF’s) which tourism organisations need to 
implement for successful management of political crises. These five critical success factors 
(CSF’s) are crisis management plan; lesson learned; communication strategies; human 
resource strategies; and marketing strategies. The recommendation of his study concluded 
with significant points that are associated with the aim of this research study, namely 
communication among stakeholders; learning from previous crises; developing a crisis 
management plan; and human resource management strategies. However, his study did not 
address the process of knowledge management and transfer that allows a firm to develop, for 
example, an effective strategy.
As known, the nature of crises can be dynamic and interrelated (Hall, 2010) therefore Cohen 
and Neal (2012) studied multiple crises from 2007 to 2009 and their impact on tourism in 
Thailand. They argued that to study the crisis of tourism should not draw conclusions from a 
single ease but should discuss the interaction and combined effects of different orders of 
antecedent crises leading up to a destructive meta-erisis. The study shows how coincident 
crises of different socio-economic orders can interact and then develop synergetic effects, and 
how unrelated crises, operating at different levels, can combine to form a complex and 
dynamic mega-crisis, which provokes unpredictable and acute calamities. Importantly, 
coineidenee exacerbates on-going crises, even as it undermines the ability of ‘crisis 
managing’ institutions such as ministries, police forces, legislatures and regulating bodies. 
All of these entities have important roles for responding to and alleviating damaging 
developments, or to deal effectively with their short-lived acute effects on particular aspects 
of the tourist sector, or with their unfurling chronic consequences for the tourism system as a 
whole. The study of multiple crises is therefore worthy of special attention in tourism 
research, as a particularly virulent variety of systemic interaction and breakdown. The study 
concluded that crisis is interstate and transformable—one crisis can lead to another crisis
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from a different source (from political crisis to tourism crisis and then economic crisis). The 
study also highlighted the fact that human action might play a role in the creation of (at least 
some) tourism crises. This indicates that the theoretical analysis of tourism crises should not 
confine itself to the activities related to the management of tourism crises after they already 
happened, but should also be concerned with activities which produce (or, alternatively, 
prevent) such crises.
In brief, the topic of tourism crisis management is an intense issue in Thailand. Research 
mainly focussed on the impact on, and response to, tourism crisis. The previous chapter 
provides strong evidence that knowledge management is the key to providing a way to handle 
tourism crisis, especially in sharing “lesson learned” and provide knowledge for planning and 
making proper decisions. However, this topic continues to be less investigated. In the 
following section, the gaps in research on knowledge management and tourism crisis 
management in hotels in Thailand will be discussed.
4.6 Gaps in the Research on Knowledge Management and Tourism Crisis 
Management in Hotels in Thailand
It is clear from this review that numerous gaps exist in relation to knowledge management 
and tourism crisis management in hotels in Thailand. The following three issues, in 
particular, have been subject to limited research.
4.6.1 Understanding policymakers and hoteliers on tourism crisis management in Thailand.
Chapter 2 indicates that the definition of crisis can be ambiguous and may vary according to 
the context in which it is being used. The understanding that people have of crises will also 
reflect their awareness of tourism crises; this will contribute to determining the crisis 
management approach adopted, and the degree of crisis management that is to be 
implemented. In addition, there are different types of crises. To handle crises requires 
collaboration and knowledge-sharing among key stakeholders in the tourism industry- 
especially the policymakers who are expected to act as knowledge spanners and brokers. This 
is essential if they are to have shared understandings of crises and common objectives. 
Nevertheless, there is a lack of literature on such understanding, and the objectives of the key 
players in terms of implementing knowledge management in relation to tourism crises. It is 
the researcher’s opinion that an essential area to analyse is the difference between the 
understandings and objectives of policymakers versus those of hotels with respect to 
managing tourism crises.
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4.6.2 Size, structure of ownership, knowledge management for tourism crisis.
Much has been written on the impact of crises on tourism and hospitality, and the managerial 
responses to crises, particularly to tsunamis, epidemics and political events. As seen in 
previous chapters, the size and organisation of businesses do influence the impacts of such 
crises, and how managers respond to these. Therefore, it is important to analyse how hotels of 
different sizes and ownership structures understand tourism crises, approach knowledge 
transfer, and their management approaches. There is also a need to examine the barriers and 
facilitators of knowledge management in these firms. To date there has been very little 
research in this area, both generally on hotels and specifically in Thailand.
4.6.3. Link between knowledge management and tourism crisis management 
As noted earlier, some researchers have recognized that knowledge management can be a key 
factor in the success of tourism crisis management. However, there is only limited evidence 
on the specific processes of knowledge management in hotels, and the same also applies to 
the types of tourism crisis knowledge, and to knowledge transfer mechanisms.
4.7 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter’s aim was to present the background of my study context. The author reviewed 
the background of Thailand, its economies, tourism, hospitality situation and statistics. The 
author especially focussed on hotel businesses as well as the literature review in Thailand and 
the gaps. The following points emerged:
First, the hotel business expanded rapidly. The increase in number of accommodation 
registrations and the amount of investment in the sectors reflects the key role of this business 
for the Thai tourism industry.
Second, the literatures in Thailand indicated that there is a real need for research to analyse 
differences between understandings and objectives of policymakers versus those of hotels for 
managing tourism crises. The studies show that Thailand has been faced with several crises 
both natural and human-made that affected tourism businesses, and hotels. However, safety, 
security, and effective crisis management are still a weakness of the Thai tourism industry so 
there should be more attention from managers and researchers. In addition, to manage crisis 
requires collaboration, especially knowledge transfer and management among key 
stakeholders i.e. policymaker and hoteliers to share the lesson learned and knowledge to 
manage tourism crisis appropriately.
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Third, the eoneept of knowledge management for tourism crisis needs more exploration. A 
number of studies on tourism crisis management have focussed on analysis of the impact of 
crises on the tourism and hospitality industry and managerial ways to respond to them. A 
number of literature sources claimed that knowledge and practice in crisis management can 
assist toward better decision and crisis handling. However, there is no research focus on the 
link of knowledge management implementation and tourism hfisis management, and no 
practical guidelines provided.
Having articulated all these key gaps, the next chapter will present the methodology that the 
researcher will utilise.
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes and evaluates the methodologies used in this research. There are nine 
sections: The first section presents the research philosophy. The type of research purpose is 
discussed in section two. Reviews of research methods and the research methods used in this 
study are presented in section three. In sections four and five discuss the ease study research 
unit of analysis and data collection process. Methods of analysis and data interpretation are 
explained in section six. The quality of the research design will be discussed in section seven. 
Section eight considers research ethics and section nine, the conclusion.
5.1 Philosophical Background of the Research
Research philosophy is ‘the world view’ or ‘basic belief that frames researchers’ work 
(Healy and Perry, 2000). In other words, a researcher’s personal philosophy of science will 
directly influence one’s selection of paradigm to guide the research (Ponterotto, 2002). The 
importance here is to provide a philosophical position which will underpin the strategy and 
methods chosen. However, the purpose of this section is not to claim that one research 
philosophy is better than another. Instead, the researcher wishes to explore different 
approaches to explore the reality through a different lens to complement previous research in 
this field. This section begins with a discussion of ontology and epistemology to illustrate the 
researcher’s assumptions about reality and a suitable way to study the research topic. The 
second part will explain the research paradigm together with the rationale of adopting 
interpretivism for this study.
5.1.1 Ontology and Epistemology Debate in Business Research.
This part discusses ontology (what is the assumption of researcher on existence of reality) 
and epistemology (what is regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline) (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007, Saunders et al., 2009). According to Bryman and Bell (2007), social ontology is a 
significant part of conducting business research because it will feed the research questions 
and affect methodological choices.
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Two groups have different assumptions about the reality—objeetivist and subjectivist 
(constructivist). The objeetivist excludes a social actor from the social phenomenon while 
subjectivism tends to include a social actor's own account of the social world through a 
process of social interaction (Bryman and Bell, 2007, Saunders et al., 2009). To have a better 
idea, Smircich (1983 in Saunders et al., 2009) provided the example of debate between 
bl:jectivisf and ^ 1 ^ ectivisf viewpoints using the topic of organisational culture. The 
objeetivist acknowledges culture as something that exists in an organisation. The subjectivist 
argues that is too simplistic because culture is actually created and recreated through a 
complex of phenomenon such as social interaction or physical factors (Smircich, 1983 in 
Saunders et al., 2009).
Brayman and Bell (2007) stated that there is a strong relationship of ontology to 
epistemology in business research. The two assumptions explained above will correspond to 
the design of research and the collection data that are required. Epistemology can be defined 
as the justification of acceptable knowledge in a particular field of study (Saunders et al., 
2009). There are different names and classifications that explain the ways that we should 
study the reality, i.e. positivism, phenomenology, pragmatism, interpretivism and realism 
(Saunders et al., 2009). The major epistemology—positivism and interpretivism—  that is 
mostly employed by tourism and hospitality researchers is discussed as follows.
To begin with, Bryman and Bell (2007) described positivism as an epistemological position 
that advocates the application of natural science methodology to the study of social reality. 
Positivists believe that everything around us is matter (including the behaviour of humans); 
therefore it can be measured (Holbom et al., 2009). Research is value-free and the researcher 
is independent, assuming the role of an objective analyst (Saunders et al., 2009). Reality is 
assumed to be existing 'out there' independent of the perception, beliefs, and bias of the 
researcher (Saunders et al., 2009). Positivism is a quantitative approach that employs 
statistics, and uses large sample surveys, structural equation modelling, etc. as the common 
methodology used (Simons, 2009). The findings of research will be a law-like generalisation 
(Saunders et al., 2009).
In contrast to the first philosophy, phenomenology or interpretivism has a different view for 
developing knowledge. Interpretivists focus on a subjective and descriptive model to deal 
with complicated situations rather than an objective, tangible or mathematical model 
(Remenyi et al., 2005). Such philosophies argue that the social world of business and
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management science is too complex to be treated as a physical science (Saunders et ah, 
2009). To put it another way, any rich explanation and insight for complex management 
studies in the social world will be lost if its complexity is reduced to a series of law-like 
generalisations. In addition, this school of thought considers each business situation unique, 
with different and particular circumstances. Additionally, this school of thought considers 
ahd~takes into accbünf the "changing state of business organisation as well as different 
interpretations by people. The role of the researcher is to be an expert who interacts with and 
influences the research process, and is ‘not value free.’ Thus, field studies that engage 
researchers and participants in the real social setting are more appropriate to generate 
interpretive knowledge. A common methodology used in the interpretive paradigm is a 
qualitative method that employs in-depth interview, ethnography, grounded theory, etc., to 
gather and analyse obtained data (Simons, 2009).
It is obvious that a research project can be influenced by several world views. The objeetivist 
will tend to conduct research in a positivism manner while the subjectivist will adopt 
interpretivism. In the next segment, the researcher will provide the rational of adopting 
interpretivism for this study.
5.1.2 The Justification for Adopting Interpretivism for This Study
This research is eoneemed with knowledge management for tourism crises. There are two 
major influential factors determining the researcher’s reasons to adopt interpretivism. First, 
the impact of values—especially the researcher’s personal beliefs. Second, the nature of the 
literature and theoretical background of the fields.
“The researcher’s personal philosophy o f science will directly influence her or his
selection o f the research paradigm to guide the research. ”
(Ponterotto, 2002, p. 369)
First, the researcher’s own value and background tends to impact one’s epistemology 
standpoint. As stated in Chapter 1, this researcher’s experience with Master Degree work has 
always involved using face-to-faee interviews, which is a part of qualitative research 
methodology in an interpretative approach. Not only does this researcher feel quite familiar 
and comfortable with this method, it is also felt that it could provide a wider and more in- 
depth perspective of the topic studied. The face-to-faee interview allows interviewer and 
interviewees to interact to ensure better understanding between two parties. As well, it allows
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the researcher to observe and interpret the data gained based in a consideration of differences 
in context and setting that influence the subjects’ understanding and practices. Although 
positivists argue that research should be undertaken in a value-free manner, Saunders et al. 
(2009, p. 114) argued that the exclusion of our own values as researchers is impossible. The 
decision to advocate positivism suggests the existence of a certain value decision (Saunders 
et al, 2009). This researcher is cdnvineed that in order to undersfànd the "edmplex 
phenomenon for this current research, the researcher have to interpret actions, events, and 
artefact from the interviewee’s perspective.
However, Walle (1997) argued that the choice of art or science should be determined by the 
situation in which research takes place, not in some misguided search for rigor simply for its 
own sake (Walle, 1997). Therefore, the second justification for adopting interpretivism is the 
consideration of the nature of the research problem, the existing literature, and theoretical 
background.
This study's main aim is to explore knowledge management for tourism crises. Tourism is 
obviously the main field of the study. The nature of tourism is an open and complex system 
which is influenced by internal factors—perspective and capability of individual and group 
and external environmental factors such as political, social, technological and economic 
forces. In studying tourism, human elements are involved; therefore, it is important to allow 
people to speak their own word instead of seeking only a reaction to researcher-determined 
agendas (Ryan, 1995). Hence, it is necessary to take such factors into account when 
interpreting data (De Sausmarez, 2004).
De Sausmarez (2004) pointed out that the field of tourism over the last 50 years has been 
dominated by positivism through quantitative methods. According to Walle (1997), the field 
of tourism needs to embrace a general recognition of the legitimacy of a variety of research 
epistemological standpoints. The limitation of research strategy influenced by positivism is 
that it cannot examine the reality in all its complexity (Walle, 1997).
It is suggested that in research relevant to tourism crisis management, there is a need for 
researchers to move beyond simplistic prescriptive models which may provide checklists or 
information on what managers should do before, during or after crises. Rather, they ought to 
move toward descriptive models which develop and/or test models, concepts or theories 
related to tourism crisis management to examine why crises were managed ineffectively in 
the tourism industry (Ritchie, 2004). In addition, as previously discussed in the literature in
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Chapters 2-4, there is a need for employing different paradigmatic positions besides 
positivism to improve our understanding of crisis and disaster management in the tourism 
industry. It should include phenomenological approaches to explore the reason behind the 
decision-making and action of hoteliers towards crisis management (Ritchie, 2004). The case 
study strategy is needed to test models and concepts surrounding crisis management in the 
tourism ihduMfy (Ritchie, 2004)7 Thefefbre, this study wiir use interpretivism through multi­
case study research with interviews and non-interviews as a mixed qualitative method to 
collect data.
In light of the previous discussion so far, to discover the reality for this current research 
study, subjectivism and interpretivism are suitable in numerous ways. It would help me to 
pursue the research by using methods that this researcher have practiced, to have a deeper 
view of the differences between understandings and objectives of policymakers versus those 
of hoteliers for managing tourism crises that affect hotel businesses. Also,to have in-depth 
understanding of implementation of knowledge transfer and management for managing crises 
from the hotelier’s perspective. Moreover, it would help to discover broader views on the 
issues and to bridge the relevance gaps supplied by way of the rigorous quantitative research 
favoured by the positivists. After knowing the adopted research philosophy of the current 
study, the next section will discuss types of research purpose.
5.2 Types of Research Purpose
There are three major kinds of purpose of research: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. 
The author will first briefly discuss the characteristic of each one, then discuss and 
summarize what type of research purpose this project adopted.
Let’s begin with ‘exploratory.’ The aim of exploratory research is to define and provide 
insight into and understanding of a specific phenomenon or concept. Moreover, this research 
can be used to examine the problem more precisely and to gain further information before 
confirming findings by using another type. Thus, exploratory research could be used when 
the problem area is little known, in order to increase familiarity with the area. Exploratory 
research focuses on research questions rather than specific hypotheses or actual measurement. 
Hence, flexibility, loosely structured information, small sample size, and an evolutionary 
approach are the main characteristics of exploratory research design. (Malhotra and Birks, 
2007). According to exploratory research's purposes, methods for collecting data in this type 
of study will vary to include different approaches, such as literature search, expert surveys,
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pilot surveys, secondary data, individual in-depth interviews, focus groups, and instructed 
observations (Uma, 2003, Yin, 2009)
Descriptive research aims to describe specific phenomena. It tries to describe the 
characteristics of some variables under study in a specific situation (Uma, 2003). The variety 
of applications" of descriptive fesearch leads to its extensive use in the literature/ Tor 
instance, it can be used to describe the characteristics of a specific group; estimate the 
percentage of a specific population having a certain type of behaviour; count the frequency of 
events; and/or determine the perception of specific goods or services. As this purpose is 
concerned with the explanation of variables in percentage format, methods for collecting data 
will include highly structured methods; for example, questionnaire survey or structured 
interview. The last research purpose is “explanatory” which is quite similar to descriptive 
purpose in the fact that it explains the characteristics of the variables. However, explanatory 
research will not only explain the obtained data but also the causal relationship between 
variables (Saunders et al., 2009).
It is claimed that the area of knowledge management and tourism crisis management in 
tourism industry is still in an infancy stage, so the purpose of this study will start as 
exploratory research. In order to accomplish this, the researcher examined the understanding 
and objectives of respondents about tourism crisis management; eharaeteristies of tourism 
crises, barriers, and facilitators of knowledge transfer; and knowledge management for 
managing tourism crises that affect hotel businesses in Thailand.
5.3 Research Methodology used in This Study
In methodological issues, the two major approaches are quantitative and qualitative. Before 
explaining a multi-ease study research as the strategy adopted for this study, this section 
provides the advantage and disadvantage of quantitative and qualitative methodologies that 
have been a controversial issue among researchers.
5.3.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Approach
Qualitative research has its roots in the phenomenology paradigm and has an inductive view 
of the meaning of human attachment to events (Bryman and Bell, 2007, Saunders et al., 
2009). The nature of qualitative research is more flexible and attempts to describe and
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understand people and situations without establishing hypotheses from exiting theory and 
prior knowledge.
The advantage of applying qualitative methods is that the data reveals a richness of 
information about the feeling, reasoning and decision process; plus, attitudes and values. 
Although this information has the limitation of being unable to be quantified, it can be useful“    • '  -* - —----------------- — .... — ...—  — - -  - •     -       - • ... —. ........... . —   JL. . . .    .  . . .  . '  .  ... . ______ __ _
to explain the reason behind some actions. Aeeording to McDaniel and Gates (1993), in order 
to gain significant information, especially through interview, the researcher must have special 
skills. For example, interpersonal and communication skills, because a qualitative researcher 
must engage with people (Cassell and Symon, 2004). The limitation of applying a qualitative 
approach is the tendency toward generalisation of its findings and validation of results caused 
by dynamics of the samples (Payne and Williams, 2005).
With a questionnaire, for instance , research can acquire data from a large sample size in less 
time and for less cost (Bryman and Bell, 2007). With the structured format of a questionnaire, 
the data can be analysed by a computerised data analysis program which is fast and reliable. 
Nevertheless, the quantitative method is argued not to be applicable for investigating 
complex issues (McDaniel and Gates, 1993).
In brief, there are three key differences between quantitative and qualitative methodologies 
that are apparent. First, a view toward the research subject. Qualitative researchers hold an 
inductive view by attempting to engage with people in order to understand the meaning 
attached to human that is influenced by different settings and events. While quantitative 
researchers have a deductive view by excluding themselves from the subject and attempting 
to develop a hypothesis from the exiting theory and develops a rigorous test in order to reject 
or support a hypothesis.
Second, flexibility for research design. Qualitative inquiry is quite dynamic; it allows a 
researcher to adapt the research design to match the situation. For example, in interviewing 
with unstructured or semi-structure, interviewers can change the order of questions to ask 
interviewee(s) if the interviewer finds that the questions are related. However in completing a 
questionnaire, which is the main tool to collect data for this approach, answering questions 
has to be done in quite a structured way.
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Third, the matter of generalisation. Generalisation traditionally is seen as a central aim of 
quantitative research to formulate theory or create universal laws for further applications 
(Mayring, 2007). Mayring (2007) said that there are different possibilities to arrive at a 
generalization depending on types of research and research design, i.e. analysis of total 
population, random or purposive samples, argumentative generalization, theoretical sampling, 
wafiatioh, and triangulation. Qualitative methods" often'dembhstrate a lack of enthusiasm for" 
the problem of generalizations (Larsson, 2009). The line of reasoning is that qualitative 
research tends to focus on a specific study that does not address other contexts, but 
contributes to the broader picture by filling a ‘gap’ in the whole. However, Marying (2007) 
claimed that qualitative-oriented research—for example, a ease-study strategy—can 
demonstrate the possibilities of generalization through the use of contrasting cases (3-10 
cases are recommended) or the longitudinal study by identifying time series in a single ease 
and analysing trends.
Having considered the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. This research 
employs a qualitative research approach with a multi case study strategy because 
investigating the knowledge management for tourism crises is involved with asking the 
perspective of policymakers and hoteliers as to their understanding, objective and 
implementation regarding the issues. The researcher has to engage with respondents in order 
to have a better understanding of the reason behind their implementations. Moreover, the 
study also specifically focuses on a case of hotels in Thailand. Therefore, the researcher does 
not intend to develop a universal eoneept of knowledge transfer and management for 
managing tourism crisis in broader contexts. Instead, the research intends to discover and 
provide a framework that would be applicable to hotels that are located in Thailand. To 
achieve a broader perspective on the topic, the researcher prefers to utilise challenging 
flexible and dynamic data collection tools to explore the reality rather than having a fixed and 
highly structured research design. The following section will explain a case study research 
that is employed as a strategy for this research.
5.3.2 A Case Study Research Concept
This segment provides the understanding of ease study research and the rationales for 
employing the case study strategy in this current research. It is followed by rationales for 
adopting multiple ease study research and its limitations are highlighted at the end.
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5.3.2.1 The Definition and Features of Case Study Research
There are two major different meanings of ease study: (1) teaching and learning ease study 
and (2) case study research (Remenyi, 2012). The difference between these two is that the 
first refers to a story which could be real or fiction to challenge the reader to solve the ease 
problems (Remenyi, 2012). The latter one is an accurate context of situation and has a formal 
vÿàÿTô obtain valid and reliable research findings (Rerhenyi, 2012).
The definition of the ease study as a research strategy is studying and understanding the 
activity of an important context in order to explain ‘how’ and ‘why’ some social phenomenon 
work (Stake, 1995, Simons, 2009, Yin, 2009). In an empirical inquiry, Yin (2009) 
distinguished the case study from other research types, in that the ease study will use multiple 
sources of evidence to investigate a phenomenon in depth, especially when many variables 
are involved in a real life context. Although a survey can study a phenomenon, its ability to 
investigate context is limited. Remenyi (2012) added that case studies not only employ 
multiple resources but also multiple research methods, therefore the ease study is not an easy 
option. Nonetheless, Remenyi (2012) argued that the ease study presents a rich multi­
dimensional picture of a complex phenomenon.
5.3.2.2 Rational For Employing Case Research Strategy
Consistent with my ontological and epistemological stance, and the research aim, case studies 
would be a suitable research strategy for several reasons.
First, this study used qualitative methods to study the implementation of knowledge 
management for tourism crises that affected hotels in Thailand. This study focused on 
a specific phenomenon of organisational behaviour in Thailand context that needed to be 
studied in depth on the phenomenon and the reasons of why hoteliers implement knowledge 
management for managing tourism crisis, how it is implemented, and how key factors 
(barriers and facilitators) influence practices.
Secondly, a ease study provides the flexibility to use other evidence to understand and 
compare the hoteliers’ and policymakers’ viewpoints. Non-interview evidence such as 
documents and observations can reveal the influence of key actors and the interactions 
between them. Besides, Remenyi (2012) claimed that multiple sources of evidence are better 
than hearsay and offer a degree of data triangulation. Nevertheless, Remenyi (2012) noted 
that it is important to avoid an error of mutual eonformability—the same answers from two
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sources do not prove that things are true. Hence, I will need to be careful when I interpret the 
information.
Thirdly, the ease study helps to explore the understanding of the hotel businesses that often 
undergoes dynamic change. Through closely describing, documenting and interpreting events 
that unfold in a real life setting, it can deterrnine the barriers and facilitators of implementing 
knowledge management for tourism crises that affected hotels in Thailand.
Fourth, the researcher believes in subjectivism and interpretivism, therefore a ease study 
would allow the researcher to engage with the participants. This is both a political and an 
epistemological point. This shifts the role of the researcher from being the controller to being 
a eo-constructing researcher. According to Simons (2009), this will create a mutual 
understanding and provide opportunity for the researcher to take a self-reflexive approach to 
understanding the case and oneself.
5.3.2.3 Rationale for Adopting Multi-Case Study Research Strategy
This part explains the reasons why this type of case study was chosen. Yin (2009) noted that 
there are two major types of case study research: single and multi-ease studies or the so- 
called comparative case method. The single case study is often used for a unique ease or a 
longitudinal research study.
The reason for not choosing to do a single ease study is because it is more suitable for 
extreme eases which are rare and therefore worth documenting (Yin, 2009). In this study, 
knowledge management practices are assumed to be conducted to some extent in Thai hotels. 
Moreover, the single case study according to Yin (2009) is more for the well-formulated 
theory. Although the model of knowledge management and tourism crisis management has 
been developed by a number of researchers, only a few have investigated the link between 
these two issues (Ritchie, 2004).
The reason that I am choosing the multiple-ease studies with embedded units is because of 
replication. Replication for ease study research is an attempt to cheek whether the findings 
could be duplicated in a second or third case, or even more (Yin, 2009). There are two kinds 
of replication: (a) literal replication, which finds similar results (to show what is important 
and unimportant to the original findings) and (b) theoretical replication which produces 
contrasting results but for anticipated reasons (Yin, 2009). Hence, key important or 
unimportant issues on knowledge management of tourism crises can be captured from the
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research findings. In addition, Yin (2009) claimed that the advantage of conducting multiple 
case studies is that the evidence from this type of ease study research is more robust.
5.3.2.4 The Limitations of Qualitative Multi-Case Study Research
This part presents the researcher’s awareness of three limitations and a solution to overcome 
theni. The first hmitation is that rnulti ease-stud^ research js conducted in a natural or field 
experiment; therefore, details are hard to plan and control. Nevertheless, Remenyi (2012) 
argued that the researcher can examine the situation and then determine the most important 
elements and consequences of the before-and-after situation. Instead of viewing it as a threat, 
a surprise situation would be an opportunity to discover something unique or new.
The second limitation is that a ease study cannot be replicated in the same way as the logic of 
a survey which takes a larger sample in order to increase the level of reliability and 
generalisability. Reminyi (2012) argues that a case study is not conducted in order to 
replicate nor use the findings to apply like a universal law as in traditional experimental 
research. Instead, the findings of ease studies will be considered representative in some sense 
of a group of similar situations, organisations or individuals. The second, third or fourth cases 
are done to compare and contrast, and from that more learning emerges (Remenyi, 2012). In 
addition, to use a larger sample based on the survey logic may not help to enrich our 
understanding of the situation but it will increase the level of confidence in the findings.
The third limitation is that multi-case study research, with interview and non-interview 
evidence (documentation and observation), is dealing with large amounts of data that require 
time and effort to collect and analyse. However, the benefit is that good quality information, 
dynamic ideas and suggestions would generate real value for this study.
5.4 The Unit of Analysis
This section presents the unit of analysis of this study in order to understand the relationship 
of eases and the research objectives (Yin, 2009). It is important to be reminded that this is an 
exploratory research, therefore propositions and the phase of linking data to the proposition 
will be excluded from the research design stage. The units of analysis and the embedded units 
would be as illustrated in Figure 5.1.
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The knowledge management of tourism crises
Po licym akers
The Ministry o f  
Tourism and Sports, 
TAT, THA, ATTA, 
TIC, Tourist Police, ' 
and PATA Thailand 
(See: Section 4.3.2)
Objective 1
Hole
Objective 2 and 3
Small /
independent
hotels
Large/
independent
hotels
Large / Thai 
chain hotels
Large / 
Foreign chain 
hotels
-Embedded -Embedded
-Embedded 
case 1 -Embedded
ease l , case 1 ............... case 1 ..........
-Embedded -Embedded
-Embedded 
case 2 -Embedded
case 2 case 2 case 2
Figure 5.1 The design for multiple-ease
Figure 5.1 shows that to answer objective 1, the researcher conducted data collection from 2 
main groups which were (1) the tourism crisis management policymakers group and (2) the 
hotel group; and then compare the understanding and objectives of policymakers versus 
hoteliers for managing tourism crises. For answering objective 2, the researcher investigated 
how knowledge was transferred and managed for handling such tourism crises implemented 
in 4 hotel types which vary in size and structure of ownership. Lastly objective 3, the 
researcher examined barriers and facilitators of knowledge management for tourism crises 
that affect these hotels.
5.5 Data Collection Process
This section explains the data collection process starting from pilot test to cheek the 
feasibility of the interview questions and data collection process, in order to refine the data 
collection plan. In this study, the researcher collected data mainly from faee-to-faee 
interviews as it is a robust way to obtain data. The interview data collection was divided into 
two stages as shown in the data collection diagram in Figure 5.2. First, semi-structured 
interviews with tourism crisis management policymakers (Appendix 2: Data collection 
process for stage 1). Second, semi-structured interviews with hotel managers in the three 
types of hotels (Appendix 3: Data collection process for stage 2). The end of the section
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explains other non-interview data that this research used to obtain more data for better 
interpretation and understanding.
5.5.1 Pilot Study
Before conducting the main study, the researcher conducted pilot studies. There are two 
reasons for conducting the pilot study: (1) evaluate the ihtervie’w questions for problems 
with respondents in answering the questions, as well as their answers for sufficiency to 
achieve research objectives; and (2) check whether the research design and the field 
procedures—i.e., accessing the respondent and interview schedule—are feasible. It is 
important to note here that the data from the pilot study will not be included in the main 
results because it is focused on the processes of the main study. In this section, there are two 
aspects to be presented: (1) the data collection process of pilot study and (2) the lesson 
learned as the outcome of the pilot study.
5.5.1.1 The Data Collection Process of Pilot Study
The selection of the pilot test was planned based on convenience and accessibility as I am 
studying at University of Surrey in the United Kingdom and needed to undertake the pilot in 
advance of the main fieldwork visit; therefore one policymaker of a Thai tourism related 
association in London was selected to be interviewed. The other interviewees, with hotels 
came later in the data collection process, and so could be conducted in Chiang Rai province, 
Thailand where I used to work and have good relationship with the local hotels. For the pilot 
test, I initially planned to interview 3 persons: one policymaker from tourism related 
association, and two General Managers, one from a large hotel and another one from a small 
hotel (See: Table 5.1). However, the actual samples of respondents were extended from three 
to five because of the dissatisfaction of the answer (i.e. too short an answer, no example 
given) obtained from an interviewee and a further interview needed to be done to confirm the 
revised version of interview questions. Therefore, in Table 5.1, the number 5 was the one 
piloted.
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Table 5.1 Interview schedule of pilot study
Type of organisation Position o f interviewee Date of interview
Policymaker (London 
Office, UK)
Director 24 Sept. 2012
Policymaker Head of the station 30 Nov. 2012
Large, Thai chain Hotel Director of Finance 29 Nov. 2012
Small, independent 
hotel
GM / Owner 29 Nov. 2012
Small, independent 
hotel
Owner 4 Dec. 2012
5.5.1.2 The Lesson Learned Front the Pilot Studies
Lesson 1: Techniques of interviewing and modification of the research instrument— 
interview questions
For the pilot studies with policymakers, the first revision of the main research instrument 
which was the interview questions of policymaker was made after interviewing the director 
of policymaker (London Office, UK) in early October. The second revision of interview of 
policymaker was made again during November 2012 for policymaker’s organisations located 
in Thailand to test the interview questions for which necessary changes were made. 
Afterward, the list of interview questions was agreed upon for use in interviewing 
policymakers in stage 1 during October to December 2012.
For the pilot studies with hoteliers, the first revision of interview questions was done in 
November 2012 after the researcher interviewed a large, Thai chain hotel and small, 
independent hotel. The list of ambiguous and repetitive interview questions has been revised 
and removed. Moreover, questions have been added in order to gain sufficiency in quality of 
answers for the research objectives. Examples of the questions and the discussion of general 
feedback from interviewing, and testing the instrument derived from the first pilot test, will 
be further discussed below.
A problem was found when asking respondents to think of the tourism crisis that has the most 
impact to the tourism industry in the past decade. Because they tended to respond with the 
most recent crises, the researcher was not sure whether these answers are representative or 
that the interviewee cannot recall past tourism crises. This question was asked at the 
beginning when the interviewee might have been a bit nervous. The solution to this is to ask
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what situations the respondents think are crises at the start of the interview. Then the 
researcher could ask them to comment on the list of major crises and what the impact of each 
one was on the tourism industry as a whole—especially hotels.
Secondly, there were some questions that the interviewee who was policymaker was reluctant 
to answer. For instance, “Can you think of any sjiecific examples of good practice in hotels 
that implement knowledge management for tourism crises?” As the interviewee is the 
policymaker, the first questions made him feel that if he provided a name of a hotel as being a 
good example it would seem that he favours one hotel over another. Therefore, he refused to 
answer these questions but told me to ask the concerned association which is the Thai Hotel 
Association who will know best on this. A solution to refusal to answer this question is to 
change the language in the interview questions by asking them to consider the best practice 
examples that they know of. To avoid the hesitation to answer I would also tell the 
interviewees they do not have to mention the hotels by name unless they want to.
Another question was, “Could you think of barriers that could make knowledge management 
for tourism crises become ineffective? The answer to these questions was: “We have done 
good job.” This is possibly a phenomenon of ‘saving face’ which is a dominant cultural factor 
in Asian society. Revealing obstructs or problems in the organisation can be linked to its bad 
image. The solution was to ask a positive tone of questions such as: “what factors do you 
think your organisation should have in order to be even better than now.”
There were smaller issues also, such as the interviewee answer to some questions being too 
short, and then the researcher would ask them to provide examples or to elaborate, so as to 
encourage them to talk more and allow research to gain rich descriptive data.
However, in some cases, the interviewee answered too long and the answer was not relevant. 
Therefore, in the main study, the researcher would have to inform interviewees as to the 
number of questions so that they can evaluate how much time they should devote to each 
question. A researcher has to be assertive—but not aggressive—and lead the conversation.
Having said all that, I agree with Sommer and Sommer (1991) who wrote in their book 
‘Practical Guide to Behavioural Research, Tools, and Techniques’ saying that the semi- 
strueture may have an advantage on loss of consistency of the same procedure in interview 
because the questions may need to be adjusted to suit the interview situation. The respondents
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are from different backgrounds. Therefore wording, tone, sequence of questions, etc. may 
need to be adjusted to suit the situation in order to ensure obtaining in-depth information.
Afterward the refined questions were tested again in the second pilot test by interviewing the 
owner of a small, independent hotel. All feedback from this second pilot with hoteliers 
cbhfiimed that the list of questions for infëfviëwihg respondent in Stage 2 during March -  
May 2013 were appropriate for the main study.
Lesson 2: Overcome Challenges
This research is qualitative, involving faee-to-faee interviews with elite policymakers and 
hotel respondents.
The first challenge that came early to mind was scheduling the interview timetable. To reach 
the top executives in each organisation appointments had to be arranged through gatekeepers; 
however, the researcher had good experience in collaborating with gatekeepers due to 
personal relationship and background of the researcher. Although the appointment for 
interview has been confirmed, changes can suddenly happen. For this pilot test, the researcher 
got a phone call to cancel an interview 30 minutes before due to sickness of GM, the 
interviewee. The interviewer followed the interview and sampling procedure as before (i.e the 
position, the working experience and knowledge of the person on the topic) for selection of 
the next respondents who matched the criteria for what I was searching. In another ease, a 
policymaker had an urgent meeting. If there is no proper substitute then the researcher would 
have to arrange an alternative date of interview as in the ease of the policymaker.
The second difficulty is control of the interview setting. The researcher conducted the faee- 
to-faee meeting at the place of the interviewee. Four of five interviews were conducted in the 
guest receiving areas of the hotel or organisation, therefore interruptions and noise from 
surroundings interfered with the conversation and caused problems later trying to hear the 
audio recording when the researcher endeavoured to transcribe the interview. In the main 
study the researcher requested interviewees to arrange interviews in a quiet environment such 
as a meeting room or the office of the interviewee.
In conclusion, the purpose of conducting the pilot study is to examine the feasibility of a 
research endeavour. The pilot of this project was considered a success. However, as I am 
aware that this achievement is not a guarantee for the success of the project as the pilot test is
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basically a small sampling (van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001). Nevertheless, the pilot study 
is a crucial stage to the researcher to learn lessons of conducting qualitative research and to 
refine ideas eoneeming the research project as mentioned in the previous section. Having a 
trial run experience made the researcher feel more confident that the interview questions are 
adequate and research design is feasible.
5.5.2 Interview Data Collection
There were two stages in the interview data collection process. The first was to interview the 
policymakers, and the second was to interview the hoteliers. The first stage was carried out 
for one month in December, 2012. Due to the reason of the time constraint and to achieve the 
data saturation, the first stage of interview was repeated. To gain the data from all samples, it 
was done yet again during March to April, 2013. The second stage of hotel interviews was 
carried out over 3 months from March to May, 2013. Following are the responses of the 
interviews in stages 1 and 2:
Stage 1: Semi-Structured Interviews with Tourism Crisis Management Policymakers
The 3 reasons for conducting stage 1 were: (1) to understand interviewees’ views about what 
are the tourism crises that affected hotels in Thailand, (2) to comprehend their understanding 
of knowledge management for tourism crises from policymakers and later compare with the 
hotelier. (3) to request their help to screen candidates for Stage 2. Next, the research design, 
sampling procedure, and administration are discussed.
a) Design
Semi-struetured interviews were held with policymakers in order to obtain information as to 
each individual’s understanding and objectives of managing tourism crises that affected 
hotels in Thailand. The questions focused on the subjects’ understanding and objectives of 
tourism crises that affected hotel businesses in Thailand during 2001 to 2012. Finally, the 
interviewees were asked to explain the implementation and collaboration of knowledge 
management for tourism crises between policymakers and hoteliers. The content of the 
interviews was developed from the available literature and models from Chapter 2 to Chapter 
4. (Appendix 4: topics for discussion with tourism crisis management policymakers and 
hotels). All interviews followed a standardised format in order to ensure comparability of 
responses and enable the researcher to reach general conclusions as to the approaches 
adopted by stakeholders regarding the above issues.
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b) Sampling
The sample was purposively taken from the working group for crisis management in 
Thailand shown in Figure 4.7. The researcher focused on the people whose work directly 
related to the tourism industry and excluded the other ministries because they are dealing 
with unrelated crisis issues. The reason that the researcher used the purposive sample is that 
in qualitativeTesearch the sàmplës arë often small (Tdssëÿ ëf àl., 2002); but this Is  hot a 
problem, as the researcher is not attempting to generalize the findings. Nevertheless, more 
interviews can be done until no new material is emerging; at this point, data gathering usually 
stops (Paraboo, 2006 in Ryan et al., 2007).
According to Table 5.2, the tourism crises management working teams in Thailand 
interviewed were in public sectors—Department of Tourism, Ministry of Tourism and Sport, 
Tourism police and Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT), Risk Management Division, 
Tourism Authority of Thailand as a representative of Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis 
Management Centre (TIC). In the private sector were Thai Hotels Association (THA), 
Association of Thai Travel Agents (ATTA), Pacific Asia Travel Association ( PATA ), and 
Tourism Council of Thailand (TCT)
Table 5.2 List of the interviewed policymakers
Date of 
interview
Organisations 
(Total 8 organisations)
Number of 
respondent
(Total : 9 persons )
1/12/12 Thai Hotels Association 2
2/12/12 Tourism Authority of Thailand 1
2/12/12 PATA Thailand Chapter 1
6/12/12 Department of Tourism, Ministry of Tourism and Sport 1
21/12/12 Tourist Police (The extended participant) 1
20/03/13 The Association of Thai Travel Agents (ATTA) 1
24/04/13 Risk Management Division, Tourism Authority of 
Thailand as a representative of Tourism Intelligence Unit 
and Crisis Management Centre (TIC)
26/04/13 Tourism Council of Thailand (The extended participant) 1
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Attempts to interview at least one executive in each individual organisation was made, but in 
a couple of eases with no success due to the time constraint of the data collection during 
October 2012 and the busy schedule of some policymakers. In addition, for fulfilling data 
saturation, the researcher decided to interview more organisations that are involved in Thai 
tourism crisis management policy. Hence, the second attempt to obtain data from 
policymakers was cdhdueted during March and April 2013, ' - —
With two periods of data collection in stage 1, the response rate was 100% with an extra two 
organisations added to the data collection plan in order to achieve the data saturation 
principle. The top executives of both public and private organisations involving tourism crisis 
management at the national level in Thailand (Managing Director, president and governor) 
were approached. Some organisations due to the busy schedule of their top executives, the 
vice president, or director of concerned department in charge of tourism crisis management 
were interviewed instead.
e) Administration
All subjects were contacted initially by letter at the beginning of September 2012. 
Afterwards, the agreements to cooperate in research were followed up by phone calls to agree 
to dates and times. In each case, a semi-struetured interview and other non-interview methods 
were used in eolleeting data which will be later discussed in 5.5.3.
During December, 2012 and March-April, 2013, 9 participants from 8 organisations in Table
5.2 were interviewed according to the specified date. The duration of interviews lasted thirty 
to sixty minutes and consisted of approximately 17 question groups around 4 themes. All 
interviews were recorded faee-to-faee and transcribed. Each subject was asked if this is 
acceptable and was given the opportunity to decline the use of voice recorder if he or she was 
not comfortable with that. Notes were taken as each interview progressed.
Stage 2: Semi-Structured Interviews with Hotel Participants
After finishing the data analysis for stage 1, the researcher decided to list two embedded hotel 
ease studies for each of four hotel types: (1) small/independent hotels, (2) large/independent 
hotels, (3) large/ Thai chain hotels and (4) large/international chain hotels. Therefore, for the 
whole of the study, 9 hotels (See: Table 5.3) were asked to participate in this study to allow 
comparison in order to generate theoretical replication. These hotels were selected through a 
screening process eollaboratively with the informants and the researchers during the study of 
stage 1 to ensure that they were appropriate comparative cases for this study.
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a) Design
The content of the semi-structured interview (See: Appendix 4: topics for discussion with 
tourism crisis management policymakers and hoteliers) was developed from the available 
literature and secondary data and findings from the people interviewed in the first stage. The 
questions concentrated on their understanding of the tourism crises that affected hotel 
businesses in Thailand Trbrh 2001 to 2012; especially definition of crise^ types of crises and 
criteria to classify the category of tourism crisis for the hotel industry in Thailand. In 
addition, the subjects were asked about the implementation of knowledge management for 
tourism crises that affected hotel businesses in Thailand. The interviews were recorded by 
voice recorder and designed to last for one hour.
b) Sampling
As mentioned, the hotels that were selected for each type of hotel were screened 
collaboratively by the informants and the researcher in the data collection of stage 1. Initially 
the researcher planned to only use those hotels that are members of the Thai Hotel 
Association because it would be easy to access the hotel information through the 
association’s database. There is a total of 859 members in the Association list, of which 312 
are located in Bangkok. The researcher filtered the list of 312 members based on these 
recruitment 4 criteria: (1) size /structure of ownership; (2) hotels located in touristic areas of 
Bangkok; (3) having direct experience in dealing with past tourism crises between 2001- 
2012; and (4) having shown a record of co-operation with the team of policymakers in 
dealing with crises at the final stage of screening. The researcher sought to include at least 
two hotels for each category of the hotel type. All large hotels were cooperative to participate 
in the study, while the small hotels did not respond. With time constraints, and several 
attempts contacting the small independent hotels, the researcher decided to approach 3 other 
small hotels suggested by the informants in stage 1 and matched with the recruitment criteria. 
Although these hotels are not members of the association, they are registered by the Ministry 
of Tourism and Sport and met other key criteria of the purposive sampling. Therefore, these 
three small hotels were used in this study.
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Table 5.3 The list of the interviewed hoteliers
T ype o f H otel /  N am e
A ctual n u m b er o f respondents by position
D ate o f  interviewExecutive
(pax)
M iddle.
(pax)
S ta ff
(pax)
l.S m all/Independen t hotels
Case 1 1 1 1 26 April 2013
Case 2 1 - 1 4 M ay 2013
Case 3 1 1 1 22 M arch 2013
2. L arg e /In d ep en d en t hotels
Case 1 1 1 1 18-19 M arch 2013
Case 2 1 1 1 20-21 M arch 2013
3. L arg e / T hai chain hotels
Case 1 1 2 1 6 M arch /23 M arch 2013
Case 2 1 2 4-5 M ay 2013
4. L arg e /In te rn a tio n a l chain hotels
Case 1 1 1 1 2-3 April 2013
Case 2 2 1 1 3-4 April 2013
T otal 10 10 9
G ra n d  T otal 29
Executive management (Owner or General Manager) was purposively selected to be the main 
target of the interviews. However, the interviewer also met with a few employees who were 
department heads or were rank and file employees in the organisation in order to have a better 
understanding and to achieve the data saturation. From Table 5.3, there were 9 hotels and a 
total of 29 respondents comprised of 10 executive managers 10 middle managers and 98 
rank- and-file staff who participated in this study. According Guest et al. (2006) as few as 3-4 
respondents in each organisation can produce a high level of accuracy and a researcher can 
achieve data saturation. Therefore, in some hotels the researcher interviewed more than 1 
person in each position to gain insight data. These hotels and respondents were selected 
according to the selection criteria and interview procedure for hoteliers, which can be seen in 
Appendix 3.
c) Administration
All interviews were conducted face-to-face and taped. Each interviewee was asked if this 
was acceptable and was given the opportunity to decline the use of voice recorder if he or she 
was not comfortable with that. The interviews took place during March-May 2013 which is 
from the beginning of the shoulder season (the low season for tourism in Thailand) and out of
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the main holiday season—except for the Thai New Year which is 12-14 April 2013. 
Therefore, in this period, the subjects agreed to take part. All subjects were contacted 
initially by letter at the beginning of January 2013. Afterward, the agreement to cooperate in 
research was followed up by phone calls to agree on dates and times. Each interview was 
designed to last for one hour.
5.5.3 Non-Interview Data Collection
The previous section provided details about interviews and this part explains the plan of 
obtaining data from written and sensing evidence (observation). This non-interview data 
collection was used to contextualise the social setting, to develop the profiles of the 
policymakers and hotel cases, and especially to support the interview data.
As previously stated, the advantage of case study research is that the researcher can use 
several methods to collect data (Remenyi, 2012). Therefore the creditability of findings can 
be obtained through convergence of different perspectives (Saunders et al., 2009, Yin, 2009, 
Remenyi, 2012). However, it is argued that different methods cannot really help to confirm 
the accuracy, but combining them can add range and depth (Flick, 1992). Therefore, in this 
study the purpose of combined interview (primary research tool) and non-interview data 
collection methods is for adding more understanding and seeing the situation through 
different lenses, though not for the purpose of confirming the interviews (Flick, 1992, 
Remenyi, 2012).
5.5.3.1 Informal and Formal Documents
The non-interview data that 1 had planned initially to acquire from stages 1 and 2 is both 
formal and informal written evidence. The formal evidence that 1 plan to request from them 
are documents they use to disseminate knowledge for tourism crises; for example, hotel fact 
sheets, standard of procedure of crisis management and training courses, the minutes of 
meetings and their standard of procedure of tourism crisis management. As expected, there 
are several limitations of using the method to collect data.
First, there was a lack of standardisation and comparability of data. The small organisation 
has no written documents that are useful to the researcher, while most of the large 
organisations have a crisis management plan. The format and style of the documents are 
tailored to each property.
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Secondly, confidentiality of most of the information such as the standard of procedure, 
training plan, and crisis management plans. The researcher asked the interviewee to explain 
about these documents briefly during the conversation.
Nevertheless, by explaining that this research is for academic purposes and ensuring the 
anonymity of the source, the researcher has obtained some documents to interpret the ------y —'—•'---- — •    — '    - —----------   • — -....—      ^ ...---    ...     JT. -............................
findings. The sections where data from these documents were presented, they are available in 
Appendix 5.
5.5.3.2 Observation
Simons (2009) stated that observation has been one of the research tools for the case study 
strategy. Observation data can be collected through watching individuals within the 
organisation and the way the organisation is structured (Remenyi, 2012). Observation has 
several benefits to the case study research in: (1) gaining an insightful view and sense of the 
setting, (2) providing ‘rich description, (3) discovering the norms and values of the 
organisation and interaction of the people, (4) capturing the respondent’s experience, and (5) 
providing a cross-check on data obtained in the interviews (Simons, 2009). (Simons, 2009). 
In this research, observation was used as a supportive tool to the interview method and to 
capture the environment where the interviewee is working; observation was also made of the 
environment artefacts related to knowledge management implementation, such as the crisis 
management manuals, the announcement and training programme and the storage of 
documents.
The research objectives are to analyse differences in the views of the respondents on tourism 
crisis and analyse differences between hotels of different sizes and structure of ownership. 
Two observed elements were the respondents and setting (hotels). The reason for observing 
respondents is to record their emotional states while they answer the interview questions 
(sensing their degree of certainty or uncertainty with their answers in positive or negative 
attitudes). Also, in order to observe how they interact with the environment and artefacts 
relating to knowledge management, for example in his/her workplace in order to supplement 
data obtained from the interview. Golledge (1987) explained in environmental psychology 
that human thought and decision are influenced by the environments where they live and 
work. Hence, this research to record the emotional state and the evidence found in the setting 
could help in the interpretation of interviewees’ perspectives and their implementation 
regarding the research topic.
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The process of observation includes observing the emotional state when an interviewee 
answers each interview question. A record was made with note taking at the end of each 
question if the interviewee showed any reluctance to answer or display positive or negative 
facial expression while they were answering. Additionally, the researcher observed the 
interviewee interacting with his/her environment; for example accessing the documents and 
IT based information; as well as the evidence related to knowledge transfer and mahagemeht 
in his or her office, such as poster, books on shelves, certificates on walls, etc. The reason to 
observe the setting and interaction of interviewee in his or her environment has helped 
portray the case study from the researcher’s understanding.
The process of this observation includes the experience of researcher as a hotel guest for two 
days and one night. Also, to have 30 minutes for observing staff and ambience of the hotel by 
means of touring in-house or sitting in the lobby in case the in-house tour is not permitted. 
Afterward, a descriptive narrative observation of the realistic characteristic of environment, 
services, interaction of staff guests of each hotel that is different in size and the structure of 
ownership was written.
These impressions of observation are recorded in narrative observation reports (See: 
Appendix 6). As Remenyi (2012) said, the benefit of recording feelings from site 
observations and interviews into the notes is that it can be used as “the glue to stick all the 
interviews together and then make sense of the whole.”
The researcher is aware of limitation of observation but as Yin (2009) says, it can reveal the 
reality of events in real time and cover contexts of the case, even though it takes time and 
adds cost. Nevertheless, this method will help to complement data obtained from 
interviewing and documentation. In addition, this researcher had to be aware of se lf  
reflexivity and ensure that events observed were understood correctly by asking interviewees 
for clarification.
S.5.3.3 The Treatment and the Usage of the Data from Non-interview Data Collection
The documents were scanned in PDF format and stored in the internal source folder under the 
folder “documentation” in NVFVOI O. While the observation notes taken during the interview 
and during stays at the hotels was typed in Microsoft Word and stored in the folder “filed 
note” in the internal source of the NVIVO 10. During data analysis, the researcher read
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throughout and then wrote a memo (a researcher’s note in the NVIVO 10). The researcher’s 
note in memo then later could be used in conjunction with the data of the interview.
The data gained from the documents and observation (field note) were analysed and 
presented in findings and discussions of Section 6.1, 7.1, 7.2. These sections offer an 
introduction of the context of the policymakers and the hotels. Especially in Sections 7.1 and 
7.2. ,the details that are included in these sections are derived from hotel fact sheets and field 
notes of the researcher (observation) while staying for two days in each hotel and observing 
the interviewees’ work environments (Appendix 6: An example). The profiles of each hotel 
presented in Section 7.1 and 7.2 are the general characteristics of its environment, products 
and services in addition to any artefacts related to the topics of tourism crisis management, 
knowledge transfer and management. It should be emphasised that although the documentary 
and observational data are important, they were intended to play a supportive role to the 
analysis of the interview data.
To conclude Section 5.5, the data collection process of this study involved various methods; 
therefore, it is important to maintain the chain of evidence to increase its reliability. The data 
collected from these three sources were kept in a case research database to make sure that it 
can be retraced. The case research database contains citation of specific documents, 
interviews, and observations, with dates and time.
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5.6 Data Analysis
The material collected from qualitative research includes a large amount of rich data which is 
often unstructured, and therefore it is a challenge to the researcher to find coherence and 
structure while maintaining the original concept (Bryman and Bell, 2007). In particular, 
multi-case study research employs various sources of data including both interview and non­
interview, so to analyse the data is akin to putting the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle together and 
then drawing a convincing conclusion or finding an answer to the research question 
(Remenyi, 2012). In this section, the treatment of data from interview and non-interview 
sources is explained, followed by template analysis which is the selected method for analysis 
of the data for this case study.
5.6.1 Creating a Case Study Database
The interview was the primary data collection source. There are two stages of interview with 
the different groups of respondents: the first group is policymakers and the second is 
hoteliers-the General Manager, a few employees who are department heads, and rank-and- 
file employees in the organisation. The interview tapes and notes of the research were 
transcribed (See: Appendix 7). Each interview will be retained in its original language and 
only quoted Thai statements will be translated into English.
All data from both interview and non-interview sources will be kept in a case research 
database to make sure that it can be retraced. The case research database will contain citation 
specific documents, interviews and observations, with dates and times.
5.6.2 Template Analysis
To analyse the data from different sources, the researcher used template analysis which 
involves analysing data into a common format (Remenyi, 2012). Template analysis is for 
analysing and presenting data in a common format so that the similarities and differences can 
be identified (Symon and Cassel, 2012 cited in Remenyi, 2012).
The justification to support the use of template analysis is that template analysis allows 
researchers to tailor the themes in advance so that these themes can be matched with the 
requirement of the researcher. From the above argument, as this research is based on 
constructivism and the researcher wants to ensure the development of the cross-case analysis, 
thematic analysis with pre-defined codes would best fit as the tool to analyse the data.
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There are four stages of template analysis suggested by (King et al., 2004) which are: (1) 
creating the initial template (2), revising the template (3) finalizing the template, and (4) 
using software in template analysis.
The first step is creating the initial template. King et al. (2004) said that the research should 
create pre-defined codes v^ich will help to guide the analysis. They explained that the codes 
should not be too short that make you lose direction or too extensive that the researcher will 
be overwhelmed by a mass of information (King et al., 2004). They suggested that the initial 
template should be related to one’s interview questions. Therefore, the initial template of this 
study was illustrated in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3 shows that the initial template contained five highest order codes, sub-divided into 
one or two lower ordered codes. The sub-lower ordered codes reflect the depth of analysis. 
The template is organised in a hierarchical structure in order to make sure that there is a 
logical flow in the relationship between themes.
After the initial template is done, in the second stage the researcher has to work 
systematically through the case study database. The researcher will begin by defining the 
codes for data in the case study database. The section of data will be labelled into related 
themes which will have to be coherent with the project’s aim. By performing this task, the 
initial themes will be modified for appropriateness according to the following steps suggested 
By King et al. (2004):
• Insertion— to consider adding new codes for the new themes that appear to be 
related and provide answers to the research questions.
• Deletion—to remove inadequate codes that may overlap or may not be 
needed.
• Scoping— redefining the codes so that they will not be too broad or too 
narrow.
• Reclassifying the order of the codes—either high or low-order codes can be 
rearranged for a better relationship and more logical order of the themes.
Third, the final template was produced by constructing the analytical template. This last 
template development was used together with NVivo version 10 to manage the data.
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Fourth, the researcher used NVivo version 10 which is a powerful software tool that analyses 
the relationships among themes (King et a l, 2004). It is true that the software is not able to 
make judgments about the data; however, it aids in organising and examining the data. 
(Appendix 8: Data analysis by NVivo 10).
1. The understanding o f  tourism crisis management  ^ _____ _________  ______ ............................. ........
1.1 The meaning o f  tourism crisis affected hotels
1.1.1 Classification o f  tourism crises 
1.2 The meaning o f  tourism crisis management
1.2.2 Approaches to managing tourism crises
2. The objective o f  tourism crisis management
2.1 The role o f  organisation in tourism crisis management from the past till the present
2.2 The role o f  organisation in tourism crisis management in the future
3. Implementation o f  knowledge management o f  tourism crises
3.1 Roles in this process
3.2 The knowledge management process
3.2.1 Knowledge acquisition
3.2.2  Organisational knowledge creation
3.2.3 Feedback and learning from previous experience
4. Implementation o f  knowledge transfer o f  tourism crises
4.1 The knowledge conversion modes and mechanisms
4.1.1 Socialisation
4.1.2  Externalisation
4.1.3 Internalisation
4.1.4  Combination
5. Barriers and facilitators for implementation o f  knowledge transfer and management o f  tourism crises
5.1 Facilitators (The 8 enablers o f  knowledge management)
5.2 Barriers (Technological, Organisational, and People challenges ‘TOP’)
Figure 5.3 Initial template
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5.7 The Quality of the Research
Remenyi (2012) and Yin (2009) said that there are 3 eommon issues coneeming case studies 
that we can use to judge the quality of the research: Internal validity, external validity 
(generalisability) and reliability.
Internal , validity test that what the researcher believes is. being studied is in fact what is 
actually being studied (Remenyi, 2012). Yin (2009) suggested tactics to increase internal 
validity by using multiple sources of evidence, establishing a chain of evidence and having 
the key informant review a draft of the case study report. As stated in discussing the data 
collection process, this research employed both interview and non-interview (documentation 
and observation) as multiple sources of evidence. To ensure a chain of evidence, the data 
collected from these multiple sources was kept in a case research database to make sure that it 
could be retraced with dates and times. The respondents were asked to review the case study 
report to confirm the validity of the data.
Beyond internal validity considerations, using multiple case studies with embedded case 
design instead of a single ease can provide replication logic to promote external validity. 
External validity tests whether findings are generalisable beyond the immediate case study 
(Yin, 2009). It is important to note that case study research is not aimed at statistical 
generalisation; instead, the researcher relies on analytic generalisation in order to have a 
broader theory (Yin, 2009). Thus using two cases for each type of hotel would provide strong 
support and generate extensive knowledge for the theory.
Thirdly, reliability tests sureness that the research is reliable and knowing if repeated by 
others would produce similar results (Yin, 2009, Remenyi, 2012). As stated earlier when 
discussing limitations, this concept produces challenges for qualitative case study research. 
Remenyi (2009) argued that in qualitative research, each researcher brings his/her own value 
set to the study. Moreover, Yin (2009) noted that the emphasis of doing the same case over 
again is not in replicating the results of previous findings but minimising the errors and bias 
in a study.
In order to avoid confusion with the terms often used to judge the quality of quantitative 
research, a number of scholars have proposed four terms to be used instead of internal 
validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity, as shown in Table 5.4.(Ryan et al., 2007, 
Remenyi, 2012).
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Table 5.4 Criteria forjudging quality of research for this study.
Q uantitative research Q ualitative research
M ethods that this research uses to ensure 
quality
Internal validity Credibility Member checks 
Engagement in the field  
Data triangulation 
Chain o f  evidence
External validity Transferability Description o f  setting and organisation 
types
Position o f  participants 
Embedded cases for lateral replication
Reliability Dependability Chain o f  evidence
Embedded cases for lateral replication 
Inter-coder reliability check
Objectivity Confirmability Description o f  the study context data 
collection, management and interpretation 
Presentation process
Source: Adapted from Lincoln and Guba (1985), Ballinger (2006) in Finlay et al. (2006), 
and Remenyi (2009)
Table 5.4 shows a pair of criteria for judging the quality of research for quantitative and 
qualitative studies. This research is qualitative, from an interpretivism viewpoint taking an 
inductive approach, so this section explains how the research meets these criteria.
The creditability and dependability criteria were met by using data triangulation from 
multiple sources. The data from all sources were kept as a chain of evidence in the NI VIVO 
10 (See: Appendix 8). For instance the interview voice recoded file and transcripts of the 
interview are stored in the internal source system under the folder called “Interview” so it 
could be retraced and retrievable. The documents was scanned in pdf format and stored in the 
folder “documentation”. Credibility was demonstrated by the way that I conducted face-to- 
face interviews and directly engage the respondents. The data was put through the process of 
‘member check’ i.e. respondents reviewed the case study report to confirm the creditability of 
the data (Finlay, 2006).
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According to Figure 5.1, using multiple case studies with embedded case design to answer 
research objectives allowed the researcher to cross check the findings from the first 
embedded case to the second embedded case. Although generalisation in the wider context is 
not the primary concern of qualitative research, the findings of similar results (lateral 
replication) from these embedded cases is likely to have meaning for other hotels of similar
. . . . . .  ---- «     • m--------------  *- -- # 4 4 / V  y  #  V ' ' ' '             -......................   - - - .----- ------ ---
Size and organisation type in Thailand (Ym, 2009)
The results gained from the cases would be expected to be dependable. I conducted the inter­
coder reliability eheck to reduce the error and bias generated by me when coding the 
voluminous amount of data from each transcript of the interview. The process of an inter- 
eoder reliability check included 4 stages: (1) Develop a coding scheme for two samples of 
transcripts (one from the policymaker and another from hotel). (2) Ask three PhD colleagues 
in the same faculty that are not only knowledgeable in the field but also familiar with a 
Thailand context for the coding. Afterward, we compared and discussed the coding result. 
There was a high level of inter-coder agreement. (3) The researcher then presented the code 
scheme to two supervisors for final agreement. (4) The acceptable coding was deployed in 
full sets of transcripts.
I performed the coding and analysis by myself, and the report of the analysis with Nvivo 10 
was discussed to the supervisors. Due to the limitation of time and resources to set up the 
inter-coder reliability cheek, this is the process that I have conducted. However, with such a 
high level of agreement among coders, I am confident that my coding would be replicable by 
other equally knowledgeable coders if they were available.
Repeated or similar results are likely to be generated under the condition that another 
researcher can clearly follow the trail used by the investigator to investigate the similar 
phenomenon and context (Remenyi, 2009). Other organisations can use the findings as they 
will be informed about the characteristics of the setting and organisation types, so that readers 
can determine if the findings apply to them or not. The explanations regarding the study 
context, data collection and management, and the interpretation and presentation process has 
and will be clearly explained to ensure confirmability of the conclusion and interpretation.
With regard to the rigour or trustworthiness which demonstrates the plausibility and integrity 
of the process of this research study, the researcher will ensure rigour in documentation, 
procedure and ethics. First is rigour in documentation; the researcher will cheek that there is
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a correlation between the steps of the research process and the research objectives. Secondly, 
to ensure procedural rigour, the researcher will reduce bias and interpretation through the 
process of data triangulation and member checks. Thirdly, regarding ethical rigour, the 
researcher will ensure that confidentiality issues and the rights of participants are dealt with 
during the research process. More details on ethical rigour will be explained in Section 5.8.
5.8 Research Ethics
Simons (2009) stated that ethics is “how we behave or should behave in relation to the people 
with whom we interact.” In this section, I will discuss some general ethical principles and 
procedures that I adopted for this research study.
First and foremost, the participants received consent forms which provided information 
including their rights and the procedure for conducting the research (Appendix 1). The 
researcher ensured that the informed consent documents were signed by the person the 
researcher asked to interview and by a person authorized to allow permission to access 
documentation and undertake observation.
During field study, the researcher honoured confidentiality of the participants. Although the 
interviews were taped, the participants might ask to stop or delete what had been recorded at 
any time. As mentioned earlier in discussing the data collection process, at the end of the 
interview individuals were asked for permission to use the interview and if anything had to be 
excluded. Moreover, the interviewee would remain anonymous. Simons (2009) said that 
anonymity can deal with the protection of identity and assures confidentiality. Pseudonyms 
will be used in reporting individuals and organisations, and participants may be referred to by 
their role (Simons 2009). Although Walford (2005 in Simons 2009) argued that in small scale 
studies it is hard to be anonymous, this researcher planned to anonymize respondents in this 
case study report for three reasons, after Simons (2009). First, although it would be easy to 
know the head of an organisation if their organisation is named, it will be hard to define other 
staff that will be included in the interview. Second, identification may restrict what 
participants say. Third, ensure avoidance of prejudice by readers. If they know the 
respondent(s), they may pass judgement before actually reading the report.
Once the data from interviews and non-interview sources had been obtained, the participants 
were asked to look at the draft of the case study report and lists of documents and narrative 
observation notes that the researcher obtained. Giving participants the opportunity to have 
control over what information will become public would ensure the basic principle of doing
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no harm. Simons (2009) said that this could be an issue of ethical dilemma as the report may 
not present information fairly. Therefore, Remenyi (2012) and Simons (2009) commented 
that researchers must use their professional judgment as to whether or not to include material 
as to whether it is core to their research questions. Nevertheless, this researcher ensured that 
there is a mutual agreement through negotiation between researcher and participants, and all 
direct quotations and atftibuted judgments reported will require the explicit perrnission of the 
respondent (Simons, 2009).
5.9 Chapter Conclusion
The main aim of this study is to explore knowledge management for tourism crises in 
Thailand from 2001 to 2012 and to understand how this is manifested in the hotel sector. 
This current study employed qualitative research with interpretivism as its epistemologieal 
stance and constructivism as its ontological orientation.
Multi-case strategy with embedded case study design were used in this study in order to 
provide in-depth understanding of the phenomenon and allow cross-case comparison. 
Interview was the main source of the data collection plan that was divided into two stages: 
first, semi-structured interviews with tourism crisis management policymakers; and second, 
semi-structured interviews with hoteliers including hotel managers and employees. Not only 
were interviews conducted, but also non-interview evidence (documentation and observation) 
was obtained in order to meet a high quality of research standard especially in dependability 
as well as creditability and transferability of findings.
A number of challenges faced the researcher when the pilot study and field research were 
constructed. For the interviews, there were difficulties in scheduling interviews and dealing 
with the bureaucracy steps to access the subjects. However, with lessons learned from the 
pilot studies, the researcher has contingency plans for flexibility in the interview timeframe 
or/and negotiate to interview the substitute persons. For documents, the greatest difficulty 
was the confidentiality of information. However, the researcher attempted to request the 
interviewees explain briefly during conversation.
To analyse the data, template analysis was used, and Nvivo version 10 is used in the data 
analysis process, especially for coding and examining large amounts of text.
Generally, this chapter has considered the philosophy behind the methodology and 
justification for adopting this approach to the research question. It has described the concept
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of case study as the research strategy used and the research methods to collect the data and 
then has summarised how the data from both interview and non-interview sources were 
analysed.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE POLICYMAKERS
6.0 Introduction
This chapter presents analysis and discussion of the findings of an in-depth interview, 
conducted with nine participants who are policymakers in eight organisations. These 
interviews took place initially in October 2012 and again for follow-up insights from 
extended lists from March to May 2013. This chapter addresses a part of the first specific 
objective of this thesis, which is to explore the understandings and objectives of policymakers 
in the tourism crisis management arena. In addition, this chapter gives an insight to the views 
of policymakers for the other objectives of the thesis, i.e., to study knowledge management 
for tourism crises, and also to examine barriers to and facilitators of such knowledge transfer 
between policymakers and hoteliers. This evaluation will be later utilised for a comparative 
study in Chapter 8.
This chapter comprises five sections. The first section offers an introduction of the 
interviewees (e.g. their rank, roles and experience related to knowledge management of 
tourism crises). It also provides a brief description of the social setting and business 
environment in order to understand the relationships and the constraints under which the 
interviewee is working.
The second section discusses what the interviews revealed in terms of two areas: their 
understanding of tourism crisis in the context of Thailand and their approaches to past and 
present crisis management situations & solutions adopted by Thai policymakers. As will be 
seen, to get a definition of tourism crises was a controversial issue. The term was used 
differently in different contexts.
The third section presents the findings of knowledge management as the vehicle for 
managing tourism crises in Thailand. It presents the opinion of policymakers on the 
relationship of knowledge management on tourism crisis management. The involvement of 
policymakers in knowledge management for tourism crises.
Section four provides the critical issues that influence the process of knowledge management. 
Evidence revealed after reading sections two and three that there were ties between 
knowledge management and tourism crisis management, but that success or failure is shaped
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by several factors reviewed in Section 3.6 of Chapter 3. The highlights of section four not 
only reveal insight on barriers but also insert some ideal recommendations by policymakers.
Overall, these sections were established as meaningful insights data sets that are associated 
with the first research objective, to analyse the understandings and objectives of 
policymaWs whic^ ^^ ^^  ^ be used later to compare with those of hotels for managing tourism 
crises that affect hospitality businesses in the following chapter. Quotes will be used 
throughout comments arising from the analysis of the entire data set. Then it will conclude 
with a comparative discussion viz., the known literature.
6.1 Overview of the Policymakers’ Profile and of their Social Context
This section begins with an introduction of the principal interviewees. There were a total of 
nine interviews conducted in eight organisations based in Thailand. The term policymaker 
refers to the Thailand Tourism Crisis Management Working Team (TCM) comprised of 
governmental institutions and tourism associations that work collaboratively to monitor any 
changes that could affect tourism crises in Thailand and thereby make response decisions. 
According to the literature review in Chapter 4, this TCM team was formally formed in 2007 
and is comprised of:
1) Public Group (government and state enterprise);
2) Private Group (profit and non-profit tourism associations).
As stated in Chapter 4, their duties are to monitor any triggering events in tourism that could 
affect the situation of tourism in Thailand. Their tasks cover making decisions, developing 
flexible strategies and regulating policies with respect to tourism crises. They aimed to be the 
centre of tourism crisis management by acquiring, storing, sharing and application of 
experiences with regard to tourism crises to the tourism stakeholders.
Before moving on to the distilled view of what has been found from conducting the field 
research in sections two and three, the role and social setting where this group of 
interviewees operates are presented. This helps the researcher to visualise their world and so 
interpret the data from the interviews in context.
Due to anonymity, their identity will be protected and they will be identified as PUB l-4 for 
the policymakers from public sectors, and PRI_1 -4 for policymakers from the private sector.
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For the organisations which have more than one interviewee, interviewees will be identified 
with letters A and B, such as PRI 2A, PRI 2B.
Public group Private group
PRI 1PUB 3PUB 2
PUB 1
PRI 3PRI 2A
PRI 2B
PRI 4
PUB 4
Figure 6.1 The lines of reporting of tourism crisis management (Policymakers)
Figure 6.1 illustrates the line of reporting of the public and private group of TCM 
policymakers. The explanation is of the line of reporting and comparison between public and 
private policymakers on their role and their social setting as components of the TCM team. 
However, on a day to day basis, these public and private groups work independently and have 
their own specific job descriptions.
One key differential characteristic between the public and private is the line of command. 
PUB l and PUB_2 report and receive commands and policies directly from the Ministry of 
Tourism and Sport.
The work of PUB 2 is related to developing tourism sites, tourism industry, and level of 
standard of Thai tourism. This team’s role relates to tourism crisis management and is to 
provide strategic direction and/or monitor tourism practices, especially those of tour 
operators, travel agencies and tour guides. Likewise, PUB l reports to Ministry of Tourism 
and Sport, Ministry of the Interior and supports the work of PUB l to facilitate the security 
of tourists.
PUB 3 and PUB_4 work in state-owned enterprise. Their organisation is the Destination 
Marketing Organisation (DM0) of the nation whose purpose is to promote Thailand to 
increase the number of visitors. Their operation is more flexible than PUBl and PUB2, but 
still has the atmosphere of a traditional (hierarchical) authority-based mode of management
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which is commonplace in public organisation. The organisation is funded by the government. 
Therefore, it still needs to work and collaborate with the governmental units, especially those 
of the PUB l and PUB_2 teams. The organisation of PUB_3 and PUB_4 is important as their 
organisations established the Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Centre.
The work of PUB 3 in relation to tourism crisis management is communication and 
preparation of reputation management during tourism crises, while PUB_4’s daily job is to 
monitor risk to the entire tourist organisation. In this research, PUB 4 was interviewed as the 
executive members of Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Centre (TIC) task 
force. Therefore PUB_4’s role also involves risk assessment and reporting of Thailand 
tourism crisis to the Governor and members of the Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis 
Management Centre (TIC) task force. Figure 6.1 showed that PUB_4 becomes the centre 
(Coordination Centre), to which both private and public groups have to report any related 
tourism crisis issues.
On the private policymakers’ side, they are the tourism associations, some for profit and 
some non-profit organisations. All tourism associations interviewed are local, except the 
organisation of PRI l, which is the only international (non-Thai) interviewee of all of the 
policymaking interviewees. This individual’s work is to monitor the situation of tourism in 
the Asia Pacific region, especially in Thailand. The members of these private organisations 
are various, ranking from national to international businesses, large to small enterprises, and 
including academic institutions across the region. Input of the non-nationals as regards 
tourism crisis management is not only to cooperate with the government, tourism associations 
and members to create awareness toward tourism crisis preparation, but also to provide 
training and guidelines for its members in crisis preparation and education.
PRI 2A, PRI_2B and PRI 3 are the representatives of tourism related businesses. PRI_2A 
and PRI 2B work in the profit association of hotel industry, while PRI 3 is a tour operator. 
Basically, they participate in TCM taskforce as the representatives of the tourism business 
suppliers and work to facilitate their members’ interests and so provide a conduit for insights 
gained from hotel managers and tour operators. PRI_4 has the more complicated tasks of 
those two organisations as it has to work closely with the public group and become the 
representative of tourism associations (PRI l, PRI 2A&B and PRI 3) in Thailand. It is a 
non-profit organisation which obtains funding from government and its members across the 
industry. Although it is a private policymaker its office is situated in the same building as
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PUB_3 and PUB_4, but on a different floor. This creates potential for greater face-to-face 
interaction and internal cooperation.
The duties of the PRI_4’s organisation are providing analytical information and strategic 
directions to the tourism bureaus; all private and public sectors in tourism in Thailand; and 
Thai interests overseas. The executive cornmittees of this organisation are the Executive 
Directors of the tourism associations and tourism businesses. PRI_2 and executive boards of 
the hotels that were interviewed by the researcher are part of the executive committee of the 
PRI_4’s organisation.
It can be said from above that the public and private policymakers have been working closely 
and that the TCM team comprises familiar faces of key persons in the tourism industry. The 
president of any tourism association may be nominated to be the committee or the executive 
consultant of one or more organisations within the industry.
Since we are now familiar with the profile of the interviewees, the next section presents the 
findings from the in-depth interviews. This will be followed by the researcher’s comments 
and discussions based on a comparison of the findings to previous literatures in order to see 
whether the current comparison would support these and, or provide additional insights.
6.2 View of Tourism Crisis Management held by Policymakers.
This section focuses on the main finding of the research, which was carried out as a series of 
semi-structured interviews with policymakers based in investigating the following sub­
themes: the first theme is the level of understanding among policymakers of issues relating to 
tourism crisis; and the second is the aim and policymakers’ implementations of tourism crisis 
management. The analysis is going to be informed by the literatures of Chapter 2 on concepts 
and theories on tourism crisis management and the roles of policymaker.
6.2.1 Understanding among Policymakers of Issues relating to Tourism Crises
This section focuses on the understanding of policymakers on two issues, which are: 1) how 
they define tourism crisis; 2) what they think are the most serious tourism crises during the 
past decades in Thailand. The aim of this section is to explore their understanding on the 
concept of tourism crisis.
The first of the key questions posed in the semi-structured interview focused on their 
understanding as to what in their opinion constituted tourism crises. The reason for asking
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this question is to attempt to explore how the term is defined by the industry policymakers in 
Thailand as well as to examine their individual perception toward defining tourism crises. 
Further, the question checks whether their understanding will link to the approach of tourism 
crisis management in the second theme.
All respondents perceived ''cfisis’’^ be a threat The negative impact on tourism of crises 
was highlighted using such key phrases as the reduction in the number of tourists and the 
consequential loss in profitability of the tourism businesses because of the loss of confidence 
in tourists’ safety. The following are examples of how a tourism crisis was defined by the 
maj ority of policymakers :
“Any situation which has the potential to affect the long term confidence in a 
destination or that o f  an organisation or that o f  its uninterrupted continuance. Any 
situation that can interfere with stability and or normal operating procedures or 
processes. So the key considerations are “long term confidence ” and/or the capacity 
to “continue operating normally.” (P R I l )
“A crisis can he seen occurring when there is a reduction in tourist numbers and as a 
consequence tourism businesses losing profitability. ” (PRI4)
One interviewee from the public group added that the event that is regarded as crisis to him
must be a national problem and affects the whole tourism system.
“The situation at the national level, fo r  example a natural disaster or an economic 
recession that effects the whole tourism system. ” (PUB_ 1)
After comparing and reviewing these opinions of the respondents, it is clear that they all 
identify the economic consequences of the crises, but in different ways and or aspects of the 
tourism industry. PRI l and PRI 4 are examples of a vast majority focused on profits, 
reputational damage, image and emotional impact—i.e. loss of confidence. It is noticeable 
that these impacts can be interrelated. Not surprising, the term crisis was generally viewed as 
‘problems’. This finding is akin to definitions provided by several scholars, especially 
Sonmez (1998), Beirman (2003), and Brewton (1987) that have been reviewed in Chapter 2. 
That notwithstanding, Ulmer (2001) stated that crisis can be an event that creates a potential 
for ‘opportunity’, ‘renewal’ and ‘growth’ in some organisations. In some organisations that 
were affected by a crisis, it gave them opportunity for learning and developing, and a 
perspective of moving forward (Ulmer, 2001). But, as evidence obtained from these
interviewees indicates, crisis is a thing that none of them want to encounter.
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Evidence was given by PUB l that those tourism crises were on such a large scale so as to 
affect the nation and its definition as a tourism destination as a whole. In line with the 
foregoing, the question can be posed, “Must a tourism crisis be a large scale event only or 
could it be also just a minor event?” In this sense, there was one interviewee whose work is 
associated with the Destination Marketing Organisation (DM0). This person provided a 
different view about what colild be for him a tourism crisis: small events can be counted as 
crises if they have significance for the target market of Thailand tourism. His comment was:
“A crisis can be any incident that affects any key market o f Thai tourism industry, fo r  
example the murder o f  a British citizen in Thailand. The British news reported the 
incident and this affected negatively British confidence in Thailand as a safe tourist 
destination (especially fo r  younger women). The death o f  a New Zealand tourist in 
Chiang Mai and whose parents were unhappy with the police investigations etc., and 
so to draw attention to their concerns they created a webpage called ‘Error in 
Thailand\ ” (?\]B_3)
PUB 3 was attempting to emphasize that crimes can trigger a tourism crisis. He explained 
that it was because in his example of the British tourist who died it occurred in a major 
tourism generating region and with the city of Chiang Mai being in the top three tourist 
destinations in Thailand. The negative consequences generated by the tourist’s death 
presumably would impact on tourist interest from the European market and consequently 
trigger a quantifiable loss
It points to two interesting findings. Firstly a crisis would range in precedence from a mega­
event as ‘disaster’ to a minor event as ‘incident’. These findings support the idea of an 
incubation crisis process introduced by Elliott (1998) and Roux-Dufort (2007) that before 
crisis happens there are triggering events.” Secondly, small incidents can expand into major 
national economic problems if no action is taken. This finding also corresponds with Cohen 
and Neal (2012) that crisis is transformable— one crisis can lead to another from a different 
source (from political crisis to tourism crisis and then economic crisis).
Then next step was to ask interviewees to evaluate the impact of those crises that have mostly 
affected the tourism industry—especially hotel businesses in the past decade. The reason for 
asking this question is to explore the system that policymakers use to classify crises. There 
was broad similarity between tourism crisis classification and approaches of tourism crisis 
management which has been reported in the literature.
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When interviewees were asked to mention the most serious tourism crisis that occurred in 
Thailand in the past decade, the majority of policymakers pointed out that the most negative 
tourism crises were those of a political nature—with specific reference to Thailand's 
Suvamabhumi Airport outside Bangkok which was forced into closure in 2008 and the 
demonstration at the Ratchaprasong intersection, which is located right in the centre of a 
major business and shopping district of Bangkok. The example of statements of why 
political crisis was considered as the most serious are provided as follows:
“The Political crisis... The conflict o f two parties caused serious damage to the 
reputation to our country and made inhound tourists develop a negative image o f  
Thailand. ” (PUB_2)
“The Political crisis resulted in the death o f  several people. The reporting on the 
number o f  deaths made tourists feel unsafe about coming to Thailand. The airport 
closure four years ago discouraged business travellers from investing in or travelling 
to Thailand. ” (PUB_3)
The results showed the above interviewees’ evaluations made reference to a number of 
deaths, the reduction of good reputation, and psychological effect on tourists to determine the 
seriousness of the tourism crisis.
While, PRI l whose organisation works internationally in tourism in the Asia Pacific region, 
further noted that a natural disaster such as flooding was a crisis as well because it generally 
affects the business area of Bangkok.
“The offices and industrial estates were floodedfor a few  months. Tourists were not 
confident to travel in these circumstances. The business people who come fo r a 
business meeting...if something bad happens to one o f  their employees, then the 
company has a legal duty to respond. In a time o f crisis the business sector is much 
more sensitive and aware than are the leisure travellers. ” (PRI l)
Nevertheless, one more respondent confirmed that human-made crises have a stronger impact 
than do natural ones. He argued that it was harder to predict with respect to natural crises, 
which often occur in specific areas and where the crises impact can be controlled. Natural 
crises are events that commonly can occur anywhere in the world. His statement follows:
“Political crisis is the major issue that affects the tourism industry because it is 
difficult to control and demonstrations can expand very fast in any direction..... 
Natural crises can happen in any countries.... flooding or Tsunami often occur in 
specific areas o f  a country. ” (P U B l)
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Only one interviewee thought the SARs epidemic was the most serious crisis in recent times 
for Thailand because at that time there were no tourists received from China and Taiwan for 
approximately six months. Following is his statement:
“SARS caused Thailand to lose its tourists from its main markets for six months. SARs 
was a regional tourism crisis. Don’t forget that we are in Asia. The country that had 
the highest impact from SAR^ was China. The Chinese market was stdrtihg to boom 
fo r  us. Chinese and Taiwanese were two o f our top five markets. SARs stopped all 
international tourism activities in this region. ” (PRI 3)
The statements of PUB l and PRI 3 pointed that an event although not ranked as the highest 
level of shock, can become a serious crisis if that event took place over a long period, as 
evident in key words from “floodfor few  months” and “SARs for six months”. This finding is 
in congruence with Moreira (2008) that people perceived higher risk in long-term crisis than 
catastrophic risks.
It is not unexpected that the system the respondents use to classify and rate crisis is various. 
Nevertheless, when the interviewer encouraged the respondents to give reasons why they 
thought that their chosen crisis was the most serious one, it was found out that some 
interviewees also mostly combine the level of control and the level of severity i.e. loss of 
number of tourists; the number of deaths; reputation damage; and the psychological effect on 
tourism target market as indicators. This finding contrasts with the crisis classification 
system provided by Prideux et al. (2003) that claimed that the lower the level of predictability
an event is, the more likely a crisis will be rated as a higher shock event. It also contrasts with
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Burnett (1998, p.483) that using ‘threat level’ alone is enough to rate a crisis as being one 
needing to be in focus. This finding added the understanding that no matter how much rating 
of unpredictability or high threat an apparent crisis is, if the company has the ability to 
control it then the crisis would not cause so much impact to the organisation. Hence, it is 
suggested that policymakers should pay attention to developing crisis resilience in both short 
and long term.
The key findings in this section relate to the way these interviewees understand tourism crises 
by using different classification criteria to explain/identify tourism crises. According to the 
literature, Bramwell and Lane (2000) noted that lacking a consensus as to the definition and 
classification system of tourism crises may be problematic for cooperation in tourism crisis 
management among policymakers that are formed by prospective partners of government, 
non-profit and profit organisations. Cooperation in tourism crisis management could be
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workable if a policymaking group held a shared understanding in order to make decisions and 
act on solving tourism crises more effectively (Bramwell and Lane, 2000).
The next part presents the reasons for involvement in tourism crisis management by 
policymakers and the approaches that they adopt. It would be interesting to find out how the 
understanding of these policymakers of the tourism crisis issue(s) can shape the aims and 
implementations of tourism crisis management.
6.2.2 The Propensity of Policymakers’ Implementation to Manage Tourism Crisis and 
their Involvement in Tourism Crisis Management
This part focuses on two aspects: The first aspect is to explore the objectives of tourism crisis 
management by policymakers. The second aspect is to explore tourism crisis management 
implementation approaches to see whether they are reactive or proactive style(s) and what 
approaches consequently are adopted for managing tourism crises. The literatures that are 
analysed and discussed here are from Chapter 2, especially the models and theories of crisis 
management e.g. risk management theory, the crisis life cycle model, strategic tourism crisis 
management and chaos theory.
To begin with the first aspect, the interviewees were asked about their organisation’s 
objective role on tourism crisis management in order to discover what their organisation 
wants to achieve from tourism crisis management.
Most of policymakers stated that the safety of tourists was one of their organisational key 
objectives. Since 2007, there was the recognition of the need to establish a crisis 
management plan and a taskforce to manage tourism crises. As one interviewee described in 
the following statement:
“One o f our aims is to protect and service tourists and the tourism industry. Our job  
is like that o f  the civil police but here the tourism industry is our focus. We have to 
take care o f  tourists and the people who are working in the tourism (hospitality) 
industry. We coordinate with government ministries especially the Ministry o f  
Tourism and Sports Tourism as well as related associations—ATT A and hotels to 
create crisis management plans such as evacuation plans, emergency plans, and 
crisis management task force plans. We followed the standard practice arising from  
the Emergency Decree when dealing with nationwide crises. For example, we set up 
a team to control the demonstrations in 2007 and responded to demonstrators 
starting from soft to hard control but throughout held to an overarching objective to 
avoid the loss o f  life and or other casualties. ” (PUB_1)
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A similar statement was made by PUB_2 who said that his organisation’s primary vision is to 
improve safety because safety per se is critical to economic success. However, the mission 
and role of the organisation below is involved in developing information technology to 
provide Management Information Data in terms of statistics and knowledge of tourism for 
detailed analysis and presentation to management. The following is his statement:
“We are the middle men who coordinate relations between the private organisations 
and government ministries to handle tourism crises. Starting in 2012, we created the 
Tourism Watch Team which works on conducting tourism research and modelling 
predictions /forecasts, analysis o f  -  political, economic, social, and natural economic 
threats during the period 2012—2015. The Tourism Watch Team provides 
information to tourism entrepreneurs on the potential crises that Thailand could 
encounter in the short to medium term (i.e. 1 year or 2 year time span, such as; La 
Nina and El Nino, Floods and Tsunami risks. It demonstrates the practical 
knowledge guideline (s) and safety strategies evolving for both tourists and the 
tourism business. ” (PUB_2)
Another respondent from a state owned enterprise said that the safety of tourists is his 
organisation’s main objective and such is written into the organisation’s vision statement. It 
was the first organisation to initiate a crisis preparation plan due to the influence of the civil 
society, media, tourism businesses, and tourists who want to ensure that Thailand is a safe 
destination to visit. His statement follows:
“We took a pro-active role in tourism crisis management recently. We are becoming 
more involved in responding to the issues raised and have learned from previous 
crises through our focused marketing programme. Our role is to promote Thailand 
as a safe destination especially to international tourists. We have the budget fo r  
marketing and promotion so other organisations, tourists, and businesses count on us 
to solve all problems arising from tourism crisis. However, we have had to reduce 
our roles because o f overlap /  duplication with the work Ministry o f  Tourism and 
Sport. Nevertheless, we are still keeping on developing the public relations and crisis 
communication roles while the work on managing tourism crises and information on 
crisis management remains under the Department o f  Tourism and Sport. ” (PUB__3)
The key finding from these interviewees’ statements showed that the objective of crisis 
managing held by policymakers are related to their roles in managing tourism crises. The 
policymakers clearly focused on economic aspect and placed their priority on tourists as well 
as businesses as the central objective of being involved in tourism crisis management. This is 
congruent with Hall (1998) that policymakers become involve in tourism crisis management 
primarily driven by the economic benefits rather than social focus. However Hall (1998)
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suggested that the policymakers should also consider the sustainable tourism principles as 
well.
When asking whether there were tourism crisis management plans or manuals embedded in 
the organisation, one said that their plan is still in progress and that the database of for 
communicating the plan is still under construction, while another one searched his 
organisation’s website during the he was interviewed by the researcher but he did not find it. 
He said that his staff may have forgotten to upload their plan into the database. This 
information made the interviewer have doubts as to whether tourism crisis management is 
being seriously and or proactively implemented in this constituency.
However there was a private profit organisation that tends to proactively plan for tourism 
crises by having a comprehensive handbook in regard to tourism crisis management. The 
booklet provided the Four Rs concept of Crisis Management (Reduction, Readiness, 
Response and Recovery). This individual said that their booklet recently had been 
instrumental in developing a seminal policy document and had led to collaborative planning 
projects with both their private and public counterparts. His statement follows:
“We were basically one o f the two operators that really were very well prepared 
...the crisis management guidelines o f  4 Rs— reduction, readiness, response and 
recovery. Our document called Bounce Back was drawn up after the Beijing meeting 
a year and a half ago where again the PATA members decided we needed to do 
something to collaborate in a more productive fashion. This is an area where we 
shouldn V be in conflict; we should not compete with each other either; we saw that 
we should help each other because by collaborative endeavours we can be mutually 
protective o f  our common interests. ” (PRI_1)
The establishment of the Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Centre: (TIC) 
and having a crisis management plan (4 Rs) are supported by the literature; it would help 
policymakers to assess potential crises that may emerge and their relative probability of 
occurrence, to prevent an event escalating into crisis, and help transferring risks. For example 
via financial tools such as crisis insurance (Tsai and Chen, 2011). However, the linear models 
such as 4Rs were criticised for their weakness in that they are based on the belief that when a 
crisis happens automatically it will become more serious, needing to provide an extensive 
resolution which may be unnecessary (Jaques, 2007).
However, most respondents from private organisations reported that there were no specific 
plans concerned with tourism crisis management in their organisations. Therefore, most of
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the policymakers from private organisations rely on the public group to be the leader in 
responding to and or launching any regulations or standards to prevent crises that could affect 
their members. Most of the private policymakers see their roles as being as being passive and 
as such to encourage the government to respond to tourism crises. The above stated is 
illustrated by this example:
“We coordinate with our members to accumulate their problems and then we speak 
to the government with a view to their launching the appropriate regulatory responses 
to crises. Heretofore we used to respond to tourism crises in a reactive style but more 
recently we are attempting to find  ways to prevent a crisis or crises from affecting our 
members. ” (PRI 3)
The rest of the private organisations provided similar opinions, but one policymaker from a 
private organisation also said that the policymakers from the private groups should play a 
supportive (proactive) role rather than acting solely as a lobbyist to the government. He 
justified this by saying that the private policymakers know more about the nature of their 
industries. They are able to access their members to collate information for a comprehensive 
response to a crisis more effectively. The effectiveness of this viewpoint is demonstrated by 
the following example:
“In the case o f  the Suvarnabhumi airport closure in 2008, there were many tourists 
stranded in Bangkok and or unable to fly  to their home destinations. ...I was asked to 
provide help in temporarily accommodating these inconvenienced passengers, I  
calculated briefly on piece o f paper their subsistence being how much per head and 
per day. This information was relayed to the Minister and the government approved 
an emergency budget o f  THB 2000 per tourist per day. I  then coordinated with the 
city hotels to help take care o f those stranded viz., their emergency room and board 
until the government could solve the problem arising from the demonstrations at the 
airport. ” (PRI 2)
There was one respondent who seemed to disagree that the government or state-enterprise 
owned organisations should act as the major driving force behind tourism crisis management 
because of their slow and/or bureaucratic style of working. His statement follows:
“Because in Thailand, our culture leads us to believe that we can solve every crisis... 
And that obviously doesn V work in the real world. So they were totally unprepared. 
They (the Ministry o f Tourism) hardly realized what was happening...? And the 
TAT—they tried a little bit... every statement they make needs to be approved by the
Prime Minister or at least in the Prime Minister office I f  someone wants to make a
crisis management statement or crisis communication statement he has to ask the
office o f  the Prime Minister. And before the answers were two days after the event
as demonstrated during the flooding o f last year (2012). Consequently, this two day
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delay meant that the statements issued were useless because the situation was 
changing so fast and these kind o f statements were unrealistic. So, that being the case 
such a system o f bureaucratic roadblocks makes it very difficult fo r the tourism 
industry or fo r  the public sector to make constructive statements (or give direction /  
leadership)) in times o f  emergency. Also, statements in general by a tourist board will 
always be looked at as being biased ...their job being perceived to be just a lip service 
function and or only to say ‘no problem ’...that’s what they are getting paidfor. When 
----------this happens a major public relations opportunity fo r  emergency planning is lost. ”
(PRIJ)
Statements regarding the role and involvement of policymakers in crises provide four 
interesting findings. First, the lack of a partnership which is the formal-structured 
collaboration between the private and public policymakers hence there is a confusion of 
participant roles. In addition the public policymakers do not seem to be working very much 
on their coordination roles and there was a conflict of interest among policymakers as shown 
in statement of PRI_1 above. Second, lack of formal planning crisis and being more inclined 
to reactive crisis management style due to less intervention from movement to guide the 
industry. This second finding confirmed the study of Henderson (2002) that the role of 
national tourism organisation in Southeast Asia that is not very proactive and lack of formal 
planning due to resource constraint. Third, finding that some of policymakers have 
increasingly adopted a more proactive tourism crisis management while some were involved 
little to none. This diverse level of participation is supported by Hall (1994), that the nature of 
tourism industry is a voluntary compliance, the industry would comply with more 
involvement in proactive crisis management schemes and more profit-oriented than cost- 
oriented. This implied that policymakers would become more proactive if they perceived that 
the tourism crisis management programs will provide those benefits that suit to their interest. 
Fourth, The Thai culture is significant aspect that shapes the understanding of policymakers 
in the arena of tourism crisis management plan and how they work together in handling 
tourism crises. It supports in part the statement of Hofstede (2000 cited in Vatanasakdakul, 
2007, p.59), describing Thais as having “high cultural vâlüés in collectivism, power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation and femininity society”. It is obvious that 
although they have established a team to deal with tourism crises, there is still a gap in terms 
of the power distance between members, resulting in some members have less input into the 
policy making and implementation process, and mostly participating in a relatively reactive 
style. Turning to tourism crisis planning, the evidence broadly resonates with the description 
of Thais by Hofstede (2000 cited in Vatanasakdakul, 2007, p.59), notably in terms of having 
the characteristics of “ uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation ” From the view of the
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western interviewee (PRI l), the policymakers did not demonstrate sufficient effort in 
dealing proactively with tourism crises.
All in all, Section 6.2 provides an insight of Thai policymakers’ understanding and their 
practice toward tourism crisis management. The next theme will report on the finding and 
discuss the views held by these policymakers on the challenges of linking knowledge 
management and transfer with tourism crisis management.
6.3 Findings and Discussions of Views held by Policymakers on Knowledge 
Management for Tourism Crises.
This section presents the finding of the research which was carried out as a series of semi­
structured interviews with policymakers based on investigating the following three sub­
themes: The first is about opinions from the policymakers with regards to the relationship 
between knowledge management, transfer and tourism crisis. The second is the process of 
creating knowledge of tourism crises. The third is about knowledge transfer among 
policymakers and businesses—especially hotels. These four themes are relevant to the 
research by providing insightful perspectives of policymakers to the second and third 
objectives of the research study. The analysis is going to be informed by the literatures of 
Chapter 3 regarding concepts and theories on knowledge management, and on knowledge 
management of tourism crisis in Thailand discussed in Chapter 4.
6.3.1 Opinions of the Relationship between Knowledge Management and Transfer, and 
Tourism Crises.
The background related to knowledge management in Chapter 3 states that knowledge 
management is a critical element in overcoming the challenges of volatile businesses. After 
reviewing the current research, there was a lack of work investigating the understanding of 
these policymakers, especially to the issue of knowledge transfer and management of tourism 
crisis. This section therefore will provide insight of the policymaker’s view on the 
relationship between knowledge management and transfer, and tourism crisis.
Most respondents agreed that knowledge management is important to tourism crisis 
management, as knowledge is perceived to be the guideline for making decisions and/or
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taking some actions to overcome crises and improve the skills and abilities of tourism 
personnel to manage tourism crises. Some of the interviewees' views are presented here:
“It is important. I f  we don’t have knowledge management, we don’t have a clue what 
to do. ” (PUB_1)
“It is the heart. I f  we don Ï have knowledge to manage crisis, it will he more difficult 
to solve crises ... cannot have sufficient knoMedge to make decision in time ... cannot 
predict the situations.” (PUB_2) ........................
Although knowledge management is regarded as an important issue, the implementation of 
knowledge management in the context of the range of Thailand crises is still minimal and it 
should be encouraged to increase more knowledge creation as clearly described by the 
following interviewee.
“Yes! But there is very little knowledge management about tourism crisis 
management—that’s why there are challenges.... I  very much believe that’s becoming 
o f greater importance, not only to handle crises but also from a business point o f view 
people have to learn managing, destinations, countries and companies during crisis 
because you can’t simply say with all this crisis there’s nothing and we ’re going to 
wait until the crisis is over. . .get more knowledge and start understanding that yes 
there always will be tsunamis and cyclones or typhoons but there’s so much you can 
do. ” (PRI l)
There were some respondents who thought that knowledge management could provide ideas 
of how to manage crises and showed a significant degree of reluctance to treat much of what 
they are doing as “knowledge management”. However, knowledge management cannot 
guarantee that tourism crises can be managed successfully due to their dynamic nature. Their 
statements follow:
“Knowledge management can be applied to manage crises. Can the exiting 
knowledge solve all crises? I  thought key practices could be partly helpful but the 
details o f crisis responses have to be adjusted to the situations. All crises are 
different. Although we have a manual o f  tourism crisis management, during the crisis 
that occurs, we have to solve the rising problems. ”
“I  heard the term o f knowledge management, many people talk about knowledge 
management but I  am not sure o f ways to manage knowledge? ”(PRI_3)
It is apparent that most respondents have a high level of agreement that knowledge 
management is vital. It is linked to an appropriate decision and action to solve tourism crises. 
Nevertheless, some participants were unanimous in recognizing this importance and felt
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confused about the practice of knowledge management. Some policymakers believe that 
knowledge management is simply a process of having massive information from various 
sources. Doubts were detected from the interview as to whether the overload of information 
will actually help policymakers gain benefits or merely increase the cost of operation and 
time consumption to capture unnecessary data. Also, we could see that some policymakers do 
hot actually uhdefstahd the process of crisis rhahagemeht. The phrase “mh people talk 
about knowledge management” indicates ah important distinction between knowing what and 
knowing how. Knowing how to manage crisis is a difficult task involving creating the 
knowledge of crises.
The literature stated that there has been a growth of academic discussion amongst public and 
private organisations about knowledge management (Ritchie, 2004). This is due to the hype 
on benefits of knowledge management as an engine to increase competitive success in the 
global economy (Penrose, 1959, Simon, 1968, Davidson and Voss, 2002, Hjalager, 2002, 
Cooper et al., 2005). However, it can happen that those who are involved in managing crises 
get confused when applying what they understand as knowledge management; therefore 
knowledge managers need to bear in mind that implementing knowledge management is a 
complex task and requires both resources and effort. Thai policymakers showed a contrasting 
understanding on term of knowledge management from the literature and misunderstood, 
thinking that the term ‘knowledge management’ has replaced ‘information management.’ 
Knowledge actually is information that has already been interpreted through cognitive 
structure and has been translated so that humans can understand it (Chang and Chen 2004, p 
24 cited in Hall and Williams, 2008). Jahaspara (2004, p. 16) explains that knowledge is 
regarded as ‘actionable information’ which is stored in the right place and in the right form 
and can be retrieved for usage, especially to make a decision—in this case for handling 
tourism crises. So far in this part we can conclude that knowledge management was 
perceived by the majority of policymakers as having a relationship to tourism crisis 
management. The next part will reveal knowledge management activities within the 
organisations of the policymakers.
6.3.2 Knowledge Management Process of Tourism Crisis
It was suggested in the previous part that most policymakers are positively supporting the 
necessity of having knowledge management for managing crises, either with the purpose to
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better plan the changing circumstances or to make appropriate decisions for tourism crises. 
This section inquires further whether knowledge management is held in their organisations or 
not. How is knowledge managed in case there is such in place?
Figure 6.2 was taken from Chapter 3, and shows that the knowledge management process 
ihvdlves 4 main sfaps, which are knowledge acquisition, organisational knowledge through 
storing, knowledge application, and lastly learning through feedback. Hence, in this part we 
will investigate the implementation of knowledge management based on these four stages 
shown in Figure 6.2
Feedback and Learning
Knowledge acquisition Knowledge ApplicationOrganizational knowledge for managing 
tourism crises
Figure 6.2 Knowledge mauagemeut model
Source: Author’s presentation applied from Nonaka (1996), by Liyanage et al (2009), Hall 
and Williams (2008) and Hjalager (2002).
Before moving on to knowledge management process, we shall consider whether there was 
knowledge management implementation of tourism crises within their organisations or not. 
The researcher assumed that knowledge management is being implemented by policymakers.
There was high expectation in one case because the interviewer noticed that there was a room 
with the sign ‘Knowledge Management’ on the ground floor before going to the office of one 
interviewee. So, the interviewer encouraged the interviewee to explain the function of the 
room, whieh basically was used for document storage. His statement follows:
“Ah...the knowledge management centre, keeping our documents and files. It is a 
requirement that we need to set up a room as knowledge management centre.... 
nothing much inside just storage room o f our files. ” (PUB_2)
This statement of PUB_2 was unexpected. Notwithstanding, the finding showed that policy­
makers misunderstand the concept of knowledge management. Will the documents stored 
inside be used and analysed for application to tourism crises and planning? The reasons for
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not understanding the concept of knowledge management may be linked to the following 
interviewees’ comments, where they express that the idea of having knowledge management 
is being influenced by many factors.
Most of the interviewees said that knowledge management has already been implemented. 
Particularly, the public organisations are obligated to implement it as it is a. part of their daily 
work.
“Knowledge management being a part o f  the daily work, we have to keep documents 
and share knowledge to staff ” (PUB_3)
“Tourism is a competitive market, we need to create a knowledge asset to help us to 
improve and sustain our competitiveness. ” (PRI 3)
“We accumulate knowledge, work with several institutions to execute the marketing 
strategy and launch campaign for the tourist market. ” (PRI_4)
The comments made by PUB 3 and PRI 3 illustrated that the implementation of knowledge 
management by the policymakers had influenced managerial and environmental factors, i.e. 
leadership, governmental, market and competitiveness. This finding is similar to Holsapple 
and Joshi’s (2000) work which studied the influencing factors of having knowledge 
management in organisations. In their work, there were three major classes of influences 
(managerial, resources and environmental), with different factors in each of them. In this 
research it was also discovered that for the public policymakers, the governmental factor is 
the major driver, while for the private policymakers, the market and the competitiveness 
become the major forces. According to Holsapple and Joshi (2000) there are more factors that 
influence the practice of knowledge in the organisation which are culture and technology. 
However, these two factors were perceived to be missing. Holsapple and Joshi (2000) said 
that culture and technology were also the critical factors. As well, Wong (2005) supported 
Holsapple and Joshi’s (2000) statement and emphasized that the process of implementing 
knowledge management would entail the need for a culture of support and understanding— 
not merely leadership as proposed by them.
To conclude, we have discovered that knowledge management is still poorly understood by 
the policymakers. Although evidence can be detected from statements of knowing what is 
knowledge management and its benefits, a vast majority of lack understanding of how to 
implement it. Nevertheless, there is a marked tendency toward more practice of knowledge
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management. The following part thereafter will provide insight into the implementation of 
knowledge management by policymakers. It starts from knowledge acquisition (the source of 
knowledge), either from internal or external sources to the organisational knowledge creation 
(the storage of knowledge asset). Then knowledge application (application of knowledge into 
tourism crises) and learning from previous crises. Knowledge transfer will be presented 
sepamtely in Section 6.3.3 duèlb the fact that it has various points to be discussed.
6.3.2.1 Knowledge Acquisition
Beginning with the acquisition of organisational knowledge of Thai policymakers, according 
to the literature knowledge of crisis management can be acquired from both internal and 
external sources. The reason to ask this question is to know where the policymaker’s 
organisations get their knowledge from. Knowledge acquisition activities were illustrated by 
the following interviewees:
Example of internal sources:
“We send the official letter invitation to invite representatives o f  concerned 
organisations to have meetings especially during the crisis to discuss and assign the 
role o f  each organisation to manage the crises. ” (PUB_1)
“We have a monthly meeting o f the executive directors. We have had seminars— 
informal training for our staff—about 3-5 times, outside in Kao Yai because i f  we 
have seminars in our office the staff will be worried about their work. ”(PUB_2)
“Internal sharing, we have a meeting every afternoon, especially during the crisis. 
For example the red and yellow shirt (crisis), we analyse the situation every afternoon 
and broadcast information to internal employee through internal loudspeakers, like in 
schools when they announce to students... everyone in our organisation can update 
the situation. As for Email... they may be too busy to check. ” (PUB_3)
Examples of external sources:
‘A s for Information obtained from tourism associations, they will report to us the 
situation and impacts. They also are the middle channel to bring our statement to tell 
their members in different areas such as Phuket, Chiang Mai Had Yai and to 
customers. ” (PUB_3)
“It comes from airline industries. They have done a lot on crisis preparation. Thai 
Airways has a fantastic crisis management centre and the director in those days has 
helped me. ” (PRI l)
We searched for the risk management curriculum from institutions in UK, America, 
Japan and Singapore. We chose to buy the crisis management curriculum from  
Singapore as they have experienced similar crises. We send our team o f  15 persons
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including me to train with the experts fo r one week and come back to develop our 
plan; and the Singaporean expert came to coach us. ” (PUB_4)
Further note about the external source of knowledge—especially survey or researches by 
universities—seems to be favoured by the policymakers in creating a knowledge base of 
tourism crises.
“We hired Chulalongkorn University to conduct the survey researches and analyse the 
potential tourism crises that will affect our industry. We use this research to discuss 
with government on crisis preparation and actions. ” (PRI 4)
Notwithstanding, one interviewee suggested that the policymaker should not leave 
knowledge of crises management to come solely from outside professional researchers. 
Instead, the knowledge creation should be done as a participatory action research where the 
policymaker conducts the research with assistance or guidance of professional researchers.
“I  cooperate with professional researchers to conduct research under the project o f  
“tourism Watch. ” We work together to propose a new course o f  action to help on 
analyses o f  tourism crises and ways to handle them. We cannot work alone as we 
cannot understand everything; we need a team o f experts. ” (PUB_2)
These findings on knowledge acquisition showed that the policymakers obtained knowledge 
of tourism crises from both internal and external sources. To sum up, internally, knowledge 
was generated in discussions, meetings, formal and informal training, and seminars among 
the policymakers themselves. Externally, knowledge was generated in meetings, workshops, 
standards of practice of crisis management of outsiders such as tourism suppliers, tourism 
related associations, universities, and government. At a glance, it was evident from the 
interview that having knowledge from various sources (both internal and external sources) 
could offer the advantage of having many contributing ideas. However, according to Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990), the organisations should consider whether the knowledge that they 
obtained can be understood by knowledge users. The last point made by PUB_2 is supported 
by the literature saying that new knowledge of tourism sometimes will not be understood well 
and therefore there is a requirement for the experts to monitor and translate technical 
information for the users (Hickman and Crandall, 1997). Hence, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) 
claimed that knowledge receivers also need to have pre-existing relevant knowledge 
background in order to be able to assimilate knowledge well. All in all, this part provides 
information about how the policymakers obtained the knowledge of tourism crises, and next 
part will explain the ways that they use it to record the knowledge.
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6 3 2 2  Organisational Knowledge for Managing Tourism Crises through Storage and 
Retrieval System
Organisational knowledge comprises how the relevant knowledge is recorded in different 
forms, such as written documents or structured information stored in electronic databases, as 
well as tacit knowledge embodied in an individual’s memory.
IT era has promoted the way to store knowledge more in codified format. It would be 
interesting to know how policymakers keep the knowledge they obtained from various 
sources, but also to know whether technology has any effect on the practices of the 
organisational knowledge for managing tourism crises through storage and retrieval systems. 
Following are some of their statements on storage of knowledge of tourism crises.
“We have an internal database to share the knowledge among our staff that are 
located in different locations around the world. We stored the formal documents in 
both online and offline formats so that when there is crisis we can access from other 
locations. ” (PUB 3)
“We recorded what we have done for crisis to apply to future crises. I f  we are dealing 
with a similar problem then we can implement in a similar way. We may not have a 
system... actually; we work with crises we remember all in our brains."' (PRI_2)
While most policymakers—especially the above interviewees (PUB_3 and PRI 2)—paid 
attention to a codified form of knowledge and IT has influenced to store this type of 
knowledge, there was one who said that in reality the tacit form of knowledge embedded in 
people is more applicable to solving tourism crises.
“We solve crises then we throw the knowledge away not really recorded. When we 
faced similar crises, we asked what the previous person did...Knowledge o f crisis 
management in Thailand is often used from that which is embedded in a person. 
...every crisis during the past 10 years we always consulted ex-Prime minister Anun. ” 
(PRI_3)
“7/ is a special action plan; I  keep the files o f  it in my drawer. We developed the crisis 
management plan but we did not use it much. As far as I  remember, (we) used only 
two times. Crisis is urgent; I  used my experience and common sense. ... Policemen 
are the front-line team to solve tourism crises. We are dealing emergencies every day 
and we get used to it. ” (PUB_1)
In short, the storage strategy for knowledge of tourism crises adopted by policymakers was a 
mix of both personalisation-based form and a codification-based form. Most of the 
policymakers stated that official knowledge of tourism crisis is recorded in an explicit form. 
It is stored in both online and offline format such as email and internal databases. The tacit
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knowledge is also being embodied by key persons and some interviewees perceived that this 
form of knowledge is more utilisable.
The finding also shows that in the interviews there is no clear systematic knowledge storage 
or retrieval system of knowledge for crisis management in each form. Consequently, it could 
lead to a problem when policymakers need to retrieve the knowledge and apply to manage. . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  j .  —.  — - . _ --— —--—  • ' — . . . . — ---------------   —  ..—. .. . . . . . . .  - . .  .. .  . . . . . . . .  —. ___ . . - ----------  ... ■ w -. ___. . .  - - - — -
tourism crises. This implied that a database management system is important. The practice 
of keeping codified knowledge in IT used by policymakers in order to store and share the 
explicit form is supported by Alavi and Leidner’s (2001) study. They said that keeping 
knowledge in codified form can be better than it being remembered by a person, because of 
memory loss. However, the points made by PRI_3 and PUB l are interesting as they pointed 
out that to manage the crises, the tacit knowledge—i.e. the experience and the skills of the 
people— is more accessible in a timely manner. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggested that 
we perhaps can consider storing knowledge deeply in human memory through a building up 
of many practice trails on related problems. How acquired tacit and explicit knowledge are 
shared will be further discussed in Section 6.3.3. As we now know more about how 
policymakers create and store the knowledge of tourism crises within their organisations, 
next is to research how they applied the knowledge into tourism crises management.
6.3.2.3 Knowledge Application and Learning from Previous Tourism Crises 
The interviewees were asked if there were specifically good examples of knowledge 
management practice from past tourism crises. There are two examples of tourism crises that 
most policymakers brought up: one is the airport closure in 2008, and the second is the 
flooding that happened in 2001. This section reveals whether knowledge management is 
being applied and whether helpful to them in managing actual crises. Also, whether or not 
previous experience gained from crises has helped to better manage other crises.
6.3.2.3.1 Airport closure in 2008
“Flights from Thailand's international airport have been suspended after hundreds 
of anti-government protesters stormed the building outside Bangkok”
(BBC, 2008)
The above text is taken from BBC’s news website describing the situation of airport closure 
in 2008 due to the anti-government protest. As a consequence of this political crisis, in 
November 2008, International flights to and from Thailand's main airport were halted after 
rampaging anti-government protesters surged through police cordons and stormed the
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sprawling terminal. The PAD seizure of Don Muang and Suvarnabhumi Airports (both in 
Bangkok) is estimated to have cost the Thai economy at least three billion Baht 
(approximately US$100 million) a day in lost shipment value and opportunities. The closure 
of the airports left almost three thousand passengers stranded within the main terminal, and 
another 350,000 were stranded inside the country, as all flights were grounded for a short 
while. Nevèrthëlëss, thé real impact in the total number of tourists arriving to Thailand and 
the loss it caused is difficult to estimate. As we know from the previous section, this tourism 
crisis was one of the worst events that have affected the tourism industry of Thailand.
Following are some comments of applying knowledge management to handle the airport 
closure crisis:
“We immediately set up a temporary help center” Emergency Tourist Assistance Call 
Centre at 1414 for this crisis to he the centre o f  crisis management, crisis information 
that linked all parties in tourism. ” (PUB 2)
“Every key person stands by all day all night to make decision to whatever it will 
happen. We have a formal meeting every day during the crises to estimate what we 
will do next. It is hard to predict what the protester would do. ” (PRI_2)
“We have a standard to manage the emergency. We followed the standard ofpractice. 
Every policeman is trained regularly to manage the protestants step by step basing on 
the level o f vilolence. "(PUB l)
“We have to admit that we didn ’t expect this. This crisis provides us the lesson to be 
learned. ” (PUB 3)
These evidences obtained from the interviewees showed that in stages of emergent crises 
having a centre of knowledge i.e. call centre and a knowledgeable team to manage tourism 
crisis is important for the stakeholders in order to have a place where they can share and 
receive information. The statement of PUB l illustrates that the existing explicit form of 
knowledge is important to provide an initial standard of practice to handle tourism crises 
which cannot be neglected. However, with the nature of crisis that is hard to predict, 
knowledge has to be updated and analysed through knowledge sharing 24/7 to coordinated 
and provide information to those who are involved and affected by crises. Two way 
communication—especially meeting and telephone—was the main mechanism to 
communicate knowledge of tourism during the airport closure. We now have some ideas of 
how knowledge management is being implemented in a real crisis situation and see more in 
the second example of tourism crises-the flood of 2011. This finding confirmed the study of
199
Paraskevas et al. (2013) that knowledge of tourism crises is in both codified and tacit forms. 
In the stage of emergent crisis, the codified knowledge has to be converted into a more non­
static form so that it can be improvised, rationalised and then shared through a high degree of 
social interactions.
C J Z  J f  Flqodmg in 2011
As mentioned in the literature reviews of Chapter 4 about the part of Thailand that is located 
in the Monsoon belt, this type of natural disaster is expected to occur. Severe flooding started 
at the end of July 2011 triggered by the landfall of Tropical Storm Nock-ten. Flooding soon 
spread throughout the provinces of Northern, North-eastern and Central Thailand along the 
Mekong and Chao Phraya river basins. In October, fioodwaters reached the mouth of the 
Chao Phraya and inundated parts of the capital city of Bangkok. Flooding persisted in some 
areas until mid-January 2012, and resulted in a total of 815 deaths, 3 missing and 13.6 million 
people affected. Sixty-five of Thailand's 77 provinces were declared flood disaster zones, and 
over 20,000 square kilometres of farmland were damaged. The disaster has been described as 
"the worst flooding yet in terms of the amount of water and people affected."
Following are some comments of applying knowledge management to handle the flooding:
“We have the previous information on the price o f the hotel and meal, we had 
experienced from the airport closure. ... the old files were brought up again to decide 
fo r  the emergency budget to help tourists. ” (PRI_2A)
“The Tourism Intelligence Unit operates all day all nights to monitor, receive and 
sending out the information to our offices across the world to ensure that they have 
the single message. ” (PUB_4)
“We do to help Thailand to the best o f  our ability during the fo o d  period. We sent 
messages to PATA member travel professionals worldwide telling them about the real 
situation on the ground in Thailand PATA has put frequent updates on our Facebook 
and Twitter feeds. We encouraged tourists and travel professionals to refer to the 
very useful fo o d  situation updates on www,tourismthailandupdate.com. ” (PRJ_1)
The statements of PRI 2A showed an interesting finding that experience and decisions of 
previous knowledge ean be applied, although to different crises. While statement of PUB_4 
added that the role of the crisis management centre is not only to accumulate information but 
also to analyse information and send out a clear and accountable knowledge as can be 
referenced from the term “single message.” Technology through website and social network 
became an important mechanism to share knowledge to a wider group— especially to the 
public.
2 0 0
Comparing the knowledge management implementation of these two crises that affected the 
tourism industry, we could see that in the latter there is innovative crisis management through 
setting up the tourism crisis communication system. It not only caused development of a 
website to be the platform of knowledge of tourism information of crisis and single message 
of knowledge, but also learning from previous cases. As expected, lessons learned from the 
previous crisis helped to manage the crisis better even though crises are not the same in their 
characteristies. However, it required time and effort to work together to process and adjust or 
create new knowledge or ideas for a new solution to crisis problems. This finding supports 
the Lewinian experiential learning model developed by Kolb (1984) in which an individual 
can obtain knowledge; it can then be applied to crises. The test of knowledge application will 
be reflected to form a concrete experience within the organisation. However, the concept of 
double loop learning to explore real sources of problems or make analysis of the situation 
was hardly evident. It can be evident that the implementation of dealing with previous crisis 
was applied for the following crisis without being fully analysed or taking a risk of applying 
another solution. This finding could be explained by Jashaspara (2011) that the firm that has 
scarce resources tended to avoid taking risks in a play safe manner. In addition, the reason 
that the feedback and double learning stage was neglected could link to Section 6.1 that 
showed that policymakers are busy people who also have their day to day work, and that in 
the aftermath of crises they have to return to the pressures of their main jobs (Pforr and 
Hosie, 2007).
Overall, Section 6.3.2 raised the fact that knowledge management was proactive and 
implemented by Thai policymakers to some extent. However the practices of knowledge 
management are not very well organised. For example, in aequiring systems, the sources of 
crisis come from different channels, without having a knowledge audit to analyse what 
knowledge the policymakers would need. Massive relevant or even irrelevant data obtained, 
led to a waste of time and resources to manage data which policymakers still are unsure 
whether it will be used or not. Nevertheless, the example of cases of real tourism crises—the 
airport closure in 2008 and flooding in 2011—confirmed that knowledge both tacit and 
explicit is important for use in making decisions. Having a single centre of information for 
crises can help all tourism stakeholders know what they themselves should manage during 
crises. Learning and sharing are important as well. The trials and errors made during the 
action of the airport closure helped policymakers to put more effort on crisis management and 
communication. For example, the knowledge of deciding the budget to help tourists during
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flooding was based on the decision made in 2008 for the airport closure. The official website 
www.tourismthailandupdate.com was developed to ensure the single message and real time 
communication to the public. Nevertheless, the double loop learning query and analysis of 
the problem was limited. As this research focuses also on how the knowledge is transferred, 
in the next part we will lead to the analysis of data that related to knowledge transfer.
6.3.3 Knowledge Transfer Mechanism (KTM) (Policymakers)
From the previous section, we have understood the implementation of knowledge 
management starting from knowledge acquisition, storage, application and learning. This 
section considers one step of knowledge management process which is called “knowledge 
transfer.” Knowledge transfer refers to distribution of relevant knowledge to those who need 
it at the right place and time, utilising the right form. The knowledge transfer mechanism 
(KTM) refers to the way knowledge is transferred to internal and external tourism 
stakeholders. This section covers only the internal knowledge transfer among policymakers 
while the external knowledge transfer for the case of policymaker and hotels will be reported 
and discussed in Chapter 8. The background of this section is from Chapter 3 about the 
knowledge conversion modes by Nonaka (1994) and the mechanisms of knowledge transfer 
by Hall and Williams (2008) and Hjalager (2002).
The previous section indicated that policymakers held both explicit and tacit knowledge of 
tourism crises. In general, it found that there are three factors that determine what mechanism 
will be used to transfer crises: types of crisis knowledge; the phase of crises management; 
and the absorption capability of the individual or group.
Following is a conclusive comment on knowledge transfer mode and mechanism of tourism 
crises internally amongst policymakers is reflected by the following interviewee:
“Before crisis happens, we have meeting with Thai Hotel Association and hoteliers to 
ask for their help to monitor and report the security o f  the tourists. For example Kai 
Kao gang rob many tourists so we share their face and their information to hotels. 
However during the crisis, our special team will be there at the crisis location. We 
send our specialist to provide knowledge to security o f  the hotels during the 
demonstration. The managers o f hotels have the specialists’ telephone numbers to call 
in case o f  an emergency so that we can give them the instruction on how to handle the 
crisis. We also give them the manual and training on how to handle emergencies. ” 
(PUB_1)
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Interestingly, face-to-face meeting was the most mentioned method of knowledge transfer 
mechanism for policymakers in all phases of crises. This is perhaps due to knowledge of 
crises being embedded in individuals who are expert or have experienced previous crises. The 
statement on the frequency and agenda of meeting was reported by the following interviewee:
“These two years !  have had 482 'meeting agendas. We have meetings every dcy! 
(PRI_3)
Nevertheless, one interviewee revealed that it is always workable because meetings often
have to be postponed due to poor attendance, or frequency made people tired of travelling to
different meeting venues. His statement follows:
“We have met twice now and now these 2 weeks nothing happens because everybody 
is in London. I  think we are going to meet one more time before the end o f the year. I  
don’t thinkfloods will happen this year so there’s no direct urgency. ” (PRI l)
He then continually suggested that it is better to divide the knowledge sharing and 
distribution into smaller groups. Following is his statement:
“The way o f having an informal small group o f two per organisation we were talking 
o f 6 or 8people; that is the best way to keep going. ” (PRI l)
Besides the meeting, nowadays thanks to technology—for instance an online channel such as 
website, social networks, webinar—become the favorite one in comparing to the off-line 
communication channel. These are due to the rapidity and the ease of accessibility by mass 
viewers. Some example statements are:
“We have the center o f  information that sends and receives information both online 
and offline. Social network and website are getting important to share knowledge 
nowadays. We have www.thailandtourismupdate.com as the main website to deliver
messages to public. ” (PUB_3)
“Both Facebook and even more important Twitter as the most important. What I  just 
briefly saw from New York or from the USA ... all Twitter Twitter Twitter that creates 
communication networks so we have to start working more on social media and 
communicate faster as we did this whole thing in Skype and you know we have to 
communicate and talk and talk and talk.” (PRI l)
Statements of PUB_3 and PRI l highlighted that technology has greatly impacted the 
exchange of knowledge—both formal and informal communication from explicit to tacit and 
vice versa. The website and other social media such as Facebook, and Twister become the 
modem channels to share explicit to explicit, or to tacit.
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In contrast to the above view, one interviewee said that crisis knowledge should not be kept 
in codified format then shared only through an online channel, but needs to be embodied in 
key persons to be ready for response to tourism crisis. The interviewee added that website or 
email is rapid and provides wider access but not the right tool to deliver for the crucial 
knowledge among key decision makers. Shortwave radio and telephone are more practical
_ . . .  1 -      - «  1—t 1 1   •    *'” • 1 1  /  -  - y #    - -      -  - ............................  -•   -  -   - • -------------- -----and are used. Following are illustrative statements:
“We should practice and understand the procedure by heart, but during crisis 
telephone or radio walkie talkie is more efficient. ” (PUB_2)
“I  have the list o f  every key person and minister’s mobile phones. We talked often 
among public makers. Telephone so far is best communication channel o f  
information. ” (PRI 2)
So far, it is apparent that that most of knowledge of tourism crisis was shared through 
different channels depending on the phase of a crisis and types of knowledge. During pre and 
post crisis, it was more often shared in explicit forms such as one-way direction via email or 
official letters, memo, or manuals rather than in tacit forms via meetings and trainings. 
However, during a crisis, two-way communication-especially telephone and face-to-face 
meetings become the primary method to convert knowledge from explicit to tacit form; and 
then to disseminate knowledge to the policymakers in order to make the appropriate decision 
in a timely manner.
Throughout Section 6.3.2 and above, comments have outlined the modes of knowledge 
conversion and the mechanism of knowledge transfer that can be extracted out of the 
illustrative quotes; they are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Knowledge conversion mode and mechanisms (Policymakers)
Knowledge conversion mode - Mechanisms o f  knowledge transfer o f  tourism crises
Individual Group
Tacit to Tacit 
(Socialisation)
M obile phone 
Satellite phone 
Walkie-talkie 
Informal dialogues
Formal M eeting
Short W ave radio (Walkie-talkie ) 
Webinar
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Knowledge conversion mode
M echanisms o f  knowledge transfer o f  tourism crises
Individual Group
Tacit to Explicit 
(Externalisation)
Documentations 
M eeting reports 
Email 
M emo
Documentations 
M eeting reports 
Email
Social networks. B log, Facebook,
Twister
W ebsites
Explicit to Explicit M eeting reports
Documentations
Email
M emo
Manuals
M eeting reports
Documentations
Email
M emo
Manuals
Explicit to Tacit Reading from the meeting reports, 
em a ils ,websites, documentations
Reading from the meeting reports, 
emails, websites, documentations. 
Training by experts 
Webinars
Source: Author’s presentation taken from illustrative quotes in Section 6.3
There are several mechanisms used for information transfer shown in Table 6.1. The choice 
of mechanism depends on different factors: the forms of knowledge—tacit or explicit; the 
transfer condition and the characteristic of the receivers, either individual or group; the 
relationship; and lastly the phase of tourism crises. It is evident that meetings and face-to-face 
communication are the preferred mechanisms to convert knowledge from tacit to tacit mode 
and tacit to explicit mode. At an individual level, informal dialogues, either through face-to- 
face or two-way communication devices, mobile phone and shortwave radio, are accepted as 
the best mechanism to communicate knowledge of crisis for immediate decision making 
during a crisis hit. At the group level, the formal meeting is preferred. This corresponds to 
the study by Salis and Williams (2010) on the positive link between productivity and face-to- 
face communication (FTFC) in problem-solving of groups, teams trough meetings of senior 
or line managers and employees (Salis and Williams, 2010).
After a meeting the knowledge is supposed to be recorded into informal meeting reports and 
memo to share with participants through different mechanisms such as documentation, email, 
and manuals. Lastly, from the explicit to tacit mode, knowledge will be added into the
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person’s knowledge through reading of meeting reports, emails, websites, and 
documentation. Group training by experts will be added as one more mechanism to share.
To conclude Section 6.3, the majority of policymakers recognised the importance of 
knowledge management and there is a positive trend of practicing knowledge management of 
tourism crises. Sevbrak made efforts to establish knowledge of crisis management, 
demonstrated by their attempts to acquire knowledge through multiple channels from both 
internal and external sources. However, a storage and retrieval system of knowledge is still 
inefficient if  it causes the omission of retrieving the crisis management plan to apply to 
crises.
Two real tourism crises: airport closure in 2008 and the flooding in 2011 have been brought 
out as examples to illustrate and cross check against what already has been told about 
knowledge management practices. It clearly confirmed that the lessons learned from 
managing the airport closure have helped the policymakers to innovate a crisis 
communication system as a better way to handle crises. Also, it is apparent that the actions of 
how to handle previous crises can be applied to future events. Therefore, the feedback of 
knowledge application and ongoing manner of knowledge management should be 
implemented.
The final part of Section 6.3 illustrates that knowledge of tourism crises was shared through 
different channels depending on the type of knowledge form, the number of receivers 
(individual or group), their relationships and the condition of transfer, i.e. the phase of the 
crisis.
So far, we have understood the process of management, starting from knowledge acquisition 
to storage system of knowledge asset within the organisation, and lastly to the modes and 
mechanisms by which knowledge is shared. In addition, we have seen how knowledge has 
been applied to real tourism crisis situations and learning from previous crises. The next 
section, which is the last, will consider the facilitators and barriers of knowledge management 
and transfer.
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6.4 The Facilitators and Barriers of Knowledge Management and Transfer 
(Policymakers)
It is widely accepted that knowledge management is a complex issue, with success or failure 
to implement knowledge management depending on several factors. There are three parts in 
this section. The first is the 8 facilitators of knowledge transfer by Orzano et al. (2008). These 
8 facilitators are (1) active network, (2) reflective practice, (3) helpful relationship, (4) robust 
infrastructure, (5) accessible technology, (6) supportive leadership, (7) effective 
communication, and (8) trusting climate. The second part is the barriers informed by Riege’s 
(2007) key barriers of knowledge management (Technological, Organisational, and People 
challenges ‘TOP’). The last part is regarding suggested ways of overcoming barriers by 
policymakers of this study.
To begin with the facilitator of knowledge management, most interviewees said that active 
network and helpful relationship are the keys that facilitate knowledge management of 
tourism crises.
The following are an example comment on the active networking:
“We have a very close relationship due to the nature o f  our work that needs to 
cooperate all the time. We have regular contacts to talk and share our ideas.” 
(PRI_2A)
The statements that illustrated the helpful relationship among the policymakers are:
“During tourism crises, everyone is willing to help. The crisis made us who suffered 
from crises understand and sympathise each other’s more and offer helps. It is a 
place marketing rather than individual business unit marketing. ” (PRI 2B)
“The PRI l  who has experience in international level has become the valuable 
sources o f knowledge on tourism crisis management. He was trying to encourage us 
the Thai government to work on crisis preparation. ” (PUB_3)
“I f  he or she says “yes ” then the sharing and receiving o f knowledge happens. That 
person continues to develop their knowledge and skill more without being forced and 
then innovation happens. ” (PRI_3)
To consider the above comments—especially PRI 2B and PUB_3—it could be seen that if 
the people are willing to help and have good attitude toward knowledge management then the 
process can be done effectively. However PRI 3 made an interesting point that both senders 
and receivers should have a positive attitude in sharing knowledge amongst themselves. This 
is similar to the literature reviews in Chapter 4 regarding knowledge transfer that the 
knowledge deliverers should wish to share relevant knowledge and have an ability to
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translate complex knowledge to receivers. This is supported by the study saying that 
successful knowledge transfer is occurring when receivers themselves would want to learn 
knowledge and have the right absorptive capacity (Liyanage et al., 2009).
Undoubtedly, link to the previous sections. It can be noticed that technology nowadays 
facilitates the knowledge management process in storing codified knowledge into a computer* • • -  - - ——— — ----- --——-------- . ... — — - . .  —  —— Wi'. .— . . . .  —  —_  A - - . .  . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  ..Wi' ._ ... -----  — — . . . . . . .  . . . .  . .  .............................       .X . . .  . .. .
database system and also helps them communicate better. This can be illustrated as follows:
“We need to provide correct knowledge, fast and accessible by many people, internet 
is important to serve these needs. ” (PUB l)
“Everyone in our department has a computer. It important fo r them to assist their day 
to day jobs and knowledge sharing through emails and social networks. ” (PUB_3)
PUB l and PUB 3 statements showed that technology has great positive impacts for storing 
and retrieving codified knowledge; sending and receiving knowledge from insiders and 
outsiders rapidly and widely. This is supported by the literature that knowledgeable staff and 
management coupled with proper investments in technology and equipment can develop 
sufficient countermeasures to help mitigate tractable crises (Racherla and Hu, 2009).
To conclude knowledge management facilitators, active network, helpful relationship, 
technology and effective communication are four main components that enable the 
knowledge management of tourism crises. Nevertheless, other factors which are robust 
infrastructure, supportive leadership, and trusting climate, are not directly mentioned. With 
these facilitators, an organisation will be able to accomplish an outcome of making decisions 
to solve problems and establish a culture of organisational learning (Orzano et al., 2008). 
Especially, the support from the leader (knowledge champion) is a vital facilitator to motivate 
staff to take risk, to share knowledge and to collaborate in knowledge sharing and reflective 
activities (Weick, 2002). Lacking of these facilitators could be the reason of why knowledge 
management is not fully understood and implemented widely among policymakers at the 
present.
Next topic is the barrier of knowledge management of tourism crises. According to Riege 
(2007), there are three key barriers of knowledge management (Technological, 
Organisational, and People challenges ‘TOP’). Following are the findings from the 
interviewees when asked them to evaluate and explain how these three become a barrier of 
knowledge management.
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The primary problem causing knowledge management to be unsuccessful was people, 
especially their attitude, understanding and their different knowledge capability. This was 
reflected by following views:
“Some people were afraid that to share knowledge to another will make the other 
smarter than them... “We need to educate people, especially in this organisation. 
People have not enough knowledge i f  we cannot compete in the high competitive 
environment. ” (PRI_3)
“We are always afraid that something can go wrong. ...only the best thing is to do 
nothing. ” (PRI l)
The above comment by PRI l and PRI 3 illustrated that two types of personalities are the 
barriers to acquiring and sharing knowledge of tourism crises; one is those who have a high 
perception of their status (arrogant). He or she believes that knowledge makes them superior 
know-it-all types. The second group is those who hold a conformist attitude, as is typical of 
people with low self-esteem.
The second barrier was the organisation in the collaboration aspect as illustrated by the 
following comment:
“Lack o f serious cooperation from other organisations both public and private. 
There was an awareness o f  tourism crisis management but the participation level is 
not much... It is a political issue. Everyone wants to show o ff their power, take 
benefits so nothing is seriously done. ” (PUB_3)
One interviewee reported that regarding to organisation; the leadership and unclear roles of 
each member of the teams can become a major barriers:
“We got the high degree and present a good idea. Our ideas cannot be implemented i f  
the boss says no. ” (PRI 3)
Statements of PUB_3 pointed to a lack of establishment of a common goal or norms, and 
spirit of teamwork among policymakers, while PRI 3 pointed out the problem of 
organisational culture not being open and having a high hierarchical level. This finding tends 
to support the study of Thanasankit and Corbitt, (2002) who asserted that there is a strong 
link between the concepts of power in Thai culture’s hierarchical forms of communication 
and the decision-making process in Thailand. Thai staff tend to avoid participation or 
confrontation with supervisors, so that ideas are unlikely to be generated by the staff, and 
transferred to the management.
209
Technology seem s not to  be a barrier for most all policymakers. However, the problem that is found 
is the lack of knowledge of people to use the technology to support the knowledge management 
process. The statem ent that reflects the view is followed:
“We have several new programme hut staff don V know how to use. ” (PUB_1)
This mismatch of technology and people is similar to the work of Riege (2007) where firms 
have adopted new technology that does not fit the requirement and is not user-friendly. 
Riege (2007) recommended minimising this problem by offering training and also auditing of 
suitable technology.
Another new barrier was budget as one stated that:
“We don’t have budget to really focus on establishing the knowledge management 
system. Lots o f  work but not enough manpower. Workload is currently overloaded. 
We don’t have the budget to hire people. ” (PUB_3)
The comment of PUB 3 is related to the issue of financial resource. It is no surprise that 
resources can become a barrier of knowledge management. Lacking of financial resources to 
hire more employees caused staff to have a high workload and too busy to participate in 
knowledge management implementation. This is similar to the work of Pforr and Hosie 
(2007) which claimed that “busyness” is the barrier to learning and sharing knowledge.
Turning to the last part of this section, the interviewee encourages the policymakers to 
provide suggested ways to overcome the barriers of knowledge management.
Following are the suggested ways related to overcome the problem regarding people:
“So you have to start on the bottom and that was education so the new generations 
got a better education and get more knowledge and start understanding. ” (PRI_1)
“Education would enhance the competency ofpeople. ...W e should offer a chance for  
staff to study higher. Emphasis skill and work-based education than the theories- 
based education. Many people graduated with a degree but they don’t have 
experience. ” (PRI 4)
Education is a way to change people attitude. I f  they understand, they will change 
the perception. ” (PRI_3)
From the above comments, we can see that the majority of interviewees agreed that education 
and training are the solution to overcome the people barrier. This finding is congruent with 
Riege (2007), that managers must provide a mentoring and coaching programme to eliminate 
the misperception and lack of proper absorption capability.
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In conclusion of the facilitators and barriers of knowledge management and transfer, it is 
discovered that an active network and cooperative relationship are the key factors that helped 
manage past tourism crises. Meanwhile, “people” issues are a common barrier among all 
policymakers—especially attitude and knowledge capability—and are the major barriers of 
knowledge management perceived by policymakers in Thailand. Therefore, education and
. . .  ,  - • *   * « - «----------T4   1 - ---- . . . ---  -  — -  — - •f‘~ * --    -«   . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .     . . .      .     .training are perceived as the solution to overcome this barrier.
6.5 Chapter Conclusion
In general, there are several key observations which have arisen as a result of the qualitative 
data collected from the in-depth interviews conducted with policymakers in Thailand with 
regard to their views. Objectives are tourism crisis management and knowledge management, 
and implementation between policymakers and hotels as well as its barriers and facilitators of 
the knowledge management process. Nine interviews with policymakers conducted in eight 
organisations in Thailand support this research.
The first observation was about their relationships amongst themselves and the social setting, 
given that some of these policymakers work in public organisations, whilst others work in 
private industries. Nevertheless, they all are involved in tourism crisis management to some 
extent. All of them have their day-to-day job duties and participating in tourism crisis 
management team is an extra job. As they are working in the same industry they have quite 
strong relationships and meet regularly about general issues of the tourism industry. Some of 
them have offices in the same building. Therefore, in terms of knowledge management, it 
could be viewed that this social setting may promote informal knowledge sharing and 
collaboration of tourism crisis management.
As for the second, it was clear that there is no common understanding of what is a ‘tourism 
crises among the policymakers. However, all policymakers perceived a tourism crisis as a 
threat, leading to problems in different aspects. Notwithstanding is the classification of 
severity of heterogeneous crises. There is a need for common criteria to assess tourism crises. 
Having a consensus and a common classification system to prioritise what crises should be 
paid attention to, otherwise it would severely damage the wider group. Key points from the 
interviewees’ statements about tourism crisis management objectives are to ensure safety of 
tourists and operation of tourism businesses. This is done by attempting to proactively plan 
and manage tourism crises. A focus on safety of tourists and profitability of tourism business
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by policymakers brings implicit economic success, but wellbeing of other stakeholders, 
especially the community, is vital as well.
The awareness of proactive tourism crisis management practices only began recently and 
previous crises were managed in a relatively reactive style. The collaboration of the 
policymakers is ruore like a network a partnership and their participation is un­
structured. Tourism crisis management plans or manuals are not yet extensive, and many 
private companies still rely on government policy to prevent crises rather than on internal 
crises management, thus being passive actors. However, it seems that slowly there is a trend 
developing to adopt a more proactive tourism crisis management style among the various 
organisations.
The third observation has to do with knowledge management transfer and tourism crises. It is 
not difficult to see that knowledge management (KM) is being positively received within 
policymakers’ organisations. Knowledge management is seen as a key element to predict and 
successfully overcome tourism crises, also knowing that it needs to be dynamic and proactive 
due to the uncertain nature of crises. However, the term is still not well understood by 
everybody as shown that some policymakers still believe that knowledge management is just 
about managing information, and there is much left to do in Thailand in order to improve 
knowledge management among all the stakeholders. An important contradiction has been 
encountered: while the concept of knowledge management is welcome and supported to 
manage tourism crises, it gives the impression that some policymakers feel reluctant to spend 
time and resources on it, and some others implement it in an inefficient way.
In terms of acquisition, both internal and external sources are used to get information and 
knowledge, through seminars, brainstorms, and studies carried out by universities, etc. 
However, in general, organisations do not pay attention to knowledge audit; what knowledge 
is needed; from which source best to be obtained; and if all the relevant participants will be 
able to understand and use the new knowledge. Toward creating organisation knowledge, it 
could be said that the storage strategy for knowledge of tourism crises adopted was a mix of 
both personalisation-based and codification-based forms. However, systematic knowledge 
storage system of both forms performed by policymakers is unclear.
The application of knowledge management and crises management is enforced by the 
government in Thailand. Although officially it is there, sometimes and in some organisations 
it is not well implemented, and it only exists to satisfy legal requirements.
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Looking at two important tourism crises, such as the closure of Bangkok airport in 2008 and 
the floods of 2011, it is true that some innovative crises management has been applied, and 
there has been a certain evolution which allowed some improvement in managing these 
crises.
Regarding Imowledge transfer, it has been revealed that most knowledge of tourism crises 
was shared through different channels depending on type of knowledge form, the number of 
receivers (individual or group) and the condition of transfer i.e. the phase of the crisis. During 
pre and post crisis, more knowledge was shared in explicit forms in one-way direction (via 
email or official letters, memo or manuals) than in tacit forms via meetings and trainings. 
However during the crisis, the two-way communication (especially telephone and face-to- 
face meeting) becomes the primary method to convert knowledge from explicit to tacit form, 
and then to disseminate knowledge to the policymakers in order to make the appropriate 
decision in a timely manner.
Lastly, one important fact worthy of attention is regarding several barriers that complicate the 
proper implementation of knowledge and crises management. Some of these barriers are hard 
to overcome, as derived from a vast array of interviewees’ responses: people’s attitude, their 
personalities and knowledge capability are major difficulties toward knowledge management. 
Training and support culture is perceived as a way to overcome such a barrier.
The aim of this chapter was to be the first chapter that presents the findings of a primary 
research objective toward assessing the understanding and objectives of policymakers on 
tourism crisis management. Chapter 7 will investigate the same themes in more detail from 
hotel respondents’ viewpoints. Chapter 8 will provide a comparative analysis of 
understanding between policymakers and hotel respondents about tourism crisis management 
and knowledge transfer and management implementation between them. Chapter 9 will then 
draw together the main findings of these chapters and suggest methods which could be used 
as guidelines to enhance knowledge management for tourism crises.
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CHAPTER 7 
HOTELIERS
7.0 Introduction
it was one of the arguments of this thesis, as stated in Section 4.6.2 “the research gap,” that 
not enough is known about the differences amongst hotels of different sizes and/or their 
ownership structure(s) in their recognition of tourism crises—and or of their knowledge 
transfer and management approaches to such events.
Therefore, in this study the researcher attempted to provide insightful data and discuss the 
findings of this thesis specifically for hotels and their understanding and implementation of 
knowledge management in tourism crises. This evaluation will be later utilised for a 
comparative analysis of knowledge transfer systems or methods and the management of 
tourism crises between hoteliers and policymakers in Chapter 8.
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section offers an introduction to the hotels 
which were selected as the nine embedded case studies demonstrating four different types of 
hotels: Type 1: Small / Independent; Type 2: Large / Independent; Type 3: Large / Thai 
chain; Type 4: Large / Foreign chain. The details that will be included in this section are 
derived from hotel fact sheets and field notes o f the researcher who stayed for two days in 
each hotel and observed the interviewees’ work environments (Appendix 6). The field notes 
are descriptive narrative observational reports of recorded viewpoints from site observations 
and interviews supported by contemporaneous notes. This information can be used to 
understand and analyse each case study in context. The profiles of each hotel presented in 
this section are the general characteristics of its environment, products and services in 
addition to any artefacts related to the topics of tourism crisis management, knowledge 
transfer and management.
The second part of this chapter presents an overview of the interviewees—  hotel respondents, 
e.g. their ranking (top, middle, rank-and-file staff), their department roles and experience 
relate to knowledge management of tourism crises. This section also provides a brief 
description of the participants within their social setting and business environment in order to 
understand the relationships and the constraints under which the interviewee is working based 
on the observational reports of the researcher.
214
The third section discusses what the interviews revealed in terms of two headings: First, The 
hotel respondents’ understanding of tourism crisis in the context of Thailand. Second, their 
reflection(s) on past and present crisis management situations in Thailand, and the positive 
and or negative impact of the solutions that have been or are being adopted by hotel 
respondents. We know from the literature and the previous chapter that the views of policy- 
makers are cdhtfadicfory regarding the concept of tourism crises, i.e. uncertainty as to the 
definition and characteristics of such crises and how this confusion has led to the problem of 
collaboration amongst policymakers and other tourism actors. This section will continue 
investigating this issue from the hoteliers’ points of view and their understanding of the 
issue(s), and whether this understanding influences collaboration internally amongst hotel 
staff in managing tourism crises.
The fourth section presents the research finding of knowledge management as the vehicle for 
managing tourism crises in Thailand. The forth section is sub-divided into three parts. The 
first part discusses the opinions of hotel respondents as to the relationship between 
knowledge management and tourism crisis. The second part reports on the implementation by 
hotels of the knowledge management process and involves three stages, which are: 
knowledge acquisition, knowledge organisation through storing, and lastly knowledge 
application. The third part discusses the mechanism and activities of knowledge transfer to 
convert knowledge forms and sharing knowledge..
The fifth section explores the facilitators of and barriers to knowledge transfer and the 
subsequent enhanced management in the context of hotels. An important question is what 
has facilitated or obstructed these hotels viz., their capacity to implement knowledge transfer 
and management effectively among the four embedded hotel categories. The section will 
conclude with ideas for overcoming identified barriers and enhancing the facilitators from
interviewees’ viewpoints.
- - - ■ - - - - - - -  . . .  ..... • . . - ..
The sixth section is the conclusion. This will highlight the major findings among the 
(identified) four types of hotels based on the main themes of the research so far. It will 
consider whether the findings have supported or challenged the views current in the known 
literature and or from empirical studies previously carried out to examine knowledge 
management and tourism crises management from the viewpoint of the hotel industry.
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7.1 The Profile of the Case Study Hotels.
The reviewed literature indicates that the organisational structure, their resources such as 
manpower and facilities of hotels of different size, and/or their ownership (independent / 
chain) determine the complexity and/or capability for dealing with tourism crises and their 
capacity for the implementation of knowledge management initiatives.
For this research, the types of hotels that are investigated and the rationale for their 
identification were explained in Chapter 4, specifically in Table 4.7. To reiterate, the hotel 
classification for this research is based on 1) the characteristics of size using the number of 
room(s) below 100 rooms for small hotels and more than 250 rooms for large hotels and 2) 
the structure of ownership, whether independent [one property] or chain [more than one 
property in different locations including national and international chains]. As explained in 
the research methodology chapter, the hotels that this research planned to study were 
categorised into 4 types —Type 1 (SI): Small / Independent; Type 2 (LI): Large / 
Independent hotel; Type 3 (LNC): Large / Thai (National) chain hotel; Type 4 (LFC): Large / 
Foreign chain hotel.
For anonymity purposes their identities are protected and they are identified as SI, LI, LNC 
and LFC for each category. There are at least 2 embedded case studies per each type of hotel 
so they are identified with number 1 (the first embedded case), 2 (the second embedded case) 
and 3 (the third embedded case). Therefore, SIl refers to the first embedded case of the small 
and independent hotel.
Table 7.1 Profile of the hotels in Bangkok
Hotels Approx 
no. of 
rooms
Approx. 
Number of all 
staff 
( both full 
time and part 
time)
Location Structure of 
ownership
Type of client Service
Standard
Price range 
per night 
(Trip 
advisor’s 
website)
SIl 50 5 -Tourism Centre 
(near attractions) 
-Business Centre
independently
owned
• Leisure 
Tourist
Budget £10-£25
SI2 50 5 Tourism Centre 
(near attractions)
Independently
owned
• Leisure 
Tourist
Budget £ 8 -£ 1 5
SB 90 30 Business Centre Independently
owned
• Business 
tourist
• Leisure 
Tourist
Medium 
(3 stars)
£15-£30
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Hotels Approx 
no. of 
rooms
Approx. 
Number of all 
staff 
( both full 
time and part 
time)
Location Structure of 
ownership
Type of client Service
Standard
Price range 
per night 
(Trip 
advisor’s 
website)
LIl 742 600 Business Centre independently
owned
• Business 
tourist
•  Leisure 
Tourist
Luxury 
(5 stars)
£30-£120
LI2 400 250 -Tourism Centre 
(near attractions) 
-Business Centre
independently
owned
• Business 
tourist
• Leisure 
Tourist
Good 
(3 stars)
£38-£60
LNCl 1251 900 -Business Centre Hotel chain • Business 
tourist
• Leisure 
Tourist
Good 
(4 stars)
£46-£68
LNC2 517 600 -Business Centre Hotel chain • Business 
tourist
• Leisure 
Tourist
Luxury 
(5 stars)
£93 -£110
LFCl 450 600 -Business Centre Hotel chain • Business 
tourist
• Leisure 
Tourist
Luxury 
(5 stars)
£115-£136
LFC2 500 600 -Business Centre Hotel chain • Business 
tourist
• Leisure 
Tourist
Luxury 
(5 stars)
£92-£120
Sources: Author’s presentation obtained from documentation of the studied hotels
The foregoing table (See: Table 7.1) illustrates the four types of hotel that have different 
characteristics in a two-fold way. One is the nature of their operations and market 
segmentation, and the second is the number of staff.
The first aspect is the nature of their operations and market segmentation. From a review of 
the interview data it was seen that all hotels interviewed are mainly international tourist- 
oriented, trying to attract more international tourists into visiting the country for both 
business and leisure than the domestic market. For this reason, the opinion provided would be 
very much focused on this segment of tourists.
The small hotels are located in the touristic areas so as to accommodate and service budget 
travellers. In contrast, the large hotels are primarily located in the business areas of cities, 
allowing business people to stay close to the offices they visit, and providing some extra high 
quality services (airport shuttle, conference rooms, business/secretarial services and catering
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and or laundry services etc.) in comparison to the first type of hotel offering primarily budget 
focused services.
The small hotels and the large hotels offer different experiences, products, and or services to 
their hotel guests. The small hotels that are in the embedded case studies are categorised into 
the “budget hotel” category because they offer limited products and or services to guests who 
have a smaller budget and/or restricted social appetite, e.g. package tourist, backpacker and 
long stay retiree.
In contrast to the larger hotel, the LI, LNC, and LFC hotels offer a high standard of products 
and luxurious services for a higher price. Especially, the chain hotels add a strong input of 
brand image to the products and services available to their customers. In term of room price, 
it is notable that LFCl is a bit more expensive than its direct competitors LFC2 and LNC2 
hotels (all 5 star hotels with similar characteristics). The price of the LIl hotel is also high 
when comparing it with LI2 hotel, but this is due to the fact that the former is a five star hotel 
while the latter is a three star hotel. However it is important to note here that in this study, the 
choice of classification is based on size and structure of ownership rather than quality of 
service(s).
The second aspect in which all four sites differ is in number of employees. As would be 
expected, small hotels with fewer than 100 rooms are managed by a smaller number of staff 
(from 5 to 30 people, as can be seen in Table 7.1). Conversely, the number of staff is 
substantially increased when the hotel is bigger, due to the need to manage a larger number of 
clients and facilities / services. Despite the fact that more services are usually found in bigger 
hotels the correlation is not linear.
At a certain point in size, the services provided are very similar, being differentiated by 
quality rather than by quantity. Larger hotels (more rooms) need more staff, as stated before. 
The average number of employees seems to be stable around 1.2 persons per room in the 
largest hotels (LNC2, LFCl and LFC2, having around 500 rooms).
However, it must be highlighted that LNCl, which has 1,250 rooms, can be managed with 
only 0.72 persons per room, it could be due to the greater management efficiency, economies 
of scale and or just offering a lower quality service throughout..
After clarifying the circumstances of the hotels chosen for this case study, the next section 
gives a profile of the interviewees from these hotels.
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7.2 Overview of the Hotel Respondents
The previous section provides a description of the status of each hotel that was selected for 
the embedded case study. This section now introduces and profiles the hotel respondents.
There were twenty nine participants in all comprising
• Eleven owner/executive managers,
• Nine middle managers and
• Nine rank-and-file staff.
These respondents were purposefully chosen according to the selection criteria and interview 
procedure for hoteliers that can be seen in Appendix 3.
In some hotels, the researcher interviewed more than one person in each role to clarify 
functions, to gain insightful data, and to achieve data saturation. The researcher’s success in 
obtaining data saturation can be demonstrated by the fact that sufficient data has been 
obtained in order to fulfil the scope and objectives of this part of the study.
For the sake of anonymity, the identity of the hotel respondents has been protected and they 
will be identified as
• T for top management,
• M for middle management and
• S for rank and file staff.
If there is more than one interviewee in the same position and hotel these will be identified 
with number 1, 2, 3... For example, MlOFSIl refers to the first middle manager of chosen 
case study, number one 1 of small / Independent hotel.
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Table 7.2 Profile of the interviewees
Hotels No. ID
code
Nationality Experience 
in Years
Department
1
i {
I f
SIl 1. T1 Thai 5 E xecu tive.... 2- T2 ...... Thai ........... Executive
3. S. Thai 5 HK
SI2 4. T Thai 15 Executive
5. S Thai 10 FO
SB 6. T Thai 20 Executive
7. M Thai 10 HK
8. S Thai 8 HK
1 ■ 
hJ
â i
II
LIl 9. T Thai 20 Executive
10. M Thai 12 PR
11. S Thai 14 HK
LI2 12. T Thai 20 Executive
13. M Thai 20 FO
14. S Thai 8 HK
1
1
i lcn ^
II
LNCl 15. T Australia 6 Executive
16. Ml Thai 10 FO
17. M2 Thai 5 HR
18. S Thai 8 HK
LNC2 19. T Italian 20 Executive
20. Ml Thai 15 FO
21. M2 Thai 20 Security
22. S Thai 1 HR
l l
i f
LFCl 23. T Swiss 10 Executive
24. M Thai 10 HR
25. S Thai 5 Risk prevention
LFC2 26. T1 Austrian 8 Executive
27. T2 Thai 7 Executive
28. M Thai 4 IT
29. S Thai 5 Executive
Note: HR: Human Resources department, HK: Housekeeping department, FO: Front Office Department, 
IT: Information Technology Department, PR; Public Relations Department
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Table 7.2 showed that the majority of the respondents are Thai (26 persons). Three foreign 
respondents are Swiss (1 person), Austrian (1 person), and Italian (1 person) and all of them 
are in top management working in the executive department of the chain hotels.
The participants are from various departments. Twelve respondents work in the Executive 
department. These participants are owner. General Manager or Resident Manager. Only one 
rank-and-file staff works in the Executive Department as administrative officer. Others are 
working in Housekeeping Department (6 persons). Front Office Department (FO) (4 
persons). Human Resources Department (3 persons). Security Department (1 person). 
Information Technology Department (1 person). Public Relations Department (1 person) and 
Risk Prevention Department (1 person). Due to the specific function of each, it is to be 
expected that departments will have different perspectives e.g. patterns of contact and 
communication amongst colleagues and or members of the public / clients etc., and varying 
degrees of access to the specific knowledge.
It is noticeable from the researchers’ observation and the interviews conducted that the large 
hotels in this study were characterized by functionality and their departmentalized structures. 
This means that labour was divided into small manageable departments and was clearly 
identified as to the responsibility for specific job roles. In addition, in the large hotel, one or 
more department(s) can be established in order to take care of specific roles. For example, in 
LFC2, the Loss Prevention Department handles business interruptions from the standpoint of 
crises and customers’ complaints. This function could be conducted by other departments in 
other types of hotels, but for LFC2, it is the requirement and is a policy determined by the 
hotel’s headquarters. In the small hotel, the organisation of staff is more informal and or 
flexible which allows for more natural and face-to-face contact of staff in different 
departments and or levels.
As we are now familiar with the profile of the hotels and the interviewees; the next section 
will present the results of the in-depth interviews categorised into themes. This will be 
followed by the researcher’s comments and or discussions based on a comparison of the 
findings with previous studies contained in the literature in order to see whether the current 
comparison would support or provide additional knowledge to what has already been 
determined.
2 2 1
7.3 View of Tourism Crisis Management held by Hotel Respondents.
This section focuses on the main finding of the research which was carried out as a series of 
semi-structured interviews. There are two sub-themes: 7.3.1 level of understanding among 
hotel respondents of issues relating to tourism crises; and 7.3.2 the hotel respondents’ 
implementation of tourism crisis management and their aims for managing tourism crises. 
The analysis is informed by the subject matter of Chapter 2, Chapter 4, and especially Section 
4.3, which provides the background particular to Thailand and its distinct tourism crises.
7.3.1. The Understanding among Hotel Respondents of Issues Relating to Tourism 
Crises.
Chapter 3 and findings from the previous chapter about the view of policymakers showed that 
the meaning of tourism crisis is controversial. The term was regarded as a threat toward any 
organisations that are affected directly or indirectly by tourism impacts. Now, it is necessary 
to consider these issues for each of the four hotel types in this study.
The interview began with a question posed to interviewees as to whether they could elaborate 
their understanding of what in their opinion constituted tourism crises. The reason for asking 
this question was to attempt to explore how the term is defined by the respondents who work 
in different hotels types and or different positions in these hotels.
One of the most surprising findings in this study was in relation to the definition of “what is 
tourism crisis” by a top manager of a chain hotel. The researcher was told that the hotel has 
experienced and managed several crises. However, the interviewee seems to be uncertain 
about defining “tourism crisis” in his reply: “Fm not sure i t’s correct.” (T0FLNC2) The 
definition of tourism crisis by the top manager interviewed was:
'’'Tourism crisis to me, I  think, is about when there is a certain crisis that happens in 
an area or a location that will affect the tourism o f hotels or tourism in location sites 
that are important places; so, that’s how I  understand it. Fm not sure i t ’s correct. Ok? 
When the 2 words come together—tourism and crisis—it should be something like 
that.” (T0FLNC2)
As stated earlier, generally, the term “tourism crisis” is perceived by all hotels in this study as 
"events that cause a problem ” (T0FLI2) for the organisation. The negative consequences of 
tourism crises toward hotels are illustrated by the following comments of the interviewees:
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"An event that affects tourist confidence to travel. The number o f  hotel guests 
becomes fewer.” (T0FSI3)
"The hotel income is reduced and this affects hotel employees. ” (MOFLFCl)
Next, one interesting contrast in the understanding of tourism crisis was between large and 
small hotels. Large-sized hotels especially hotel chains seem to actively respond and have the 
will to prepare for crises. The respondents from large chained hotels said that tourism crisis is 
something severe, big and unexpected. Such events have potential impact on the organisation 
and people (customers, staff and staff family in the organisation) as well as the nation where 
the hotel is located. They emphasized the necessity of making an effort to respond to crisis. 
The above stated is illustrated by the following examples:
“Tourism crisis is something which happens unexpectedly. A crisis is always 
something for which we had not planned to ever happen and whenever a crisis 
happens in our industry it requires immediate action and reaction. ” (TOFLFCl)
“Tourism crisis is anything that will impact tourism whether a natural phenomenon, a 
political uprising or political situation, or could be something even like a financial 
situation that is going to upset the usual path o f  tourism in Thailand. We need to 
provide special attention. ” (TOFLNCl)
“Businesses are affected severely and number three—most importantly—many o f my 
employees and their families are really affected. We have to find  the way in you 
know, put actions together and then work through these crisis periods. ” (T10FLFC2)
Similarly with the small hotel, all (i.e. TlOFSIl, T0FSI2, T0FSI3) agreed that crisis could 
cause negative impacts for hotels, especially due to the reduction of hotel guests. "No guestl” 
(TlOFSIl). Nonetheless, strategic tourism crisis management was absent. This highlights the 
difference that the large hotel top managers specifically thought in strategic terms, while the 
small hotels did not say anything about this. So it can be implied that strategic planning is not 
central to their thinking. This finding corresponds with the study of Herbane (2010) 
indicating that managers in small firms tend to give more attention to the effect of crises and 
to solving problems that arise rather than to pre-planning.
In summary, the definition of tourism crises among the respondents in this study showed that 
their understanding is similar about crises being events that cause negative impact upon their 
organisation. However, in large hotels, most of interviewees mentioned a broader 
understanding of the impacts of tourism crises, including:
• confidence of tourists to travel to crisis identified destinations / locations;
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• reduction in tourist numbers;
• disruption to hotel operations;
• reduction of hotel income;
• threat to employee job stability; and problems generally for the entire tourism
industry.
These conclusions link to the next finding which indicates that: 1) the larger hotels would 
appear to have a focused determination toward proactive tourism crisis management and or 
risk assessment/management policies. 2) The smaller hotels narrow the impact of the crisis to 
a customer perspective and do not carry out planning or risk assessment/management 
programs, so that they adopt a passive role.
After the first question, the interviewees were asked to provide examples of those events they 
consider to be tourism crises that affected the hotel industry during past decades and what 
(tourism) crises had most affected their hotels. The aim of asking this question is to link the 
kind of event they associated with the definition of crisis that they have elaborated previously 
i.e.
What is the crisis that impacts the hotel industry (especially their hotel), the 
most, and what criteria bring about this conclusion?
It appears from the majority of interviewees’ responses that the most serious crises in their 
opinion were political in nature, especially for example, the airport closure of 2008 and the 
politically inspired demonstration by Red and Yellow shirt factions. There were three major 
reasons for this:
Firstly, the level of control over the situation by hotels or the policymakers. This was clarified 
in these interviewees’ replies:
"O f the 2009 and 2010 events, that with the most political violence was 2010, It had 
the biggest impact for the municipality o f  Bangkok... but then 2010 with the political 
violence was so dramatic it did not look like that there was any control within 
Bangkok whatsoever— with o f  course the consequential mass (tourist) cancellations 
which were difficult for sustaining business in that period. ” (TOFLNCl)
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"Because it was uncontrollable ... They (international tourists) cancelled although we 
said that the situation was not that serious anymore. The media sells the news... 
flooding we can still handle because we have Thai tourists. ” (T0FSI2)
The importance of the level of control is agreed to by one of the top managers of a large 
internal chain. However, to be more precise he adds that he used more than one criterion to 
evaluate the crisis and/or its consequences. These criteria are the length of the crises and the 
level of predictability. His statement follows:
"It was a situation that was the longest and so unpredictable that we didn’t know 
when it would flnish. Natural disasters come and go. Ok, these we can adjust to and 
or handle. But this political crisis, it was so long. The road in front o f  the hotel was 
closed and there were shootings, bombings, also there were killings, so we didn’t 
know and that is the agenda here because it can take months to get 
clarity. ” (T0FLNC2)
Secondly, some interviewees mentioned other reasons to evaluate the seriousness of crises. 
The following is the use of the impact on the target market of the hotel as a criterion. 
Epidemics such as SARs and Avian Flu had the most serious impact on the hospitality 
industry because of the effect of these diseases on the Asian tourist market which is the Thai 
hotels’ target market. Below are their statements and reasons:
"SARS and Avian Flu affected a wider area in both international and domestic 
markets. People avoid travel in fear o f  contamination. We don’t know how to prevent 
it. It is anew disease.” (TlOFSIl)
"Our target market is Asian, and Asians are afraid o f disease epidemics, so they don’t 
travel because o f SARs. ” (MOFLH)
The casualties / fatalities became the primary criterion to evaluate crises for the senior 
manager of a large, foreign chained hotel. He provides a contrasting view viz., the Tsunami as 
the worst tourism crisis because of the number of deaths.
“The Tsunami was different and a lot o f  people died. It was a disaster and everybody 
knows how it affected businesses in Phuket. For at least fo r three years, Phuket 
afterwards tourist numbers dropped. So, a natural disaster is more devastating 
because people die and many are injured... Again, the political crisis with the Yellow 
shirt faction - when they occupied the airport nobody died; but then compared with 
when the Red shirt faction occupied the city center the military moved in, people died. 
Again, it was Thai people dying, Thai people killing Thai people, so it was a local 
issue. It caused logistical nightmares fo r  us but internationally people understood
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that a political development was taking place and at some point in time it will be 
over—and in time it was over. ” (TOFLFCl)
Thirdly the last reason is the direct impact of an environmental crisis to hotel property, 
specifically to the independent hotels, both small and large. Their properties were located in 
the flooded areas of the city. Therefore, the flood was the most severe crisis for them. They 
had to close the hotel during the crisis. Their statements are illustrated below:
"Flooding affects the logistics system; suppliers cannot deliver produce to 
us. ” (SOFLIl)
"We are directly affected by floods; we have to close the hotel. ” (M0FLI2)
Interestingly, some hotels in this study explained how they are not directly impacted by the 
flooding. This type of environmental crisis provides businesses opportunities that would not 
be available to them but for the disruption caused by the flooding. One of the hotels reported 
that a flood situation adds more income for hotels with new products and services. Here is an 
example of a statement about the link between crisis and business opportunity:
“We had overbookings. The family o f  staff our business partners... they come to stay 
with us as long term guests. It is more convenient fo r  them to go to their workplace... 
Our car park was rented by a company to bring their cars to park to avoid the 
flooding.” (M20FLNC1)
Thus, we can summarize about what made the hotel respondents consider was the most 
serious tourism crisis in the past decade in Thailand. There are several criteria to evaluate. 
The three common criteria are 1) level of control, 2) level of uncertainty and 3) length of 
crisis. Other criteria to be considered are the number of casualties and or deaths, and the 
impact to the target market and or to hotel properties. These findings support the assertion in 
the academic literature that the hotel should use one or a combination of criteria to evaluate 
the crisis in order to reduce the shock of unforeseen events (Prideux et ah, 2003). Using these 
criteria, hotels are able to anticipate crises that cause the most serious or direct impact to 
them (Prideux et ah, 2003, Ritchie, 2009). Then, the hotels are in a position to put in place a 
programme to proactively prepare before a crisis happens by applying several crisis 
management approaches i.e. risk assessment, and a crisis management plan (Prideux et ah, 
2003, Ritchie, 2009).
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Among the above criteria, the level of control is the most significant criteria reflected by a 
majority of interviewees. This criterion is in congruence with the classification system of 
crises for lodging business provided by Rachela and Hu (2009) in Section 2.2.2. Rachela and 
Hu (2009) suggested that to increase the level of control over an unexpected crisis, the hotel 
should increase the knowledge and training to suit the local scenario. If the hotel has 
experienced crises repeatedly, the hotelier should grasp opportunity to learn how to deal with 
them.
Another interesting finding also shows that a crisis does not have only a negative side but can 
be the trigger for business opportunities. These triggers will help the hotel decision makers to 
develop business strategies to prepare them for the business opportunity brought on crisis. 
This finding corresponds to Ulmer (2001) who is convinced that crisis can be an event that 
creates potential ‘opportunity’, ‘renewal’ and ‘growth’ for some organisations.
This section has provided an understanding as to how the hotel interviewees recognise crises 
and the criteria that they used to evaluate the seriousness of tourism crises so as to develop 
their strategic plans and appropriate responses. We shall now move to the approach that these 
hotels of varying sizes and ownership structures chose to manage the tourism crises that 
affected them.
7.3.2. The Hotel Respondents’ Implementation of Strategies to Manage Tourism Crises
This part of the study focuses on two aspects: Firstly, to examine the roles and objectives of 
the different hotel categories in the study and how these impact on the drawing up of a crisis 
management plan and then highlighting the plan’s priority with regard to each category. 
Secondly, is to analyze the interviewees’ historical experiences in order to get fuller insight 
into their responses to past tourism crises. The literature from Chapter 3, especially models 
and theories of tourism crisis management, will be used to discuss the findings.
7.3.2.1 Roles and Objectives of the Implementation to Manage Tourism Crises 
The research data has revealed that different sized hotels tend to have different goals when 
formulating their crisis management plans. The aims of large hotels are to pursue crisis 
management plans from a viewpoint of protecting the lives and interests of their stakeholders 
and also protecting their assets, while smaller hotels tend to set their primary objective at the 
lower level and confine their crisis interventions to minimising costs.
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The following are some examples of statements reviewed and showing the primary concerns 
of large hotels (both chained and independent) in the implementation of their crisis 
management plans.
"It’s not about revenue; i t’s not about profit and loss; it is about protection and it is
--------- about protecting the human element o f  the job as well as protecting the asset .. . and
having that preparedness in the event o f any situation. ” (TOFLNCl)
"The priority is always to maintain the safety o f  the guests and the associates.” 
(TOFLFCl)
It is noticeable from the above statements by TOFLNCl and TOFLFCl that the safety and 
protection of assets are linked. Here, ‘reputation’ is a key ethical determinant. It is necessary 
to make sure that the guests are safe-otherwise the reputation of the hotel (an important and 
valuable asset) is damaged.
Nevertheless, some small hotels showed a tendency to concern themselves only with the short 
term survival of their company during the crisis period. This is achieved through the 
management of their operation costs as shown by the below interviewee.
"Reduce the cost o f operating during the crisis. ” (T20FSI1)
Thus, a comparison of these hotels shows that the large sized hotel is concerned initially with 
the personnel safety issue over its operating costs. Small hotels in this study perhaps have 
lower reserved funds and operate at a lower daily room rate and or services. Therefore, when 
a crisis affects them, they are more likely to be worried about their operating costs and cash 
flow.
The large hotels in contrast, having substantial capitalisation, this enables them to primarily 
focus on the safety of their personnel asset(s) which are directly linked to their reputation. In 
addition, especially the large chained hotels, have to comply with their counterpart hotels’ 
best operating practice procedures. Therefore, they aim toward achieving the objectives of the 
crisis management plan provided by their headquarters.
A follow up question was asked of the respondents to describe their roles during crisis events. 
The hotel personnel of the large hotels in this study understood their roles for responding to
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crises and were actively (proactively) engaged in implementing a crisis management plan. 
Compare this to the respondents from the small hotels that were not so sure about their role in 
a crisis situation and did not feel confident that they could assist by offering any ideas related 
to crisis management. The following are replies made and showing the cooperation among 
the hotel respondents in different positions:
Examples of top managers’view:
"Listen to reports o f  the situation by my staff identify the problems and make decision 
to solve the problems. ” (T0FLI2)
"The main role o f the GM is to take charge o f the situation and to reassure guests and 
staff that from a hotel prospective the situation is under control. ” (TOFLNCl)
Examples of middle managers’ views:
"Coordinate and give information, monitor the situations, such as the level o f  
flooding' (M0FLI2)
"I am at the front office desk so I  have to provide information to, and look after, my 
subordinates and the hotel guests ” (Ml 0FLNC2)
An example of a rank and file staff’s view
"I try to find  the customers, I  explain to them about the ongoing situation, and report 
back to my boss ” (S0FLI2)
Upon consideration of the above interview responses, the researcher noticed that the large 
hotel top managers, as shown in the statements of T0FLI2 and TOFLNCl, normally receive 
reports of the crisis situation from their middle management and staff. Afterwards, they 
analyze this information, make decisions, and give direction on how to handle tourism crises.
The middle manager, as evident from statements of M0FLI2 and M10FLNC2, acts as a 
crisis monitor and as a coordinator between top management and the operational staff, 
transferring instructions given and information received smoothly throughout their 
management hierarchy.
The staff in the large hotel not only receive their instructions and then are able to implement 
these accordingly, but they also provide valuable and necessary feedback to their supervisor. 
However, in the smaller hotels, staff were not so sure about their role nor did they feel 
confident that they could assist by offering any ideas related to crises and or its management
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as illustrated by the responses of the following interviewees:
“I  don’t know what to tell them. Normally, they tell me what to do. I  called her to ask 
what to do. ” (S0FSI2)
“This is important, the owner will tell us what to do. ” (SOFSIl)
The implication of these comments are possibly that the managers of small hotels have good 
knowledge about all functions because of the size of their hotel so they do not have to ask for 
more knowledge to make decisions. Also it could be that the employees have less education 
and experience than those who work in the bigger hotels
Interestingly, one of the rank-and-file staff replies demonstrates a very passive lack of 
knowledge of the crisis management topic. Her statement shows that her focus is on practical 
and immediate cleaning:
"I clean the rooms, make sure that the vacant rooms are clean. ” (S0FSI3)
It is evident that scale affects the way hoteliers go about setting their objective in crisis 
management and organizing the staff’s involvement in the process of knowledge 
management. The large hotels have more human resources for handling tourism crises. This 
finding is similar to the study of Barton (1994) that the small company has human resources 
restriction and utilizes an experience-based crisis handling approach while the large firm has 
a higher number of stakeholders to share the fate and internal knowledge source from staff.
Overall for the large hotels, we can say that the top managers are the key persons to apply 
knowledge in decision making. General Managers will be the centre of all internal sources of 
information originating from several department heads, and they will then make the final 
decision about how to act in a tourism crisis. The middle managers not only implement a 
knowledge-generated action plan for top management but they also have to be the screener of 
information from staff. They need to know what to report and not to report to top 
management. The acquisition of knowledge from top down is the typical way for large hotels 
to operate. The knowledge from staff is shared upward to the top level is minimal. 
Nevertheless, this feedback loops from both top-down and bottom-up and is vital 
communication for successful crisis management.
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Turning to small hotels, the internal acquisition process of gaining knowledge runs from top- 
down rather than bottom-up. Several of the rank and file staff in this study echo that they are 
an unimportant source of information for top management. The rank and file staff in this 
study raised the viewpoint that they did not think that they are in position to contribute any 
knowledge to the hotel to manage tourism crisis due to their limited knowledge and authority. 
Therefore fheir role will mostly be receivers of instructions (and therefore knowledge) from 
the boss in a one way direction.
The next sub-section will show from the corporate memory of past experiences how they 
have actually implemented management of crises.
7.3.2.2 The Implementation of Tourism Crisis Management by Hotel Respondents.
The previous sub-section provided a hint that the large hotels focus on the safety of personnel 
(hotel guests and staff) as the primary objective of tourism crisis management. The staff at all 
levels of the large hotel seem to be proactively involved in tourism crisis management but 
that the staff in small hotels are not so. In this section we continue to investigate what has 
been implemented in tourism crisis management and what would be an ideal and or 
innovative crisis management plan amongst different hotel types.
In general, when asking whether there were tourism crisis management plans or manuals 
embedded in the organisation, it seems that there is a limited level of implementation in 
proactive crisis preparation among small hotels. This is in contrast to the large independent 
and chain hotels that have emergency manuals and instruction maps for guests available in 
the guest rooms. This was shown from the observation by the researcher and from interviews 
with some respondents from all of the large hotels.
The following are some examples regarding the proactive plan for crisis management from a 
representative of a large hotel:
"We actually have a manual for a type o f  crisis management. It can be fo r typhoon, it 
can even be for war, or fire—whatever the circumstance, ok? So, when there is a 
situation coming up we are already prepared. We may not be very experienced about 
it but we are prepared. Some situations might be the first time fo r us, such as the 
political protest we had—which was the worst situation. What we did was we o f course 
followed our procedures, policies. The most important is how can we create security 
fo r our staff andfor the guests—how do we provide that? ” (T0FLNC2)
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For the international chained hotel, a top manager reported that their crisis management plan 
is very important. Furthermore, he expected that everyone in the firm will follow its 
guidelines. His statement follows:
“For every hotel we have a crisis plan. The crisis plan is a hook that once in a while 
we update. It ’s called a business continuity plan and immediately we go to this. You 
see, it is a local crisis plan and an international crisis plan, and it keeps all the 
information we need and what to do. This is periodically updated, the last time being 
2011. Every hotel has a plan; i f  something happens call the guests and get them 
down to the assembly point and give them (the guests) instructions on what to do for  
fire, water, or bomb threat. ” (TOFLFCl)
It is interesting to note from the statements of T0FLNC2 and TOFLFCl that there is a crisis 
plan in place that focuses on immediate action requirements (e.g. Response to a threat such as 
a fire) and not about longer term issues such as how to care for guests if the airport is closed, 
or if the power is cut off for several days. According to Jin (2010) long term crisis (sustained 
crisis) causes more damage to the reputation; staff perceived higher risk; and more crisis 
resources were required. Therefore, it is a necessity for hotels to consider both short and long 
term crises.
A comparison of the procedures and practices engaged by small hotels highlighted one of the 
reasons why small hotels do not adopt proactive crisis management approaches through the 
preparation of procedures and instruction manuals like the large hotels. One interviewee said:
"We experienced a crisis fo r the first time. No one knows that it will happen again. I  
doubt that we can do anything. ” (T0FSI2)
In a follow-up to the points made by the above interviewee, one of the top executives of a 
large hotel agreed that hotels cannot prepare for all crises but they should not give up on 
planning. Therefore, he suggested that there must be a person with responsibility for crisis 
management in the organisation. His/her role is to make decisions tailored to different 
emerging situations and that this business survival plan should be updated and expanded on a 
continuous basis. In addition this senior executive said:
"It becomes a management crisis, meaning management by incremental development. 
I  do have my comprehensive plans but, you know, every crisis is different and no 
paper or plan will completely cover every specific crisis. There is no magic solution to 
every crisis. We need to have a communication leader so I ’m that communication 
leader. I  direct the appropriate response and tailor the business continuity plan to 
meet the needs o f  the unfolding situation. ” (TOFLFCl)
232
To summarize, we see from the analysis that the large hotels—especially the international 
chains—can be seen to play a more active role in their crisis management through the 
establishment of business continuity plans for possible crises (including unanticipated 
events). It may be accepted that there has to be a sharing of knowledge (vertical and 
horizontal) across the board in the same chain, but this point will be investigated later. 
Nevertheless, their coiatihgehcy plans are likely to focus on short term preparations rather 
than a response to longer term situations. In contrast, the small hotels perceived crises as 
events that are unlikely to happen in the future and therefore they tend to put less effort into 
preparing for and or managing issues of high uncertainty. However, large hotels are seen to 
place more effort and resources into crisis mitigation for both certain and uncertain events. 
Large hotels establish a leadership role to bring knowledge and experience together guided by 
their fundamental hotel crisis management plan. This gives them greater flexibility in 
identifying the key elements of the problem and adopting an appropriate response in 
managing uncertain situations.
These findings can be linked to the literature review (Chapter 2), where it was stated that 
large organisations normally pay more attention to crisis preparation than do smaller firms. 
Darling (1994) stated in his study of crisis management in international business that large 
firms, especially international companies, are more susceptible to crises. He believes that 
these sensitive firms should develop a formal and systematic response (business survival 
plan) to crises in their industries or sectors. Given the size of these firms, failings in crisis 
management can/will have substantial negative effect upon a wider range of stakeholders. 
Therefore, proactive crisis management has come into being to ensure that decision and 
action are being executed effectively and in a timely manner.
However Runyan (2006) emphasized that small business should not neglect to develop their 
crisis mitigation plan(s). These plans should encompass the flexibility to address both 
foreseen and unforeseen crises. The reasoning here being that small firms have more hurdles 
to overcome before their business recovers from a crisis because of their vulnerability from 
any cash flow interruption; i.e.; they lack access to capital and or credit to aid their recovery 
and similarly with access to government assistance and/or ability to overcome consequential 
unforeseen infrastructure problems.
The researcher continually encouraged the interviewees to provide historical examples of
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practices of tourism crisis management carried out in their hotels. An important issue that 
arose as a result of these questions was the way in which hotels’ management of tourism 
crises depended on the institution’s size and or influences exerted by ownership/management 
structures. The best examples of tourism crisis management practices by the respondents are 
taken from two actual crisis events: (1) A human-made crisis—the political protest in the 
Centré of Bangkok during 2010 and (2)AnaturaTcrisis—thefloodingin 201T.
(1) Political demonstration in Bangkok in 2010 
Almost all of the hotels in this study are located in the area that was directly impacted by the 
political demonstrations. Some had to close down their businesses for several months, due to 
the risks to the lives and safety of employees and hotel guests. Here are descriptions by the 
interviewee about the impact on the hotel received from the political crisis in 2010:
“This hotel is on the corner o f  Silom Road and the demonstrators were on the other 
side. There were snipers on top o f a nearby building and they were shooting from  
there. Then also there was shooting here on the Silom Road. The demonstrators threw 
bombs over a large area so it was affecting us over here and people were getting hurt. 
They fe ll down and were dying. We knew they were going to die but we Just didn't 
know what to do. ” (T0FLNC2)
“The manager has to live in the hotel and cover the roles o f  his subordinates. We try 
to have not so many workers in the hotel. ” (M20FLNC2)
An interesting incident highlighting one response to a real time crisis situation was described 
by a senior hotel manager. He decided to remove the guest privileges of individual tourists in 
order to protect them from the street violence. The General Manager informed the guests to 
stay inside the hotel and had all the entrances secured. This was an alternative to asking the 
hotel guests to vacate the hotel or to evacuating them to another location as was indicated in 
the business continuity plan. He said that due to the sudden nature of the crisis, he had to 
make sure that the hotel was a safe place for the hotel’s guests, especially the international 
guests who were not familiar with the Kingdom of Thailand.
"The Red Shirts, you know, occupied the whole City Centre just outside the hotel. 
Sukumvit Road has a railway crossing and that is where they blocked the road. So, 
right outside our hotel the Red Shirt territory began and then soon afterwards the 
military arrived on the scene. Then they began fighting. So, we realized that our 
crisis plan would not work in these fraught circumstances and immediately we had to 
triform the guests, “Do not go into the street. You need to stay in the hotel. ” We 
closed the doors and didn’t let the guests go out. We needed to stay on duty and keep
234
them in (the hotel).'''’ (T0FLNC2)
Remember that this manager’s previous statement showed how he had included his intuition 
(experience) into the decision process. He nevertheless emphasized that before this acute 
(political) crisis, he had to comply with the norms of the hotel crisis management standard.
"We were operating fo r nine months on a heightened threat/ security condition. Every 
single guest had to he checked when entering and or leaving the hotel and every piece 
o f luggage had to put through the x-ray machine. That was a lot o f additional work 
and a major increase in manpower costs! But, it was the right thing to do because it 
made it more difficult for someone to attack the hotel. When we started this procedure 
our business levels in the restaurant collapsed because a lot o f  people did not feel 
comfortable with these security measures. “I  want to have a coffee, why do I  have to 
show my purse to you? ” That was the opinion during that event, but then jive years 
later when we had to do it again, 90% o f the guests in the hotel understood and 
accepted the security procedures. ” (T0FLNC2)
The implication from this experience is that a consequence of the implementation of crisis 
management policies in a hotel can also be the cause of issues of customer dissatisfaction. 
However, over time the customer will come to understand the (customer safety) policies of 
the hotel. This finding is partly supported by Racherla and Hu (2009), that crisis 
countermeasures can improve service quality. Hence, this finding has added something new 
to the body of knowledge on crisis management.
In summarizing this section, it is evident that the political crisis had affected hotel(s) 
operations and threatened the lives and safety of hotel(s)—their staff, employees and guests. 
The case study showed that even though there is a crisis management plan in place, the crisis 
plan has a limitation, i.e. when things do not follow the plan (or its scenarios); an emotional 
response is a necessary component (consequence) in reaching a “rational” decision (Sayegh 
et al., 2004, Paraskevas et al., 2013).
(2) Flooding in 2011
This is a different crisis type from the one mentioned above; it is caused by a natural disaster. 
Here, not all hotels in this study were directly affected by the flood. There was only one large 
hotel that had to close down—and for almost four months—due to its location being adjacent 
to the river.
The positive impacts of flooding to some hotels in the crisis are illustrated below:
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""We had lots o f  guests who came as long stay guests because their houses were 
flooded. ” (MOFLIl)
""We offered hotel rooms and meals at a special rate to the families o f  the staff that got 
affected by the flood. The staff could stay and work for us without being worried 
about their families. ” (MOFLFCl)
From the above statement it can be seen that during crises there are also those who have both 
positive and negative impacts from the crises. Here is the statement by respondents who are 
working in one of the hotels that was unfortunately damaged by the flood.
""Our hotel is located near to the river so we attempted to prevent the river flooding 
from damaging our hotel by shoring up its boundaries with sand bags. The water 
however didn’t overflow the sand bags but instead flood waters came through the 
service drains pipes and also over the neighbouring lands. ” (T0FLI2)
He explained his action and role during flooding crisis affected his hotel as follows:
At first, we tried to place sand bags and create a concrete wall surrounding the hotel 
building. My staff used a mechanical pump to remove water out from the hotel areas. 
However a consequence o f this action was that we got complaints from the nearby 
villagers that we were increasing the levels o f  the flood water encroaching on their 
houses. Knowing that, I  told staff to take down the wall and let the flood water flood  
into the hotel. The lobby was flooded. We moved all documents and movable furniture 
upstairs. There was not many staff remaining on site because they too were also 
worried about the safety their own (flooded) houses and were concerned fo r  their 
families too. I  let them go home. We kept two safety teams operating on fortnightly 
rosters to monitor the property and to prevent theft. ” (T0FLI2)
The implication of the above interview is that hotels are dependent upon and influence the 
surrounding area. The hotel can be an active agent in shaping the nature and distribution of 
the crisis. The hotel should consider the community as also the stakeholder when making the 
decision on how to handle crises.
He further explained his action and role after the crisis:
""My employees reported the damage to the hotel, and the effect on the staff and their 
families. We not only had to spend funds to renovate the hotel but also to rehabilitate 
the morale o f the staff. Our staff had become stressed and worried and also the hotel 
had lost revenue. I  organised a party fo r  all staff to thank them fo r  their efforts. I  took 
this opportunity to talk to the staff and I  gave them a promise that we will help each 
other. I  admitted to them that I  had lots o f expenses and debt but fortunately the bank 
offered the hotel a loan with low interest. ” (T0FLI2)
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It is noticeable that in a time of crisis, a crisis leader must be in place and should be selected 
based on his/her place in the organisation’s hierarchical structure. In this study it is revealed 
that top managers should act as leaders to manage crises arising. To handle a crisis 
effectively, a hotel should also have a contingency plan due to the uncertain nature and 
impact of natural disasters.
The fortuitous results of this hotel’s experience, was its ability to survive the flood crisis 
based on its teamwork and also its plans to manage and support its employees after the crisis 
had ended. Compassion was an important leadership characteristic in this example. Below are 
examples of statements from the staff that confirmed the fact that the empathy demonstrated 
by their top managers was an important factor in helping their organisations recover from 
crisis.
“He (MD) cares about us. He told that i f  our family are affected by the flood, we 
can move our family to stay in the hotel. We can concentrate on working without 
being worried about our family. ” (M0FLI2)
“My salary wasn Y increased as usual but we still got three staff meals. I  understand 
his situation. The hotel also had financial problems because we didn't have 
customers. No one was dismissed. ” (S0FLI2)
To summarise this section about the Bangkok floods of 2011, it is confirmed that business 
opportunities can be created as a consequence of a crisis situation. We also discovered that 
the hotel can be an active agent in shaping the nature and distribution of the crisis. The 
decisions made by top managers to respond to crises not only affect their hotels but also the 
stakeholders and hinterland. Lastly, to survive throughout the crisis, the top manager needs 
to be a charismatic leader both to guide and to support his or her subordinates. This will 
increase the morale among staff and the spirit of teamwork needed to overcome the crisis.
All things considered. Section 7.3 provides the insight of hotel respondents about their 
understanding of tourism crises, and the concepts and procedures adopted toward tourism 
crisis management. The next theme will examine these findings and discuss the views held by 
these hotel respondents in this study on the challenges of linking knowledge management and 
transfer with tourism crisis management.
7.4 Hotel Respondents’ Views of Knowledge Management for Tourism Crises
This section presents the finding of the research on three sub-themes: The first is the opinions 
of hotel respondents on the relationship between knowledge management and tourism crises.
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The second part reports the implementation of hotels on knowledge management process 
involving 4 stages: acquisition, storage, and knowledge application and learning. The third 
part focuses on knowledge transfer implementation—especially modes and methods to 
convert knowledge types from tacit to explicit, and vice versa. These three themes are 
relevant to the research, providing insightful perspectives of hotel respondents to the second 
objectives of the research study. The analysis will be supported by the literature review in 
Chapter 3 regarding concepts and theories on knowledge management, and on knowledge 
management of tourism crisis in Thailand discussed in Chapter 4. From the data collected 
concerning the knowledge transfer and management process, there are differences between 
different types of hotel—especially small and large; and in a non-strategic approach mainly in 
small hotels.
7.4.1 Opinions of the Relationship between Knowledge Management and Tourism 
Crisis
Respondents were asked whether they thought there were any relationships between 
knowledge management and tourism crises. The reasons for asking this question is to know 
the benefits of knowledge management to tourism crisis managing as well as to evaluate their 
level of commitment on knowledge management for tourism crises between different types of 
hotels. These links to the second theme in Section 7.4.2 for which they were to describe the 
knowledge management process of tourism crises.
As expected, most hotel respondents agreed that knowledge management is important to 
assist them in having better physical and psychological preparation for tourism crises. The 
physical preparations are especially the basic equipment; knowledge of the staff to help hotel 
guests with basic aids; and learning from previous response to crises of what is good to carry 
forward or needs to be improved. Benefits of knowledge management to manage the tourism 
crisis on physical aspects can be illustrated by the following comment:
“The knowledge at least helps us to prepare equipment, staff knowledge—for  
example, first aid—and to prevent the impact o f  crises. I  think that taking preventive 
measures costs less than to resolve the damage due to tourism crises. ” (TlOFSIl)
A further benefit of knowledge management is psychological preparation by increasing 
staff’s awareness of tourism crises. One of the top management in a large foreign hotel chain 
emphasized that knowledge is key for managing a tourism crisis and that staff need to be
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equipped with knowledge through training to ensure that they are ready for sudden changes in 
their hotel environment. His statement follows:
“Train, train, train! Constantly keep in mind and remind them that we are in a 
fragile environment—hotels are actually very fragile... For continuing improvement 
we always have quizzes, so during the training and after the training staff has to at 
least fill out the quiz, you know, to kinda check out the understanding, and that’s the. . . . . . . .  — —— - — - -- . —J. - . .  -  -- . . . .  .  . . . . . . . .—......-------------- . . .  . - ------------------ ---------- . . .  — ^ 3  . ... . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . ... ... ........
” (T10FLFC2)
Nevertheless, a top member of management from a large organisation raised the point that 
knowledge management is not the ultimate method to ensure that crisis can be resolved 
effectively. His statement shows there is no guarantee of enhanced achievement in handing 
crisis through knowledge management:
“Too much knowledge can hold you hack”... ”To know everything is to know 
nothing. ” Although you know lots, have a good education, you still can make right or 
wrong decisions ” Knowledge can help you in the process o f  making decisions hut it 
doesn’t guarantee 100% that your decision will he correct. You have tons o f  
knowledge but when crises happen, you become frustrated to know what approach 
you should use. ” (TOFLH)
Thus, in their comments, TlOFSIl and T10FLFC2 agreed that knowledge management is 
important for both small and large hotels. It helps establish a proactive approach to manage 
tourism crisis through physical and psychological preparation to deal with crises. However, 
the contrasting view of TlOFLIl showed his doubt about applying knowledge to respond to 
crises. The fact that T10FLFC2 said that the knowledge is not quite useful could be 
explained by the phenomenon of the bottleneck of relevant knowledge, Runyan (2006) 
explained that in the phase of crisis response, there is an increasing amount of information 
communicated both within and outside the organisation, but a decrease in the number of 
communication channels. To prevent the bottleneck of knowledge or the failure of knowledge 
transfer system, Runyan (2006) suggested building an alliance; to increase the coordinating 
activities, and share information outside the firm and within the firm. The knowledge transfer 
mode of tourism crises will be further discussed in Section 7.4.3.
Regarding the commitment of tourism crisis established within an organisation, the data 
showed that there is higher commitment in large chain hotels than in independent large and 
small hotels. The constraint of resources to implement knowledge management is the 
probable factor that influences their commitment to it.
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Several large hotels—especially chained, both Thai and international—have a crisis 
management plan in a printed manual to guide their decision making in emergencies, 
including tourism crisis situations. Here are examples of the description of their crisis 
management plans:
a aW  zY wzZZ through different scenarios. You
could have somebody who is drowning in the pool fo r  instance and how you might 
handle it. It could be you need to know what’s happening when there is earthquake, 
or what’s happening when there’s a storm coming. ” (T10FLFC2)
“How to prepare a crisis report, so that means whenever there is a crisis there’s 
documents with very much detail. It a standard procedure! It is the knowledge o f the 
hotel. ” (M20FLNC2)
In contrast, it was a surprise that one of the large independent hotel managers said that they 
did not have a tourism crisis management plan. Although; they recognise that the process of 
knowledge management would help them in managing tourism crises.
“We don’t have the crisis management plan. When I  need to make decision on 
incoming crises, I  go through old files and make decisions basing on what we have 
done in the past. ” (T0FLI2)
No strategic approach to knowledge management was also evident in a small hotel. They put 
off from developing the tourism crisis plan because it involves financial cost and a 
considerable amount of time given for crisis which for him hardly happens in the same way. 
Evidence can be found in the following statement.
“I  am not sure about spending time and money to create a crisis management plan for  
events like this. It is hardly likely to happen again. ” (T20FSH)
To this point, it can be seen that the chain hotels employ a strategic knowledge management 
of tourism crisis by developing a crisis management plan. This standard of practice guides 
hotels with the same brand to respond to tourism crisis in the same way. Large and small 
independent hotels have less concern to develop a substantial knowledge of tourism crisis 
because of their lesser concern for standardisation, and also due to a limitation of resources to 
implement the knowledge management. However, both large and small independents are not 
totally turned away from implementing knowledge management process as seen in the 
statements by T0FLI2 that he also stores old files and uses them as a reference whenever he 
makes decisions.
In summarising the theme concerning opinions of the relationship between knowledge 
management and transfer, and tourism crisis, the finding shows that they were related in the
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sense that knowledge is significant to tourism crisis management as it helped hotel 
respondents to better prepare for crises in terms of physical (equipment, know-how 
knowledge) and psychological preparation. This finding added new benefits of knowledge 
management to tourism crises that corroborates the existing literature in Section 3.4 on the 
significance of knowledge management for managing tourism crises. However it doesn’t 
guarantee that having knowledge in place will increase success in managing tourism crises. 
In addition it was discovered that having too much knowledge could become a barrier to 
making decisions. The same point was made by Stiglitz (2002), that the problem of 
information when making decisions is the cost in money and time. In other words, 
information acquisition involves a transaction cost (Stiglitz, 2002). Firms will therefore 
acquire information up to the point when the cost exceeds the utility it provides them. 
Nevertheless, too little information would lead to poor decision-making. Rather than being 
worried about loads of information, Jashapara (2004) and Racherla and Hu (2009) suggested 
that if we have a good knowledge retrieval and transfer system then the right knowledge can 
be retrieved in a timely manner by the decision makers.
We are now starting to recognise elements of knowledge management process that are 
important to the effectiveness of crisis management. The next section brings you to an insight 
of how different hotels implement each stage of a knowledge management process.
7.4.2 Knowledge Management Process of Tourism Crises
It was suggested in the previous part that most hotel respondents recognise the benefits and 
positively support the necessity of implementing knowledge management. As well, there is a 
hint from the previous section that different hotels have different levels of commitment and 
resource capability for implementing knowledge of tourism crises. Thus, this section makes 
further inquiry as to whether knowledge is managed in case there is such in place starting 
from knowledge acquisition in sub-section (7.4.2.1); organisational knowledge including 
storage and retrieval in sub-section (7.4.2.2); and the application of knowledge into real 
tourism crises in sub-section (7.4.2.3).
7.4.2.1 Knowledge Acquisition
The interviewees were asked where they obtained their knowledge in order to evaluate which 
sources of knowledge are the most appropriate for managing tourism crises. There are two 
highlighted findings in this section. First, all hotels in this study used a mix of both internal 
and external sources but the larger hotels seem to have wider access to both sources, i.e. from
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tourism associations and other associations related to their departments. Moreover, some of 
their executive management are members of tourism associations, which allows the hotel to 
have a chance to access knowledge from those associations, as evident below from the 
statement.
“Our hoard member used to be the president o f  the Thai Hotel Association. He visited 
us sometimes to give us ideas from the association.” (MlOFLNCl)
Furthermore, the hotels obtained information not only from tourism related associations, the 
hotel respondent from a large hotel said, but also from specific associations related to their 
fields i.e. the Thailand Public Relations Association (TPRA), and the Hotel Security 
Association of Thailand (HOSAT).
“I  am a member o f the Thailand Public Relations Association. We gain knowledge 
specifically on PR issues and exchange news and what to do in periods o f  crisis. ” 
(MOFLFCl)
“We have a monthly meeting with HOSAT and sharing information through emails 
between members. ” (SOFLFCl)
Likewise, one of the middle managers who works in the security department said that they 
receive considerable knowledge from both local and tourist police to receive updated news— 
especially about criminals. His statement follows:
“We have a radio channel o f  the police and tourist police. We communicate with them 
through shortwave radio and hearing updated information from them.” 
(M20FLNC2)
To this point, it seems to be an advantage for the large organisation to have access to various 
associations. However, one of the top managers admitted that these associations and tourism 
associations often are lacking in consistency—some are repetitive, some are different. 
Therefore the knowledge from them has to be carefully analysed. His statement follows
“PATA, TIC A , TAT—they all came up with their own daily updates on information. 
TICA did their own thing, TAT did their own thing, and PATA had their own news. 
Even though 70% o f information is kinda the same, 30% were different 
recommendations; so, what we do then is communicate with them and we disseminate 
the information and see what is relevant to us or not. ” (TOFLFCl)
Interestingly, amongst hotels—although they are business competitors—when it comes to 
tourism crises, they form an alliance to deal with crises together to make sure that their area
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can survive and recover. Below is an illustrative statement:
“Yeah, I  mean...during the crisis...we were usually in regular contact with the 
Grand- Hyatt Erawan , the Renaissance,, the Four Seasons...! mean, with the major 
big hotels. And then, we have also support from the Ratchaprasong Group—and 
where we are a member o f the Ratchaprasong area. ” (T10FLFC2)
Furthermore, some hotels located in specific touristic areas have also formed an alliance 
amongst themselves. For example, one small independent hotel is located on Koasan Road, a 
short touristic street in central Bangkok. The restaurant and small hotel businesses there have 
formed a group to discuss and share problems, and solutions about the crises happening in 
their area. Below is the statement:
“Small hotels and other businesses such as restaurants, bars, etc. on Koasan, we 
work together about the crisis. We have a president o f  Koasan Road, appointed from  
amongst the business owners to coordinate the businesses in this area. ” (T0FSI2)
So far on knowledge acquisition, we can observe the importance of developing the formal 
community group as well as communities of practices of knowledge sharing. There are 
several ways to accumulate knowledge to manage crises such as formal collaboration through 
the Tourism Crisis Management Unit and informal through the communities of practice 
which is the concept developed by Wenger (1998). The statement of M20FLNC2 
demonstrated the social participation between security staff with the local policeman. There 
was exchange of knowledge through shortwave radio. This reflected Wenger’s (1998) views 
on the need for a shared repertoire to enhance the communities of practices. The hotel had to 
invest on this mechanism of communication and staff needed to be trained in the 
communication codes of the policeman’s shortwave radio communication. Additionally, the 
above statement of T0FSI2 showed that the hotels in the same area tend to work together as 
they are likely to encounter similar impacts of tourism crises. “Regular contact” is the 
reference word highlighting the significance of the frequency of social participation among 
members in the communities as a basis for sharing knowledge in dealing with tourism crises.
The second highlight on knowledge acquisition is that there is the link between the phase of 
the crisis (the prior-to-crisis stage and the response stage) and selecting a knowledge source.
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The prior-to-crisis hotels acquire knowledge from border sources both internal and external, 
especially through modem communication channels.
“Internet is a part o f  daily life and daily source o f information. I  could browse and 
update news anytime from emails, websites. Face book. ” (TlOFSIl)
TOFLll reported that although he became aware of tourism crises news from media which is 
the most accessible source, it likely to be biased. The example of this common view can be 
illustrated as follows:
“We get the news about crises I  heard mostly from the TV, but TV often shows the 
same news. Soldiers kicked people repeatedly. ” (TOFLll)
A top manager of a chained hotel supports staff as a key crisis signal detection source of 
problem and they should be encouraged to share what they know. His statement is as follows:
“Our hotel came up with an initiative “See something, say something. ” ...when 
someone sees a plastic bag just in the middle o f the corridor or the big pantry or 
anything, they have to report as it could be a bomb. ” (TOFLFCl)
The above statements implied that the media becomes the major source of making people 
especially aware of external sources of crisis that could affect the hotels, especially in the pre­
crisis and prodromal phase. The employees also become an important source of early 
detection of problems happening in the organisation.
However, while in the stage of crisis response, the knowledge that will be used is primarily 
from an internal source, i.e. from the top management of the organisation, and staff. 
Especially chain hotels get policy and guidelines of tourism crises from their headquarters. 
Here is an example of how knowledge of headquarters is important to the chain hotels:
“We are big corporation people like (NAME REMOVED) and (NAME REMOVED). 
They start to develop those parameters, and “parameter ” means every hotel needs a 
crisis plan—local crisis, international crisis—and we are at the point i f  really now 
something terrible happens we have to follow plans. ” (TOFLFCl)
“We have procedures for all crises, we cannot do anything else, and we have to 
strictly follow corporate procedure i f  not we might be questioned why we didn Y act 
according to the standard o f procedure. ” (M0FLFC2)
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Thus, the implication of the above two comments is that the policy or procedure from 
headquarters is the "Books of the Law.” It contains code of conduct and governs the 
behaviour of all employees. The common process of knowledge acquisition is precisely 
explained by an employee in a large national chain that...
  “The corporate executive committee will have meetings to find  solutions and then give
direction to each hotel in the chain through its General Manager. Then, the general 
manager will meet with the department heads to work out solutions for our hotel 
property. Afterward, the department heads will disseminate the knowledge to 
supervisors, and supervisor to me. ” (S0FLNC2)
As stated earlier, knowledge resources are not limited to top management only, but are also 
available from internal sources such as human resources. Sales and Marketing departments. 
Knowledge sharing amongst staff in the same line of command in organisations becomes an 
important source as well. These can be illustrated by the following quotes:
“Hike to create scenarios to ask my subordinates—for example, sales department—to 
think o f the target group after the crisis is over. Are we ready for the seminar group? 
la m  the conductor but my staff has to work out information and solution to present to 
me. la m  just a conductor”. (T0FLI2)
As anticipated, the statement of T0FLI2 corresponds to one of the interviewees who is his 
subordinate; that the middle manager has to work quite hard to gather information and 
suggest solutions to top management as illustrated below.
“We have a meeting in which we are assigned to monitor and gather impact data o f  a 
tourism crisis to our departments, and present our opinions for solutions. Then, we 
have meetings to discuss an action plan. ” (M0FLI2)
The second finding on the link of source of knowledge and the stage of crisis supports the 
study of Racherla and Hu (2009) that in the pre-crisis and prodromal stages hotels need to 
widen their scope of knowledge by searching for this from various sources. In this study, the 
internet is significant as an initial source to be aware of crisis development. Then, during the 
crisis phase, scope of knowledge integration would be narrowed to specific issues that arise 
and use of knowledge of tourism crises has been approved by the hotel administration. 
Lastly, post crisis knowledge feedback from internal staff is needed to capture essential 
experiential knowledge. This feedback can be shared with other stakeholders to revaluate the 
usefulness of the knowledge. The finding indicates that the internal source of knowledge 
received from people in higher positions in the organisation, including a standard of
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procedure from headquarters is more immediately relevant than external sources. This 
supports the theory of institution-based trust introduced by Zucker (1987) and Ardichvili et 
al. (2003) that especially in the formal organisation (in this study in the large or chained 
hotel), the employees believe that the structural code of conduct will ensure that their 
behaviour is trustworthy and that they are protected from negative consequences, such as 
dismissal or blame.
To conclude this knowledge acquisition topic, it can be seen that there are various sources 
available to management amongst small and large hotels. However, the large hotels have 
wider access to more sources as some of them are members of various associations. Even so, 
having contact with different associations—both related and unrelated to tourism—can sound 
as if it is going bring lots of advantages. Knowledge from these sources—however lacking in 
consistency—must therefore be carefully analysed by hotels and selected for that which 
meets their needs. Still, being a member of associations can be useful—especially with other 
member hotels in the same zone and area facing the same crisis circumstance. Small hotels 
especially, could clearly see the benefits of obtaining knowledge from other hotels nearby to 
ensure that businesses in that area can be serviced throughout a crisis.
The additional highlight finding showed that the stage of crisis become the factor that 
determines which source of knowledge will be used to apply to crises. Media is the greatest 
source of knowledge as the hotel respondent becomes aware of external crises and to widen 
one’s scope of knowledge. Nevertheless, there is a limitation factor that news seems to be 
biased toward drama to some extent as reporters attempt to sell the news. Therefore, the 
knowledge received from headquarters of the hotel group (in case of chained hotels), owner 
or top management (in case of the independent hotel), became more trusted knowledge to 
apply in tourism crises.
7.4.2.2. Organisational Knowledge for Managing Tourism Crises through Storage and 
Retrieval system
The second stage of knowledge management process is the establishment of organisational 
knowledge storage. The literature in Chapter 3 informs us that there are two ways to record 
knowledge: one is the codified form and the second is the personalised-based form. The first 
refers to the recording of knowledge in written documents or structured information. The 
second refers to skills and experience which are stored in an individual’s memory.
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In general, most large hotels have established both codified and personalisation-based forms 
to store knowledge of tourism crises. In comparing the large both chained and independent 
hotel, it was found that the chain has a more structured programme—training and state of the 
art technical database—to store knowledge in both forms. Whereas, with small hotels the 
storage of knowledge regarding tourism crises obtained very little interest from hotel 
f  espdhdehfs at all levels.
Interviewees were asked to explain how they stored knowledge that they have acquired from 
mixed sources. The finding and discussion in this section is divided into three clusters. It 
begins with the implementation of establishing organisational knowledge of large chained 
hotels. Then, it follows with the findings of large independent hotels, and lastly for small 
hotels. The reason for dividing hotels into three groups is because there are significantly 
different practices amongst them.
7.4.2.2.1 Large Chain Hotels both National and International
To begin with insight findings from large chained hotels. Top management and middle 
managers of all four large chained hotels claimed that their knowledge has been stored 
systematically not only in the codified forms but also in personal-based form. Examples of 
the codified form are electronic databases and hard copy files of documents. Training is the 
way the hotels commonly adopted to instil knowledge into employee memory. Besides 
training, rehearsals and tests are tools to ensure that staff remembered the knowledge of 
tourism crisis by heart.
First, we focus on data that could be evidence of storing knowledge of tourism crisis in 
codified forms by the large chained hotels in this study. As expected, knowledge can be found 
in the forms of documents such as policies and flies of papers that were printed out from 
emails and external and internal correspondence. Soft-flles are kept in folders in their 
personal computers, mobile phones, and the company database system. What followed are 
evidences of storing knowledge of tourism crisis in codified forms by the large chained 
hotels.
One of the top managers in an international chain hotel, suddenly walked from the round 
meeting table where he was sitting for the interview, to the cabinet next to his desk. He 
brought out two black folders and explained that these are how the knowledge of crises is 
basically stored. While he spoke, he showed the researcher the table of contents containing
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international and local crises, the facilities and amenities, blueprints, and different colour 
codes of crises. They are clearly structured by labels. The standard of practice for different 
crises are similar to one I found in a guest room but with more detail on the practitioners’ 
sides. Following is his statement about the storage of knowledge of tourism crises in his 
hotel.
“We record. We have policies and procedures. We have different levels ofpolicies 
and procedures. SOP’s (standard operating procedures) come from the Corporate. 
And then we have LSOP’s (local operating procedures) which we develop for  
eventualities like these. They will he recorded and there will he sign o ff and 
implementation. ” (TOFLFCl)
Furthermore, the result of the study indicates that that the new technology has become the 
major source. As well, the majority of hotel respondents stored the knowledge in their 
computers and mobile phones. One of the top managers from a chain hotel explained about 
the use of various devices to store the knowledge.
“We stored everything and very easy now you receive it in email, receive it on your 
phone. You can store that to the driver to some extent to this day. I  still have a flood  
file in my Outlook that I  can refer to as a reference i f  need he so we keep the floodfile  
open. I t ’s always there in standby. ” (TOFLNCl)
Thus, the above statement of TOFLNCl implied that there is increasing demand for 
electronic document storage to be kept in a specific situation file such as a flood crisis file. A 
prediction of the expected outcome was that the hotels need a digital knowledge warehouse 
that is reliable in all circumstances such as the possibility of electric failure, as mentioned 
below. The Director of an IT department confirmed the need for IT in knowledge 
management, and also agreed as to the importance of IT on knowledge establishment that:
“Our hotel group has the internal server which backs up all-important soft flies, and 
the system can standby and can operate even during blackout.'' (M0FLFC2)
The integration of technology in this stage of the process of knowledge management is 
strongly evident in the above statement. This corresponds with Alavi and Leidner (2001) who 
concluded that IT can be a better tool in enhancement and expansion of both semantic and 
episodic organisational memory.
One typical anticipation storage process by hotels was noted by one of the middle managers 
who uses both computer and a traditional filing system to store documents. The important 
issues will be printed out to keep for future record.
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“I  stored electronic documents in folders in my computer because it is easier to find. I  
print the important documents out, file them and keep on my shelf." (MOFLFCl)
Contrary to expectation, a Human Resources Director explained that normally documents 
will be kept for at maximum of 5 years. Following is her statement of the length of time 
kiiowledge ^-especially the explicit files—will be kept in the organisation.
“When crisis happened, we have meetings, we keep all related documents. It is not a 
policy, it is just a temporary standard o f  practice to serve a particular crisis case. I  
might go back to check old documents. But everyone knows that documents older than 
5 years will be demolished. The information that we have must be an up-to-date one. ” 
(M20FLNC1)
The researcher wondered whether this knowledge be stored for the longer term for future use, 
and further enquired about this. The respondent replied that the tourism crises do not happen 
very often and likely to be the same, therefore the old practices were out-of-date to deal with 
future crises.
Now, we turn to the personalisation system to store the knowledge in the hotel employees’ 
mind and developing their skills relating to tourism crisis management. The following quotes 
showed that staff are trained and tested to ensure that they would not forget it.
“Oh, ok...we have at each property their own kind o f  training and their own kind o f  
practice. For example, le t’s say there is afire. I f  there’s a fire we have to have a 
general evacuation twice a year and then each o f the staff at the lower level will have 
to report. For example, le t’s say general evacuation. We have a fire on one floor 
and each o f the departments o f every section o f the hotel will take record first o f  what 
their duty is. Their duty is to do this, this, and this; and then i f  it doesn’t work we ask 
why, what happened?...and after general evacuation they will have a meeting and 
then each person will have to discuss what the problem is and then from there they 
will try to improve and this goes on to every kind o f training” (T0FLNC2)
He continued to explain why staff needs to be trained. Not all staff are able to access the 
policy or procedure of tourism crisis management which are mostly available to top and 
middle managers only. His statement follows:
“The thing is that we can’t give to everybody so only give to the one who is 
responsible, like the GM. For example, the head o f departments they have the 
responsibility to take the manual and train—not put it on the shelf. So, each 
department would have their responsibility to train the staff. ” (T0FLNC2)
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What is surprising is that all the large foreign chained hotels in this study, really made an 
effort to ensure that their staff remember knowledge of tourism crises by heart. It is a duty of 
“taking care” to ensure that guests are safe. Here is the statement of a Human resource 
manager about the training program and the test.
“The risk prevention department, human resources department and department• • - - . — - -- .  ------  -  • —— A —  ----  ... . . . .  . . . .  .... . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . .  . - . - ...................... ... — JL —. . . . . . .  .. .    _ —.  . ..
heads work together to create the training programme. We have a yearly programme 
run by HR department for nerw staff. The risk prevention department goes to each 
. department weekly to do 15 minute training sessions for crisis. Department heads 
have to remind their staff and provide the update knowledge, especially during crises.
I  spot check with each employee that I  meet, ask them one by one. It is a serious issue 
because we have a lot o f  visitors from our corporate, and they will evaluate us on this. 
We have the duty o f  care. ” (MOFLFCl)
Nevertheless, one middle manager revealed that people often act by their instinct as seen 
from the case below. When faced with a shocking incident, people feel stressful and forget 
what they have been trained to do.
“A housekeeper saw a person fall down from third floor, he immediately went to carry 
the injured person and ask for help. By the standard o f procedure, he has to inform the 
security officers and then follow the steps. And you know that you shouldn Y touch any 
part o f the injured. However, that housekeeper said that he was shocked and just wanted 
to save a life. He was trained but he was shocked. ” (M0FLFC2)
This disadvantage of tacit knowledge of crises embedded in staff memory and the need for 
training and rehearsal programmes to remind them is similar to the study of Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) that demonstrates that a loss of human memory can be avoided by storing 
knowledge deeply in memory through building up over many rehearsals on related problems. 
Nevertheless, the statement of M0FLFC2 on the shock of the staff added the point that 
training should not only be done to prepare knowledge but also their mental focus.
So far we have studied the insight of the organisational knowledge establishment of large 
foreign chain hotels. To summarize, interesting findings reveal that the chained hotels mostly 
have a highly systematic storing system for knowledge in both codified and personalisation 
forms. Although the codified form of knowledge is a common way to record knowledge of 
crises, it might not be accessible by all staff in the hotels and the retrieval system for the 
filing of folders from the cabinets or the computers may have limitations. Trainings become 
the major method to transfer the explicit forms of knowledge into staff memory. 
Nonetheless, it is important to think of ways to ensure that the staff could remember and have 
ready mind and body to apply knowledge for sudden incidents without becoming panicked.
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7.4.2.2.2 The Independent Large Hotel
The next topic is the findings for the independent large hotels. What is surprising is that both 
respondents of the large independent hotel admitted that there are no systematic ways to 
record knowledge of tourism crises within their firms.
“Not really a systejn. It is a rneeting then somebody takes notes or meeting minutes 
so that in the future we will not forget who has done what, and how. We don 7 have a 
specific storage system fo r knowledge o f tourism crises. ” (T0FLI2)
In line with the above view, one of the top managers of the independent hotel explained why 
there is no systematic system among the independent hotels. He said that there is a lack of 
awareness of the importance of knowledge management and know-how on knowledge 
management systems among Thais (Thai hotel owners). Here is his statement:
“I  don 7 want to say that Asian countries—in particular Thailand—cannot catch up 
with the Western countries on knowledge management. We are far behind and are not 
very interested to record. When crisis is solved, then no one talks about it anymore. 
The westerners have a good data storage system and paid attention on creating the 
knowledge warehouse o f previous lessons-learned. ...The knowledge management 
concept just recently booms in Thailand... Government is now starting to implement. ” 
(TOFLH)
However, a middle manager of a large independent hotel provided a similar explanation to
middle managers in large chained hotels that she stored knowledge in her computer and files
in her cabinets at her workplace. Her statement follows:
“We communicate a lot via emails. I  kept the important information in my computer 
divided into folders. I  also have a file o f the correspondents categorised by 
department. The most updated on the top o f older documents. ” (TOFLH)
All rank and files staff of large independent hotels revealed that they have little to no 
participation in storing knowledge of tourism crisis. The recording of new knowledge for 
them is simply to make a short note to remind them on what to do or to ask those who possess 
knowledge—such as secretary of the department head—to tell them. Their statements follow:
“Secretary will keep. Folders classified by department. ” (SOFLH)
“Write a short note fo r myself ” (S0TL12)
To summarize the key findings from the large independent hotels, the top managers admitted 
that there is no systematic way to store the knowledge of tourism crises. The storing of 
knowledge for large /independent hotels is the accumulation of emails and filings of previous
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tourism crisis cases. In addition, there is no clear explanation of how knowledge will be 
retrieved to apply it to future crises. It also found that staff in the large independent hotels 
were uncertain if they have a part to play in this stage of knowledge management process.
7.4.2.2.3 The small independent hotels
Turning to the small independent hotels, as expected, most of these revealed little interest in 
implementing knowledge storage. One of the top managers of a small independent indicates 
that she occasionally uses the record of previous crisis to help her make decisions but it could 
not really be applicable.
“We record in written forms for 2 months. I f  the crisis is expected to happen then I  
will bring the fd e  to review. But I  made decisions from my common sense. These will 
be the reference about what we had done in the past. It doesn’t cover everything. ” 
(T20FSI1)
While the operational staff said that there is no systematic way to store the knowledge, one of 
them thinks that it is not her business to record any knowledge but another makes a short note 
to remind herself. Here are their statements:
“I  don’t store anything, my boss does. ” (SOFSH)
“Write it down, like studying in school. A short note. ” (S0FSI2)
The reason for not having a storage system was revealed by a staff member who explained 
that the hotel is so small and they don’t experience a lot of crises. Here is the illustrative
statement.
“We have 7 staff in the (housekeeping) department, not so much problem, no need to 
make a note. ” (M0FSI3)
It is noticeable that there was no systematic structure for establishing organisational 
knowledge in the small independent hotels. The statement of a top manager of a small 
organisation showed her doubt about the effectiveness of a crisis managing plan for helping 
her in dealing with future crises. In addition, with a small number of staff, every employee 
has a workload which is a barrier to participate in a storing process.
In summary about the establishment of organisational knowledge, comparing small and large 
hotels, large hotels paid more attention to storing knowledge. The practice of using a
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recording system is similar to the work of Hallin and Mamburg (2008) and Yang and Wan 
(2004). They explained that document files and computers were used as storage tools in the 
hospitality industry. Logbook and standard of procedure (SOP) were the most crucial 
information storage. The fact that large hotels and chained organisation hotels have better 
storage systems than the small hotels would be similar to the studies saying that large 
organisations have better resources in knowledge management implementation (Desbuza and 
Awazu, 2006, Wong and Aspinwall, 2004).
7.4.2.3 Knowledge Application for Past Crises.
There was a hint in earlier parts that some hotels—especially the chained—usually have 
a tourism crisis management plan. Therefore, the interviewees were asked if there were any 
specific examples of applying knowledge to respond to those crises.
Generally, respondents in large independent and small hotels did not say much about how 
explicit knowledge was applied. In most cases, they will use common sense and experience 
to make decisions.
“It (Political crisis on Silom Road) was unexpected. I  made the decision right at that 
moment based on my common-sense and told my staff to do I, 2, and 5. ” (TlOFSIl)
Less application of explicit knowledge to manage the crisis due to the nature of their jobs was 
echoed by the following interviewee. A housekeeper of a large hotel said that...
“I  am not working in the office; I  cannot carry papers around. ” (SOFLIl)
A top manager of an independent hotel observed that the large chained hotel has procedures 
for crisis managing because it is a way of being controlled by their headquarters or the hotel 
ovmers that live far away, unable to see and know the situations. He commented that crisis 
managing is a double-edged sword that does not allow the management team to freely make 
decisions based on what is actually happening.
“The international chains have procedures to control their hotels worldwide to follow  
their standards. These papers are good fo r  them to control and to get reports on what 
is being done to respond to crises. The owners live in Chicago, Paris and other far  
away areas; they are not experiencing the real situation. We are on site and deal with 
the reality. A standard o f procedure to me would be a double-edge sword. ” 
(TOFLH)
253
A middle manager from the large independent hotel admitted that learning from past 
experience had helped them to prepare better for similar crises.
“The demonstration o f Red and Yellow was a repetitive crisis fo r the past 2-3 years. 
The recent conflict was the most tragic with burning buildings. We immediately knew 
what to do based on previous procedures such as stocking supplies. ” (MOFLIl)
A vast number of respondents from the large chained hotels confessed their high commitment 
to a standard of practice in deciding what to do with crises. It is summarised by this 
interviewee:
“I  mean, you would take this document and say: ok we have this similar crisis done 
here as to what actually has been done. You work from this document. ”
(T10FLFC2)
He then further added that tourism crisis plans and contingency plans are very important and 
helpful when dealing with crises because they can happen suddenly and allow no time to 
think of ways to respond.
“You have to have contingency plans, you know .You have to have plan B; you have 
to have plan C; you have to think ‘i f  this doesn 7 work, what then? ’ And you have to 
plan this. You have to think thoroughly in advance—not when it happens, because 
you have no time with things happening; then you have no time to think about a 
contingency plan. You need to have it beforehand. So, it really helps when you have 
a document, and this document is available for the crisis team. ” (T10FLFC2)
A supportive statement on the necessity of a crisis plan was made by a security manager who 
plays the main role in crisis response of a national chain hotel in this study. His statement 
follows:
“We can bring it to apply to a crisis. We have it. We bring the procedure to talk 
about the steps. I  can 7 remember everything, we have to look at the plan. Everyone in 
the organisation must know and use it. ” (M20FLNC2)
He continued, saying that because of this plan, it helped his hotel survive from being burned 
down by the demonstrators during the political crisis. Similarly, Hall and Williams (2008) 
stated that the innovative plan therefore has become the backbone of every organisation to 
develop new ideas which are superior to competitors in the market place.
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“Sorry to say other hotels were burned down. It was a surprise, we were a target in 
the list when they [demonstrators] spoke on the stage. We have a good plan which has 
helped us survive till now. ” (M20FLNC2)
A staff member that worked in an international chain hotel has observed the advantage of 
working in such an organisation when crisis affects the country. The crisis management team 
at the headquarters evaluates the situation of the country and provides the guidelines of 
implementation to the subsidiary hotels.
“We immediately define the condition o f the case and increase the level o f  safety 
measures. Checking bags o f  customers, scanning customers’ bodies. The global 
headquarters evaluates the level o f safety o f  Bangkok and tells us the condition o f  
Bangkok. It was in yellow code... not high risk. No terrorism or serious danger. ” 
(SOFLFCl)
A top manager of a national chained noted the limitation of the explicit plan for managing 
crises and indicated that it is not detailed enough. However, the plan needed to be developed 
and he has brought his experience in dealing with different crises when making the new plan 
and making decisions about the flood.
“Almost and again considering that we had emergency plans in the hotel: do they 
cover flooding, or did they cover flooding? Tell enough detail? No. So, we now have a 
fu ll detail flood action plan in terms o f how to respond; in terms o f the actual flood  
situation that threatens this physical building. ...During the process when carrying 
out a contingency plan and everything else I  do, I  prefer to go back to my tsunami 
manual in terms o f just making sure I  didn’t forget something, i f  there’s anything 
that would be different, or anything that we might add just to make it better. ” 
(TOFLNCl)
The statement of TOFLNCl shows that to make decisions on crises requires both explicit and 
tacit knowledge and this knowledge needs to be cross checked to confirm the appropriateness 
of decisions and actions. This finding supports the study of Paraskevas et al. (2013) on the 
need of using different types of knowledge, especially procedural and behavioural. In a non- 
emergent crisis stage, all knowledge in codified formats needs to be prepared i.e. scripts, and 
standard procedures. However knowledge cannot be static—especially in dealing with 
emergent crises—but it could be experimented, rationalized and improvised (Paraskevas et 
al., 2013).
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From the section dealing with the application of knowledge to past crises, it can be concluded 
that for small and large independent hotels, the managers most likely applied what they call 
their own common sense plus their tacit knowledge, i.e. experience from previous crises. 
These types of hotels are less concerned about developing an explicit crisis preparation plan. 
However, large chained hotels apply both explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge learned 
from previous experiences of managing crises. Top executives and middle managers of large 
chained hotels fully comply with their plans and procedures to support decision-making and 
response to crises. Some of these hotels received procedures to handle crises from their 
headquarters, but this practice can be both advantageous (to gain robust knowledge) and 
disadvantageous (to be overly controlled by headquarters). In dealing with emergent crises, 
knowledge cannot be static, it needs to be experimented, rationalized and improvised to suit 
the circumstance.
7.4.3 Knowledge Transfer Mechanism (KTM) (Hotels)
From the previous section, we have understood the implementation of knowledge 
management—starting from knowledge acquisition, storage and application—and see the 
importance of exchanging forms of knowledge to maximise innovative ideas to deal with 
crises. In this section we consider one further crucial step of knowledge management process 
which is called “knowledge transfer.” The concept of knowledge transfer is used differently 
in different research areas. In this study, there are two aspects to be studied. First, the modes 
of knowledge conversion those hotel respondents used to maximise the knowledge reservoir 
of tourism crises. Second, the mechanism of knowledge transfer to individuals versus groups 
in order to ensure that their staff is equipped with knowledge to make decisions for 
responding to tourism crises. The background of this section is from Chapter 3 about the 
knowledge conversion modes by Nonaka (1994) and the mechanisms of knowledge transfer 
by Hall and Williams (2008), and Hjalager (2002).
Chapter 3 indicates that there are two forms of knowledge—tacit and explicit form. The 
organisation can maximise the knowledge of tourism crisis through the process of conversion 
of these knowledge forms. Table 7.3 summarised an overview of mechanisms used to convert 
from one form to another through different knowledge transfer methods.
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Table 7.3 Knowledge conversion mode and mechanisms (Hotels)
K now ledge  
conversion m ode
M echanism s o f  know ledge transfer o f  tourism  crises
Individual G roup
Tacit to Tacit M obile phone Formal Meeting
(Socialization) Satellite phone Webinar
Short W ave radio Training
Informal dialogues Town-hall meeting
Training ( formal and informal) Training (formal) 
Communities o f  practices
Tacit to Explicit Documentation Documentation
(Externalisation) M eeting reports M eeting reports
Email Email
M emo Social networks : Facebook, Twister
W ebsites
Explicit to Explicit M eeting reports M eeting reports
Documentation Documentation
Email Email
M emo M emo
Manuals Manuals
Pagers Logbooks
Database N otice board 
Bi-w eekly magazine 
Database 
E-Library
Explicit to Tacit Reading from the meeting reports, Reading from the meeting reports, emails.
emails, websites, documentation websites, documentation. 
Training by experts.
Source: Author, based on illiistrative quotes in Section 7.4
Generally, several of those interviewed commented that the hotel tends to employ both 
formal and informal knowledge transfer and mixed mechanisms to share knowledge. As 
concluded by one of the top managers of the large international chain hotel that...
“No i t ’s in both ways, I  mean the formal way would be that you are asked to support 
the writing and standards and procedures. So you have fo r example, what are the 
standards, what are the procedures when fire breaks out, ok? Or, when there is a
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flood, or when there is a riot. Then you will be asked to refill the current desktop 
standards and you say: “Look, you went through this crisis; please go through what 
we have at the moment. As a standard worldwide i f  there’s anything you want us to 
change, anything you want us to add, please do it so it steps from the theory. ” That’s 
the formal part and you have to report...! mean, we have to have a crisis report. So, 
that means whenever there is a crisis there are documents, which are very detailed 
and will then have to be forwarded to the crisis centre in London. That’s where we
  had head offices fo r  Singapore to report to. I t ’s very structured, so i t’s very ...you
know, very bureaucratic; but i t ’s something which is kept as a formal document. ” 
(T10FLFC2)
Table 7.3 showed recognition that the number of recipients (individual or group) and the 
form of knowledge (tacit or explicit) become criteria to specify the mechanism of knowledge 
transfer. In addition, the interview data revealed that there are an additional three criteria that 
hotels in this study adopted for selecting which mode and mechanism(s) are to be used for 
sharing.
The first one is the characterisation of crises by means of the degree of seriousness and the 
phase of the crisis. These are the most important factors to identify which mode of 
conversion and mechanism of transfer will be used according to the seriousness of crises for 
large hotels. For types of crisis that are evaluated as high risk to the firms, they use the formal 
socialization mode through face-to-face communication, i.e. formal meetings to share ideas 
and be transparent to all staff.
“Morning brief meeting every day. Executive meetings every week. Emergency 
meetings in every serious crisis. Afterward we announce our action plans. ” 
(M10FLNC2)
Town hall meeting is important fo r the high risk crisis, because it makes all staff 
understand and go in the same direction. I f  we communicate through different people, 
the message could be distorted. The staff want to hear from the executive. ” 
(T20FLFC2)
However, in small hotels respondents said that their face-to-face communication will assume 
a more informal style rather than a formal meeting because of the low number of employees, 
especially SH and SI2 which only have 5 employees.
“Talking is better than the notice board because it is faster and we can ask 
questions. ” (T0FSI2)
“Small hotels do not use a formal meeting. We send a person to tell staff” (T0FSI2)
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One manager added that the explicit-to-explicit knowledge transfer has to be used to support 
face-to-face communication in order to remind staff and they can use this as a reference. 
A human resources manager of a large chained hotel gave an example of using a bi-weekly 
magazine to transfer knowledge among staff.
 “The (NAME J^MOVED) Today” The secretary to the General Manager prepares
this one. It is similar to meeting minutes but this magazine is capturing the highlights 
o f the meetings to disseminate to all staff fo r reading and to remind them o f our 
standard telling them what they need to know. It is issued bi-weekly. ” (M20FLNC1)
Next, we consider the link between the phase of the crisis and mechanism for knowledge 
transfer. Before a crisis hits the organisation and after it has been resolved, there is less 
pressure of time on sharing the knowledge and providing an opportunity to discuss the 
lessons learned from previous crises. Therefore, the conversion mode and mechanism was 
aimed at accumulating knowledge and feedback of crisis management.
Observing several statements so far, it was felt that trainings both formal and informal, are 
the most appropriate mechanism to transfer knowledge, especially to the large group of rank- 
and-file staff during a crisis event. Here is the view of one of the top managers.
“The best channel? We channel through internet to the website. They (MANAGERS) 
will take it and then train the staff. ” (TOFLNCl)
As well, there was recognition of the accumulation and sharing of codified knowledge with 
the assistance of technology to share information across organisations, especially in foreign 
chain hotels. Following are the explanations of some interviewees in large firms on these 
points.
“We have an e-brary system which allows everyone in our chain to share opinions. 
For example, one o f  the staff suggested we install fabric to solve the complaint o f  
noise between the doors o f  connecting rooms. However, the suggestion will not be 
included in the standard until it is approved by the knowledge team o f the corporate. ” 
(M0LFC2)
“I  input the daily report into an online logbook system. With this system, we can 
attach clips from our 400 camera o f the CCTV. This system records our solutions to 
problems. The board and GM can enter in the keyword such as guest name, date, 
department, and then the information about that incident will pop up. No need to 
submit the duty manager logbook or present cases in the morning meetings. The 
executives can put their comment under the case. ” (MlOFLNCl)
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However, during the crisis, the knowledge needs to be transformed into tacit form which is 
more actionable. One respondent said that knowledge needs to be retrieved rapidly with 
precision and accuracy. Thus, it is better to use a technological communicative device such 
as computer with emails, telephone and pagers. Here is the explanation by a staff how she 
received the knowledge from her supervisor.
“The supervisor checks email and tells the floor staff. Each floor will have an internal 
telephone. Staff have their pagers and we call our operator to text them. ” (S0FLFC2)
Nonetheless, a staff member in the independent large hotel commented about the limitation of 
technological mechanism, suggesting that it would be suitable for supervisor level or back- 
office workers but not the operational staff. Her statement is as follows:
“We are not allowed to use mobile phone during work. It would he good i f  they gave 
us a Tablet (LAUGH).” (MOFUl)
However, for small firms the phase and seriousness of crises did not influence much change 
on their choices of knowledge conversion mode and transfer mechanism. Due to the small 
number of employees and close relationship among staff, stage of crisis is only relevant in 
that it increases the frequency of knowledge sharing through socialization via informal talks 
through different channels.
“Telephone, talking while we walk pass each other every morning. It is easy. ” 
(T20FSH)
“Talk after changing the shift o f  working. Call more often to monitor and to give 
directions. ” (T0FSI2)
At this point it can be noticed from the above statements that there are differences in sharing 
knowledge between large and small hotel and among staff at different levels. Stage of crises 
determined the mechanism, style (formal or informal) and frequency of knowledge sharing.
The second criterion is the availability of the resource of knowledge transfer revealed from 
the data. It can be observed that the large, especially chain hotels have the know-how of 
trainers and financial resources to arrange the training programs. They also have the facilities 
and money to invest in a technology system such as e-brary, the online logbook system which 
assists them to share knowledge. It is noticeable that technology facilitates knowledge 
transfer and complexity of transferring knowledge in large hotels due to their vertical 
organisational structures. This is in contrast to the study of Claver-Cortes et al. (2007), that 
the organisation with high organisational structure generally faces a problem of
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communication. However, other complexities of inter-organisational knowledge transfer are 
such as culture, language and social activities.
The last criteria are the background of the receivers in terms of knowledge and their jobs as 
seen from the statement mentioned rank and file staff. Here is evidence about a relationship 
of the background of staff loiqwledge and the mechanisms.
“The document contained technical terms and English vocabulary, we have to 
translate to them and tell them what the key messages is ... tell them in the morning 
brief and translate the memo and put on staff notice board. ” (SIOFLNl)
With respect to the background of the staff, one said that the human resources manager, 
training managers, department manager, and supervisors are responsible for explaining and 
translating knowledge to their subordinates. The statement follows:
“It is not easy to make everyone understand because people have different degree o f  
knowledge and experience. Although you have higher educational degree you don’t 
know the property, products. That is why we needs the orientation for new staff to 
ensure that everyone has a basic knowledge o f hotel so we can make them understand 
easier what we tell them. Not only Human resource department that train them but 
their supervisor and department heads have to be the mentors o f  new staff.” 
(M20FLNC1)
The implication of these two statements is that knowledge will transfer more effectively if the 
sender and receiver have background knowledge and experience about the topic they are 
sharing. The statement of M20FLNC1 highlighted the fact that the relationship of supervisor 
and subordinate is important for sharing knowledge. The interaction between them would 
mean there is more chance for staff to learn new knowledge from their supervisors.
To summarize knowledge transfer, we can say that the hotel respondents employ various 
mechanisms both technology-based and nontechnology-based to transfer and create the 
knowledge of tourism crises within an organisation. The phase of crisis, the absorption 
capability (knowledge equipment/facilities and background of recipient) determine the 
selection of what mechanism will be used. Face-to-face communication is the preferred 
method of sharing knowledge of crises which is likely more in know-how form (tacit 
knowledge). The style with low number of employees, is informal talks in small hotels and 
formal meetings for the larger ones. Technology nowadays helps increase the flow of 
knowledge within tall organisational structured hotels, nevertheless the complexity of culture 
and language still remains and becomes a barrier of the knowledge transfer process.
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Overall Section 7.4 confirmed that the size and structure of ownership plays an important part 
in knowledge management. What follows is the powerful comparison of implementation of 
knowledge management process by different types of hotels (See: Table 7.4).
Table 7.4 A summary of the comparison of the implementation of the knowledge 
management process across the four hotel types
Knowledge
management
process
T yp el
(Small/Independent)
Type 2
(Large/Independent)
Type 3
(Large/Thai Chain)
Type 4
(Large/Foreign
Chain)
Acquisition Internal and External 
sources
Internal and External 
sources
Internal and External 
sources
Internal and External 
sources
Difficult to access 
tourism associations
Wide access to tourism 
associations
Wide access to 
tourism associations
Wide access to 
tourism associations
Top-down Top-down & bottom- 
up
Top-down & bottom- 
up
Chain policy and 
guidelines
Top-down & bottom- 
up
Chain policy and 
guidelines
Storage Little interest to 
implement Knowledge 
storage
Interest to implement 
Knowledge storage
Interest to implement 
Knowledge storage.
Interest to implement 
Knowledge storage.
No systematic storage No systematic storage Systematic storage: 
codified and in 
personalized forms
Systematic storage: 
codified and in 
personalized forms
No involvement of  
staff
Staff uncertain how to 
retrieve Knowledge for 
future crises
Staff trained and 
involved
Staff trained and 
involved
Application No procedural 
application
No procedural 
application
Procedural 
application; crisis 
plans
Procedural 
application: crisis 
plans
Application o f tacit 
knowledge
Application o f tacit 
knowledge
Application o f tacit 
and explicit 
knowledge
Application o f tacit 
and explicit 
knowledge
Transfer Informal
communication
Informal / formal 
communication
Informal / formal 
communication
Informal /  formal 
communication
Face-to-face from 
informal contact via 
Communities of 
practices
Face-to-face with 
formal meeting and 
informal via 
Communities of  
practices
Face-to-face with 
formal meeting and 
informal via 
Communities of 
practices
High technology and 
codified knowledge 
transfer
Face-to-face with 
formal meeting and 
informal via 
Communities of 
practices
Advanced technology 
and codified 
knowledge transfer
Source: Author’s development from the findings.
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Table 7.4 showed that there is higher commitment in this sense, more so in large chained 
hotels than in independent large and small hotels. Constraint of resources to implement 
knowledge management is the probable factor that influences their commitment to 
knowledge management. Small hotels do not seriously consider implementing knowledge 
management nor have a tourism crisis plan, because it implies costs and a considerable 
amount of time.
With respect to knowledge acquisition, there are various sources available to management 
amongst small and large hotels; however, the large hotels have wider access to more sources 
as some of them are members of various associations. Even so, having contact with different 
associations—both related and unrelated to tourism—can sound as if it is going bring lots of 
advantages. Knowledge from these sources—however lacking in consistency—must 
therefore be carefully analysed by hotels and selected for that which meets their needs. Still, 
being a member of associations can be useful—especially with other member hotels in the 
same zone and area facing the same crisis circumstance. Small hotels especially, could 
clearly see the benefits of obtaining knowledge from other hotels nearby to ensure that 
businesses in that area can be still operated throughout the crises. Knowledge acquisition 
from a top-down approach is a typical way for all hotels, while a bottom-up approach is also 
found in large chained hotels. This feedback loop from both top-down and bottom-up is vital 
communication for successful crisis management. However, in small hotels, non-managerial 
staff feels that they cannot contribute very much to prevent crises nor improve knowledge 
within the organisation.
Talking about knowledge storage, one of the conclusions is that large chained hotels have a 
very good structural programme, training and state of the art technology to store knowledge. 
However, the large independent hotels do not have such a well-structured programme. For 
small hotels the establishment of knowledge regarding tourism crises is of very little interest. 
It has been concluded therefore that large chained hotels have highly systematic storing 
systems for knowledge in both codified and personalized forms. Training becomes the major 
method to transfer the explicit forms of knowledge into staff memory in this case.
Next, we consider knowledge application, for small and large independent hotels. The 
managers just applied what they call their own common sense plus their tacit knowledge, i.e. 
experience from previous crises. These types of hotels are less concerned about developing 
an explicit crisis preparation plan. However, large chained hotels apply both explicit
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knowledge and tacit knowledge learned from previous experiences to manage crises. Top 
executives and middle managers of large chained hotels fully comply with their plans and 
procedures to support decision-making and response to crises. Some of these hotels received 
procedures to handle crises from their headquarters, but this practice can be both 
advantageous (to gain robust knowledge) and disadvantageous (to be overly controlled by
-  4   ——      • • . .    - - •• • — - ——      . . . .  - . . ........ . . .  ^  . -   - . -•  ------------- ----- ---- ----------- - -  ........................... — . - . - - -headquarters).
Lastly with respect to knowledge transfer, we can say that the hotel respondents employ 
various mechanisms both technology-based and nontechnology-based to transfer and create 
the knowledge of tourism crises within their organisations. The phase of crisis, and the 
absorption capability (knowledge of equipment/facilities and recipient experience) determine 
the selection of the mechanism that will be used. Face-to-face communication is the most 
preferred method of sharing knowledge of crisis which is likely more in know-how form 
(tacit knowledge). The style with a low number of employees is informal conversation in 
small hotels and formal meeting for the larger ones. Technology nowadays helps reduce the 
flow of knowledge between chained hotels, nevertheless the complexity of culture and 
language still remains and becomes a barrier of the knowledge transfer process which will be 
discussed in the following section.
7.5 The Facilitators and Barriers of Knowledge Management and Transfer 
(Hoteliers)
This section is outlined in two aspects: the first is the facilitators of implementing knowledge 
management transfer. Second are the barriers and suggested ways to overcome these by the 
hotel respondents. The 8 facilitators of knowledge transfer by Orzano et al.’s (2008) and 
Riege’s (2007) key barriers of knowledge management (technological, organisational, and 
people challenges ‘TOP’) explained in Chapter 3 will be used to support the discussion. It is 
not the existence of facilitators and barriers that interested the researcher, but the relationship 
those facilitators and barriers have to the knowledge management process and transfer 
specifically across these four hotel types. It is also important to note that that how facilitators 
and barriers impact on knowledge management processes would be expected to vary from 
organisation to organisation. How organisations create and share information and knowledge 
is vitally important if an innovative crisis management is to be developed. Therefore, barriers 
that impact along these lines must be understood and managed where possible.
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Orzano et al. (2008) identify 8 facilitators: (1) active network, (2) reflective practice, (3) 
helpful relationship, (4) robust infrastructure, (5) accessible technology, (6) supportive 
leadership, (7) effective communication, and (8) trusting climate. It was discovered that most 
hotel respondents reported that the psychological related factors (helpful relationship, 
supportive leadership and trusting climate) are the significant facilitators specifically 
assocrated with knowledge transfer and sharing. The following are three" examples of ways to 
implement these factors in the work environment.
“In fact, i f  we want to work together, we should not have a class system—high 
position or low position. We should work like a family and that is the key to work 
together. I f  we separate class and job— I  am manager and you are just a staff; I  am 
sales and you are administrator; don 7 bother me ... it will be difficult. ” (SOFLIl)
“Every department has to create knowledge. In the beginning, it is understandable 
that we are not ready to handle crises because we didn’t prepare. However, fo r  the 
next crises better preparation should be expected through learning. We need 
collaboration amongst the departments. For 39 years o f  working everyone said “up to 
GM. ” NO, it cannot be only me, ” I  replied. The reasons for each decision should 
come from everyone in the hotel. ” (TOFLIl)
“Our GM is trying to reduce the gap between employees. Thank you party for the 
staff... Food is served by the GM and executives. The GM is dressed like a chef and 
making foodfor staff. This creates trust and relationship so that stafffeel that there is 
no gap and are willing to share their opinion. ” (M20FLNC1)
These illustrative examples implied that the organisation that has no social gap between 
employees in different positions would enhance knowledge sharing. In addition, the close 
family-like relationship between management and rank-and-file staff encourages the staff to 
participate in knowledge sharing.
In addition, the literature in Chapter 3 indicated that hardware factors are important as well 
for knowledge management processes, especially in processing knowledge storage and 
retrieval and transfer in a timely manner. The findings showed that large hotels have more of 
these factors than the small hotels. The chained hotel for instance has highlighted how 
technology helps to communicate and disseminate knowledge to a high number of 
employees. The following are the illustrative examples.
“The technology gets better and with these crisis management centres and everything 
all based on technology we communicate now on virtual or the computer conference 
calls and i t’s easy. It hasn ’t been that easy in the past. ” (TOFLFCl).
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“Technology I  would say is important to communications ... in terms o f instant 
communication ...to get that information at the right time. Clarity o f information is 
critical to eliminate panic, eliminate speculation and also to ensure that there is a 
central message so that i t ’s not collaterally responding to what you say or creating 
uncertainty. They think they knew what was going on so there’s a direct message 
from a source that is reliable—whether it be from my office or whether it be from  
outside it—that says ‘this is the situation, at least you can stop gossip, stop 
uncertainty and maintain calm and control o f  the situation’. ” (TOFLNCl).
These two illustrative examples from both of the large/chained hotel managers explained how 
technology has helped in knowledge acquisition from the source and sharing knowledge to 
the staff. There was not much information received from large independent and small hotels. 
It could be that technology is not necessary for independent firms and small hotels where the 
number of employees is low and there is no complexity of intra-firm communication.
One of the middle managers in the large independent chain hotel shows her eagerness for 
having an infrastructure of knowledge management i.e. a knowledge centre. She believes that 
this centre would have helped to access knowledge easier.
“My dream is to have the knowledge centre like the library and have a librarian to 
take care o f the centre. I f  we have a problem then we can contact to request the 
information. Knowledge may be kept by different department head, i f  they left the 
hotel then we can still access the knowledge though this centre. ” (MOFLIl)
Further from Orzano et al.’s 8 facilitators, the job satisfaction and Thai family culture 
relationship was added as two new aspects to facilitators by two hotel respondents. One of the 
staff in the house-keeping department said the job satisfaction made her become loyal to the 
firm and she would do anything for the firm. The remuneration system also becomes 
motivation for her to continue to work for this organisation. Compensation is an expression 
of gratitude for employee good work and loyalty.
“ I  love my organisation. la m  happily working here. I  Want to work for this hotel with 
my best effort... I  have worked here for 10 years, I  got the gold locket crafted in “A ” 
to reward me for my performance. ” (SOFLII)
Next is a statement about Thai family culture relationship. It is not really much of a shift 
away from the concept of Orzano et al.’s; however, this hotel respondent perhaps wants to 
highlight that different cultures require different ways of reacting to each other, based on the 
country’s cultural background.
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“...not to operate too much like western organisations. In Thai family culture. 
Everyone is so bonded. Wai gesture is used to say hello. Talking like a family 
member. I  think that only in Thailand that we call or treat stranger like a visiting 
relative by using sister or brother even at first meet. ” (M20FLNC2).
The new facilitators that are evident from the statements of SOFLIl and M20FLNC2 relating 
to job satisfaction and Thai family culture reflect the distinctiveness of Thai cultural value in 
relation to how to motivate employee to participate in knowledge management and transfer. 
The characteristics of Thais, described by Hofstede (2000 cited in Vatanasakdakul ,2007 
,p.59), as having high cultural values and femininity in their society, shows that staff need to 
feel that they are accepted by and treated in a caring manner by their co-workers and their 
organisations.
To summarise the facilitators for knowledge management functions, we could say that the 
company should have both software and hardware resources. However, there is a tendency to 
answer showing that the software or psychological related factors become more crucial 
factors to encourage staff to participate in all stage of knowledge management, especially 
knowledge sharing.
We turn now to Riege’s (2007) TOP key barriers of knowledge management (Technological, 
Organisational, and People challenge (‘TOP’). Among all these three factors, most 
respondents said that “People” challenge is the major barrier. The barrier issues are an 
example and they mostly affect the stage of knowledge transfer. The issues related to people 
are background knowledge, behaviour, interest and attitude. The following are examples of 
statements which demonstrate these issues.
“Why is it people? Because people can communicate and people participate. I f  the 
people don 7 communicate and don 7 participate it becomes a barrier i f  you do not, i f  
you don 7 understand i f  we don 7 contribute ... I f  the people they are in the bond and 
things become switched on. ” (TOFLFCl)
“Very simple because people are not machines. A t the beginning, people always 
react differently. Depending on the situation your people might react like this; some 
people react like that; so there’s a big uncertainty....this is the most challenging part 
because you have to adjust constantly, not only to the situation o f  the crisis but also to 
the way your employees and your people handle and work around the crisis and with 
the crisis. So I  think the softest spot is the people. ” (T10FLFC2)
“In human nature people tend to do things the way they like to do it, the way they 
think that is convenient fo r  them. They think o f  how to do shortcuts, they think o f  how 
to do things they like. For example, I  can give you a few  hotels that have been open 
fo r over 20 years in (NAME REMOVED) and their GM has been working there over 
20 years. The same person! Imagine the way he works... he will do things the way he
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wants and he’s been doing it fo r so many years, so i f  somebody is going to tell him to 
change its very difficult fo r him. So i f  he understands he will go, then he will try to 
follow us. I f  he’s a stubborn person then it might be difficult fo r  him to believe 
everything we say because he will say that he is working in that area and he knows 
best. How can another person in corporate office tell him to do like this instead o f  
like that. ” (T0FLNC2)
The representative opinion of a chaos in managing people with keywords are such as “don’J  
communicate and don’t participate”, “react differently”, “do things the way he wants”, to 
change is very difficult”. Hence, people seem to be the greatest barrier of knowledge 
management process. The phase that ‘people are not machines” by T10FLFC2 and the 
earlier statement of on the remuneration system by SOFLIl highlighted the interesting 
finding that to make people participate in knowledge sharing or learning required greater 
effort to motivate. This finding is in contrast to the learning model by Kolb (1984) which 
assume that people would change and learn after going through several experiences. This 
finding supports the statement of Jashapara (2011) that people need incentives to learn.
Hotel respondents have suggested solutions to manage the people problem through training 
and social interaction i.e talking in order to develop understanding.
“Training is the tool to change their behaviour and groom their knowledge. ” 
(MOFLIl)
“For past crises, I  think that human nature was the main barrier. I f  that person is not 
ready the crisis solving becomes a struggle. We need to talk to the person and listen 
to the reason why they are not willing to cooperate. ” (M0FLI2)
The middle manager of LNC2 proposed a solution explaining that a different nationality 
requires a different tactic to change their attitude and behaviour. He proposed that for Thai 
staff, the approach would be talking and making them understand to change behaviour 
slowly.
“Well, you know it depends on the people. I f  a Thai person, we might have to go 
slowly and try to convince him and make him understand. I f  he’s a—I  don’t want to 
name nationality—but i f  supposing he’s a German you just tell him do it and he will 
do it. But fo r Thai they work from their heart, they prefer to do things according to 
their heart. I t ’s quite difficult sometimes. Some people, they work according to the 
boss. Boss say do, this they would do. ” (T0FLNC2)
From a management point of view, one of the top managers of a large independent hotel 
reported moderate knowledge management commitment in Section 7.4. He admitted that it is 
useful; however, he does not fully understand the steps and he needs software to guide him in 
knowledge management.
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“I  think no one knows what knowledge management is exactly. I  mean, know where 
to start and how to store. Is there software to store? I  think that we lack know-how to 
implement knowledge management. Me... I  admit that I  don 7 know. I  am wondering 
whether recording the incidents is called knowledge management. Is there a template 
or implementing knowledge management? ” (T0FLI2)
Moving to the other two barriers, a middle manager argued that organisational policy* —— ' • • - —- - ' -—— -- — - ' — —- - -  ' - - • —  —* — — -——- . .. - . .  . — * — .— — . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . .  —. 1 —. .. -. #/ * _
becomes the major barrier more than human and technology. He said that good policy will 
give clear direction for implementation for staff. Nevertheless, he showed that these factors 
are correlated. His statement follows:
“I  think the organisational policy and management have to he clear in business 
direction. The human factor is a secondary barrier. I f  the policy is good but people 
are not ready to think it is still ok although not so good. I f  policy is not good, 
although staff is good, they don’t know to go left or right. These two factors have to 
go together.” (fA\OFlMC2)
The facilitator part confirmed that technology is important for communication and knowledge 
transfer. However, two housekeepers in a small hotel, representative of a rank and file staff 
viewpoint provide an unexpected finding that technology is not so important in term of 
communication—at least for their jobs and their small size hotel. Technology could cause a 
hassle in knowledge transfer because they need to learn to adapt to the new technology:
“We are a small organisation and my job is not that complicated to need technology 
to support.” (M0FSI3)
“No need, too complicated and more work ... Someone needs to teach us how to use 
the technology. ” (S0FSI3)
Another issue regarding technology. One of the top managers stated he did not have the 
ability to establish systematic knowledge management because of lacking state of the art 
resources in the field of technology. He stated his need to have software that could provide a 
simulation of crisis and crisis solution so that the hotel staff can key in their resources and the 
type of crisis. Then an estimation of loss to point out what need to be focused on, and what 
aspects need to be improved.
“Maybe a programme like the insurance company has to evaluate potential risk and 
then we key in our condition and different scenarios o f  crisis. Then the result 
provides tangible suggestions o f  what we have to do. ” (T0FLI2)
Although the majority of hotel respondents appear to highlight that people are the major 
barrier, in fact there are few and interestingly most of them are in the large chained hotel.
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They could not answer which one is the main barrier. They all say that these factors are 
coherent. The following is an example of a top manager’s statement who explained that 
people are to be the source of knowledge. Technology only helps to access that source of 
knowledge—especially for a very large hotel with more than one thousand rooms.
“I  qng equally important because you cannot do one more than the
other. So, we need them all. We even have to apply technology to help because now 
with technology everything is made easier. So, fo r  the human resource we have to 
think about training, have to think about how to do the manuals. And then, with 
technology we have to use it in terms o f how to distribute information to everybody as 
quick and simple as possible. The third one is policy. O f course, each section... like 
me, I  do from the rules. You have to be firm, you have to have a strong guideline that 
we have to distribute in every hotel. And not only that, we also have audits. One o f  
my duties is to audit each hotel to make sure they comply with what we told them to 
do. There are some naughty hotels who take the manual and store; and say T do the 
way I  want to do it and I  don 7 want to follow; ’ and then when we go to check we can 
seew ho’s doing their work or not.” (TOFLNCl)
In summary of this section, when looking across different hotel types, it is revealed that these 
barriers and facilitators affect the knowledge management process. However, the majority 
revealed that psychological facilitators are the major factor that influence the process. The 
staff participated in the process and by all means are willing to share because there was 
support from the supervisor or top manager. A trusting climate makes staff feel more 
comfortable and confident to express their opinions. However, hardware (technology and 
facilitator to support sharing) is needed as well, especially in a large national chained hotel. 
It was explained how technology has helped in knowledge acquisition from the source and 
sharing that knowledge with staff. Considering Riege’s (2007) ‘TOP’ key barriers, the human 
factor becomes a major barrier, especially in the larger firm due to a high number of 
employees. Managers have to deal with the different background, personality, behaviour and 
attitude of employees. The availability of technology also becomes a barrier, especially to the 
independent firms, both small and large. Meanwhile, the chain hotels receive a ready to use 
knowledge package of both crisis management plan and software directly from its 
headquarters. Riege’s (2007) TOP and Orzano et al.’s 8 facilitators seem to overlap and these 
factors are coherent.
7.6 Chapter Conclusion
What is outlined in this chapter is the cross-case study report of hotels of different size and 
structure of ownership concerning the understanding of tourism crisis, the implementation of
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knowledge management process and facilitators and barriers affecting the process. The 
following are the key findings:
First, the understanding of tourism crisis and the approach to manage it. The definition of 
tourism crisis among respondents of this study showed that their understanding is similar 
about the aspect that crisis ^  an event that causes negative impacts upon the organisation. 
However, in the large hotels, most interviewees mentioned a broader understanding of 
impacts of tourism crisis, including the confidence of tourists to travel to destinations in 
crisis; the reduction of tourists; the problem of hotel operations; the reduction of hotel 
income; employee job stability; and problems for the entire tourism industry. This links to 
the finding which indicates that large hotels seem to have stronger determination towards 
proactive tourism crisis management implementation. Small hotels narrow the impact of 
crisis to only the customer perspective and do not carry out planning programs. However, 
crisis management planning is well accepted by respondents who recognise that it is 
important to both small and large hotels. The finding indicated that before applying several 
crisis management approaches i.e. risk assessment, and a crisis management plan, it is 
necessary to classify what crisis could cause the most problems to the firm then plan to give 
priority to focus on it. The criteria to evaluate the crisis are level of control, level of 
uncertainty and length of crisis, number of deaths, and the impact to target market and hotel 
properties. However, dealing with two examples of crises shows that even though there is a 
crisis management plan in place, it has a limitation, i.e. when things do not follow the plan, 
intuition and emotional response are realistic factors in a “rational” decision process.
Second, there is the relationship between knowledge management and tourism crisis. There is 
a high level of agreement about the link and benefits of knowledge management on managing 
tourism crises including having the information to make the decision in a timely manner and 
appropriate way, and learning from previous crises in order to avoid the repetition of 
mistakes. The level of commitment in implementing crisis management is dependent on the 
type of hotel. Chain hotels employ a strategic knowledge management of tourism crisis by 
developing a crisis management plan. This standard of practice guides hotels with the same 
brand to respond to tourism crisis in a similar way. Large and small independent hotels have 
less concern to develop a substantial knowledge of tourism crisis because of their lesser 
concern for standardisation, and also due to a limitation of resources to implement the 
knowledge management could be their barrier to implement.
271
Third, the size and structure of ownership plays an important part in knowledge management. 
There is higher commitment in this sense, more so in large chain hotels than in independent 
large and small hotels. Constraint of resources to implement knowledge management is the 
probable factor that influences their commitment to knowledge management. Small hotels 
seem not seriously consider implementing knowledge management nor to have a tourism 
crisis plan, because it implies^ costs and a considerable amount of time. Tor instance: For 
knowledge acquisition and storage, the large hotels have wider access to more sources and 
storing more systematically. Large chain hotels have and apply both explicit knowledge and 
tacit knowledge learned from previous experiences to manage crises.
Fourth, the size and structure of ownership plays an important part in knowledge transfer. 
The style with a low number of employees is informal talk in small hotels and formal 
meetings for the larger ones. Technology nowadays helps increase the flow of knowledge 
between chained hotels with tall organisational structure, but nevertheless the complexity of 
culture, language and absorption capability still remains and becomes a barrier of the 
knowledge transfer process.
Fifth, facilitators and barriers of knowledge management and transfer. The different hotel 
types revealed that these barriers and facilitator affect the knowledge process in different 
ways. However, the psychological facilitators are the major part that influences staff in all 
hotels to participate in knowledge management process; for example, the willingness to share 
because of support from the supervisor or top manager. A trusting climate makes staff feel 
more comfortable and confident to express their opinions. However, hardware (technology 
and facilitator to support sharing) is needed as well, especially to large independent and 
national chained hotels where there is more complexity in knowledge transfer. Technology 
has helped in knowledge acquisition from the source and sharing knowledge to the staff. 
Considering Riege’s (2007) TOP key barriers, the human element becomes a major barrier, 
especially in the larger firm due to a high number of employees. They have to deal with 
different backgrounds, personality; behaviour and attitude of employees. Teehnology also 
becomes a barrier, especially to the independent firm both small and large hotels. It could be 
due to the advantage of the chained hotel that often receives a package of both crisis 
management plan and software directly from its headquarters. But, the large independent 
hotel, lacking relevant technology plus the cost issue, has led them to decide not to focus on 
knowledge management. All in all, Riege’s (2007) TOP factors are coherent and support one
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another. It is suggested that the firm should assess this barrier and develop an environment 
conductive to knowledge management and transfer.
Whereas this chapter has dealt with the understanding and practical aspect of knowledge 
transfer and management of tourism crisis, the next chapter will provide the comparison of 
this issue w ^  the pohcymakers. The next chapter will also look at transfer knowledge 
between hoteliers and policymakers in order to provide the improvement of the collaboration 
between them on tourism crisis management.
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CHAPTER 8
POLICYMAKERS AND HOTELIERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
8.0 Introduction —
This chapter discusses the findings from a perspective of comparing an understanding of 
tourism crisis and the collaboration between these two groups: policymakers and hoteliers. 
This chapter also examines the mechanisms used in transferring knowledge and factors 
affecting this knowledge transfer process. Data was derived from the findings and in-depth 
interviews with the same respondents as in Chapters 6 and 7.
The findings and discussion are divided into four main sections. First, the comparative 
findings of policymakers’ and hoteliers’ understanding of tourism crisis concepts are 
presented. In particular, we compare the findings of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 on managing 
tourism crisis in Thailand. Second, the collaboration between these two groups on tourism 
crisis management is examined. Third, the knowledge transfer activities between them and 
factors affecting the knowledge transfer process. Fourth, the key findings and conclusion of 
this chapter are presented.
8.1 Concept of Tourism Crisis Management: Policymakers versus Hoteliers
Chapter 6 studied how the policymakers understand the concept of tourism crisis 
management; how they generally consider knowledge management as a way to respond to 
tourism crises innovatively; and how they interpret the various crises that have happened in 
Thailand. Similar thematic analysis was applied throughout Chapter 7 with respect to the 
four types of hotels studied. This section reiterates these themes but specifically highlights 
similarities and differences in order to achieve the first objective of the research, which is to 
analyse differences in the understandings and objectives of policymakers compared with 
those of hotels for managing tourism crises that affect hotel businesses.
A brief summary of the main points regarding the understanding of a crisis management 
concept can be found in Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1 Comparative understanding of the concept of tourism crisis management 
between policymakers and hoteliers
Themes Keywords of Core Findings
Understanding of 
crisis
Policymakers’ perspectives Hotels’ perspectives.............
Definition of crisis Threat consequences especially 
toward national economic status 
and destination image.
Negative events, impact to hotel 
operations, reputation, wellbeing of 
hotel guests, staff and stakeholders.
Level of understanding 
tourism crises
Low to high Low in small and independent. 
Moderate in large and independent 
High in chained hotel both national 
and international hotels
Nature of crisis Uncertainty, Uncontrollable, 
Urgencies, Transformable
Uncertainty, Uncontrollable, 
Urgencies.
Scale of crises Re llatively large scale crises Ranging from organisational 
problems to those of crises driven by 
external factors
Classification of crises Level of control and level of 
severity, i.e. loss of number of 
tourists; number of deaths; 
national-level of reputation 
damage; and psychological effect 
on tourism stakeholders— 
especially tourists themselves
Level of control, level of uncertainty, 
length of crisis and number of 
casualties as main criteria for 
classifying tourism crises.
Objective of crisis 
management
safety of tourists and recovery of 
the tourist destination through 
marketing schemes
Protect lives of stakeholders and 
assets of their firms, while small 
hotels tend to set their primary 
objective to operate at a minimum of 
expense.
Crisis managing 
approach
Relatively reactive style, but it is 
showing signs recently of 
adopting a more proactive tourism 
crisis management approach.
Proactive style in chained hotel 
especially the international chain and 
reactive style in the independent 
small and large hotels.
Commitment level on 
Tourism Crisis 
Management
Moderate level. The private sector 
is the driver to push the public to 
consider crisis management 
planning.
High: especially for large hotels. 
Low: passive role in general for 
independent small and large hotels.
Availability of Crises 
Management Plans
There is a lack of agreement in 
developing a national action plan 
to be used.
Linear and procedural fashion i.e. 
4 Rs by FATA
Yes, for large changed hotels, but not 
for independent small and large 
hotels. Ex. -Both linear (Business 
Continuity Plan, Standard of 
procedure) and non-linear 
(Contingency plan). Evolving plans
Source: Author’s presentation with reference to Chapter 6 and Chapter 7
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It can be seen that there are still some difficulties in understanding what the coneept of 
“crisis” means, especially for hoteliers, where heterogeneous definitions and understanding 
especially on scale, were found. However, there is a eonsensus perspective between 
policymakers and hoteliers that crisis can be associated with a “threat” or negative events. 
Ideas about the nature of crises were similar, that they are events that have the charaeteristics 
of uncertainty and, cdhtrbl diffieulty, and urgèheies. The policymakers’ view of crises, was 
that if they are not met with a timely response they can accelerate and transform into other 
problems. It is also notable that polieymakers tend to refer to crises in the sense of broader 
impacts on national economic impact and destination image, with especial attention to the 
loss of life and tourism income. Meanwhile, hoteliers are more concerned about the direct 
impact upon hotel operations (assets, income, eonfidenee of stakeholders— especially hotel 
guests, staff and investors). This finding supports the majority of tourism crisis studies 
reviewed in Chapter 2 stating that the term crisis varies aceording to the context of the study. 
However, crises are mostly referred to as un-welcome events generating undesirable 
outcomes resulting in shock and fear in people (Brewton, 1987, Sonmez et al., 1994, 
Santana, 2004, Laws and Prideaux, 2006, Ritehie, 2009). In addition, it is not surprising to 
find that the polieymakers and hotel businesses have different views on the scale of tourism 
beeause these two groups have different roles and objeetives in their management 
responsibilities. This corresponds to Hall (1994) who said that the policymakers, especially 
the public group, become involved in tourism erisis management in order to sustain and 
distribute tourism benefits to a wider array of stakeholders. This explained why the 
polieymakers gave their attention to erises that affect the nation as a whole.
Regarding commitment to crisis planning and management, it seems that policymakers do not 
quite eonsider it as important as do the hoteliers—especially those of the international 
chained hotels. Large chained hoteliers specifically thought of proactive crisis planning as a 
good strategy to detect early signs through risk assessment, to minimise the shock of a sudden 
hit of crisis and position themselves for business opportunities. Nevertheless, the independent 
large and small hotels are still far from widely implementing this due to the limitation of 
resourees and know-how. Polieymakers are less proactive about crisis management planning, 
and display a more reaetive attitude. This finding is eongruent with Bramewell and Sharmen 
(1999), who state that a high or low commitment to get involved and take aetion on a 
situation depends on resources (people and budget), interest and opinion. One explanation of 
this finding is that large hotels, especially chains, are more interested in proactive erisis
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management planning beeause, as the evidence in Chapter 7 shows, they think they eould 
expose to crises than the independent hotels because of their size and the condition of being a 
multi-organisation. Also, as evident in Chapter 7 an international ehained hotel has more 
access to resources to deal with crisis (crisis knowledge, team expertise, international 
allianees, and finance). These faetors assist them to have higher commitment and be more 
effective in proactive erisis management. While for polieyrhakers, their proactive crisis 
management system was just started in 2007. A crisis management team Was set up amongst 
different representatives of both private and public sectors who hold different values and time 
commitment to be devoted to the crisis management mission. The stratégie direction and 
budget varied according to the political interest of each political party that was elected in 
different periods as revealed by one of the interviewees. This concurs with Hall (1994), that 
the value of a tourism actor determines the priorities of policy and commitment in tourism 
erisis management.
The last finding is that tourism crisis plans are influeneed by their understanding of a tourism 
crisis and its nature. Polieymakers have adopted the rather inflexible-mind-set praetiee of 
The Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA) (the linear model) of the four Rs (reduction, 
readiness, response and reeovery) into their tourism crisis management plan. Likewise, hotel 
businesses demonstrated—specifically chained hotels—that they have proeedural and linear 
crisis management plans such as a Business Continuity Plan and a Standard of Procedure. 
However, the hotels recognised that crises do not always follow an orderly pattern. Therefore, 
these large ehained hotels also have contingency plans as well as individual’s intuition to 
handle emerging situations. It can be seen that hotel businesses may adapt a plan of action 
more freely and explore alternative measures to respond to erises than policymakers. The 
praetiee of hotels in tourism crisis management is akin to the complexity theory discussed by 
Paraskevas (2006) who stated that effeetive erisis management should be a co-evolving 
system within the organisation. However, Seeger (2002) argued with the pitfall of this 
praetiee in that it aims at a short-term goal by solving crisis as quickly as possible without 
considering long-term eonsequences.
In summary, this section demonstrated that there is still a lack of shared understanding about, 
and a different degree of commitment for tourism crisis management when comparing 
policymakers and hoteliers. The differenee in their interest, resourees and opinions are factors 
that explain the findings. One might question whether these differences might affect the
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collaboration between the two. Therefore the following section will offer an insight into the 
collaboration between them.
8.2 Collaboration between Policymakers and Hoteliers for Tourism Crisis 
Management.
Tourism is a complex activity and requires participation of numerous participants that may 
hold divergent and conflicting interests (Hall, 1994). Collaboration is important as it leads to 
dialog, negotiation, transferring crisis knowledge and the building of a mutually acceptable 
plan as to how tourism should be managed (Bramwell and Lane, 2000). This section presents 
the commentary on collaboration in crisis managing between these two groups and the ideal 
of future continuation. The analysis is informed by the literature of Sections 2.5, 2.6 and 3.5.
It is important to note here about the interview data, that the findings are mostly obtained 
from the views of top management of all hotels and some of middle management from 
ehained hotels only. Staff in small and large independents hotels are unlikely to reveal their 
opinions at this stage of collaboration as this chapter is more concerned with hotel- 
policymaker cooperation.
Interviewees were asked to explain collaboration between hotels and the polieymakers. 
Generally, collaboration on transferring knowledge of tourism erisis between hotels and 
polieymakers is done through top executive members of organisations and involved 
department managers, i.e marketing departments in ehained hotels. It shows in the following 
statement.
“The case o f Airport closure crisis, The Director o f  Marketing was assigned by GM  
to cooperate with the policymakers on accommodating tourists that cannot travel out 
o f the country. ” (MlOFLNCl)
It can be implied from the above statements that it is necessary to collaborate with outsiders, 
especially policymakers, on crisis management. Top managers will take a leadership role or 
assign those who are concerned with the issue to collaborate with policymakers, as seen from 
the statement of MlOFLNCl. This finding supports Pearson and Mitroff (1993) who state 
that normally the senior executive should become the crisis champion because the champion 
builds the creditability of erisis management and has the authority to make decisions. 
However, the champion should ensure that managers communicate their strategic direction to 
internal staff to avoid subordinates’ confusion and disagreement by which top managers try 
to achieve it (Boin, 2005).
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The collaboration on tourism crises between polieymakers and hoteliers was not always 
satisfactory, especially from the viewpoint of hoteliers. Several hotel businesses in this study 
claimed that they did not receive much help from policymakers. Vice versa, policymakers 
also reported that they attempted to collaborate with private sectors. However, contributions 
from businesses are limited to hotel members of the associations located in Bangkok. The 
follbwihg are exarnjple views from fop managers in this study on the level of collaboration of 
policymakers toward hotels.
“Policymakers are doing only things that they are interested in. Collaboration with 
small hotels is not important to them. I  think that is why they are not helping us. ” 
(TlOFSIl)
“Nobody (policymakers) actually knows how i t ’s going to go. ...We were by 
ourselves. ...My best resource to make decisions was simply not in what the 
government brought in time. ” (TOFLNCl)
“The government announces that there is a crisis. We are the owner, then we need to 
start to prepare... Honestly, they just announce but not tell us what to do. They 
(policymakers) offer help like the equipment to support tourists... They announce 
long-term marketing plans. They have budget to do that... I  think that they do that to 
increase volume o f tourists but not to provide resilient recommendations fo r  hotels to 
survive through crisis. ” (T10FSI2)
The above statement reflects the interesting finding that in a time of erisis, hotels have high 
expectation of the policymakers to lead and to avert threats. However, it is evident from the 
hoteliers that they are dissatisfied with the current involvement of policymakers in managing 
tourism erises.
Nonetheless, policymakers argued that there was good collaboration from their side 
particularly with the large hotels as shown in the following statements.
“The large and chain hotels, are more interested to. have a meeting with us because 
they are afraid o f  losing their reputation. We have meetings with them. When hotels 
encountered tourism crisis, some proposed to participate in crisis management and 
some ask for information and guidelines. ” (PUB_3)
“We provided help to all levels o f hotels... During the demonstration at 
Radchaprasong, we coordinated with hotels about the name and number o f foreign 
tourists that are still staying in the hotels: Intercon, Erawan, and Four Season. We 
sent transportation to evacuate tourists from the hotels. We provided special training 
to hotels about crisis as well guidelines fo r  fire evacuation, and controlling 
demonstrators. ” (PUB_1)
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“Small hotels don 7 come to us to ask fo r  knowledge. Normally, 3 star up to 5 star 
will come because they need to take care o f  more tourists. We are the middle-man to 
talk to the government to provide loans to those businesses that got affected by crisis 
and to launch a policy on low interest loan or reduction o f tax. ” (PUB_2)
However one respondent PRI 2B declared that policymakers not only worked with big 
business but also assisted small ones that mostly needed some help due to resourees 
constraint.
“Comparing to large and small hotels, small hotels needed our help more for  
example, legal advices, equipment, and marketing activities. Although with the large 
size it might be hard to regain the same level o f occupancy rate. But large hotels are 
very strong, especially international chains. ” (PRI_2B)
From these statements of policymakers, it is a surprising finding that they attempt to 
collaborate mainly from middle to large-size hotels. This is despite the fact that the tourism 
crisis management literature emphasizes that there are many SME’s that are family 
enterprises in the tourism industry with a significant number of instances of little market 
stability; low levels of capital investment; weak management skills; and resistance to advice 
or change (Jones, 2005). The focus on the large-size rather than small could be because this 
study focuses on case hotels studied in the area of Bangkok. Referring to Table 4.6, in 
Bangkok, the large hotel has a higher number of properties and rooms (126 small hotels with 
4,020 rooms /146 large hotels with 45,976) thus they deserve more focus.
We also can observe what assistance policymakers provide hoteliers. These are: collaboration 
among different interest groups; offering practical guidelines; knowledge (trainings) and 
information and equipment to deal with crises; financial incentives; and marketing 
stimulations. These lists of general interventions of polieymakers are similar to what the 
researcher has reviewed in Table 2.4. However, the degree of interventions of policymakers 
in tourism crises in the context of Thailand is considered as not so high from the perspectives 
of the hoteliers in this study.
One of the top managers in a large national ehained hotel complained that even though the 
hotel received information and responsive actions from polieymakers on erises, they are 
outdated and not timely delivered for hotels to prepare action steps.
“Information source whether from the hotel association or tourism authority o f  
Thailand ...is out o f date and not timely in transferring information ...they were 
sending out information, it was very slow, it was very late in coming and we receive
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something coming that we knew it was finished two days ago ... just a letterhead 
saying this is the situation. ” (TOFLNCl)
He (TOFLNCl) continued to comment on the collaboration during the crisis that the erisis 
management policymakers are not the key main group to collaborate with. Instead hotels 
should contact the organisations that would offer immediate help on speeific raised problems.
“For me to speak to an authority for assistance during an emergency, it wouldn 7 he a 
tourism authority. It would he the fire brigade that stands in the road, or army, or 
police i f  we needed helicopters, etc. so the Tourism Authority is not necessary. ” 
(TOFLNCl)
This rich narrative statement by TOFLNCl highlighted the important finding that dealing 
with erises in the past, these hotels managed chaos relatively well by themselves. 
Collaboration was criticised as inactive and information was distorted and unrelated to the 
situation. This finding is similar to Boin (2005), who explained that the information of crises 
offered by polieymakers that are formed by a variety of groups get filtered and polished as 
bargaining weapons. The slowness in sharing information is due to the laek of a mechanism 
to facilitate making sense by the polieymakers (Boin, 2005). The data of erises are normally 
scattered across various organisations, so to get a chance of acquiring collectively shared 
knowledge becomes a challenge (Boin, 2005).
Interestingly, a top manager of a large ehained hotel agreed on this point and explained that 
the hotel business may elect to manage the problem at hand without coordination with the 
policymakers. His statement follows:
“We are very advanced because we helped ourselves internally just because o f  the 
size. You know, we have 4 Vz thousand hotels worldwide! I  mean, the size is immense 
and the biggest hotel company in the world by number o f rooms so you help yourself, 
ok? You immediately get your reservations system back online and reservations 
along through the system which generates, you know, around 40 to 45% o f  your 
business. So that’s where it comes in quite well. ” (T10FLFC2)
The explanation of the degree of collaboration will be more or less according to which hotel 
type, depending on the type of crisis, the willingness to cooperate and the capacity of hotels 
to handle crises—which can be summarized by this interviewee:
“Collaboration will be for all types o f hotels... small or large, depending on the type 
o f crisis and the area that got affected. During the past crises, we received help from  
hotels located in Bangkok In the case o f airport closure, hotels that are members o f  
the Thai Hotel Association offered help to support accommodation and food  fo r  
travelers that were affected. ” (PRI_2A)
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The reflection of T10FLFC2 and PRI_2A is that the size and structure of ownership plays an 
important part in collaboration with polieymakers. Membership of Thai Hotel Associations 
evidently has importance for access support from the policymakers. And, vice versa 
policymakers get collaboration from hotel businesses in the time pressure of a crisis. 
However, the directory of the Thai Hotel Association indicates less than 10 % are small 
hotels. It seems that smaller hotels are less likely to become rherhbefs of the associations^ 
maybe beeause of the membership fee and regulations, or strategic directions with which they 
would need to comply.
However, as for crisis aftermath, one top manager of an international chained hotel showed 
appreciation for the effort by policymakers, i.e. launching a promotional policy to help hotels 
with marketing issues. He believes that this is one of the faetors that made Thailand recover 
quickly from a previous crisis.
“The Thai tourism authority was very active after crisis to promote gaining 
confidence again in destination, and we gained an opening up. I said, “Look, amazing 
Thailand is hack!” That really is amazing, really! I  haven’t seen this fo r  almost 7 
years— as how quickly Thailand actually recovers from any crisis. I t ’s unbelievable! 
There’s no other I  have ever seen in any other country that recovers so fast. ” 
(T10FLFC2)
The future continuation of collaboration for tourism crises was echoed by several hotel 
respondents in this study. They need more support from the policymakers to take a leadership 
role to control a crisis and provide more applicable knowledge to handle crises in a timely 
manner. Also, there is a need to develop a knowledge management system and set up a centre 
of knowledge for businesses. The representative ideal suggestions from the hotel respondents 
are as follows:
“Control that should have been there from the central government ...providing a 
better response for the core issues... information from the government or the tourism 
authority that was actually relevant I  think would help a lot.” fTOFlTHCl)
“The role o f policymakers or government that have the budget is to see importance o f  
knowledge management. Develop the centre o f information that the businesses can 
access to bring out the knowledge to make decision and sharing the views. ” (TOFLIl)
The top manager of a small hotel emphasised the need for fair treatment and respect for the 
opinion of the small hotels. Her statement is as follows:
“It seems that decisions are made and they just want us to acknowledge and direct 
use. We have no voice against those authorities. ” (T0FSI2)
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Comparing the statement of large and small hotels, their suggestions offer nothing new from 
what we have already known from the literature. It seems that these hotel businesses want to 
encourage the policymakers to take the leader role more seriously and to welcome more 
opinion from small hotels.
On the side of the policymakers, they are looking for long-term partnership to be in a erisis 
team and working together to overcome crises. Following are illustrative examples of what 
has been said:
“There is collaboration, but when they (hotels) really suffer from losing profit they 
withdraw from working with us. ”(PUB_1)
“When the crisis happens, instead o f working together, we are starting to point finger 
to each other. That is your job that is your fault. Why are we not trying to focus how 
to solve the problems? ” (PRI_1)
The statement of PUB_1 illustrates the low commitment and highlights the interesting finding 
that collaboration during erises is more difficult than in normal periods due to the fact that 
those who are affected may not offer help outside their own businesses. While the PRI_1 
shows that the coordination is limited and there seems to be rivalry amongst them. This is 
similar to what Boin (2005) found in the level of coordination group, which was that to 
manage the crisis there is a big reshuffle of personnel and organisation hence it is a challenge 
of the policymakers to convince members to understand the importance of their roles in the 
team.
To summarise this section, it has been seen that, in general, collaboration between hotels and 
policymakers is normally done through the top executive members of the hotels and 
polieymakers’ organisations. It is also evident in responses from hoteliers and policymakers 
providing different opinions. The reasons for the difference in opinion between hotel and 
policy sides could be beeause of the sample, as this study employed the case study strategy 
with a small number. Or, perhaps it is that both sides like to talk up or to exaggerate their 
own roles. For example, from the point of view of the hoteliers, in general it was perceived 
that collaboration in a tourism crisis is unsatisfactory and inactive. Several hotel businesses in 
this study claimed that they did not get much help from the polieymakers, while 
policymakers reported that collaboration with hotels is limited to members of Thai Hotel 
Associations. Their opinion in this sense is that cooperation, especially with large ehained 
hotels is good. It has been concluded that the degree of collaboration depends on the size and 
type of the hotels, being greater with large hotels, and poorer with small hotels. The laek of
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focus of the small hotels could be from the reasons that the number of small hotels is lower 
than the large hotel in the area of Bangkok and also that the small hotels are not members of 
the tourism related associations. For future eollaboration in tourism erises, there is a need for 
a stronger commitment from both sides. The policymakers should focus more on their 
leadership role and provide a fair participation while the hotels should provide long term 
Commitment and not too much fbeus on self-serving ihferests.
8.3 Knowledge Transfer Activities between Policymakers and Hoteliers.
This section presents inter-organisational knowledge transfer activities between policymakers 
and hotels. These findings are the insights gained from each group in Chapters 6 and 7 
relative to varying types of knowledge to be transferred. Also ineluded is the in-depth 
interview data of both groups on mechanisms used to transfer different types of knowledge 
transfer in a context of inter-organisation, facilitators, and barriers affecting the knowledge 
transfer process. The background of this section is from Chapter 3 about knowledge 
conversion modes by Nonaka (1994) and the mechanisms of knowledge transfer by Hall and 
Williams (2008), and Hjalager (2002).
As presented in Sections 6.3 and 7.4, the forms of knowledge of tourism crisis are mixed 
between tacit and explicit. In addition, it is apparent that the role of hotels and policymakers 
in crisis management transfer can be a knowledge interchange between sender and recipient. 
The knowledge of tourism erisis that they are trying to share can be summarised in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2 General types of knowledge of tourism crisis held by hotels and policymakers
Types of 
knowledge
Hotels Policymakers
SI LI LNC LFC
Explicit • Crisis / / • Crisis management
knowledge management plan checklists
plan • Policy and regulations
• Standard of • Statistics and situation
Procedure / / / analysis
(SOP)
• Business
Continuity / /
Plan
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Types of Hotels Policymakers
knowledge SI LI LNC LFC
Tacit • Hotel know­ / / / • Policy know-how and
knowledge how and 
experience of
experience of 
management team
management 
team 
• Personal
• Personal skills and 
expertise
skills and / / /
expertise
• Problem
experience of / / / /
crisis
Note: SI (Small/Independent hotel), LI (Large/ Independent hotel),
LNC (Large/National (Thai) chained hotel and LFC (Large/Foreign chained hotel)
Source: Author’s presentation with reference to Chapter 6 and Chapter 7
From Table 8.2, we can see that the knowledge of tourism crises is held in both tacit and 
explicit forms. The knowledge held by hotels is kept confidential and is linked to business 
competitiveness as a safety measure. Therefore, it will be shared only if the hotels are directly 
affected, having need for outsiders ‘opinion, or be requested to share. Otherwise, it remains 
for internal use only. This statement is in accordance with what has been said, as follows:
“I f  crisis happens to us here we have the business continuity plan to indicate the blue 
prints o f  the hotels. This plan is for internal use and confidential as it is accumulation 
o f our own wisdom and experience. ” (TOFLFCl)
“In case o f  terrorism, we will share our safety process to the police so that we can 
strategically plan for the measurement. ” (T0FLNC2)
There are hints from a previous section on collaboration and facts from Chapter 6 and 7— 
particularly in the section on knowledge acquisition—that most of the explicit knowledge 
showing in Table 8.2 is officially transferred from the policymakers to hotels via an official 
written format, i.e. letter, journals, documents as well as the technology-based format i.e. 
emails and websites. The other face- to-face transfer methods are via conversations, meeting 
at conferences, etc. It also found in Section 6.1 in their profile and social context that those 
private groups on the policymaking team, some of them are owners or top managers of the
285
hotels in this study. In addition, the tacit form through a training mechanism or seminar was 
used to support raising awareness to ensure readiness and clarification of steps to handle 
crisis. The following is a statement about sharing tacit knowledge at the pre-crisis stage.
“We offer training; for example, fire evacuation and controlling the mobs during the 
political protest crises. We coordinate with hotels to rehearse the steps o f  practice so
: :  that when crisis hits we will not get confused. ” ----------
However during and after a crisis, the policymakers also admitted that the use of two-way 
communication (telephone, short wave, radio, meetings)— especially faee-to-face meetings— 
are found to be important to share tacit knowledge and can enhance the transfer of explicit 
knowledge shown in Table 8.2.
“During crises, we set up a 24 hour crisis management centre. There is a team 
comprised o f those from both private and public sectors. We meet and talk to find  the 
way to manage crises and support stakeholders.
“Recently, we began using information technology as the channel to share knowledge 
to the hotels...If it is really urgent we use the telephone and the short wave radio. ” 
(PUB_2)
It is noticeable that the telephone is the most often mentioned transfer method, but it is 
limited one-to-one knowledge sharing and requires a certain amount of trust and relationship. 
Using the telephone to transfer knowledge is not as easy and quick as it sounds if the 
knowledge sender and knowledge recipient do not already know each other from the past. A 
direct telephone line to the right knowledge holder may be protected by gatekeepers or 
themselves for privacy.
Comparing hotels with regard to knowledge transfer, large hotels have a higher formal social 
interaction (i.e. meetings, trainings) of knowledge transfer than small hotels. This is due to 
the fact that the large hotels have the resources -  time, money, people— to participate in this 
process more than the smaller ones. As mentioned earlier in Section 8.2, the small hotels 
reflected that there is nearly no social interaction between them and policymakers. The 
sharing of knowledge would be a one-way direction of paper-sending from hotels.
So far, we have discovered from this study that the crisis knowledge types and transfer 
mechanisms between policymakers and hoteliers in Thailand are in both explicit and tacit 
format and take place formally and informally through various mechanisms in a pre-crisis 
period. However, in the acute stage of the crisis, the tacit forms through faee-to-face 
meetings and the two-way communication especially the telephone was found to be the
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primary way to reach the source contacts of knowledge who are the experts, or the decision 
makers, due to time pressure. This finding supports the study of Paraskevas (2012), that there 
are both procedural knowledge (rules, plans), behavioural knowledge (skills, experience), and 
expert knowledge shared between them. However, it can be noticed that the flow of 
knowledge will be more from the policymakers to the hotels. This knowledge of tourism 
crises was perceived as an aspect of compefitivehess by hotels. Knowledge of tourism crisis 
held by hotels is confidential and will be shared only for the benefit of the hotel. The “leam- 
ignorance” which is the knowledge of what they did not know in term of crises, was not 
mentioned. The leam-ignorance knowledge recognised by Paraskevas et al. (2013) is one 
form of knowledge that they have to share with each other so that they would know 
specifically how to help in filling unknown knowledge. This could be that they don’t want to 
lose face to admit that they lack knowledge or preparation of tourism crises.
Turning to the factors that affect the knowledge transfer process the list of facilitator and 
barriers identified in Table 3.5 together with specific factors of the success of knowledge 
transfer of inter-organisation by Siguaw and Enz (1999) is used to analyse the data. These 
authors said that the challenges of knowledge management between two firms are the 
characteristics of knowledge donor and recipient. Both donor and recipient must be equipped 
with an absorptive capability, learning motivation, and intra-organisational capability 
(diffusing facilities and skills).
To transfer knowledge between policymakers and hoteliers, the first and most important 
challenge is psychological issues related to people. Their attitude and commitment toward 
each other seems to be a barrier to acceptance or rejection of transferred knowledge for 
application to tourism crises in their decision-making or organisation. The negative attitude— 
especially from the hotels—can be detected from the following illustrative statements:
“Frankly, I  am not confident in the policy o f  the government. They claimed that they 
can control and hide the fact. There were conflicts between them and different 
messages were delivered. ” (M20FLNC1)
I f  you are a big hotel, they may listen to you. But fo r  the same size as my organisation 
i f  we speak directly to the policymaker they often think that we are trying to protect 
our business interest. ” (T0FLI2)
Considering the above statements from hotels and policymakers and reading through the 
chapter, we can detect the negative attitude and mistrust between them from keywords such 
as from M20FLNC1: ’"'not confident, hide the fact, conflict o f  message'', T0FLI2 “'protecting 
the interest. ” The last statement by T0FLI2 illustrates that the policymakers also think
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businesses are involved in tourism crisis management team to protect their interest. If the 
hotelier believes that the knowledge being transferred is not very useful to them, they may be 
uninterested or unwillingness to accept the knowledge to implement within their 
organisations.
The second factor afkcting the knowledge transfer proeess is concerned with the absorption 
capability in relationship to people as well. This includes eharaeteristics of the knowledge 
sources and knowledge recipient. It was evident that during an acute crisis, the tacit form of 
knowledge—for example, managerial knowledge, personal skills and experience—are the 
preferred forms to be transferred. Therefore, it was revealed that the people doing the transfer 
must have the communication skills to explain and reveal their tactics. The following is an 
example of the statement on the communicative skill of the knowledge sender.
“We are now focusing on the effective crisis communication, to speak to public it is 
important to make panic people understand the situation, deal with cries and comply 
with our tactics. ” (PUB_3)
Other evidence is based on the interview with expatriates. The documents from the 
policymakers are in Thai. Language becomes the barrier to understand transferred knowledge 
and so they need their secretary to translate those documents. Their statements are as follows;
“Documents and emails from those authority are in Thai. Especially emails cc to 
many people. It is difficult to know which one is one is important. What is the purpose 
o f that document? I f  I  think that the email is important then I  will ask my secretary to 
tellm e.” (JOVU^Cl)
Still other evidence illustrates that in one of the international chained hotels (LFC2) —  
although he is the General Manager of a five star hotel—he needed help from the General 
Manager of the four star hotel in the same hotel chain to deal with the impacts of the closure 
of the hotels during the political crisis. These two properties are located next to each other, 
therefore they can work together to overcome the political crisis.
It is an interesting finding that this chained hotel which seems to have an advantage in terms 
of available resources to implement knowledge management of tourism crises, faced the 
difficulty of receiving knowledge from the local policymakers. We have seen that the 
evidence from the statement of a middle manager (MIOFLNCI) in the beginning of the 
chapter reported that the department head was assigned by the General Manager to coordinate 
with the outsider. This is because of language barrier between the hotel manager and the 
expatriate who acted as the crisis champion and knowledge source.
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The last factor is concerned with resource constraints and motivation to attend. One of the 
policymakers who is responsible for education and development within the Thai Hotel 
Association commented on this:
“It is difficult to have cooperation from the hotels to attend training courses we 
offered. For the training about terrorism we asked the American Embassy to have an 
expert offer the training to hoteliers: The hoteliers are not interested. They said they 
are busy. ” (PRI_2B)
Considering the statement of PRI_2B, it seems that after the political crises, the hoteliers lost 
interest in the issues and preferred to resume their busy work. This may be worse in the case 
of small hotels that have limited staff to work during a busy period.
To summarize, this section has studied how knowledge is transferred between hoteliers and 
policymakers, and also what are the main barriers affecting this process. It seems that most 
explicit knowledge is transferred from the policymakers to hotels via official written format; 
however, other tacit forms are used to support crises management also via training, seminars, 
meetings etc. But, this is the case mainly for large hotels, where there is a higher social 
interaction of knowledge transfer than with small hotels. This is explained because of the 
availability of more resources in the larger hotels. All in all, effective transfer of most types 
of knowledge required intensive and effective interaction between source and the recipients. 
The strong relationship between two groups of people could facilitate the knowledge sharing, 
especially tacit knowledge through regular face-to-face meetings or two-way communication 
channels such as the telephone. Lastly, the main barrier detected to interfere with effective 
knowledge transfer has to do with the knowledge absorption capacity of people; for instance, 
the attitude and commitment of both parties, the characteristics of the knowledge sources and 
knowledge recipient and resource constraint. Currently, there seems to be a lack of trust and 
negative attitude between policymakers and hoteliers, especially during the period of a 
tourism crisis. The language and culture barrier is most evident between policymakers and 
chained hotels. There is a limitation of staff and financial resource to send staff to join the 
training programmes offered by policymakers. This finding in terms of factors affecting the 
inter-organisation knowledge transferred is incongruent with Siguaw and Ebz (1999), who 
emphasized that both donor and recipient must be equipped with an absorptive and intra- 
organisational capability.
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8.4 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has examined the relationships between policymakers and hoteliers in terms of 
knowledge transfer and crisis management collaboration. There are three key conclusions 
arrived at in this chapter.
The first observation, concerns the comparison between these two groups on their, 
understanding of tourism crisis management concept. The findings have revealed that there is 
still a lack of shared understanding of crisis management and an unsatisfactory coordination 
between policymakers and hoteliers. This divergent understanding of such concepts can be 
one of the main issues that affects the collaboration between these stakeholders.
The second observation is about the collaboration between these two groups in different 
stages of tourism crisis. Collaboration between hotels and policymakers is normally done 
through the top executive members of the hotels and policymakers’ organisations. The 
collaboration between hotels and policymakers during tourism crises is considered as likely 
ineffective (delays in transfer and information that is not up to date) by the hoteliers, 
especially during the period of a tourism crisis (due to the fact that those who are affected 
may not offer help outside their own business during crises). Nevertheless, at the recovery 
stage of crisis, the hoteliers interviewed were impressed by the destination marketing efforts 
introduced by the policymakers. The explanation of differences in offering help to hotel 
businesses is varied according to the type of crisis and the degree of impact of crisis toward 
hotels. Policymakers should focus more on their leadership and participation role while the 
hotels should commit in the long term without too much focus on self-serving interests.
The final observation is about knowledge transfer. There are both tacit and explicit forms of 
knowledge to be transferred and the role of both groups becomes being the knowledge sender 
and receiver to each other. Explicit knowledge was most frequently transferred and captured 
in all stages of tourism crisis management. However, during the crisis period, the tacit 
knowledge embedded in the individual is most preferred and shared through two-way 
communicative devices but a face-to-face meeting is regarded as the most effective 
mechanism. The resource and capability of the hotels affected the involvement and 
commitment of knowledge transfer. For instance, the large hotel has available knowledge and 
resources to work with policymakers. The main factors affecting the past to present 
knowledge transfer between these groups are: the negative attitude, the low-level of
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commitment and the quality of absorption capability, especially the characteristics of senders 
and receivers.
This chapter has completed objective one of the research by providing an analysis of 
understanding and objectives of policymakers compared with those of hotels for managing 
tourism crises that aj%et hotel businesses. The next chapter will present the conclusion of the 
thesis by consolidating the main theoretical concepts and key findings.
291
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS
9.0 Introduction
This final chapter concludes the thesis by consolidating the main theoretical concepts 
(Chapters 2, 3 and 4) and the results from the findings and discussions of Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to reflect on the extent to which the objectives of the 
research have been achieved.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section one presents the achievement of the study 
objectives. Section two discusses limitations of the study. Section three explains the 
contributions of the research on theoretical and methodological aspects, while section four 
provides practical implications to hotels and policymakers. The chapter ends with a 
recommendation for future research.
9.1 Achieving the Aim Study and Objectives
Tourism crises can have profound consequences for the tourism and hospitality industry. 
Effective knowledge management is central to dealing with such crises and this research 
seeks to understand in a better way this aspect of crisis management. An important aim of 
this research is to assist hotel businesses and policymakers to understand and include 
effective knowledge management processes to help them deal with tourism crises 
appropriately.
Although the importance of knowledge management and tourism crises has received 
substantial attention by both researchers and practitioners, there is still a relative lack of 
research that could provide adequate explanation of how the knowledge of tourism crises is 
actually being managed and transferred—especially in the tourism and hospitality industry. 
As a result, the understanding of tourism crisis and knowledge management for this industry 
remains unclear and further exploration is needed.
Therefore, the main aim of this research is to fill in this research gap by exploring knowledge 
management for tourism crises in Thailand during the period from 2001 to 2012 and to 
understand how this is manifested in the hotel sector. It studies the implementation of 
knowledge management of different types of hotels and the mechanisms that they used in
292
order to transfer their knowledge of tourism crises internally and externally with 
policymakers.
Considering the main research aim presented above, the specific research objectives of this 
study are to: First, analyse differences in the understandings and objectives of policymakers 
compared with those of hotels for managing tourism crises that affect the tourism and 
hospitality industry. Second, analyse differences between hotels of different sizes and 
structure of ownership in their recognition of tourism crises, and their knowledge transfer and 
management approaches. Third, examine barriers and facilitators of knowledge management 
for tourism crises which affect different types of hotel businesses. What follows is the 
summary and discussion of findings of the research in relation to each research objective.
9.1.1 Research Objective 1 :
“Analyse differences in the understandings and objectives o f  policymakers compared with 
those o f  hoteliers fo r  managing tourism crises that affect hotel businesses. ”
Understanding of Tourism Crises
Lobbyists _
/  Operation interruption 
Business opportunities
/
/  Negative impacts-.
Leaders /  KM Brokers 
National economy
Guesis safety Proflt-Loss /  E„„om lc-focus Protecting the interests of \  
wider group \
High -  Low Resources
I High* low commitment
\  Proactive-Reactive-none 
approaches
I Tourists 0  Image I
Unsatisfactory' coordination
Large scale crises
\
Flexible Mgt. (plans ^ intuition) 
Knowledge receivers
\   ^ ^ /  Moderated commitment
\  Explicit and Tacit j
/  Reactive approaches 
\  Single-loop /
Inflexible Mgt. 
Knowledge donor
N ote :
H oteliers
T he  overiaped  a rea  o f  the un d ers tan d in g  o f  ho te lie rs  and  po licy m ak ers
P o licym akers
Figure 9.1 Differences in the understanding of tourism crises between stakeholders 
Source: Author’s development from research findings in Chapter 6 and 7
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Figure 9.1 shows schematically the differences in understanding of tourism crises and the 
commonalities between hoteliers and policymakers, as a summary from Chapter 8.
Regarding the understanding of the term “crisis,” there is a consensus perspective between 
policymakers and hoteliers that crisis can be associated with a “threat” or negative events 
shown in area B o ftl^  Venn diagram 9.F It is also notable thaf policymakers tend to refer to 
crises in the sense of their broader impacts on the national economic impact and tourist 
destination image, with special attention given to loss of life and tourism income. 
Meanwhile, hoteliers are more concerned about the direct impact upon their hotel operations 
(assets, income, confidence of stakeholders— especially hotel guests, staff and investors). 
Some hoteliers acknowledged that crises can also bring them business opportunities.
Both parties consider it important to implement tourism crises management. They focus their 
efforts on safeguarding the image of the brand (hotel) or the image of Thailand 
(policymakers). The involvement in tourism crisis management seems to be driven by focus 
on economics, for instance losing businesses’ profitability and national receipts from tourism 
activities. Thereafter, policymakers and all hotels have their aim on tourists’ safety to gain 
tourists’ confidence to travel to Thailand and to stay at their accommodations.
Areas A and C of the Venn diagram 9.1 shows the discussion the tourism crisis management 
approaches. The policymakers are more reactive when dealing with crises, while for the 
hoteliers there is a wide range of attitudes: proactive for the large chained hotels, reactive for 
the large independent hotels, and almost none for the small hotels. The linear crises 
management (4Rs) is being developed by a member of the policymakers as a measurement of 
tourism crisis management, but it is not widely recognised and criticised for being too static. 
While some hotels have crisis manage plans i.e. business continuity plan, standard of 
procedure and or contingency plan however their decisions and responses to crises are likely 
to be rationalised and improvised based on their intuition and the evolving situation.
The diagram areas A and C also indicate key differences between hotels and policymakers 
and their actions and roles. Hoteliers considered that their actions should be more business- 
oriented and should reduce the impact of any crisis on their daily operations. The concerns of 
the policymakers were found to be the overall national economy and protecting the interest(s) 
of a wider range of stakeholders within the industry. Therefore, the policymakers tend to pay 
more attention and allocate their resources to large scale crises, adding the important 
component of policy guidance.
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Hoteliers’ commitment goes from high (large chained hotels) to low (small and independent 
hotels), whilst for policymakers there is a moderated commitment to implement tourism 
crises management. The role of policymakers is expected by hoteliers to be dynamic and 
provide crisis leadership so as to guide the industry how best to respond to crises as well as 
provide a centre of knowledge of tourism crisis (knowledge brokerage). However, it was felt 
that the policyniakers do hot perforni this role competently. The hoteliers currently act more 
as lobbyists to pressure the policymakers group. There is a strong urge from some 
policymakers that hoteliers should participate with and share their opinions and expertise 
more to the authority. Moreover, there is still a lack of shared understanding of tourism crisis 
and an unsatisfactory coordination between policymakers and hoteliers.
Turning to their practices on knowledge management for tourism crises, other hotel types and 
policymakers are inclined more to simply the provision of information management than the 
international chain hotel. There is strong evidence that the hoteliers and policymakers have 
learned from previous crises and have become more cautious as a result of their experience. 
However, it seems from the research that they both tend to reach only the stage of single loop 
learning. Knowledge of both forms: explicit and tacit are being transferred in informal and 
formal ways between them. With the known complexity and difficulties of sharing tacit 
knowledge, procedural crisis knowledge (explicit knowledge) is mostly transferred through 
formal mechanisms such as official letters, documents, emails or fax. It is evident that during 
an acute crisis behavioural crisis knowledge (experiences and skills) is extremely necessary 
but that the mechanisms for the sharing of this knowledge type are still limited. The 
knowledge normally flows from the policymakers to the hoteliers. The hotels did not want to 
share their knowledge with outsiders because of fears over competitive advantage.
9.1.2 Research Objective 2:
“Analyse differences between hotels of different sizes and organisations in their 
recognition of tourism crises, and their knowledge transfer and management approaches. ”
It was evident that size and structure of ownership of hotels determines their particular 
recognition of tourism crises. In large hotels, most interviewees mentioned a broader 
understanding of the impacts of tourism crisis, including the propensity of tourists to travel to 
crisis destinations; reduction of tourist visits; problems of hotel operation; reduction of hotel 
income; employee job stability; and problems for the entire tourism industry in general.
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The findings confirmed that large hotels have stronger determination and resources better 
geared towards the implementation of a more proactive tourism crisis management strategy. 
This finding corresponds to the literature in Section 2.4.1 which stated that the crisis response 
in large firms have occurred proactively emphasizing the importance of pre-planning— 
especially for international corporations that end up being vulnerable to crises from external 
environments. Given the” size of such firms, failure Of crisis mahagenieht can have 
tremendous negative effects upon a wider range of stakeholders. Therefore, proactive crisis 
management has come into being to ensure that decision(s) and action(s) have been executed 
effectively.
Furthermore, a key finding was that the interviewees perceived that hotel size and its 
ownership structure as factors to determine the ability to manage a tourism crisis and 
seamlessly implement knowledge transfer. Lack of sufficient resources to manage tourism 
crises in small hotels and large independent hotels was confirmed. Therefore, small hotels are 
highly dependent on external organisations— especially policymakers—for information on 
necessary crisis response.
In terms of implementing knowledge management, the characteristics of tourism crises as 
well as the context of hospitality have shaped the way knowledge management is being 
processed currently. This is akin to Burnett (1998) who reported that managing tourism crises 
is shaped by time pressure, control issues, threat level concerns and response option 
constraints.
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Figure 9.2 Common characteristics and differences among types of hotels in this study. 
Source: Author’s development from research findings in Chapter 7
Powerful findings were illustrated in Figure 9.2 on the relationship among the different type 
of hotels studied according to their knowledge transfer and management. At the centre of the 
graph, area (D), it can be seen that all hotels obtained knowledge from the mixed internal and 
external sources. However, only the large hotels (chain and independent) have wider access 
to tourism organisations, a high interest in implementing knowledge management and top- 
down/bottom-up approaches to sharing crisis knowledge, together with formal and informal 
ways of communication. Although, there are various ways to share knowledge, this study 
found all hotels prefer to share knowledge through face-to-face contacts—especially in 
meetings. These hotels recognised that crises do not always follow an orderly pattern.
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Therefore, they also apply individual’s intuition (tacit knowledge) to handle emerging 
situations.
In small independent hotels, represented in area (I) of Figure 9.2, the organisation of staff is 
more informal and/or flexible which allows for more natural and face-to-face contact between 
the staff in different departments^ and/or seniority. Nevertheless,^ t fîriding shows that they 
seem to have the lowest interest in implementing knowledge management for tourism crises. 
They put off developing a tourism crisis plan because it involves financial cost and a 
considerable amount of time for crisis planning which for them may not happen in the 
predicted way. In addition, the staff have a low degree of involvement in knowledge 
management. As for rank-and-file staff, they are not so sure about their role in a crisis 
situation and did not feel confident that they could assist by offering any ideas related to 
crisis management. The flow of knowledge in tourism crises tends to be relatively in a one­
way direction from top-down. A possible explanation is that the managers of small hotels 
have good knowledge about all functions because of the size of their hotel so they do not 
need to ask for more knowledge to make decisions. Also, it could be that the employees have 
less education and experience than those who work in the bigger hotels.
However, the large hotels in the two circles below (II, III and IV), having a higher number of 
staff and more resources, enabled them to implement knowledge of tourism crises to a greater 
degree. The overlapped area (B), showing the large hotel respondents, indicated stronger 
determination to implement instruction in knowledge management for staff at all levels. The 
reasons possibly were that their decisions and actions involved a wider group of hotel 
stakeholders and they recognized the benefits of implementing knowledge management to 
increase the effectiveness of managing tourism crises. In addition, they gain wider 
cooperation with outsiders, and as a result, the scope of knowledge becomes wider. Although 
there was a concern about the complexity of communication within large hotels, technology 
nowadays has made it convenient and efficient to manage the flow of knowledge within tall 
organisational (hierarchical) structured hotels. The knowledge of tourism crises was 
evidenced to flow in hoth top-down and bottom-up directions.
The area A of the Venn diagram nonetheless shows that the large independent hotels 
encountered similar limitation as the small independent hotels in terms of resources to 
implement knowledge management. Those of areas I and II are seen having the problem of 
having appropriate absorption capability especially. They tend to receive knowledge from the
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outsiders, especially from policymakers. With the difference in the characteristics of 
small/independent hotel (I) and chained hotels (III and IV), there is almost none of the same 
implementation found between them as shown in C area.
The distinctive finding of the knowledge management implementation of large independent 
(fi) and chain hotels (III and IV) were that large independents tend to have a higher cost of 
knowledge management implementation, due to the fact that they do not have the opportunity 
to share the costs incurred among other hotels, whilst the large chain hotels can share these 
costs within their chain. Chain hotels normally can obtain a ready-made tourism crises plan 
and knowledge base from their headquarters. However, the standardised procedural 
knowledge of tourism crises that flows downward from headquarters may cause inflexibility 
and inapplicability to the specific problem that the subsidiary hotels encounter. Nevertheless, 
the chained hotels may also receive the benefit of maximising both tacit and explicit 
knowledge from staff mobility, shared knowledge across hotels in the same chain. With 
access to substantial capitalisation from investors, they can establish state of the art 
technology to implement knowledge management and activities to support learning, i.e. 
training and giving feedback that other hotel types cannot afford.
The final finding has to do with the chain hotels that have their headquarters in Thailand and 
those with headquarters outside Thailand (The foreign chained hotel) shown in (III) and (IV). 
It seems that there is no significant difference between them except the expected challenges 
of geographical and cultural difference (language, difficulties to have face-to-face meetings, 
etc.).
9.1.3 Research Objective 3:
“To examine barriers andfacilitators of knowledge management for tourism crises that 
affect different types of hotel businesses”
Knowledge management is a complex issue, with success or failure to implement knowledge 
management depending on several factors. This part of the study highlighted the finding how 
these facilitators and barriers affect the hotel respondents for their in-house and inter­
organisation knowledge transfer and management. These facilitators and barriers shown in 
Table 9.1 strongly confirmed that Orzano et al.’s (2008) eight facilitators of and Riege’s 
(2007) key barriers to knowledge management and transfer are also influential factors in the
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context of the tourism and hospitality industry in Thailand. The finding further expands the 
lists of facilitators and barriers as shown in Table 9.1.
The key finding shows that for both internal and external knowledge transfer and 
management, the psychological facilitators regarding the helpful relationship; supportive 
leadership; effrctiye communication among the staff; and trusting climate are the major 
focus that influences the process. For instance, where the staff participate willingly in the 
process and share experiences / knowledge it is because there is encouragement and support 
from the supervisor or top manager. A trusting climate makes staff feel more comfortable and 
confident to express their opinions.
Table 9.1 Evidences to the facilitators and barriers found through this study
Evidence found by the researcher
Facilitators Internal knowledge transfer and 
management
External knowledge transfer
Active network Weak evidence Strong evidence
Reflective practice Weak evidence Weak evidence
Helpful relationship Strong evidence Strong evidence
Robust infrastructure Evidence in large chained hotels Strong evidence
Accessible technology Evidence in large chained hotels Strong evidence
Supportive leadership Strong evidence Strong evidence
Effective communication Strong evidence Strong evidence
Trusting climate Strong evidence Strong evidence
Job satisfaction New facilitator found -
Thai family culture and relationship New facilitator found New facilitator found
Motivation (remuneration system) New facilitator found New facilitator found
Barriers
Technological aspects Evidence Evidence
Organisational aspects Evidence Evidence
People challenge aspects Strong evidence Strong evidence
Resources constants ( budget ) New barrier found New barrier found
Source: Author’s development ;Tom research findings in Chapters 6-8
It was revealed that the active network is a strong facilitator for inter-organisation knowledge 
transfer and management but not so much for sharing knowledge internally within the
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organisation. An explanation could be that to transfer knowledge across properties, the 
network enhances the accessibility of external knowledge sources from unfamiliar 
organisations. With regard to internal knowledge management, normally the internal staff 
have specific roles and authority based on job descriptions and the organisation chart which 
allow them to proceed with the knowledge management and transfer process although they 
do not know each other. ' '
Another key finding shows that different size hotels require a different hardware facilitator. 
For large hotels, the number of staff is greater and the data flow is more complicated. The 
knowledge is dissimilated in horizontal and vertical directions of the organisation chart. 
Technology is strongly evident to support such knowledge transfer. The knowledge can reach 
recipients with accuracy and in timely manner to key decision makers and other actors in 
tourism crises management in the organisation—managers as well as key staff. The robust 
infrastructure is also evident as a necessary facilitator for example to arrange a town hall 
meeting and to train staff.
The important key finding in the case of inter-organisation transfer was that that both donor 
and recipient must be equipped with an absorptive capability in term of hardware resources 
(technology and infrastructure). For instance in the chained hotel, the subsidiaries and 
headquarters must have a compliable technology and a linked data management system.
The newly emerged facilitators that increased the list of Orzano et al.’s (2008) 8 facilitators 
are: job satisfaction, Thai family culture relationship and motivation with remuneration 
system. Job satisfaction caused staff to become loyal to the firm and they would want to 
contribute their knowledge to help the firm. Thai family culture and relationship was added 
because staff look after each other as if they are the family members, which foster 
collaboration between them. A positive remuneration system also becomes a strong 
motivation for staff to continue to work for this organisation. This shows that Thai cultural 
values have a direct effect on the willingness of staff to participate in knowledge transfer and 
management
Turning to the barriers, for both the internal and external knowledge transfer and 
management, the most important barrier for the majority of the interviewees was clearly the 
people challenge: how to manage different people within the organisation, with different 
attitudes, different knowledge levels, different cultures, etc.
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Currently, there seems to be a lack of trust and a negative attitude between policymakers and 
hoteliers, especially sharing the information. The language and culture barrier is most evident 
between policymakers and chained hotels.
For the technological barrier, only the (small and large) independent firms considered it as a 
barrier, because large chamed hotels declared thsd they are ready to use packaged systems 
and have innovative technologies available for knowledge of tourism crises. Regarding the 
case of conflict between policymakers and hoteliers, it was sensed that there is weak evidence 
of the presence of any hardware facilitator in technology to facilitate the collaboration of 
knowledge transfer and management.
The last barrier is about the organisation. The small hotel seems to lack strategic direction to 
implement knowledge management for tourism crises. The rank-and-file have less 
participation in knowledge management process and tourism crisis management. However, 
having a small number of staff seems to be advantageous for increasing the chance of face-to- 
face interaction and fostering a good working relationship amongst staff. In transferring the 
knowledge between the origination and recipients, it was evident that different organisations 
have different norms, values and interest. As a result, conflict of interest and unsatisfactory 
collaboration between hoteliers and policymakers exists.
The newly emerged barrier beside the ‘TOP’ barriers is resouces. The constant flow of funds 
affects the ability of hotel and policymakers to develop an appropriate absorption capability 
and also to involve and or to commit to collaboation in knowledge management 
implementation for tourism crises.
Although people are perceived as the major barrier, the finding confirmed that these factors 
are coherent and the organisation should try to solve these barriers. The majority of 
interviewees agreed that education and training are the solution to overcome the people 
barrier. This finding is congruent with Riege (2007), that managers must provide a mentoring 
and coaching programme to eliminate the misperception and lack of proper absorption 
capability. For instance, the case of any mismatch between technology and people can be 
minimised by offering training and also researching for suitable technology. The solution is 
to reduce the tension caused by differences in attitude and behaviour. An interviewee 
proposed that for Thai staff, the approach would be talking and assisting them to understand 
and change behaviour in an incremental manner.
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9.2 Limitations
The research was designed thoroughly and conducted with an effort to meet a high quality of 
research standard especially in dependability as well as creditability and transferability of 
findings. However, there are still some limitations which are related to methodological and 
practical constraints.
First, methodological limitation. By applying the case study strategy, the interview group size 
is small, based on a specific region (Bangkok) and country (Thailand). A non-probability 
sampling technique is selected, thus it is lacking in general application. Nevertheless, the 
researcher was aware of this fact and justified the reasons for choosing the case study strategy 
in Section 5.7. This researcher wants to provide a rich qualitative analysis and description of 
particular tourism crises affecting the Thai tourism industry. The outcomes of the findings 
with respect to theory would possibly be transferable to other researchers to assist their 
judgement about their findings in similar settings (Remenyi, 2009).
Second, the literature in Chapter 4 indicated that not all provinces in Thailand were regarded 
as tourism destinations. The hotels in this study are located in the touristic and business areas 
in Bangkok, so their primary market is international tourists. Hence the findings would be 
specific to this international tourist oriented hotels.
Third, the study evaluates the issues relating to knowledge management for tourism crises in 
Thailand from 2001 to 2012. In order to gain in-depth description evidence occurring in the 
past, the data collection of this research is mainly gained from the views of the policymakers 
and hoteliers who are currently working now in the organisation and have backgrounds 
related to the topic of the study. Consequently, the discussions and finding were drawn from 
what respondents remember had happened or how they had been involved in the tourism 
crisis events. Therefore, documents are important evidence to be used to corroborate the 
results from the interviewee’s perceptions.
Fourth, acknowledging the absence of appropriate data from documentation due to 
confidentiality and limitation of time spent in observation. It may slightly affect the quality of 
the research as to creditability and transferability. However, the data is derived from 
interviews of at least two embedded cases per each type of hotel, recognised to provide an 
analytic generalisation in order to have a broader theory (Yin, 2009). In addition, 
interviewing more than one person in each hotel is able to provide strong support and 
generate extensive understanding of the studied hotels.
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9.3 Contributions to Knowledge.
This section presents how this study has added to the exiting body of the knowledge. Overall 
key main contributions are summarised in Table 9.2.
Table 9.2 Summary of key main contributions
Theoretical Contributions Methodological Contributions
1. Understanding of concept of tourism 
crises and approach to manage them by 
policymakers and by hoteliers in context 
of Thailand.
2. Practices of knowledge management and 
transfer for tourism crises by hotels in 
Thailand that have different 
characteristics with respect to size and 
ownership.
3. Support of the exiting literatures in 
particularly nonlinear crisis management 
approaches, knowledge management and 
transfer models.
4. Extended lists of barriers and facilitators 
of the knowledge management process.
1. Employing a multiple case study research 
methodology and interviewing 
interviewees at multi-levels of the 
organisation from rank-and-file staff to 
top managers within each case study 
hotel adds a holistic depiction to the 
available findings.
Source: Author’s presentation
Table 9.2 shows the main contributions of this thesis. The rest of the section will discuss in 
relevant to the theories and the research methodology.
9.3.1 Theoretical Contributions
The findings from this study make several contributions to the current literature.
First, the study has gone some way toward better understanding of the concept of tourism 
crises understood by hoteliers and policymakers in the context of Thailand. The difference in 
their understanding is presented in Figure 9.1.
Second, the findings of the research provide contextual and situational insights into how 
hotels with different characteristics in respect to size and ownership dealt with tourism crises
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in Thailand and integrated that with a knowledge management process. The evidence 
emerging from the empirical data has provided valuable insights into the importance of 
implementing knowledge management as a tool to support hoteliers and policymakers to 
make decisions and handle crisis appropriately (Sections 6.3, 7.3 and 7.4). The presentation 
of the common characteristics and differences among types of hotels in their knowledge 
management for tourism crises is shown in Figure 9.2.
Third, this research provides a list of mechanisms for transfer of tourism crises knowledge to 
policymakers in Table 6.1 and for hotels in Table 7.3. The choice of knowledge transfer 
mechanism depends on three factors: (1) resources (i.e. finance, number of staff) of the 
organisation, (2) the forms of knowledge—tacit or explicit and (3) the transfer conditions 
including the characteristic of the receivers, either individual or group; the relationship; and 
lastly the phase of tourism crises.
Fourth, the study’s major findings that were confirmed, contradicted and extended some 
empirical findings as summarized in Table 9.3.
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9.3.2 Methodological Contributions
Employing a multiple case study research methodology and interviewing interviewees at 
multi-levels of the organisation from rank-and-file staff to top managers within each case 
study hotel adds a holistic depiction to the available findings. By using a qualitative 
approach, the research findings are more profound and comprehensive in explaining how and 
why than the findings that most of the previous research literature on tourism and hospitality 
offered by using quantitative approach. In addition the use of several methods in the data 
collection process— interview (primary research tool) and non-interview data (observation 
and documents)—has added the credibility of findings being presented.
9.4 Practical Implications
In addition to the academic contributions, this study also offers implications to policymakers 
and hotel businesses. According to the research results there are five important practical 
implications of effective knowledge management for tourism crisis to both groups as shown 
in Figure 9.3
A ttune th e  ’ 
understanding ! 
and se t com m on  j  
ob jectives o f | 
k now ledge  
m an agem en t o f | 
toruism  crises\__________ J
Audit th e  
necessary  
k now ledge o f  
tourism  crises and  
th e  absorption  
cabability
J
X
O rganise th e  
team w ork  to  
m anage th e  
orgnisational I 
k n ow ed ge and  
collaborate with ; 
know ledge source |
Establish th e  
system atic  
know ledge  
m an am gen t  
process to  create  
th e  organisational 
know ledge
C ontinue to  learn 
and have a 
com m itm en t to  
know ledge  
m an agem en t  
p rocess
Figure 9.3 Practical implications for effective knowledge management of tourism crisis 
Source: Author’s presentation
To begin with the first implication, the result of the research in Figure 9.1 shows that the 
primary reasons they are ineffective in their collaboration and knowledge management for 
tourism crises are due to the different understanding of and the conflict of the common goal 
amongst policymakers themselves as well as hotels. Therefore, it is necessary to attune 
understanding on a concept of tourism crisis and to set agreed objectives for the process of 
creating and sharing knowledge of tourism crisis. These can be achieved by providing 
education through training and social interaction. Also, by encouraging face-to-face meetings 
in order to develop relationships, personal interaction and enhance collaboration. The 
policymakers should create more emphasis on knowledge of tourism crises platform to 
stimulate knowledge exchange between several interest groups to find the balance of needs or 
at least to create the awareness and understanding of different groups. Technology can assist
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online face-to-face meetings and should be adopted more widely to share knowledge of 
tourism crises. For example, tacit knowledge embedded in a crisis-experienced person is 
important, especially dealing with an urgent crisis. It is important to reduce the fear of 
sharing by developing the error-harvesting culture. It refers to an organisation where a group 
of team members work together to discuss problems, issues and collective appraisals on 
remedial measures.
The second practice has to do with auditing for what knowledge of tourism crisis is needed. 
The finding shows that the current practice of most organisations in this study does not much 
go beyond information management. As a result, they encounter an overload of information 
which not only causes time and effort to management but which may or may not be 
applicable for managing tourism crises. Therefore, it is important that within each 
organisation, between policymaker and hotel they should work together to audit what 
knowledge of tourism crisis is needed; from which sources; and how to transfer right 
knowledge to the right people at the right time. In addition, the finding shows that at present 
supporting programmes of tourism crises by policymakers are influenced by the large 
businesses and ignore the heterogeneity of the hotel industry. Hence, policymakers should 
therefore assess the different absorption capability and focus policy on categorisation for 
different hotel types and provide problem-specific assistance for knowledge, advice, and 
trainings.
The third practice is organising a team of knowledge management of tourism crises. There is 
a strong link between the benefit of knowledge management and tourism crisis management. 
However, the process of knowledge management is complex, especially in large 
organisations and inter-organisation knowledge transfer. Therefore, a clear organisational 
structure, role and partnership agreement should be officially set up. Especially, important for 
the policymaker whom the business has counted on heretofore as the leader in tourism crisis 
management. Within the Tourism Intelligence Unit, policymakers should consider appointing 
a full-time manager to work in the Unit. The Unit should have specified divisions such as for 
hotels, travel agencies, MICE, and tourist services. The finding in 6.3.2.1 shows that 
knowledge of tourism crises came from several sources and may have technical issues and 
consequences that not easily understood and or comprehended. Therefore, the policymakers 
should employ experts to monitor and translate technical information; then transfer it to the 
different users, especially hotels.
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The fourth is to pay attention to implementing a systematic knowledge management process, 
especially the knowledge storage/retrieval and knowledge transfer systems in hotels. 
Although the systems require an investment of money, time and effort, the benefits of 
implementing knowledge management of tourism crises is evident from the finding of this 
study. Policymakers should offer help, especially to independent hotels, to have sufficient 
knowledge absorption capabilities so that they can collaborate more in knowledge 
management for tourism crises. The findings also revealed that small hotels likely do not 
have a tourism crisis management plan because it is a matter of not having resources to create 
one.
The fifth is the commitment in implementing the knowledge management of tourism crises. 
Knowledge management is a continuous process. Those organisations that have experienced 
crises repeatedly should grasp the opportunity to learn how to deal with them. The 
organisation should develop putting in place a programme to proactively prepare before a 
crisis happens by applying several crisis management approaches, beginning with risk 
assessment and a crisis management plan to suit the local scenario; then in addition, they 
should focus on providing feedback and sharing lessons learned from crises to be able to 
avoid the same mistakes or to explore an innovative way to deal with crises. However, it was 
suggested that work overload is a barrier to learning and that staff are likely to share their 
feedback in a trusting environment and also from having something to be gained. 
Therefore, this would be managed through a human resources function such as getting 
confidential feedback from a human resources appraisal and attaching the evaluation to the 
remuneration system.
In addition to above five key practical implications for both policymaker and hotels, there are 
some specific implications for hotels, which are that they need to develop collaboration with 
policymakers and including other tourism stakeholders—all being co-producers of 
knowledge of tourism crises.
It is clear from the interviews that collaboration with the policymakers and including other 
tourism stakeholders is a good foundation on which to build. The tourism industry is 
fragmented and diverse, especially since by collaborating the small and large independent 
hotels can use the advantage of being in cooperation to access and to negotiate for support in 
both resources and knowledge to deal with crises. In addition, the findings also show that 
through collaboration, the social interaction and relationship fostered the knowledge-sharing
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with special attention to tacit knowledge which is vital in acute crisis periods. Personal trust 
and relationship is seen to be effective in opening pathways to reach this level of knowledge 
in a timely manner.
Hotels should also endeavour to create relationships with other stakeholders, especially with 
the con^unity. When handling a tourism crisis, the hotel focuses on its business and hotel 
guests, and sometimes overlooks the community, as seen in the case of a large hotel that 
handled the floods. It is evident from this case that the hotel can be an active agent in shaping 
the nature and spreading of the crisis. Thereafter, the hotel should consider the community as 
an additional stakeholder when making decisions on how to handle crises to avoid conflicts.
The chained hotels seem to have an extensive and innovative knowledge of tourism crises but 
the study showed that they are unlikely to share this with the outsider because this knowledge 
is also considered valuable and proprietary to enhance their competitiveness by increasing the 
confidence of hotel guests to stay with them. However, tourism crises can be aggregated and 
expanded to encompass other and major problems. The sooner the problem can be detected 
and managed the lesser the damage and by damage limitation it will benefit society including 
the hotel itself.
9.5 Recommendations for Further Study
Possible areas for further research are grouped into three areas: scope, specific issues arising 
from analysis, and methodology:
First, as the research was limited to tourism crises in Thailand, to rank-and-file staff, middle 
manager and top managers in the hotel industry, future studies are encouraged to replicate the 
conceptual framework in a context of different areas or to other sectors in order to achieve 
cross-sectional comparisons.
Second, considering that knowledge management and tourism crisis is a recently considered 
field as well as other concepts described in this study (e.g. knowledge transfer, crisis learning 
and collaboration), future research is necessary. As mentioned throughout this study, there 
are still fundamental problems to be addressed such as conceptual definitions and 
implementation. This research provided an exploratory analysis of those concepts in the case 
study and more attention is necessary.
Future research might consider giving more attention to the taeit knowledge since the transfer 
of tacit knowledge is more diffieult and complieated. Therefore, more research on the tacit
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knowledge of tourism crises is needed in order to provide a more complete and thorough 
understanding of this complex area.
Rather than focusing mainly on the knowledge transfer and managing processes, future 
studies could also extend to study the individual or group learning of lessons learned from 
previous crises.
This study has also shown that crisis communication is important, and a more in-depth 
examination of meehanisms to communicate on specific types of erisis (es) and the stages of 
crisis (es) is needed.
Lastly in terms of methodology, there is a different array of research approaches, for 
example: longitudinal studies to monitor the change in application of knowledge management 
activities to other and future tourism crises.
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Appendix 1: Examples of Correspondence
[Date]
[Position]
I am a PhD researcher at the School of Hospitality and Tourism Management / University of 
Surrey and I am researching Knowledge Management for Tourism Crises: A Multi-Case 
Study of Hotels in Thailand.
The specific research objectives of this study are: (a) analyse differences in the approaches of 
policymakers compared with those of hotels for managing tourism crises; (b) analyse differences 
between hotels of different sizes and organisations in their recognition of tourism crises, and their 
knowledge transfer and management approaches; and (c) examine barriers to, and facilitators of, 
the transfer and management of knowledge about tourism crises.
The results of this study should provide hotels and policymakers with a framework for 
understanding the role of knowledge transfer and management approaches to tourism crises, and 
suggest ways in which these can be improved.
Your input and participation are critical for the success of the study. At least 3 persons—General 
Manager, Department head and staff—are requested to participate in the interview which may take 
approximately 60 minutes per person. The interview could be arranged at your convenient time 
and date between 10 March and 10 May 2013. Any information you provide will be kept strictly 
confidential and will be used only for research purposes.
Thank you very much for your co-operation.
Yours sincerely,
Jirapa Wongtao
PhD Researcher
School o f  Hospitality and Tourism  
Faculty o f  Business Econom ics and Law  
University o f  Surrey 
Guildford GU2 7XH
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The main aim of this study is to explore knowledge transfer and the management of tourism 
crises in Thailand from 2001 to 2012 in the hotel sector. The specific research objectives are: 
(1) analyse differences in approaches of policymakers and hotels to manage tourism crises 
that affect hotel businesses; (2) analyse how hotels of different sizes and organisational types 
approach tourism crises and knowledge management; and (3) examine the barriers and 
faeilitators of knowledge transfer and management with respect to tourism crises businesses.
The study has potential to benefit hotels, policymakers and other stakeholders by increasing 
their understanding of knowledge transfer and management practices for managing tourism 
crises. The study aims to provide insights into how knowledge transfer and management 
practices have been implemented differently in hotels with different sizes and organisations, 
as a contribution toward developing crisis management guidelines.
All the information and data you provide will be treated as confidential and will only be used 
for academic purposes.
As part of this study, you will be interviewed by the researeher at your convenience and at the 
loeation of your choice for approximately 60 minutes. The interview will discuss your 
thoughts on, and experience of, knowledge transfer and management of tourism crises. If 
you give permission, these interviews will be audio taped and then transcribed. After 
completing the interview, you may be contaeted to confirm some details that we talked about 
or to eonfirm that the researcher has recorded your views accurately.
The questions will deal with policy, management and other professional issues. You will, of 
course, have the right to choose not to answer any question that makes you feel 
uncomfortable. Furthermore, you may withdraw from the interview at any stage if you so 
wish.
1 will be emailing a summary of the findings of this study to all participants. Please write 
your email address in here if you would like to receive this 
summary_________________________.
If you have any concerns about any aspeets of the study, please eontaet Jirapa Wongtao 
(email: i.wongtao@surrev.ac.uk (3) +44 (0) 07721311126 (UK) (5) +66 (0) 815321033 
(Thailand) or Professor Allan Williams (email: allan.williams@surrev.ac.uk (5) +44 (0) 
01483 686308) and Professor John Tribe (email: i.tribe@surrev.ac.uk (D +44 (0) 01483 
686319).
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UNIVERSITY O F
SURREY
Project Title: Knowledge Management for Tonrism Crises:
A Multi-Case Study of Hotels in Thailand 
Consent Form
• I agree to take part in the study on Knowledge Management for Tourism Crises: A Multi- 
Case Study of Hotels in Thailand.
• I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided. I have been given a full 
explanation by the principal investigator (Jirapa Wongtao) of the nature, purpose, location 
and likely duration of the study. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all 
aspects of the study and have understood the advice and information given as a result.
• I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information sheet, being 
used for this study. I understand that all personal data is held and processed in the 
strietest eonfidenee, and will be held and stored in line with the University policy (i.e., 
held for 10 years) and kept secure in aceordance with the Data Proteetion Aet (1998).
• I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time.
• In the event of needing to complain about any aspects of the way I have been dealt with 
during the eourse of the study, I understand that I should eontaet Jirapa Wongtao (email: 
i.wongtao@surrey.ac.uk (3) +44 (0) 07721311126 (UK) (5) +66 (0) 815321033 (Thailand) or 
Professor Allan Williams (email: allan.williams@surrev.ac.uk (3) +44 (0) 01483 686308) and 
Professor John Tribe (email: i.tribe@surrev.ac.uk (3) +44 (0) 01483 686319).
• I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating in 
this study.
Name of partieipant (BLOCK CAPITALS) ............................ .............................
Signed ..........................................................
Date................................................................... .........................................................
Name of researcher Jirapa Wongtao
Signed............................................................... .................. .................. ....................
Date................................................................... .....................................................
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A ppendix 5: L ist o f  D ocum ents O btained
No. List of Documents Sources Specific reference to 
documents in thesis
1. Hotel Fact Sheets LIl ,LI2,LNC 1 ,LNC2,LFC 1 ,LFC2 Section 7.1, Section 
7.2
2. Emergency Procedures LNC2 Section 7.3
3. Membership Directory PRI_1,PRI_2,PRI_3 Chapter 5, Section 
5.5
4. The definition of tourism 
crisis
PUB_4 Section 6.2
5. The 4 stages of crisis 
communication
PUB_3 Section 6.2
6. Preparation of reputation 
management
PUB_3 Section 6.2
7. PAT A Bounce Back Crisis 
Recovery Guide
P R I l Section 6.2
8. PATA Webinar on:
• Risk Evaluation and 
Avoidance 
Preparation
• Effective Tourism 
Crisis Management
• Risk Mitigation and 
Crisis Management 
in Tourism - 
Recovery Marketing 
Model, the 10 step 
process.
• Review and 
Direction for Crisis 
Prevention and 
Recovery 
Management
PRI_1 Section 6.2
9. Thailand Tourism 
Confidence Index 2013/1
PRI_4 Section 6.2
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Appendix 6: Examples of Descriptive Narrative Observation from L FC l
It is now noon, on 2 April 2013,1 arrived at the hotel. The concierge came to me to help me 
take my luggage from the taxi. This is the third time that I visit this hotel, but this will be the 
first time that I stay overnight. The hotel decoration is modem and luxurious as you would 
expect from a five star hotel.
At the check-in counter, I gave my national ID card and signed the guest registration form. 
When I handed in the form, the receptionist could see my career credentials and where I am 
working. He said that he graduated from Mae F ah Luang University where I was a lecturer 
before I went to study at University of Surrey. It was a surprise to meet a student from the 
University where I used to work. While he was preparing my check in, we chatted a bit of 
about his working life here.
After getting a key card and a white envelope, he escorted me to my room which is located 
on the executive floor. This floor can be reached by using the key card inserted into the 
elevator machine for safety and privacy.
When I arrived at my room, my luggage was there already. It was such an efficient 
cooperation between receptionist and concierge. He explained to me the breakfast area and 
services in the room.
The room was elegant, a welcome fruit basket was served. I opened the letter which 
contained a welcome note by the General Manager and benefits of the executive floor, i.e. the 
Free Wi-Fi, Newspaper, welcome drink, ABF at Executive floor, and fitness. I was so 
impressed how they treated me with the upgrade for the price I had been offered.
I went to the desk inside the room to check what things are available related to my research 
topics. On the desk there was a folder containing information, telephone number both internal 
arid external. Welcome note, and stationary as what you can expect to see in the hotel. In the 
folder, they also have the Guest Emergency Procedure available in Thai, English, Japanese, 
and Chinese for crises, i.e. Fire, Earthquake, Terrorism, Medical emergency, suspicious 
object. Bomb Threat.
As an example the message for the hotel guest for suspicious object or bomb threat:
• “DO NOT TOUCH IT” report immediately to nearest Hotel Staff, DO not talk to 
anyone else about it.
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“Dial [Telephone number is removed] to bring the suspicious object to the hotel 
Management’s attention
Do not let anybody go near the suspicious object 
Follow instruction from the hotel Management 
Please try to remain Calm at all times
An example of fire in your room / on floor
Sound the alarm by shouting “FIRE” at the top of your voice 
Quickly pull down the fire alarm 
Inform Hotel Staff 
Dial Emergency hotline service
Proceed to the nearest Fire Exit together with any visitors in a hurry, while trying to 
keep calm
Use the fire Exit and go down the stairs. Do not use the elevator 
Proceed to ASSEMBLY POINT and stand by at FLAG POLE in front of hotel. Car 
park ( see the MAP)
Report to our emergency Coordinators service and remain calm 
Wait for the “All Clear” before going back to the hotel”
PLEASE DO NOT PANIC 
At the door (the door) of my room there is the evacuation map showing its location and the 
fire exit.
Next morning, I received a wakeup call at 7.00 am. I had three interviews scheduled starting 
at 9 am. I went to have breakfast. I was impressed by the variety of food and quality. The 
staff was very friendly, you can order them what to cook and then they bring it to your table. 
Tea and coffee are served by staff. There was a mixture of family groups and business 
people. It was not so crowded. Too bad I had less than an hour to be there.
I called the Executive secretary to confirm the schedule and interview venue. I was asked to 
go to the Business centre. At around 8.45, I contacted the receptionist to inform about my 
appointment. The executive secretary to the General Manager came out from the room behind 
the business centre. She escorted me to the room and offered me coffee or tea.
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At around 9 o’ clock, the secretary brought two persons, one is a rank-and-file staff member 
and her department head. After greeting, I explained my research details and followed the 
process. I informed the department head that I only needed to interview a rank-and-file staff, 
one person at a time. I had a department head scheduled for the next hour. However, I 
expressed appreciation for his coming. We exchanged business cards in case I needed to ask 
him for further information. The interview went ok and interviewee provided very useful 
information related to the topic. At about 10:15, I began to interview the Human Resources 
Department Manager. She provided good insight into her roles.
At 11:15 the executive secretary asked me to wait in the receiving area in the Executive 
Office. I was waiting for the interview with the General Manager because he was engaged 
with other business. The interview started at 11:30. I was invited to his office. There are his 
working desk with laptop and three cabinets behind, and on the side. I was asked to sit at the 
round table with 5 seats located in front of his desk. The interview went well and the 
interviewee was knowledgeable on the topic. When we came to the questions about tourism 
crisis management, he suddenly stood and walked from the table to the cabinet next to his 
desk. He brought out two black folders and explained that these are how the knowledge of 
crises is basically stored. While he spoke, he showed the researcher the table of contents 
containing international and local crises, the facilities and amenities, blueprints, and different 
colour codes of crises. They are clearly structured by labels. The standard of practice for 
different crises are similar to the one I found in a guest room but with more detail on the 
practitioners’ sides.
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1 Appendix 7: An Example o f Transcribed Interview: Transcripts from Interview
2 TO FLNCl
3 The code of Interviewee : TlOFLNCl
4 Hotel : [Name removed]
5 Date of interview : 23 March 2013
6 Gender : Male
7 Nationality : Australian
8 Duration : 75 min
9 Interviewer: So, for the first question, 1 would like to ask your opinion. How do you define
10 the word “Tourism crisis”?
11 Interviewee: For me. Tourism crisis is anything that will impact tourism whether a natural
12 phenomenon, a political uprising or political situation, or could be something even like a
13 financial situation that is going to upset the usual path of tourism in Thailand. We need to
14 provide special attention.
15 Interviewer: How long have you been working in Thailand?
16 Interviewee: Collectively, would be six years. But this period has been four years.
17 Interviewer: WeTl focus on the timeframe of your working in Thailand be about six years;
18 and from your experience, what crisis do you think had the most impact to tourism in
19 Thailand, especially to the hotel industry?
20 Interviewee: Well, 1 think in my working experience when 1 was here the Asian tsunami that
21 was in 2004 had a massive impact on tourism, not just in Thailand, but throughout the region.
22 Then again, 1 guess, in 2008 it was the airport closure that everybody talks about. 2009 was
23 politics. After that, 2010 was a continuation of politics. 2011 was flooding you know, so
24 there’s been a string of tourism crises that had affected the country so 1 think, if anything,
25 Thailand has the perfect way to define what is actually a tourism crisis because we had so
26 many.
27 Interviewer: Regarding the hotel industry, or even this hotel, which one that you faced had
28 the most impact to the way the hotel operated?
29 Interviewee: Um 1 would say probably of the 2009 and 2010 events, that with the most
30 political violence was 2010,1 think. It was the worst one and had the biggest impact for the
31 municipality of Bangkok...but then 2010 with the political violence was so dramatic it did
32 not look like that there was any control within Bangkok whatsoever with of course the
33 consequential mass (tourist) cancellations which were very difficult for sustaining business
34 in that period.
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35 Interviewer: If I understand right you think that the crisis that seemed that you didn’t know
36 when it was going to end, and the impact expanded to a wider area, was quite significant?
37 Interviewee: As well, but also the nature of the event being so violent, costing loss of lives,
38 that was out of control. So yes, the unknown in terms how long that situation would go on
39 for, but also the lack of safety and general public safety caused by snipers on the roof, people
40 being shattered on the streets—the media publicity that surrounded all of that wasn’t great for
41 our tourism image in Thailand at that time.
42 Interviewer: from that event, or another kind of event, how did you manage that crisis?
43 Interviewee: Internally, as a hotel operator? Um...how does one manage? You look at
44 protecting your business and your people. There is your first priority. And when you say
45 “your people,” you will look after your staff. And then your guests and staff will receive the
46 main priority. But, there’s also the looking after the actual physical property and the actual
47 business of the revenue mark which has become secondary to that situation. It is such an
48 immediate emergency situation. It’s not about revenue; it’s not about profit and loss; it is
49 about protection and it is about protecting the human element of the job as well as protecting
50 the asset ... and having that preparedness in the event of any situation. We look at
51 contingency plans and securing the hotel and then of course we look at the security plans for
52 our guests and our staff to ensure that they didn’t put themselves in any immediate danger.
53 And then, how we communicate what is safe what is not safe, where people should or should
54 not go. I clearly recommend not to go outside until we know for sure that there is a safe
55 environment.
56 Interviewer: So, this plan has been executed before the crisis happened, or before it affected
57 the hotel, right? Because, you also mention about a contingency plan and its centre.
58 Interviewee: Yes , the nature of crisis that had been in Thailand was not seen featured in
59 some or any contingency plans that I had been aware of and I’m not sure about hotel
60 management school, whether it teaches abut tsunami preparedness, civil unrest preparedness,
61 flooding preparedness, and so on. So, sure, there was the falling back onto some of the basics
62 of fire and life safety contingencies in terms of protecting assets and looking after guests, and
63 so on. But, a lot of these plans are actually created and modified as the situation requires;
64 then for this building in particular, I was here for the flooding situation and we generated and
65 created a flood action plan leading up to the flooding. It’s like we pull up a manual about
66 what to do in the event of a flood.
67 Interviewer: So, there’s no manual for the flooding, and it is a kind of situation that is quite
68 an unexpected event, right? The hotel didn’t have a plan in advance for that so you think that
69 you had to manage it as the problems occurred?
70 Interviewee: Almost and again considering that we had emergency plans in the hotel: do they
71 cover flooding, or did they cover flooding? Tell enough detail? No. So, we now have a full
72 detail flood action plan in terms of how to respond; in terms of the actual flood situation that
73 threatens this physical building. ...During the process when carrying out a contingency plan
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74 and everything else I do, I prefer to go back to my tsunami manual in terms of just making
75 sure I didn’t forget something, if there’s anything that would be different, or anything that
76 we might add just to make it better.
77 Interviewer: So this plan could be used for the future case?
78 Interviewee: Yes
79 Interviewer: As you are the General Manager of this hotel what is your role in crisis
80 management?
81 Interviewee : Having been through a few of the crises in Thailand I think the main role of the
82 GM is to take charge of the situation and to reassure guests and staff that from a hotel
83 prospective the situation is under control and a lot of this comes back to communication
84 back to the people. Some of the first responses that we had were actually to communicate to
85 our guests as well to our staff....to meet update to one information. We knew sometimes
86 running around managing we did not know and then we would put in some advisories for our
87 people to take precautions. For? many crises it’s really important that you assemble your
88 crisis team as one of the first priorities because these are the people that are going support
89 you and there are people who are going to be advising as well as helping with what’s going
90 on. Again, for this hotel, going back to the flood situation the first thing that we did was
91 having a flood co-meeting and regarding it we weaved together the relevant departments,
92 including engineering, food, beverage, the kitchens, housekeeping, and human resources
93 particularly. This was so that when we could sit together we could formulate our plan. We
94 could amend our plan as the situation dictated when it was required to do so. Then, of
95 course, we can communicate our plan to our guests and to our staff. The main reasons to
96 take control is to also eliminate any panic because people are very quick to panic when they
97 are in an unknown country or unknown situation. By having that reassurance that someone is
98 in charge that is known for leadership through crisis situations I think is reassuring for a lot of
99 people and it’s comforting that they know that they will be looked after or somehow that
100 there is some reassurance. In the flood situation, for example, you know, we are telling our
101 guests and our staff that if we get flooded in to please not worry. The hotel has adequate
102 generator power for electricity supply, adequate food supply. It did change as the situation
103 changed as well so I suppose the command of the situation and the communication of the
104 situation were the critical ones.
105 Interviewer: Ok. And how about support from the executive committees in terms of crisis
106 management? How about in terms of policy in general?
107 Interviewee: When you say executive committee in the hotel?
108 Interviewer: Yes, I’m talking about the headquarters because [Name of hotel is removed] is a
109 group of hotels, so I would like to know how about the support from the executive
110 management. For example, you have initiated this and that ideas and I would like to learn
111 about general policy in terms of crisis management.
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112 Interviewee: Being a hotel group that operates properties in many different locations,
113 sometimes it’s the cities; sometimes it’s the upcountry; sometimes it’s the beach. It’s really
114 difficult to have one centralized policy for any dramatic situation. So, from the corporate the
115 top executive plan or for the hotel a lot of the policy is created from the hotel operational
116 situation and is communicated back to them. They will give support for what you are doing
117 in the field.
118 interviewer: About the crisis management. It is also one of the priority policies of the [Name
119 of hotel is removed] group. Am I right? I mean, that is also one of the matters they are
120 concerned about. I don’t know whether you have to meet the policies, the core policies of the
121 organization.
122 Interviewee: I would hold that crisis management is the main priority of any hospitality
123 operation, whether it’s Imperial or otherwise, in terms of having that commitment to look
124 after our guests, look after our staff, and protecting our asset. I think for any hotel company
125 you’d find that one would be their major focus points and having that preparedness in the
126 event of any situation.
127 Interviewer: Thank you. Let’s move to the second part of the questions about knowledge
128 management, when you have to make decisions or plan anything concerning tourism crisis.
129 Where do you get knowledge for whatever you need?
130 Interviewee: Yes, this is a difficult question to answer because when you are controlling in
131 such a situation you have to understand what knowledge you are receiving. Is it gossip, is it
132 speculation, or is it fact? And this is where we look at many different sources of that
133 knowledge and where it is coming from. Sometimes we can see websites that you can look at
134 the international or travel advisories. Sometimes it’s looking at online media websites
135 whether it’s English language newspapers or the Thai language newspapers, just to see
136 updates of the situation as it is happening in or around the city. This is sometimes when you
137 get the most immediate information. It’s logging on to one of the newspapers and so
138 unfortunately sometimes we found that the accuracy of that information has not been correct
139 either. So, it’s really important to be careful when making your decision to select which
140 information you know is the most accurate. For us also, there were some different.. .let’s say
141 “on the ground” kind of people and as such their “knowledge” could be labelled as gossip.
142 But, these days with technology and so on when something’s up people are SMS-ing you
143 photographs of a particular situation and in that particular part of the city it gives you
144 immediate and instant facts by which you can make your plan or make your decisions as
145 required. One thing, from all the different crises that had been through this country, is that
146 it’s very difficult to have a centralized source of information. Also, for the facts you need to
147 allow you to make the best decisions. So, as an individual operator we have to select which
148 source is reliable; which source can be trusted; and then make decisions accordingly.
149 Interviewer: How about let’s talk about flooding and the government or the policymakers.
150 Did they provide any source of information that helped? No?—not at all? (Laughing)
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151 Interviewee: As a business operator the central control was lacking for our government
152 perspective and it got confused in the politics and grand standing. There was actually
153 nobody who actually said “we’re the judge, and this is how it’s going to go.” The flood
154 committee, whatever it is called—FROC, I think—was set up established way too late for the
155 situation. By the time they established it, the city was under threat already. The fact that their
156 own headquarters got invaded and they had to relocate shows how much coordination and
15 7....how much forethought running the management of that. Then, the government was critical
158 that the people were critical of things that they would be received. Control that should have
159 been there, from the central government that it should provide a better response for the core
160 issues let’s say the core revenue centre of the country. In terms of how to protect their control
161 of Bangkok the fact that it didn’t get there was I think 50% management and 50% good luck.
162 Nobody actually knows how it’s going to go. Control that should have been there from the
163 central government I’d be honest with that. As an individual business owner We were by
164 ourselves and we had to control, manage, and coordinate our situation based upon all of these
165 information sources that we could obtain but my best resource to make decisions was simply
166 not in what the government brought in time Information from the government or the tourism
167 authority that was actually relevant I think would help a lot.
168 Interviewer: Exactly, So you said that it would be better for you to make decisions if the
169 central government or other source of a central information is not quite up-to-date and not
170 providing accurate information.
171 Interviewee: Absolutely, but the source of it needs to be reliable. It will need to be
172 nonaligned to any political process it would just need to be somewhere else.
173 Interviewer: Real facts.
174 Interviewee: Yes
175 Interviewer: And then during the crisis you obtain many sources of information and also
176 some direction from your headquarters. So, how do you manage this information, this
177 knowledge? How do you store it in order to later retrieve it to make decisions?
178 Interviewee: Um... again, with the wonders of technology these days, it is very easy to
179 receive information and file it as required. Internally, we were meeting twice a day with our
180 flood management committee we shared what resource we had and this is where it’s quite
181 remarkable how much contradictory information was out there that someone comes with
182 news from one source, someone who had come with news from a completely different
183 source, and telling completely different things. We stored everything and very easy now you
184 receive it in email, receive it on your phone. You can store that to the driver to some extent
185 to this day. I still have a flood file in my Outlook that I can refer to as a reference if need be
186 so we keep the flood file open. It’s always there in standby.
187 Interviewer: Well, when we talk about knowledge there is also something that in the people
188 the experience, the skills that they have gets imported into that situation and people tend to go
189 and especially in hotel industry there is a high turnover. What is your idea about how their
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190 knowledge is to be used in the hotel even though they have left? You understand the
191 question? Because the people who are working during the crisis day, if they were dealing
192 with the crisis they got the skills, they have hands-on experience. Then probably later this
193 event, the flood, or any crisis might happen and these people are not here anymore so the
194 experience and the skill would be gone with them. What would be the way that you think
195 you can collect the knowledge from them? So that this knowledge of handling the crisis can
.196 still be with her, even for you in your case as the generalmanager you have establish many
197 action plans—your skill, the knowledge, and how does it stay in the hotel?
198 Interviewee: Great question because it’s true there’s a lot of turnover and different situations
199 would have different outcomes with different people that type in there. It’s difficult to
200 answer because there’s so much to plan and prepare for. There’s some things you cannot and
201 that’s the hot pot. I would say that one pot of knowledge to remain is affecting the flood
202 procedure manual that we for this hotel. Such a manual that is in place in the event that the
203 situation repeats if that someone moved on or all of the executive team that were there
204 moved on I would hope that the supposedly one-[in-charge has the sense to use that as a
205 guideline. Let’s say ok this is what happened in Bangkok in this location before. Let’s have a
206 look at what they did in the past. I think one thing that I have seen that has always been
207 focused on is in fact having their operating procedure that will be there in the event of such
208 situation again. I couldn’t confidently say that because of the flood situation, or confidently
209 say that because of the civil unrest situation, or also because of the tsunami situation. Each of
210 the locations is always uprising at those times under each dramatic crisis as we say. We will
211 able to then formulate or implement a proper strategy, a proper working document that could
212 be used with a checklist and the operating procedure, or a response manual. But, if it will
213 happen again this is what we do. Um... sorry...in the flood situation it is interesting because
214 those during the process when carrying out the contingency plan and everything else I do
215 refer back to my tsunami manual in case, just to make sure I didn’t forget anything; or, if
216 there’s anything that would be different, anything that we might add just to make it better.
217 And, sure, there is that staff turnover, but the people that you recruit probably would had
218 some experience as well so, yes, you integrate the process that was set up about that time but
219 you also obtain knowledge each time as well by reason of emergency training at the hotel
220 covering normal fire building evacuation and some other security processes as well. Don’t
221 really want to go into detail for a flood for that, however, we had systems behind the scenes if
222 you like—if we need them.
223 Interviewer: Ok and about the knowledge, what is the method that you share your knowledge
224 among internal staff in the organization? What is the method of sharing the knowledge?
225 Interviewee: During the situation, or generally?
226 Interviewer: Yes, generally.
227 M: Generally, it would be that on-going training that we had. We had a training manager,
228 the human resource development officer who does a monthly calendar of many different
229 things, some of it was related, some of it languages related, and so on. But, of course, some
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230 of it is security and safety related as well. So, in comes regular training in terms of updating
231 staff, one would that would be good for any hotel operation, for building fire drills. This is
232 where we focus a lot of our energy. This manager will also be getting back to us with first-aid
233 training for CPR to look after our guests. I suppose a lot of new threats are almost
234 predictable. Chances of the tsunami on September 22 repeating are limited so it doesn’t
235 become a priority in the training schemes. In the use of orientation trainings we teach people
236 in the. event of an emergency situation. Yes, the hotel had somewhat of a flooding plan.
237 This is where you get information from and it goes back to lots of staff, of course, for
238 departmental briefing.
239 Interviewer: And as you mentioned during crisis, what would be the appropriate method of
240 sharing information to make decisions, to make sure that everyone gets that same single
241 message?
242 Interviewee: Yeah. In the hotel, the best channel? We channel through the internet to the
243 website. They will take it and then train the staff. And again the wonders of technology. So
244 many people have mobile devices and mobile phones, so for us we have a system to
245 broadcast SMS that we can actually send instant information to our staff if we need to. This
246 is one source of information we can share. The other one comes back to the old-fashioned
247 notice board where we can just print off the information put in the lobby; put in the back of
248 passing areas; and go around sending it to people so that they will know the old memo
249 format. At least the information is getting there; obviously, email is there as well. Email is
250 only relevant if you are sitting at your computer or devices link to an email address so this is
251 why SMS was more reliable for us, because not everyone is connected to an email server on
252 their phone or any device. So, SMS, email, and notice boards would be the main points of
253 information sharing. In a real crisis, like an ultimate emergency, we also refer to public
254 address system throughout the hotel that people are to relocate to an emergency room, in the
255 voice command that screams to the guest. If it’s not an absolute emergency situation, this
256 method tends to actually create more alarm than it does to comfort people, so only in an
257 ultimate situation will we consider that.
258 Interviewer: And, in all these processes, do you think that knowledge management would
259 help the organization, or you, to handle tourism crisis more effectively?
260 Interviewee: Inside the property? Absolutely.
261 Interviewer: So, what should have been done, or in the future what else should be added or
262 done better in order to handle crisis situations?
263 Interviewee: Inside the hotel? I’m not sure what we could have done differently. When the
264 situation is over we all sat together, maybe we did a debriefing. We went through what was
265 good and what was bad—there wasn’t so much that was bad. I think for us just to review the
266 flood situation for us. We didn’t go live into a phase 4 of the action plan. We had it in teams
267 and phase 4 was ultimately the flood waters arriving from that so we don’t know what could
268 have been done differently. Up to the level we did get into we were confident that we did
269 everything we could have done and there weren’t any major complains; there wasn’t any
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270 mass panic in the hotel and we were running at very high occupancy at that stage. It was near
271 full in the hotel so looking back I would say that we successfully managed the situation to the
272 level it got to. If the situation had gotten worst I don’t know. This is kind of speculation.
273 We had to look back at it separately.
274 Interviewer: Well, you firstly mentioned at the beginning that it seemed that you had to
275 operate everything alone as a hotel with less help from outsiders. Do you think that the
276 association related to tourism and policymaker related to tourism would have been heîpfüï if
277 they were to participate or provide help to the hotel? What are you looking for in terms of
278 their help, and in what aspects?
279 Interviewee: I think information is key for that one and for me to speak in authority for
280 assistance during the emergency, it wouldn’t be a tourism authority it would be the fire
281 brigade that stand in the road, army or police if we needed helicopters, and like that.
282 Information source whether from the hotel association or tourism authority of Thailand ...is
283 out of date and not timely in transferring information, they were sending out information, it
284 was very slow, it was very late in coming and we receive something coming that we knew it
285 was finished two days ago I’m sorry were two days late now so the timing of the message
286 that’s coming out and this is something too that the guest would actually look for is not just
287 the letterhead saying this is the situation. If there was reassurance from the government or
288 the tourism authority that was actually factual and relevant, I think it would help us a lot.
289 Documents and emails from those authority are in Thai. Especially emails cc to many people,
290 It is difficult to know which one is one is important. Ads? What is the purpose of that
291 document? If I think that the email is important then I will ask my secretary to tell me.
292 Interviewer: Ok, we now come to the last question we had been discussing about the
293 knowledge management process starting for finding the source of information collecting and
294 also sharing with concerned people. You also say that knowledge is quite important for
295 handling tourism crisis so I have three factors to ask you about. Which one do you think is
296 the most related to the success of knowledge management of tourism crisis? The first one is
297 human resources; second one is technologies, and the third one is policy support from the
298 board, or the owner we say. You might also provide me some other factors if it’s related to
299 you, or think it’s important to facilitate, or...?
300 Interviewee: Yes. Human resources technology and policy—are they all important? The
301 difficult part is to specify which one is the main priority. Oh...this is the flow in the hotel
302 industry and it is people. You really need to have the people—the right people—to support you
303 and also you need to have the right message to the people during a crisis situation. Human
304 resource could be your extra little staff; could be the people in your hotel; and everybody
305 becomes the human resource at the stage just at the flooding. As well, we look at Jiadda I
306 guess. We had some people here that we have from overseas military. Again, that could be
307 human resource. We actually spoke to their group leader. We said, “Ah, this is our situation;
308 if it escalates what support do you need and what support can you give?” That was kind of
309 interesting. Technology I would say is important to communications. I don’t think of any
310 crisis that there’s any specific technology that you could say I need to have you know this
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311 element of technology but in terms of instant communication like we mentioned about
312 mobile phones, SMS, and so on—and that was technologies—it is critical to get that
313 information at the right time. Clarity of information is critical to eliminate panic, eliminate
314 speculation and also to ensure that there is a central message so that it’s not collaterally
315 responding to what you say or creating uncertainty because they think they knew what was
316 going on so there’s a direct message from a source that is reliable whether it be from my
31 7__ office or whether it be from outside it— that says ‘this is the situation, at least you can stop .
318 gossip, stop uncertainty and maintain calm and control of the situation. It’s particularly
319 important here, you know: 1200 guests’ rooms. So, potentially there’s double that in terms of
320 2400 guests plus over 800 staff. When you have 3, let’s say 3 to 4 thousand people, if the
321 restaurant is fully operating in one environment that could become an enclosed environment.
322 Very important that there are not factions that are responding to different media or different
323 intelligence that’s coming through. Everybody should be listening to the same message. This
324 is why technology is very important. Policy is important, as this is just a hotel policy, you
325 know. Very important that if we make a plan you stick to the plan because anybody else
326 knows what’s going on as well. Quite often you see there is the plan, but someone else
327 would do differently. The plan doesn’t work and the rest of the process cannot be completed
328 because that element of the plan wasn’t included. So, actually having the policies is very
329 important, even more important to make sure that the policies are all correct. This is the way
330 a checklist comes in handy, in terms of any crisis situation, in terms of the centralized policy
331 from the government authority. Of course it would be beneficial because again importance of
332 that coordinated response to any crisis rather than reactive immediate response. This is
333 happening, therefore we do this then generally it’s too late and unfortunately we have seen
334 that not just in Thailand, too. You look at the U.S. and the various hurricanes and
335 emergencies and so on there are also mismanaged. All because there was incorrect policy in
336 terms of who should respond and how they had to respond. At the end of the day people
337 suffered unnecessarily so policies are all important as well all factors that had played an
338 important part. So, I wouldn’t discard any of them.
339 Interviewer: Thank you very much.
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